

The Constitution of Japan and Democracy in the COVID-19 Era

Akihiro Kawakami

1. Emergence of the novel coronavirus and the crisis of democracy

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has been spreading throughout the world. The fact that the virus is invisible amplifies people's anxiety.

In these circumstances, people may feel too insecure about their own wellbeing to think of politics and issues of public concern, and feel that the act of thinking itself is a burden. At times like this, people want to entrust everything to a strong leader. Recent years have seen the rapid emergence of authoritarian or populist leaders. The COVID-19 pandemic seems to be accelerating this dangerous trend.

Which is more important—freedom or security? This is a problem that has been discussed since the old days, but the fear of coronavirus can bring about excessive restrictions on freedom in the name of security. With regard to personal information, moreover, governments may collect and use personal data and location history using a smartphone app—even worse, such big data, combined with artificial intelligence (AI), may be used to identify potential criminals or generate each individual's personal credit score, eventually leading to unfair discrimination or social exclusion.

In the future, governments may be unwilling to give up the ultimate authority they have obtained during the crisis and exceptional situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. The public may also be willing to accept mass surveillance and government control to escape from fear and become insensitive to excessive restrictions on freedom. This creates a "state of emergency" that shakes the very foundations of democracy.

2. COVID-19 and constitutional rights

Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates the right to life and the right of people to be respected as individuals. Article 25 states that all people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living, and requires the government to promote and extend public health, etc...

The spread of COVID-19 infections poses a grave risk to the lives and health of the people, which can be treated similarly to a natural disaster from the standpoint of the law. Minimum restrictions exceptionally placed on the freedom of movement and business may be allowed for the sake of public welfare, as set forth in the Constitution—although unlimited restrictions cannot be allowed.

Rather, the problem is that the people's right to life and health has not been guaranteed in terms of medical care, due to a poor PCR testing system for patients (including asymptomatic carriers and those with minor symptoms) and the government's medical expenditure reduction policy.

Moreover, the national government has called on people to refrain from leaving home or moving around and on businesses to refrain from operating without adequately providing compensation. The government's requests for voluntary restraint have been acting virtually as a compulsory measure through pressure to conform. However, if the government implements a policy of allowing the people to exercise self-control at their own discretion without providing any compensation, some people will continue to operate their business or attend work in

order to make a living, thereby further spreading the coronavirus and eventually leading to more business failures and economic poverty. The government needs to understand that compensation will be an effective infection prevention measure and recognize that as a result of the recent neoliberal policies that have brought about an enormous number of non-regular employees and a larger wealth gap in society, there are many people who would have no home or food if they were unable to work. It is important to take measures from the perspective that "without compensation, there will be no voluntary restraints."

It is also an urgent matter to design measures to provide support to cultural and artistic institutions guaranteeing the right to maintain the minimum standards of cultured living, as enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan, and to ensure quality and affordable education, and guaranteeing the right to receive an equal education, as enshrined in Article 26 of the Constitution.

3. Whether it is necessary to introduce the provision regarding National Emergencies into the Constitution of Japan

Some politicians of the ruling party emphasize the importance of revising the Constitution to create a provision for dealing with national emergencies, saying that a state of emergency as declared under current Japanese law is not sufficient in responding to emergency situations. This means that it would be possible for the prime minister and the administration to suspend the Constitution and concentrate power into their own hands to fully and comprehensively limit citizens' liberty and human rights (often without any compensation).

Such power belonging to the state could be easily used for an unjustifiable purpose, and the period in which it would be used could be limitlessly extended. It would make it difficult for other state organs, including judicial organs or even the people with whom resides sovereign power, to determine the appropriateness or legality of the use of such state power and limit or stop the exercise of authority. Restrictions on freedom of the press and speech would deprive the people of opportunities to criticize.

Instead, we need to consider how the principles of the Constitution can be fully implemented within its present scope to ensure that human rights are guaranteed. When a voluntary ban or restrictions are imposed on movements or businesses, they should be implemented as an exceptional and minimal measure to safeguard the life and health of people, based on expert evidence and follow-up review, and they should also be accompanied by compensation.

In an era when anyone could become underprivileged or fall victim to the virus, it is necessary to think about how the most vulnerable people can be saved, rather than placing priority on state sovereignty or considering the law of the jungle or the issue of segmentation and isolation. The Constitution requires the state and its people to achieve a society and politics that respects individuals and enables them to work together and pressure the government if necessary, rather than a society and politics that sacrifices certain people for the benefit of the public. I believe that the principle of Articles 13 and 25 of the Constitution of Japan is that no one should be ill-treated.

(Associate Professor at HPI)

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COVID-19 and the Korean Peninsula

Hyun Jin Son

The first cases of the novel coronavirus infection (COVID-19) were reported in Wuhan, China on December 31, 2019. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), as of July 2020, outbreaks of the novel coronavirus have occurred in 216 countries and regions in the world, resulting in 11,125,245 infected persons and 528,204 deaths. On March 11, 2020, the WHO declared these novel coronavirus outbreaks a global pandemic. With no vaccines or medications developed yet, the infection has been spreading around the world at a furious speed, pushing many countries to take various measures including the closure of borders.

The Korean Peninsula, which shares a border with China, has also been facing the COVID-19 pandemic. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) began to take measures to prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus by closing the country's border with China at an early stage, and by completely blocking the entry of tourists on January 22, 2020. Moreover, the North Korean authorities took emergency steps to prevent the COVID-19 pandemic from occurring within the country, and transformed the "health and epidemic prevention system" into a "national emergency epidemic prevention system" (*Labor* newspaper, January 30, 2020). The North Korean government announced that there had been no infected persons up to the present since the border closure to block the entry or departure of tourists and foreigners (Korean Central News Agency, April 3, 2020). According to North Korea's Ministry of Public Health, the testing of 922 persons for coronavirus was conducted, but all of them showed a negative result.

At the July 2 Politburo Expanded Conference, Chairman Kim Jong-un said that the country had blocked the virus from making inroads and had maintained a stable quarantine situation, and he highly evaluated the national emergency epidemic prevention system, referring to this result as "pleasing." However, it is difficult to confirm this announcement by the North Korean authorities because of the country's complete blockade of information from outside and its closed nature.

According to the WHO, all patients with suspected infections in North Korea have been isolated in designated hospitals, and relief supplies, such as diagnostic kits for coronavirus and personal protective equipment, have already been sent to the country. A Weekly Report by North Korea's Ministry of Public Health revealed that as of July 2020, 225 patients have been placed in quarantine, with a total of 25,551 people released from quarantine, according to a WHO official in Pyongyang.

South Korea's measures against novel coronavirus infections have been widely praised, attracting attention from around the world as an example of success. On January 20, 2020, the first case of infection in the country was confirmed, and COVID-19 spread quickly to many members of a specific religious group and local communities. However, the South Korean government's prompt action and social distancing recommendations successfully reduced the growth in the number of infections. Since then, the authorities have effectively controlled the spread of COVID-19. As of July 2020, the total number of infections amounted to 13,612, with 291 deaths. The country's coronavirus mortality rate stood at 2.4%.

On February 23, 2020, the South Korean government raised its alert on COVID-19 to the highest level, and set up a central disaster and safety measures headquarters, headed by the prime

minister, in order to respond to the spread of coronavirus infections at the national level. On February 26, the National Assembly passed partial revisions of the Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Act, the Quarantine Act and the Medical Service Act, which have been dubbed the "three COVID-19 acts."

The revisions to these acts have allowed city mayors, divisional chiefs and ward mayors to staff quarantine officers and epidemiological investigators as necessary, and also enabled an increase in the number of epidemiological investigators belonging to the Ministry of Health and Welfare from 30 or more to 100 or more. In addition, the scope of the persons whom the Minister of Health and Welfare can order the Minister of Justice to ban or stop from entering or departing the country has been expanded to include persons exposed to risk of infection and persons entering the country from or via quarantine control areas.

To prevent the further spread of COVID-19 in the country, the South Korean government gave the highest priority to identifying infected persons early, discovered many infected people through selective clinic screening, and provided immediate treatment. By April 2020, the maximum number of PCR tests that could be done per day had increased to approximately 200,000, and by June, the cumulative number of PCR tests done had reached 1.4 million.

Once an infection is discovered, the central and local governments identify the source by promptly conducting an infection route survey, and take necessary measures to prevent the spread of the infection, including the isolation of people who have been in contact with infected persons. To collect data to more quickly determine the route of infection, the authorities grasp the movements of infected persons and obtain basic information on those who have been in contact with infected persons by conducting interviews with the infected persons. If necessary, they use location information on cell phones, CCTV (security cameras), and credit card usage history. The collected information on infected persons is made public on local government websites and managed effectively through mobile phones apps. According to foreign news reports, South Korea's successful response to COVID-19 can be attributed to the swift action taken by the government, extensive PCR tests, the tracing of infected people, and cooperation from citizens. Within the country, however, some people claim that these measures have infringed on individual freedom, human rights, and privacy.

As shown by the many cases of COVID-19, the disease poses a significant threat to human beings beyond national borders and race. The spread of an infectious disease can not only threaten the lives and safety of individuals, but also threaten the existence of a community.

In North Korea, even though only a few infected people have been reported there are likely many more, although it is difficult to get accurate information. Due to an undeveloped health and medical system and insufficient supplies of pharmaceuticals, the country has a high rate of death from infectious disease. Accordingly, it is necessary for both North and South Korea to work together to prevent the spread of infection and take necessary measures, including treatment of the infection.

(Associate Professor at HPI)

COVID-19 in China

Xianfen Xu

The outbreak of the novel coronavirus infection (COVID-19) at the end of 2019 has brought about calamity throughout the world. The coronavirus, that is invisible to the naked eye, has claimed large numbers of lives and forced people to avoid human-to-human contact, thereby bringing about drastic changes to people's lifestyles. The initial cases of COVID-19 were confirmed in Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei Province in China. This paper presents the infection status of China, the Chinese model for infection control, and international discussions on these topics.

1. From First Case Report to Pandemic

The first case of COVID-19 was reported in China. The novel coronavirus infection identified at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan on December 8, 2019 made headlines around the world. On December 20, the human-to-human spread of the virus was confirmed. On January 23, 2020, the Chinese government locked down Wuhan, a city with over 10 million residents. China's strategy to contain the virus continued for 77 days until April 8, when the lockdown was lifted.

For the first one month since the outbreak of COVID-19, fear of an unknown virus, a tragic atmosphere and tension filled the city, which saw overwhelmed hospitals, the infection and resulting death of doctors, a 10-day rush job of constructing the two medical facilities of Huoshenshan Hospital and Leishenshan Hospital, the establishment of Fang Cang Hospital which is an emergency container hospital, and the arrival of medical teams from around the country (as if they were heading to a battlefield).

In late March, the COVID-19 pandemic finally started to come to an end, with a return to everyday life. On June 7, the Chinese Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department released a white paper titled "China's Action to Overcome Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia," declaring victory over the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 11, locally transmitted novel coronavirus infections were confirmed at a major wholesale agricultural market in the capital city of Beijing. On July 6, the situation settled down, with no new infections reported. China, the epicenter of the novel coronavirus outbreak, has almost succeeded in containing the COVID-19. According to statistics, the daily number of cases of new infections continues to be in the single or double digits, most of which are infected persons from abroad.

Looking at the world, many countries started to face the COVID-19 from around March 2020, when the situation was under control in Wuhan. COVID-19 was confirmed in 215 countries and regions. A tally by Johns Hopkins University in the US on June 29, 2020 showed that the total of infectious cases had surpassed 10 million, with the US, Brazil, Russia, India, and the UK ranking high on the list, and with China coming in 21st with 84,757 cases. The global death toll from the novel coronavirus has now topped 500,000. The US, Brazil, the UK, Italy and France rank high on the list, while China comes in 19th with 4,641 deaths.

2. Chinese Model for Infection Control

What are the characteristics of the Chinese model for infection control? Put simply, the model relies on compulsion. Persons confirmed to be infected are isolated, and those who have been in contact with infected persons are identified and isolated. Also, relevant places (e.g., workplaces, residential areas/cities) are locked down, with the imposition of a total ban on entering or leaving such places. In the early period of the COVID-19 pandemic (February to March), the traffic of people

and goods between villages was blocked. The Chinese government has implemented these isolation, lockdown, and blocking measures in a coercive manner.

Medical teams were sent to Wuhan from around the country, and the medical units of the People's Liberation Army were mobilized. Under the "one province for one city" scheme launched by the government, the 19 provinces (direct-controlled municipalities, provinces, and autonomous regions) of the nation provided medical force support to the 16 areas of Hubei Province in order to complement the nation's medical care system.

To prevent the coronavirus from being brought back from other countries, restrictions were imposed on international flights. Each air carrier was allowed to operate only one flight a week to each destination.

In a society in which the public interest comes before anything else, freedom of the individual means the freedom allowed only under the established public order. Decisions made by the central government are conveyed to local governments in a top-down fashion, thereby enabling the rapid implementation of measures. Responding with a sense of speed is possible by means of a heavy fist and restrictions on freedoms. The development and practical use of IT-based systems to track people infected with the coronavirus has contributed to further enhancement of the government's execution capability.

The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic throughout the world has led to debate over the relative merits of the political regimes of individual countries. There are voices saying that China's regime is superior to those of other countries.

3. Points of Argument from a Global Perspective

The international community has been turning a stern eye on the measures taken by the Chinese government to prevent and contain the spread of COVID-19. There are three points to the argument. The first point is skepticism about whether China has been totally transparent regarding the reality of COVID-19. The second is a dispute over the source of the coronavirus outbreak and growing calls for China to be held accountable for COVID-19. Regarding these two matters, the Chinese government countered with the issuance of the aforementioned white paper on the COVID-19 fight.

The third point of the argument is whether the US-led movement to break away from dependence on China in the global economy has accelerated or whether a new international supply network can be established under the initiative of the US. The recent deterioration of US-China relations has made these matters more complicated.

Amid growing concerns about and distrust of China in the international community, the Chinese government will be urged to respond sincerely to such issues.

Conclusion

The world has not yet seen the end of the COVID-19 pandemic—even how things are going to turn out in the future. Despite the initial expectation that seasonal climate changes and rising temperatures would help contain the spread of the COVID-19, there seems to be no end in sight. We may need to be prepared to live with the coronavirus for a long time, rather than temporarily. This unknown virus holds many mysteries, but one thing is clear: Now is the time to work together to confront this global crisis, rather than following a path toward division in the world.

(Associate Professor at HPI)

The Trump Phenomenon and a Canary in a Coal Mine

Gen Kikkawa

The Trump phenomenon, which advocates a “me-first” policy for America and undermines efforts toward multilateralism, has been spreading throughout the world. Four years ago, when Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, it was considered by most people to be an “unexpected result.” However, the world has recently seen the emergence of many “little Trumps” around the world, including Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Brazil President Jair Bolsonaro, and Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban. In many Western countries, which had once pledged to support multiculturalism and had shown tolerance in accepting immigrants, anti-immigrant movements, racial discrimination, and the persecution of minorities have been spreading, leading to the rise of far-right political parties that advocate withdrawal from the EU.

The Trump phenomenon is not likely to be a temporary phenomenon and end any time soon. Instead, the world political situation today is remarkably similar to that of the 1930s. In the 1920s, after the First World War, many countries in the world, under the initiative of the League of Nations, came to place a premium on the principle of international cooperation and were working together toward the creation of international peace. In the 1930s, however, a number of big Trumps appeared who adhered to “my country-first” policies—as represented by Benito Mussolini, the Italian political leader who created Fascism, Adolf Hitler, the German political leader who advocated Nazism, and Joseph Stalin, the Soviet political leader who put forth the theory of “socialism in a single country.” As a result, many countries moved toward dictatorship, and the world entered another world war.

In “Conditions of Peace” (1942), a work he wrote during the Second World War, the British historian E.H. Carr argued that the three ideologies of liberal democracy, self-determination of nations/nationalism, and laissez-faire, all of which date back to the 19th century and served as the ideological foundation of the international community in Europe, stood squarely against the newly emerging revolutionary ideologies, eventually leading to the start of another world war. Liberal democracy faced the challenge of Marxism-Leninism, which gained momentum through the Russian Revolution, and then the challenge of Fascism and Nazism. The self-determination of nations/nationalism was challenged by communism/internationalism, which was followed by Nazi Germany’s attempt to unify Europe. Laissez-faire faced challenges from the Great Depression which led to the formation of exclusionary economic blocs, and the communist planned economy. In their final phase, such confrontations between Europe’s traditional ideologies and newly emerging revolutionary ideologies reached their climax at the Second World War.

Failure of the principle of international cooperation began in eastern and central Europe, where there are many multiethnic nations. In those countries, little progress was being made in fostering the unity of the people, making their governance bases weaker. The spread of communist ideology from the eastern part of the European continent encouraged multiethnic nations to move toward dictatorship, diminishing freedom and increasing the oppression of ethnic minorities. They then withdrew from the international regime that had originally been established to protect ethnic minorities and prevent the rise of ethnic disputes. Latecomer “have-not” nations (or resource-poor countries) also followed the same fate. The failure of laissez-faire due to the division of the world economy into blocs

in the wake of the Great Depression made the size of territories and resources a crucial element of the international power game.

Although Japan wanted to embark on establishing colonies overseas in an attempt to ensure inexpensive resources and labor, territories around the world had already been divided up by the European powers. As a result, Japan turned its back on the principle of international cooperation, withdrew from the League of Nations, and found a new way to invade China. Meanwhile, the Nazi government in Germany—whose economy was in a dire situation, with 6 million people unemployed, due to severe pressure to pay war reparations and the impact of the World Depression—started to turn to a territorial expansion policy under the excuse of expanding its “living space.”

With growing tension in international relations and widespread authoritarianism, the issue of national security began to come to the fore, particularly in response to antigovernment forces that joined hands with forces with opposing ideologies to threaten the framework of nations. Japan and Germany moved vigorously to establish a closer relationship with each other and concluded the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact to work together to counter a common ideological threat (*Comintern*). Meanwhile, ethnic minorities, who it was thought may help those from the same ethnic background invade the nation, were regarded as a threat that could undermine the oneness of the people and territorial integrity. To strengthen the governing legitimacy, it was necessary to boost national prestige and enhance nationalism. As a means to do so, historical issues were unearthed and fueled, thereby leading to territorial conflicts.

Within nations, racial discrimination and immigration clampdowns became widespread, thereby accelerating the persecution of minorities. In 1937 and 1938, on the eve of the war, for example, those of German descent, Polish descent, Finnish descent, or Baltic descent living in the international city of Leningrad—who were all regarded as “hostile ethnic groups” because they had “historical homelands”—were forced into exile. Moreover, 170,000 Korean people living in the Far East were forced to move to Kazakhstan, for fear that they might hold secret communication with Japanese people. Under a cloud of war, ethnic minorities facing such a plight are nothing less than a canary in a coal mine crying out in a quest for global peace and order.

Today, territorial disputes often occur around the world, throwing a spotlight on historical issues. International conflicts are escalating over the destruction of the natural environment and water resources, and desertification is accelerating around the world. The annual loss due to desertification equals the combined area of Kyushu and Shikoku islands in Japan. Despite the increase in world population by 80 million per year, there is little hope for increasing the production of food, causing the gap between the rich and the poor to increasingly widen in the international community. The world today has seen the refusal to accept refugees, the proliferation of authoritarian states, suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the oppression of minorities, and the spread of racial discrimination. In the post-COVID-19 era, a worldwide economic recession and rising unemployment will spur on individual countries’ “me-first” policies. There is an urgent need to exercise wisdom and come up with measures for the recovery of the principle of international cooperation and the building of a global civil society.

(Specially Appointed Professor at HPI)

The Ethnic Peace Process in Myanmar

Narayanan Ganesan

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Southeast Asia has one of the longest running civil wars in Southeast Asia. They started in 1949 just a year after the country achieved its political independence from Britain when it used to be called Burma. The civil wars are a function of the unhappiness of ethnic minorities in the country who predominantly live in the peripheral and highland areas of the country. They felt oppressed and persecuted by the country's Bamar ethnic majority and took up arms against the state and its government. Since the post-independence government was weak and had limited capacity it was unable to defeat the ethnic insurgencies and consolidate territorial control over the entire country.

Developments arising from democratization

The partially democratic elected government of President Thein Sein attempted to bring some 16 ethnic armed groups within a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015. However, it was only able to persuade 8 out of the 16 groups to do so. There were another 5 groups that the government and military refused to deal with since they were regarded as newly formed and lacking legitimacy. When the National League for Democracy (NLD) government led by Aung San Suu Kyi won the election in November 2015 it continued the process of dialogue with the armed groups and regarded the achievement of internal peace as the most important agenda item for itself. The government's term is due to expire soon but it has managed to persuade 2 more groups to join the NCA. The remaining groups have refused to do so and formed a new organization called the Northern Alliance in late 2016 that is nominally led by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Many of the fighters from this largest ethnic army that has a troop strength of 30,000 and an auxiliary army of another 10,000 were previously from the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) that collapsed in 1989.

Recent developments and China's growing involvement

The Northern Alliance has declared its unwillingness to sign on to the terms of the NCA and has instead offered its own version of a ceasefire agreement. Both the current government and the military have thus far refused to go along with changes to the NCA. In fact, the disagreement between the two parties is so strong that they often quibble even over where to meet for peace talks. The Northern Alliance tends to prefer Kunming in China while the Myanmar government and military typically favour a venue within Myanmar. Since 2016 China has taken an active interest in brokering peace between the two parties, a development that is not always liked by the Myanmar military since sovereign issues are at

stake. But the groups in the Northern Alliance come predominantly from the Northern Shan and Kachin states that have long had political and economic linkages with China and Yunnan province in particular.

Within this Northern Alliance is a smaller subset group called the Brotherhood Alliance that brings together 4 organizations. The largest among them is the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA). This group had a previous bilateral ceasefire agreement with the military that broke down in 2011 and since then has been involved in major fighting with the military. The areas that the KIO controls include areas that are rich in gems like jade and amber that the military is keen to wrest control of. The remaining 3 groups that often act in concert against the military are the Arakan Army (AA- Rakhine ethnic group), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA - Kokang ethnic group) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA - Palaung ethnic group). The military is especially furious with these groups for their brazen attacks on towns along the Myanmar-China border like Muse since 2016. Consequently, the military has been rather unwilling to negotiate with these groups and has in the past demanded an unconditional surrender first. While both the military and the members of the Brotherhood Alliance have declared unilateral ceasefires in the past, the fighting continues unabated. The government is not always able to control the military that remains relatively independent.

Significantly increased fighting in Rakhine and Chin states

Since late 2019 the fighting has been especially severe in Chin and Arakan states in the west of the country as the AA attempts to obtain a foothold in these areas. Traditionally, it was headquartered in Laiza in Kachin state in the north and supported by the KIO. However, it has recently attempted to enlarge its footprint to include ethnic areas that it claims to represent. The military on the other hand is unprepared to allow such an expansion of the group's presence and has fought pitched battles that have led to heavy casualties on both sides. Arising from this intense fighting there are now well over 100,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Rakhine state alone with about 6,000 more in Chin state. These IDPs are over and above the more than 100,000 similar persons in Kachin state and the 140,000 Muslim IDPs in Rakhine state that were displaced by the political violence against the community in 2012. And if the civil conflicts are traced further back there are still more than 90,000 primarily Karen refugees in Thailand that have been there for the last three decades.

Impact on Myanmar's international relations

Of more recent vintage is the 730,000 Muslim refugees that have streamed into Bangladesh from the military's clearance operations in 2017. As a result of these developments Myanmar's bilateral relations with Bangladesh and Thailand have been strained. Similarly, relations with Malaysia in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also been strained. Malaysia currently shelters more than 100,000 Myanmar Muslim Rohingya refugees under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Additionally, large numbers of refugees regularly attempt to flee the refugee camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar to more hospitable neighbouring countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Consequently, this seemingly internal conflict has had major reverberations in

the region.

The Myanmar government has just now reached an agreement to hold the 4th Panglong Peace Conference in July 2020 with signatories to the NCA after the conference was postponed in 2019 over disagreements involving issues related to a new federal form of government and the future composition of the national army. The government is also hoping to woo the non-signatories and in particular the KIO and the UWSA to join the meeting. It remains to be seen whether greater progress will result from the forthcoming meeting and how the situation will evolve after the November 2020 national elections. Japan is involved in assisting the peace process and IDPs through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Nippon Foundation.

(Professor at HPI)

Sharing the Pleasant News of Receiving an Award

Takumi Kosugi

I am very pleased to inform you that my paper titled, "*A Study on the Legitimacy of the Annexation of Crimea into Russia: Focusing on the Theory of International Law and Linguistic Human Rights*," was granted the Award for Excellence of the 7th Shigeru Oda Award hosted by the Japanese Society of International Law.

This paper, a revised version of my undergraduate thesis, attempts to answer the question: Is there no room to support Russia's legal claim over its annexation of Crimea in 2014? Chapter 1 examines Russia's claim about the legal defects in the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 based on the then Soviet Constitution. Chapter 2 looks at Russia's argument about the legitimacy of the incorporation of Crimea into Russia based on international law, and Chapter 3 evaluates the logic of Russia's intervention for the sake of protecting its own citizens. I believe that the significance of this paper, as a result of a review of Russia's legal claims, is that it clarifies that part of the claim is compelling.

I believe that I was only able to receive this prestigious award because of the valuable guidance and support provided by many faculty members. I would like to take this opportunity to extend my appreciation to all of them. Special thanks go to Gen Kikkawa, my supervisor and Specially Appointed Professor, and other faculty members of the Hiroshima Peace Institute; Yasuko Tsuru, Professor of the Faculty of Global Studies, Sophia University, who provided guidance in writing my undergraduate thesis; and all of those involved in the operation and selection of the Shigeru Oda Award. This experience will encourage me to devote continued efforts to publishing this award-winning paper and writing my master's thesis. Thank you once again.

(Student in the Graduate School of Peace Studies)



Note:

The Shigeru Oda Award was established in honor of the philanthropy of Dr. Shigeru Oda, who served as a member of the International Court of Justice for 27 years, from 1976 to 2003. Its aim is to promote research in the fields of international law, private international law, international politics and diplomacy, and to foster the development of young researchers who will shoulder responsibility for the future, by making honorable recognition of excellent papers in these fields. The Award for Excellence of the 7th Shigeru Oda Award, which Takumi Kosugi was granted this time, is the highest award to date in the field of international politics and diplomacy.

(Gen Kikkawa, Specially Appointed Professor at HPI)

A New Attempt at Peace Education: Making Peace PR Videos on Smartphones

Kyungjin Ha

1. Challenges Facing Peace Education

In talking about the peace of Hiroshima, the history of war and the inheritance of memories are indispensable. Narratives by A-bomb survivors are an important asset in terms of research and education, in considering the notion of world peace through the tragedy of Hiroshima. Such narratives help provide a glimpse of wartime history to younger generations who have no experience of the Hiroshima of that time, but they do not always serve as a trigger for thinking of peace as an issue for themselves. From the perspective of inheriting the history of Hiroshima and developing new approaches towards peace, discussions cannot be conducted without involving the younger generations who will shoulder the responsibility for society in the future. In this sense, it is a significant challenge for peace education in Hiroshima to mentor younger generations as those responsible for peace in the future. In this article, I would like to focus on the activities launched in the academic year 2019—as part of a series of efforts made from this point of view—under the first-semester intensive program titled “Peace Internship” at the Hiroshima City University.

2. What is New about the Program

The program “Peace Internship” is designed for students to recognize the benefits of peace by visiting peace-related facilities in Hiroshima and having interviews with experts and A-bomb survivors. Since last year, some classes have been replaced with a series of workshops under the concept, “Your PR Campaign for Peace: A One-Minute Video Created with Your Smartphone.”

Through participation in a series of workshops, students are expected to recognize the potential of various ways of thinking about peace, consider the notion of peace for themselves, devise how to express and share their thoughts with more people, and then create a one-minute video using their smartphones.

The newness of this program is found in unexpected combinations as described below.

The first is a combination of peace and PR (“Peace×PR”). Public Relations (PR), a tool that appears far from the notion of peace, is used to raise students’ awareness of becoming the originator of a message of peace, rather than the receiver. In Japan, PR is often perceived mistakenly as an advertising or promotional activity, but it originally meant the relationship-building process, which requires an understanding of the public.

The second is a combination of peace and smartphones (“Peace×Smartphones”). Most participants are first-year or second-year undergraduate students, who are from the digitally native generation, or the generation with a high level of understanding of and heavy dependence on smartphones and tablets. A video, or a video content format familiar to the students, is used to send a message of peace, to provide them with an opportunity to consider the issue of peace as their own, in terms of both notion and expression.

3. All Classes Taught Online: A Challenge mid the COVID-19 Pandemic

The number of participants in the new program increased to 57 students from the previous year. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has forced all classes given under the program, including workshops, to be held online. Usually, each class is about three hours long. For online classes, however, it was necessary to drastically reschedule the class time and content because of major problems resulting from the many hours of internet usage, such as lack of concentration on the part of students, ineffectiveness of learning, and heavy data traffic.

As a result, each class was designed to consist of three parts: (1) one-way communication by the instructor in charge (previous learning),

(2) proactive learning by participants (self-directed learning), and (3) interactive learning between instructors and students (live learning). Prior to a class, the instructor posted documents and materials necessary for previous study (PowerPoint with sound), and based on previous learning, students conducted self-directed learning in the form of worksheets and assignments. In live learning utilizing Zoom (a web-based video conferencing program), the Breakout Room function was used to make group discussions more substantial.

Providing all classes of the program online requires a combination of various e-learning systems. In addition to Zoom, Hiroshima City University’s learning management system “WebClass” was used for communication with participating students, as well as Google Drive, for sharing materials/documents among lecturers, and YouTube (limited access), for sharing the videos created by students and screening videos online.

4. Brief Overview of Each Class

In the first online class (May 23), with Mr. Seiji Horie representing Manabi Kobo as the lecturer, students participated in workshop activities to consider differences in views/opinions over peace in newspaper articles, based on the keyword “gap.” In the second class (May 30), Kyungjin Ha, Associate Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, delivered a lecture concerning the significance of PR, which was followed by a discussion among students on the major features and potential of “PR video” created by local governments as a case study. In the third class (June 6), virtual fieldwork was undertaken with the participation of Ms. Mami Nakatao, a program officer of the tourism policy department of the city of Hiroshima, with the use of digital archives such as “*Hiroshima no Kuhaku (Void of Hiroshima)*” and “Hiroshima Archive.” Based on the three online classes, students wrote their own peace-themed stories and created storyboards. In the fourth class (June 13), students created interim reports, with Yuko Tsuchiya, Associate Professor at the Hiroshima University of Economics, as the facilitator. Following the interim reports, the students created their own videos. In the fifth class (June 27), an online screening was held, which was followed by discussions on the message of peace and the methods of expression in the completed videos. Kazumi Mizumoto, Professor at Hiroshima Peace Institute, responsible for the Peace Internship Program, participated in the operation of all the classes for this program.

5. Future Prospects

It cannot be said that workshops, compared to lectures and seminars, are suitable for online learning. This program faced many restrictions, including the necessity for students to carry out assignments on an individual basis, a shorter time for group discussions, and the inability to shoot new videos due to the government’s voluntary ban on going out. On the other hand, there were some new discoveries. All of the 47 videos created by students were unique, presenting expressive messages of peace and adding a fresh dimension to the manner of expression. Eleven of them are now available to the public on the Hiroshima City University official website.

Finally, I would like to present future prospects. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this program has turned out to be a new and interesting attempt to pursue peace education, which I believe can be a model for a workshop that enables participants beyond national boundaries and cultural differences to discuss world peace online. If young people can step forward from the discussions and start disseminating their own thoughts and ideas on peace, taking full advantage of the benefits of a multimedia society, the circle of peace education will be expanded from Hiroshima throughout the world. I look forward to future developments.

(Associate Professor at HPI)

2019

- ◆ **Dec. 2** Robert Jacobs presents a lecture to United Nations Guides at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, Hiroshima, Japan.
- ◆ **Dec. 6** Kyungjin Ha organizes a public seminar, “The Meaning of the Hiroshima Toyo Carp in Baseball Culture,” as an activity of the HPI Research project, “Preliminary Study on Cultural Reconstruction of Hiroshima,” in which she serves as the principal investigator, held at the Satellite Campus of Hiroshima City University.
- ◆ **Dec. 13** Ryo Oshiba presents a talk on, “Poverty Alleviation and Peace,” at Hiroshima Shudo University (Dept. of International Community).
- ◆ **Dec. 13** Xianfen Xu presents a lecture, “Institutionalization of Japan-China Relations,” at a seminar for students of SOKA University, held at SOKA University.
- ◆ **Dec. 15** Tetsuo Sato gives an outline presentation of the symposium and serves as moderator in the panel discussion in an international symposium titled, “Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons and Crimes Against Humanity,” held by the Hiroshima Peace Institute and others at the International Conference Center Hiroshima.
- ◆ **Dec. 20** Ha presents a lecture, “Let’s PR Your Town,” to the students of Hiroshima Prefectural Kake High School at Akiota, Hiroshima.

2020

- ◆ **Jan. 9** Makiko Takemoto presents a lecture on, “German and Japanese Peace Movements,” at a seminar for students from Kyungpook National University of Korea, held at Hiroshima City University.
- ◆ **Jan. 14** Kazumi Mizumoto attends as committee member the Hiroshima Prefecture’s “Hiroshima Report Drafting Project” meeting organized by and held at the Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology, Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo.
- ◆ **Jan. 15** Ha presents a lecture, “Peace and Media,” to the students from Kyungpook National University of Korea, at HCU.
- ◆ **Jan. 17** Jacobs presents a lecture on, “American Victims of Radiation Exposure,” at the 5th Annual HPI English Language Lecture Series, Hiroshima, Japan.
- ◆ **Jan. 24** Narayana Ganesan presents a lecture on, “Ethnic Peace Process in Myanmar,” at the 5th Annual HPI English Language

Lecture Series, Hiroshima, Japan.

- ◆ **Feb. 7** Ha organizes a public seminar, “Collaboration Project of Hiroshima Toyo Carp and JICA,” as an activity of the HPI Research project “Preliminary Study on Cultural Reconstruction of Hiroshima,” held at the Satellite Campus of Hiroshima City University.
- ◆ **Feb. 13** Gen Kikkawa, Mizumoto and Jacobs present lectures on, “International Security,” “Nuclear Disarmament,” and “Global Hibakusha,” respectively to the members of Nagasaki Youth Delegation, a group certified by PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition as a messenger working towards nuclear weapons abolition, at the HPI.
- ◆ **Feb. 14** Akihiro Kawakami presents a lecture titled, “Social Rights and Basic Workers’ Rights in Postwar Japan,” hosted by Kagoshima Local Self-Government Institute in Kagoshima.
- ◆ **Feb. 15** Kawakami presents a lecture titled, “The Legal Theory of Social Rights and Basic Workers’ Rights,” hosted by JICHIRO (All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union) Kagoshima Branch in Kagoshima.
- ◆ **Feb. 17–19** Narayanan Ganesan trains the Myanmar civil service on public policy formulation and research methodology at the Ministry of Information in Naypyitaw.
- ◆ **Feb. 18** Sato joins the oral examination of a Ph.D. dissertation online as an examiner held by the Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University.
- ◆ **Feb. 20–Mar. 3** Jacobs conducts fieldwork on the radiological contamination of the Hunter’s Point Naval Station, San Francisco, USA.
- ◆ **Mar. 3–8** Kikkawa visits the OSCE Secretariat to conduct research and interview OSCE staff in Vienna, Austria.
- ◆ **Mar. 9–11** Kikkawa visits the OSCE ODHIR to conduct research and interviews in Warsaw, Poland.
- ◆ **Apr. 1** Sato becomes a Specially Appointed Professor at the HPI, Hiroshima City University.
- ◆ **Apr. 27** Ha participates in the online round table conference hosted by PR Table Community, “Let’s Talk about Public Relations in Post Corona Era” as a speaker.
- ◆ **May 27** Mizumoto attends as councilor the regular meeting of board of councilors of the Hiroshima Jogakuin School Cooperation, held at Hiroshima Jogakuin University.

Renewal of HPI Website

Kyungjin Ha

The official website of the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) has been renewed. Since its founding, the HPI has provided support to academic activities conducted under the theme of “peace,” and has served as a bridge between researchers and citizens. The renewed website seeks to play this role of a bridge and also become a platform to further promote interactions between researchers and citizens.

Three major changes have been made to the HPI website. First, the section “Recent Research Activities” has been newly created to focus on various events and faculty member-led activities conducted at the HPI. Articles are written in a reporting style and photos are also posted so that non-participants can fully enjoy the atmosphere of such events and activities. Second, the “Research” section has been enriched to cover unique project based research (joint research) and provide outlines of the latest research conducted by faculty members. If you are considering applying to the Graduate School of Peace Studies or are simply interested in what kind of research is being carried out at the HPI, please visit and read this section. Lastly, detailed information is provided on the Graduate School of Peace Studies, launched in 2019 under the concept of “Pioneering Peace Studies approaches from Hiroshima,” including major characteristics, attractions, information regarding entrance examinations, and interviews with current students. Additionally, the new website features easier access to information on various programs open to the public, including public lectures, symposiums, and seminars.

We would like to widely disseminate the latest information regarding activities so that the HPI will continue to remain close to those with an interest in peace and peace studies. Our website will be updated regularly. We hope that you will visit us frequently.



(Public Relations Committee at HPI)

<https://www.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/>

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