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The Editors’ Notes

A Window into Peace Studies

Three Windows and Critical Peace/Nonviolence Research

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Introduction: window

Have you ever wondered what the word “window” means?

When asked to write “A Window into Peace Studies” article for *Hiroshima Peace Research Journal*, the assignment led me to look up the etymological root, not of the word “peace” but “window,” a word seemingly common but does conceal something profound. Here is what I found: the word ‘window’ comes from an Old c.1200 Norse word “vin-dauga” which is a combination of “vindr” or ‘wind’ and “auga”: “eye”, or “to see.” Literally, it is “eye-hole” or “eye-door”. In Old Frisian ‘window’ literally means “breath-door.”¹ Put another way, window allows us to breathe through and to see something outside our confinement and beyond.

In my academic life as a peace/nonviolence researcher, I have been touched by extraordinary people whose teachings enable me to breathe and see the world in a particular way. They are my “windows into peace/nonviolence studies.” Through these windows, I have come to believe that peace studies without seriously taking account of nonviolence theory and practices leave much to be desired in a world presently consumed by deadly and destructive conflicts.

What follows is a brief discussion of three “teachers” whose ideas constitute the three “windows” through which my understanding of peace/nonviolence has been formed. The paper then ends with a note on an example of how understanding “windows” as a portal to breathe and to see influenced my peace/nonviolence research.

First Window: Glenn D. Paige (1929–2017)

In August 1977, I was only 22 years old when I left Thailand to pursue my graduate study with the East-West Center scholarship at the Department of Political Science, University

of Hawai'i at Manoa. A year earlier my university in Bangkok was the site of perhaps the most brutal attack against peaceful protesters ever occurred in Thai society commonly known as the "October 6, 1976 incident." At dawn of that fateful day, Thammasat University was viciously attacked by paramilitary groups and government forces. Many who peacefully protested inside the university were burned alive, some dead bodies mutilated while bystanders watched as though they were watching a play, not the gruesome killing of human beings. Thousands of protesters were arrested. A coup d'état followed and a most right-wing government with extremely authoritarian control was installed.²

With the bloody episode still in the back of my mind, I took Glenn Paige's course titled: "Nonviolent Political Alternatives." Paige introduced me to literature I had never known before. They included Johan Galtung's classic essay "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" (1969), Ruth Leger Sivard's wonderfully informative *World Military and Social Expenditures* (1978), Gene Sharp's magnum opus *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973), Robert Cooney and Helen Michalowski's colorful *The Power of the People: Active Non-violence in the United States* (1977), and Gopinath Dhawan's profound *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (1957). Through these readings, among many others drawn both from social sciences and the humanities, and Paige's teaching, I learned that peace is not merely an absence of war, but also for people to live free of injustice or structural violence such as poverty; that global resources wasted on military expenditures robbed the world of opportunities to peacefully better human lives through social expenditures; that Gandhi's thought was much more sophisticated upon philosophical reflection; that his was not the only example of nonviolent actions, but there have been so many successful examples of people from various cultures including in the US who chose nonviolent action grounded in a radical understanding of a consent theory of power to fight against different forms of oppression.

I still remember the feeling which resulted from taking Paige's course. It was a mixture of amazement and joy to learn that there were indeed nonviolent alternatives to fight against violent oppression and massacre; and that they were not ideal but had been put into practices by real people in history; that great though they are, Gandhi and King are not the only ones, there have been many others. Some were lesser-known names to me at the time such as Danilo Dolci, Cesar Chavez, Dom Helder Camara, or Kenneth David Kaunda.³ Importantly, most who took part in nonviolent movements, both men and women, have been nameless heroes.

Moreover, these alternatives could be understood from solid theories while the possibilities of getting rid of/getting out of violence for humans are supported by ground-

breaking empirical and scientific knowledge. Paige's teaching served as my peace studies educational foundation that gave me a knowledge-based hope necessary to free myself from the heavy chain of violence that had earlier trapped me in despair.⁴

At the defense of my Ph.D. dissertation in December 1981, Paige asked me a question: as a Muslim what would I say to violence carried out by Muslims in the name of Islam around the world? My first research work once I returned home in 1982 was to look into how Muslim separatists in Southern Thailand use Islam to justify their violent action.⁵ Five years later, Paige challenged me again with an invitation to contribute a paper on Islam and nonviolence to the UN first ever conference on that subject he organized and held in Bali. Paige's critical questions including his nonkilling turn have influenced my peace/nonviolence research during the next three decades.⁶

Paige's teachings constitute a large window that allows me to see that there are indeed nonviolent alternatives to violence, that these alternatives are based on solid social sciences and humanities, and that one should dare to raise critical and at times hurtful questions in undertaking a journey as a peace/nonviolence researcher.

Second Window: Johan Galtung (1930–)

The experience of being in a class taught by the legendary Johan Galtung, the person considered the father of modern peace research by many, was unlike anything else. The fact that he is ambidextrous, and that he could write all kinds of formulae on several boards with incredible speed could make one feel a little dizzy at times. On questioning him how he managed it, he alerted me to the world of mathematics. This is perhaps what has informed the mathematician Galtung's numerous conceptual contributions to peace research.

I have found Galtung's concept of violence and analytical framework useful for my research. It began with a seemingly simple formulation that peace is the absence of violence. But violence is a complicated concept which can be distinguished as direct, structural and cultural. To work towards peace is to get rid of violence in all three forms. In analyzing the phenomenon of violence, Galtung's formulation could be understood in terms of layers of variables. The first layer, easily visible, is that of agency which could be construed with agency-related theories such as theory of action. Then the second layer, less visible, is that of structures and institutions which includes laws, education, and economics which serve as sources of violence. The third layer, invisible and near pertinent, is the cultural layer which legitimizes the other two. It is the complex domain of belief systems that include religions, ideology, language, art, and science.⁷ For example, at the time of this writing,

Kazakhstan just abolished capital punishment from its legal system.⁸ But the success or failure of death penalty abolition will ultimately depend on to what degree that society's culture supports the new structure, namely punishment law for murder cases. If people in that society believe strongly in retributive justice, sanctioned by some forms of religious or folk belief, then it will be very difficult for the change to succeed because cultural variables are the hardest to change.

Galtung's analytical framework is so important, especially for those working on religions and violence/nonviolence such as myself because it puts to rest once and for all the false question of whether a religion such as Islam causes violence. Instead, Islam or any other religion including the most pacific Buddhism can be used to justify violence.⁹ This is because religions reside within the cultural layer which works as justification, not causation, of violence.

Third Window: Gene Sharp (1928-2018)

In 1980 at a Yokohama regional meeting of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), a question was raised as to whether it would be possible for IPRA to take up the subject of "nonviolence" as part of its work. A distinguished colleague from Europe responded that IPRA should not be associated with "pacifism" since it would "discredit peace research."¹⁰ It is interesting to note that the European colleague equated "pacifism" with "nonviolence," and that in his view "nonviolence" or "pacifism" was not an academic subject worthy of peace research.

At about the same time, Gene Sharp who wrote the now world-famous *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*¹¹ was a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, and just published an award winning essay discussing the implications of civilian-based defense: *Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal*.¹² In the same year, Sharp published *Social Power and Political Freedom* arguing that in order to effectively tackle grave political problems namely: dictatorship, genocide, war, and social oppression, there is a need to rethink politics. The obvious must be questioned because "We usually take the familiar for granted, and do not really 'see' it. We often fail to ponder that which is unmistakably before us, to give it our close attention, and to ask simple but fundamental questions about it, as we would if it appeared before us for the first time."¹³

Studying nonviolent action from Sharp's *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* is to learn

to question the obvious in politics, namely the way power works. In addition, it is to understand the theory behind nonviolent action, the numerous historical cases supporting the world famous 198 methods, and how they work to alter the conflict dynamics. Apart from these, while serving as a translator of his *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* into Thai, I have also learned how Sharp was so careful with language choice for his book as we struggled for the appropriate translation of the term “nonviolent action.”

Precision of the terms used in nonviolence studies/research is so very significant to Sharp that he would sometimes chastise me for using the term “nonviolence” loosely in my works because it broadly covers nonviolent direct action, love of all humanity, passivity and surrender, among others. For him, using “nonviolence” in one’s research is “often highly ambiguous, contradictory, and even moralistic—all quite unsuited for description and analysis of conflicts.”¹⁴ Therefore the term “nonviolence” “should not be used as a synonym for the technique of nonviolent action, because nonviolent action is often practiced for pragmatic reasons and is not necessarily tied to a general belief in abstention from all violence.”¹⁵ Those who use nonviolent action may not be pacifists who may support or oppose the use of nonviolent action. In fact, pacifists who oppose nonviolent action do so because for them “some methods of nonviolent action may be too conflictual, coercive, or provocative of violent responses.”¹⁶

Sharp’s belief about precision is with Tocqueville whose quote he used as epigraph to his *Sharp’s Dictionary*’s introduction: ‘An abstract term is like a box with a false bottom, you may put in it what ideas you please, and take them out again without being observed.’¹⁷ His first two sentences in the book clearly reveal his intention. They read: “Every field of study and thought requires clear concepts, terms, and understood meaning. Without them, description, analysis, communication and the transfer of knowledge are impaired, if not impossible.”¹⁸ For Sharp, such precision is needed for the advent of non-violent struggles studies/research to help the world cope with deadly threats from genocide to dictatorship and other forms of tyranny.

Conclusion: a note on “windows” and critical peace/nonviolence research

Looking through the three fantastic windows, and though there are others in my life, these have helped me see the familiar with the unfamiliar eyes so that new questions can be raised. Critical peace research framework enables me to place variables in appropriate layers that help elucidate how different faces of violence work to trap humans in its deadly

space. Then nonviolent action grounded in knowledge from diverse fields of study in both social sciences and humanities continue to kindle my hope in critical peace/nonviolence research as knowledge-based alternatives that could help foster a more peaceful world.

Since I began this article with a peculiar understanding of “window,” let me end by showing how this understanding of “window” as something that helps one “breathes” and “sees” can connect with peace/nonviolence research/studies.

On July 8, 2013, in Lampedusa, a small Italian island some 70 miles from Tunisia known as North Africa’s “gateway to Europe” where so many migrants have died crossing from Africa, Pope Francis raised the question: “Has anyone of us grieved for the death of these brothers and sisters?” Rephrasing the Pope’s question to underscore the pain it delicately suggests, I am curious about why when seeing the sights of human suffering, in this case the migrants’, one does not or cannot grieve.¹⁹

In meditating on why this is so very difficult, I have argued that the difficulty arises from a profound sense of human failure to realize how one’s life is connected to others’, and that to be able to do so—to *see* their sufferings and to hear the cries of the oppressed, there is a need to call into question the dominant role of “thinking” as the defining quality of being human. Beyond the critique of “thinking,” breathing is then proposed as an alternative epistemic ground necessary for peace/nonviolence in the twenty-first century.²⁰ In this sense, “windows” could serve as portals to “see” and “breathe” the world one lives, both as a peace/nonviolence researcher and a human being.

References

- ¹ (<https://www.etymonline.com/word/window>, accessed December 30, 2020).
- ² Thongchai Winichakul, *Moments of Silence: The Unforgetting of the October 6, 1976 Massacre in Bangkok* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2020).
- ³ Marjorie Hope and James Young, *The Struggle for Humanity: Agents of Nonviolent Change in a Violent World* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Book, 1979).
- ⁴ For an elaborate treatment of Paige’s influence on educating me as a peace/nonviolence researcher, see Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Teacher Glenn: how a political scientist educated a peace researcher,” *Journal of Peace Education* Vol.15 Issue 3 (2018), 255-266.
- ⁵ Chaiwat Satha-Anand, *Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the Four Southern Provinces, Thailand, 1976-1981* (Tampa, Florida: University of South Florida Monographs on Religion and Public Policy, 1987).
- ⁶ See Glenn D. Paige, Chaiwat Satha-Anand and Sarah Gilliatt (eds.) *Islam and Nonviolence* (Honolulu: Center for Global Nonviolence Planning Project, Spark M.Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of Hawai’I, 1993). Throughout my academic life, I have worked on the subject of Islam

and nonviolence, see also Chaiwat Satha-Anand, *Nonviolence and Islamic Imperatives* (Sparnas, Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2017).

⁷ Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London, Thousand Oaks, Delhi: SAGE, 1996), 201-207.

⁸ *The Astana Times*, January 5, 2021.

⁹ See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Red Mosques’: Mitigating Violence Against Sacred Spaces in Thailand and Beyond,” in Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (eds.) *Southeast Asian Muslims in the Era of Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 197-220. See also Michael K. Jerryson, *Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹⁰ Glenn D. Paige, “To Leap Beyond Yet Nearer Bring: From War to Peace to Nonviolence to Nonkilling,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* Vol.2 No.1 (January 1997), 97.

¹¹ (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

¹² (Winner of the Ira D. and Miriam G. Wallach 1979-1980 Awards, sponsored by the Institute for World Order in New York.)

¹³ (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), 13.

¹⁴ Gene Sharp, *Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xiii.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 193. But elsewhere I have argued that Sharp’s distinction is too restrictive. See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Overcoming Illusory Division: Between Nonviolence as a Pragmatic Strategy and a Principled Way of Life,” in Kurt Schock (ed.), *Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle* (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 289-301.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* The epigraph is from Alexis De Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (1889), Vol.2, 63.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, xi.

¹⁹ See a philosophical discussion of “grievability” in relation to “equality” of lives in Judith Butler, *The Philosophy of Non-Violence* (London and New York: Verso, 2020), 28.

²⁰ Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Breathing the others, Seeing the lives: A Reflection on Twenty-first-century Nonviolence,” in Joseph Camilleri and Deborah Guess (eds.) *Towards a Just and Ecologically Sustainable Peace: Navigating the Great Transition* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 228-248.

特集論文

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題： 財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

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はじめに

本号のテーマ「世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威」を一考した際に、まず思いつく脅威は戦争であろう。これに人間の安全に関わる様々な脅威も付け加えることができる¹。これら多様化した脅威は、特に冷戦後に認識され始めたが、今日の国際社会が多様な脅威に必ずしも十分に対応できているわけではない。それゆえ1つの対応策として、平和と人間の安全保障の両立を指向する複眼的平和思想への転換が今まさに求められている、ことを指摘できる²。またこれは、世界の平和と人間の安全保障については、戦争という脅威のみならず、多様な視点や側面からこの問題を捉え直す必要が生じているとも換言できる。そこで本稿では、このテーマを保健衛生分野から考えていきたい。具体的には、世界保健機関（World Health Organization: WHO）の財政やネットワークを分析することで、WHOが果たしてきた役割や、その変化、新たに生じた課題を明らかにする。

ここでは、議論の前提として保健衛生分野と世界の平和や人間の安全保障との関係を整理する。加えて、WHOのこれまでの活動を簡単に跡づける。保健衛生分野と人間の安全保障の関係は、『人間開発報告書1994』で健康の安全保障として明示された。そこでは発展途上国と先進国の死因の違いや特に健康の安全が脅かされている存在として、貧困層や農村地域、子供が指摘されている。その6年後には、人間の安全保障委員会が提出した報告書『安全保障の今日的課題』に再び、保健衛生分野が人間の安全保障の一側面として取り上げられた³。健康を守ることが人間の安全保障の中核として位置づけられ、地球規模の感染症、貧困に関連した脅威、暴力と危機など、保健衛生分野と人間の安全保障との結びつきが指摘された。加えて、世界の平和との関係では、例えば、第一次世界大戦下に流行したスペイン・インフルエンザや新型コロナウイルス感染症（COVID-19）など世界的な感染症の流行を想起すれば、保健衛生分野が世界の平和に少なからず影響を与えていることは明らかだろう。

本稿で取り上げるWHOは、その保健衛生分野で中心的役割を果たしてきた。関連年表の1948年設立以来、感染症に対応するため1969年に国際保健規則を制定

関連年表

| | |
|-----------|------------------------------|
| 1948 | 世界保健機関(WHO)設立 |
| 1969 | 国際保健規則採択(コレラ、ペスト、黄熱のみ報告義務) |
| 1978 | アルマ・アタ宣言(プライマリ・ヘルス・ケア提唱) |
| 1980 | 天然痘根絶宣言 |
| 1994 | UNDP『人間開発報告書1994』(健康の安全保障) |
| 2000 | 人間の安全保障委員会報告書、BMGF設立、GAVI設立 |
| 2003 | SARS(国際保健規則改訂プロセスの端緒) |
| 2005 | 国際保健規則改訂(国際的な公衆衛生上の脅威を対象) |
| 2009 | 新型インフルエンザ(H1N1) |
| 2012～ | MERS |
| 2014～ | エボラ出血熱(西アフリカ) |
| 2015～ | ジカ熱(アメリカ大陸) |
| 2020～ | 新型コロナウイルス感染症(COVID-19) |
| 2020 Jan. | 国際的に懸念される公衆衛生上の緊急事態宣言(1月30日) |
| 2020 Mar. | COVID-19パンデミック宣言(3月11日) |
| 2020 July | アメリカのWHO脱退通知(2021年7月6日脱退予定) |

し、1980年には天然痘の撲滅に成功するなど多くの成果を上げた。同時にプライマリ・ヘルス・ケアを提唱し、単に感染症に対応するのみならず、すべての人々の健康を保障するために活動している。近年、頻発する感染症の世界的流行については、2003年の重症急性呼吸器症候群（SARS）の流行を契機に国際保健規則が改訂され、国際的な公衆衛生上の脅威に対応する枠組みが整えられた。WHOはCOVID-19の流行に際して、2020年1月30日に国際的に懸念される公衆衛生上の緊急事態（PHEIC）宣言、続いて3月11日にパンデミックを宣言し、対応している⁴。

本稿は以上のような問題関心を出発点にして、主に2000年以降のWHOの財政やネットワークについて検討する。以下、1. 世界保健機関財政の特徴では、WHO予算の変遷や性質を検討する。続く、2. 世界保健機関ネットワークの変容では、WHOネットワークの変化を指摘したい。そして3. 世界保健機関と新型コロナウイルス感染症では、COVID-19への対応とWHOの役割、新たに生じてきた課題を検討する。おわりに、保健衛生分野と世界の平和と人間の安全保障の関係を改めて考察する。

1. 世界保健機関財政の特徴

(1) 予算の推移（1992年から2018年）

本章では、WHO予算の変遷や性質を明らかにする⁵。はじめにWHO予算の推移を検討していく。WHOのプログラム予算（programme budget）は、加盟国分担金（assessed contributions）と任意拠出金（voluntary contributions）の2種類で構成される。加盟国分担金は、加盟国それぞれの分担率に従い支払われる資金、任意

拠出金は WHO 加盟国と非国家主体を含む多様な主体の自発的な拠出で成り立っている。表 1（1992-2018年 WHO プログラム予算、加盟国分担金、任意拠出金）は1992年から2018年までの WHO 予算の各項目の年次推移が示されている⁶。表 1 では、すべての項目が増加している傾向を指摘できる。しかし、その増加率は各項目で異なり、1992年と2018年を比較すれば、プログラム予算は597%、加盟国分担金は154%、任意拠出金は1,665%の増加率となる。同じく、プログラム予算に占める各項目の割合は、加盟国分担金では70%から18%に減少し、任意拠出金では29%から81%に増加した。つまり、1992年から2018年にかけて WHO 予算の重心が加盟国分担金から任意拠出金に移ったことが明らかとなる。この加盟国分担

表 1：1992-2018年 WHO プログラム予算、加盟国分担金、任意拠出金（米ドル）

| | A. プログラム 予算=B+C | B. 加盟国分 担金 | C. 任意拠出 金 | 加盟国分担 金割合(%) =B/A | 任意拠出金 割合(%) =C/A |
|------|----------------------|---------------|---------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 1992 | 459,500,680 | 324,771,106 | 134,729,574 | 70.7 | 29.3 |
| 1993 | 546,828,285 | 365,438,171 | 181,390,114 | 66.8 | 33.2 |
| 1994 | 511,799,615 | 364,816,580 | 146,983,035 | 71.3 | 28.7 |
| 1995 | 698,275,598 | 481,306,082 | 216,969,516 | 68.9 | 31.1 |
| 1996 | 575,034,742 | 359,270,090 | 215,764,652 | 62.5 | 37.5 |
| 1997 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| 1998 | 668,124,339 | 408,386,000 | 259,738,339 | 61.1 | 38.9 |
| 1999 | 786,557,406 | 418,751,000 | 367,806,406 | 53.2 | 46.8 |
| 2000 | 978,821,959 | 414,093,220 | 564,728,739 | 42.3 | 57.7 |
| 2001 | 932,871,727 | 421,279,990 | 511,591,737 | 45.2 | 54.8 |
| 2002 | 817,221,271 | 395,219,391 | 422,001,880 | 48.4 | 51.6 |
| 2003 | 969,157,379 | 397,306,745 | 571,850,634 | 41.0 | 59.0 |
| 2004 | 1,162,865,000 | 426,925,000 | 735,940,000 | 36.7 | 63.3 |
| 2005 | 1,394,396,000 | 431,550,000 | 962,846,000 | 30.9 | 69.1 |
| 2006 | 1,732,493,000 | 442,000,000 | 1,290,493,000 | 25.5 | 74.5 |
| 2007 | 1,921,497,000 | 451,115,000 | 1,470,382,000 | 23.5 | 76.5 |
| 2008 | 1,581,335,817 | 470,062,155 | 1,111,273,662 | 29.7 | 70.3 |
| 2009 | 2,103,382,680 | 470,062,155 | 1,633,320,525 | 22.3 | 77.7 |
| 2010 | 1,943,720,992 | 472,557,200 | 1,471,163,792 | 24.3 | 75.7 |
| 2011 | 1,900,006,246 | 472,557,200 | 1,427,449,046 | 24.9 | 75.1 |
| 2012 | 2,017,018,640 | 474,609,150 | 1,542,409,490 | 23.5 | 76.5 |
| 2013 | 2,404,578,672 | 474,640,515 | 1,929,938,157 | 19.7 | 80.3 |
| 2014 | 2,493,604,095 | 491,865,238 | 2,001,738,857 | 19.7 | 80.3 |
| 2015 | 2,298,971,000 | 462,651,000 | 1,836,320,000 | 20.1 | 79.9 |
| 2016 | 2,187,427,000 | 470,036,000 | 1,717,391,000 | 21.5 | 78.5 |
| 2017 | 2,567,277,000 | 456,712,000 | 2,110,565,000 | 17.8 | 82.2 |
| 2018 | 2,737,527,000 | 500,751,000 | 2,236,776,000 | 18.3 | 81.7 |

※WHA46(1993), 12; WHA47(1994), 12; WHA48(1995), 12; WHA49(1996), 12;
WHA50(1997), 12; WHA52(1999), 10; WHA53(2000), 12; WHA54(2001), 10;
WHA55(2002a), 12; WHA56(2003a), 6; WHA57(2004a), 12; WHA58(2005a), 12;
WHA59(2006a), 14; WHA60(2007a), 10; WHA61(2008a), 14; WHA62(2009a), 29;
WHA63(2010a), 35; WHA64(2011a), 31; WHA65(2012a), 44; WHA66(2013a), 67;
WHA67(2014a), 72; WHA68(2015a), 72; WHA69(2016a), 174; WHA70(2017a), 128;
WHA71(2018a), 65; WHA72(2019a), 69を基に筆者作成。

表2：1992-2017年国連専門機関間任意拠出金比較（百万米ドル）

| | WHO | FAO | ILO | UNIDO | UNESCO |
|------|--------------|-----|-----|-------|--------|
| 1992 | 352 | 365 | 150 | 138 | 82 |
| 1993 | 357 | 307 | 131 | 139 | 87 |
| 1994 | 330 | 267 | 111 | 67 | 77 |
| 1995 | 396 | 242 | 106 | 79 | 99 |
| 1996 | 341 | 240 | 103 | 67 | 116 |
| 1997 | 341 | 241 | 102 | 71 | 130 |
| 1998 | 359 | 269 | 98 | 93 | 84 |
| 1999 | 331 | 268 | 86 | 88 | 111 |
| 2000 | 557 | 314 | 94 | 77 | 198 |
| 2001 | 531 | 320 | 115 | 88 | 260 |
| 2002 | 776 | 310 | 132 | 89 | 264 |
| 2003 | 711 | 310 | 132 | 101 | 303 |
| 2004 | 1,011 | 317 | 129 | 104 | 317 |
| 2005 | 1,150 | 317 | 174 | 118 | 351 |
| 2006 | 1,371 | 425 | 181 | 120 | 291 |
| 2007 | 1,840 | 425 | 189 | 121 | 228 |
| 2008 | 1,254 | 568 | 207 | 124 | 208 |
| 2009 | 1,659 | 568 | 243 | 140 | 179 |
| 2010 | 1,565 | 891 | 248 | 229 | 323 |
| 2011 | 1,504 | 899 | 271 | 247 | 309 |
| 2012 | 1,573 | 775 | 271 | 190 | 391 |
| 2013 | 1,929 | 744 | 281 | 157 | 369 |
| 2014 | 1,970 | 805 | 278 | 182 | 365 |
| 2015 | 1,857 | 744 | 225 | 250 | 352 |
| 2016 | 1,726 | 770 | 252 | 228 | 246 |
| 2017 | 2,058 | 751 | 293 | 256 | 261 |

※UN Specialized Agencies: Voluntary Contributions, 1971-2017
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/Voluntary_Contributions_UN_Specialize_Agencies_Voluntary_1971-2017.pdf(2020年6月27日最終閲覧)を参照し、筆者作成。

金と任意拠出金の重心の逆転は2000年に生じており、それ以降現在まで主に任意拠出金が WHO の財政の柱となっている⁷。

この WHO 予算の特徴は、他の国連専門機関との比較において、どのように位置づけられるのだろうか。表2（1992-2017年国連専門機関間任意拠出金比較）を検討する⁸。表2では1992年から2017年までの WHO、国連食糧農業機関（FAO）、国際労働機関（ILO）、国連工業開発機関（UNIDO）、国連教育科学文化機関（UNESCO）の5つの国連専門機関の任意拠出金の年次推移が示されている。任意拠出金という枠組みは WHO 独自の予算枠組みではなく、国連専門機関に広く存

在している。この期間、すべての国連専門機関で任意拠出金が増加している傾向を指摘できる。WHO 以外の国連専門機関においても近年、任意拠出金の影響力が高まっている。逆に言えば、加盟国分担金の割合は相対的に減少し、加盟国の影響力が低下しているとも捉えられる。WHO の任意拠出金は、1992年の時点では FAO に次ぐ 3 億 5,200 万ドルであったが、2017年には国連専門機関の中で最大の 20 億 5,800 万ドルにまで増加した。WHO は、他の国連専門機関と比較すると急速に任意拠出金を増加させていた。この表 2 からも WHO の任意拠出金の重要性を指摘できる。

最後に WHO がこの資金をどのように使用しているのか、予算の配分状況を確認する。WHO は 2018-19 年の予算計画でポリオ根絶計画（10 億ドル）、感染症（8 億ドル）、事務（7.1 億ドル）、保健制度（5.8 億ドル）、緊急事態（5.5 億ドル）、健康増進（3.8 億ドル）、非感染性疾患（3.5 億ドル）の予算を計上している⁹。任意拠出金を柱にして、感染症対策の分野に注力する計画であることがわかる。

（2）任意拠出金の性質

ここでは WHO の任意拠出金に対象を絞り検討を進める。はじめに WHO の任意拠出金の年次推移を確認しよう。表 3（1955-2018 年 WHO 任意拠出金、累計額）は 1955 年から 2018 年までの WHO 任意拠出金の年次推移である。WHO 任意拠出金は、1956 年から取り扱われ、2018 年まで増加の一途を辿った¹⁰。この任意拠出金の 1 つの転換点として 2000 年を指摘できる。なぜなら、2000 年から 2004 年までの任意拠出額（約 28 億ドル）が、1956 年から 99 年までの 43 年間の任意拠出額（約 27 億ドル）を上回る状況に変化したからである。表 1、表 2 でも指摘した任意拠出金の重要性や 2000 年という転換点を表 3 からも指摘できる。

それではなぜ、WHO 予算は 2000 年を契機に性質を変化させたのだろうか。ここでは 3 つの要因を指摘する。1 つ目はグローバル化とそれに伴う非国家主体の活動拡大の影響である。グローバル化が進むことで非国家主体が国境を越えて活動する機会が増加した。2000 年は、後述するゲイツ財団（Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: BMGF）や GAVI ワクチンアライアンス（Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation: GAVI）が設立され、保健衛生分野における非国家主体の活動拡大の萌芽期であった。これら非国家主体の活動拡大が WHO 予算に徐々に影響を及ぼした。2 つ目は、健康の安全保障の概念化である。先述のように、人間の安全保障の一側面として健康が 1994 年に取り上げられ、2000 年に改めて人間の安全保障委員会で位置づけられた。その結果、保健衛生分野の課題が国際的に認知されるようになり、課題解決に向けた機運や枠組みが整備されていったことも、この変化の背景として指摘できる。最後にそれら外的な要因に加えて、WHO の内的な要因も指摘できる。WHO 予算の不払い問題である。1990 年代に WHO 予算の

表3：1955-2018年 WHO 任意拠出金、累計額（米ドル）

| | 任意拠出金 | 累計額 | | 任意拠出金 | 累計額 |
|---------|-------------|-------------|------|---------------|----------------|
| 1955-65 | 28,457,836 | 28,457,836 | 1992 | 128,094,226 | 1,107,576,256 |
| 1966 | 1,567,523 | 30,025,359 | 1993 | 178,010,066 | 1,285,586,322 |
| 1967 | 851,102 | 30,876,461 | 1994 | 145,445,848 | 1,431,032,170 |
| 1968 | 2,593,238 | 33,469,699 | 1995 | 209,169,637 | 1,640,201,807 |
| 1969 | 1,684,749 | 35,154,448 | 1996 | 204,302,894 | 1,844,504,701 |
| 1970 | 2,743,315 | 37,897,763 | 1997 | 226,187,743 | 2,070,692,444 |
| 1971 | 6,853,977 | 44,751,740 | 1998 | 262,948,559 | 2,333,641,003 |
| 1972 | 5,306,209 | 50,057,949 | 1999 | 367,946,260 | 2,701,587,263 |
| 1973 | 12,224,367 | 62,282,316 | 2000 | 566,289,009 | 3,267,876,272 |
| 1974 | 15,823,955 | 78,106,271 | 2001 | 513,391,699 | 3,781,267,971 |
| 1975 | 32,365,549 | 110,471,820 | 2002 | 422,001,880 | 4,203,269,851 |
| 1976 | 32,230,869 | 142,702,689 | 2003 | 571,850,634 | 4,775,120,485 |
| 1977 | 35,131,862 | 177,834,551 | 2004 | 735,940,000 | 5,511,060,485 |
| 1978 | 47,954,729 | 225,789,280 | 2005 | 962,846,000 | 6,473,906,485 |
| 1979 | 32,122,078 | 257,911,358 | 2006 | 1,290,493,000 | 7,764,399,485 |
| 1980 | 36,948,457 | 294,859,815 | 2007 | 1,470,382,000 | 9,234,781,485 |
| 1981 | 38,841,213 | 333,701,028 | 2008 | 1,111,273,662 | 10,346,055,147 |
| 1982 | 38,539,505 | 372,240,533 | 2009 | 1,633,320,525 | 11,979,375,672 |
| 1983 | 39,609,466 | 411,849,999 | 2010 | 1,471,163,792 | 13,450,539,464 |
| 1984 | 35,106,836 | 446,956,835 | 2011 | 1,427,449,046 | 14,877,988,510 |
| 1985 | 38,819,220 | 485,776,055 | 2012 | 1,542,409,490 | 16,420,398,000 |
| 1986 | 52,774,919 | 538,550,974 | 2013 | 1,929,938,157 | 18,350,336,157 |
| 1987 | 61,735,554 | 600,286,528 | 2014 | 2,001,738,857 | 20,352,075,014 |
| 1988 | 79,762,239 | 680,048,767 | 2015 | 1,836,320,000 | 22,188,395,014 |
| 1989 | 76,750,178 | 756,798,945 | 2016 | 1,717,391,000 | 23,905,786,014 |
| 1990 | 90,626,017 | 847,424,962 | 2017 | 2,110,565,000 | 26,016,351,014 |
| 1991 | 132,057,068 | 979,482,030 | 2018 | 2,236,776,000 | 28,253,127,014 |

※WHA55（2002b）, 12及び表1を基に筆者作成。1955年から2001年はWHA55（2002b）の拠出額、2002年から2018年は表1の拠出額。

加盟国分担金は、支払遅延や不払い問題が生じ、慢性的な機能不全に陥っていた。予算改革などが行われていたが、例えば、1995年には、加盟国分担金を78カ国（42%）が全く支払わない事態が生じていた¹¹。この時期 WHO の主な資金源であった加盟国分担金による活動は、困難になっていたのである。

上記の3つの要因が折り重なり WHO 予算は2000年を境に性質を変化させたとと言える。その結果、新たに生じた任意拠出金の増加という傾向は、加盟国分担金の不足分を補い、活動資金を埋め合わせる役割を持っていた。この変化で見逃せない点は、加盟国分担金と任意拠出金の性質の違いである。つまり、加盟国分担

金と任意拠出金の性質を中長期視点で検討すれば、加盟国分担金は支払遅延や不払い問題がないわけではないが、加盟国が存在する限り、WHO にとって予算の見込みが立つ安定的な財源と位置づけられる。一方の任意拠出金は、加盟国や非国家主体の自発性に依拠している。そのため、中長期的には WHO 予算を不安定化させる効果を持つと言える。付け加えれば、近年の WHO 予算の任意拠出金割合の大幅な増加は、これまで顕在化していないが、WHO 財政の不安定化という課題を生じさせる可能性を高めていた。後述する COVID-19によってこの課題が一部顕在化したと考えられる。

続いて、任意拠出金の内訳を検討する。WHO の任意拠出金は、加盟国任意拠出金と非国家主体任意拠出金の2つに分類できる。表4（2000-2018年任意拠出総計、加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金、割合）は2000年から2018年の任意拠出総計と加盟国及び非国家主体の任意拠出額、その割合が示されている。この期間、すべての項目で任意拠出金が増加する傾向を見て取れる。注目すべき点として任意拠出金の割合の変化を指摘できる。例えば、2002年と2017年の任意拠出総計に

表4：2000-2018年任意拠出総計、加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金、割合
(米ドル)

| | A. 任意拠出総計 =B+C | B. 加盟国任意 拠出金 | C. 非国家主体 任意拠出金 | 加盟国任意拠 出金割合 (%)=B/A | 非国家主体 任意拠出金割合 (%)=C/A |
|-------|----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2000* | 610,900,989 | 379,001,890 | 231,899,099 | 62.0 | 38.0 |
| 2001* | 610,900,989 | 379,001,890 | 231,899,099 | 62.0 | 38.0 |
| 2002 | 488,326,944 | 340,200,692 | 148,126,252 | 69.7 | 30.3 |
| 2003 | 637,981,962 | 429,388,865 | 208,593,097 | 67.3 | 32.7 |
| 2004 | 797,510,879 | 543,072,714 | 254,438,165 | 68.1 | 31.9 |
| 2005 | 1,014,334,618 | 670,739,839 | 343,594,779 | 66.1 | 33.9 |
| 2006 | 1,001,019,664 | 621,616,005 | 379,403,659 | 62.1 | 37.9 |
| 2007 | 1,497,044,267 | 800,715,980 | 696,328,287 | 53.5 | 46.5 |
| 2008 | 1,111,325,223 | 475,452,020 | 635,873,203 | 42.8 | 57.2 |
| 2009 | 1,633,268,963 | 960,742,930 | 672,526,033 | 58.8 | 41.2 |
| 2010 | 1,471,163,792 | 773,750,281 | 697,413,511 | 52.6 | 47.4 |
| 2011 | 1,427,449,046 | 787,548,199 | 639,900,847 | 55.2 | 44.8 |
| 2012 | 1,539,390,127 | 768,594,748 | 770,795,379 | 49.9 | 50.1 |
| 2013 | 1,929,938,157 | 1,039,295,291 | 890,642,866 | 53.9 | 46.1 |
| 2014 | 2,001,713,247 | 1,032,868,359 | 968,844,888 | 51.6 | 48.4 |
| 2015 | 1,836,970,206 | 1,020,279,072 | 816,691,134 | 55.5 | 44.5 |
| 2016 | 1,717,219,177 | 920,319,765 | 796,899,412 | 53.6 | 46.4 |
| 2017 | 2,110,685,173 | 1,040,549,547 | 1,070,135,626 | 49.3 | 50.7 |
| 2018 | 2,243,377,613 | 1,164,716,548 | 1,078,661,065 | 51.9 | 48.1 |

※WHA55(2002b), 4-10; WHA56(2003b), 4-9; WHA57(2004b), 4-11; WHA58(2005b), 4-10; WHA59(2006b), 4-14; WHA60(2007b), 4-12; WHA61(2008b), 4-16; WHA62(2009b), 4-14; WHA63(2010b), 4-23; WHA64(2011b), 5-19; WHA65(2012b), 5-25; WHA66(2013b), 4-14; WHA67(2014b), 4-15; WHA68(2015b), 4-19; WHA69(2016b), 4-16; WHA70(2017b), 4-14; WHA71(2018b), 4-14; WHA72(2019b), 4-12を基に筆者作成。

*2000年及び2001年は、2年間の任意拠出総計、加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金を平均した参考値。

占める加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金の割合を比較すると、加盟国任意拠出金の割合は、70%から49%に低下し、非国家主体任意拠出金の割合は、30%から50%に増加した。近年では、任意拠出総計の約半分を非国家主体が拠出している。これに表1を合わせると、2018年のWHO予算は、加盟国分担金18%、加盟国任意拠出金42%、非国家主体任意拠出金39%で構成される計算となる。WHO予算は2000年以降、任意拠出金に主軸が移ったが、任意拠出金の内実も徐々に変化し、非国家主体の拠出割合が増加する道筋を辿った。WHO予算の約4割を非国家主体が自発的に担っている状況は、1990年代の加盟国分担金を主軸としたWHO予算から変化していることは明らかだろう。現在のWHOは、単純な国家間合意に基づく国際機関という一般的理解では捉えきれない特徴を有していると言えるのかもしれない。一方で、加盟国という枠組みで予算を捉え直せば、加盟国分担金及び加盟国任意拠出金を合わせたWHO予算に占める割合は6割程度となりWHOは未だ加盟国の資金を元に活動しているとも位置づけられる。いずれにせよ重要な点は、WHO予算の性質は2000年を契機に変容したという点にある。

それでは、任意拠出金は、どのような国家、非国家主体によって拠出されてい

表5：2000-2018年加盟国任意拠出金上位5カ国及び中国、割合（米ドル）

| | 任意拠出額上位5カ国 | | | | | - | 上位5カ国 総計 | 加盟国任意拠出金 に占める上位5カ国 総計の割合(%) |
|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|
| 2000-2001 | イギリス | オランダ | アメリカ | ノルウェイ | イタリア | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 190,057,815 | 169,147,558 | 147,920,099 | 48,124,080 | 36,178,641 | 340,000 | 591,428,193 | 78.0 |
| 2002-2003 | イギリス | アメリカ | カナダ | ノルウェイ | オランダ | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 186,656,137 | 163,561,632 | 73,985,156 | 80,457,838 | 78,642,450 | 340,000 | 583,303,213 | 75.8 |
| 2004-2005 | イギリス | アメリカ | カナダ | ノルウェイ | スウェーデン | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 255,295,887 | 226,463,468 | 172,498,068 | 101,380,169 | 96,231,302 | 4,460,000 | 851,868,894 | 70.2 |
| 2006-2007 | アメリカ | イギリス | カナダ | ノルウェイ | スウェーデン | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 305,668,404 | 303,593,823 | 150,849,285 | 102,395,274 | 87,274,166 | 7,305,391 | 949,780,952 | 66.8 |
| 2008-2009 | アメリカ | イギリス | ノルウェイ | カナダ | オランダ | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 424,540,852 | 205,510,011 | 103,923,252 | 96,356,532 | 81,607,343 | 4,232,333 | 911,937,990 | 63.5 |
| 2010-2011 | アメリカ | イギリス | カナダ | ノルウェイ | オーストラリア | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 438,285,683 | 288,952,392 | 154,147,294 | 113,889,562 | 91,814,872 | 2,951,149 | 1,087,089,803 | 69.6 |
| 2012 | アメリカ | イギリス | カナダ | オーストラリア | ノルウェイ | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 214,918,555 | 115,690,011 | 95,333,304 | 65,782,429 | 53,285,288 | 1,710,000 | 545,009,587 | 70.9 |
| 2013 | イギリス | アメリカ | カナダ | ノルウェイ | オーストラリア | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 270,558,531 | 179,744,341 | 121,699,438 | 68,240,578 | 61,432,007 | 6,057,062 | 701,674,895 | 67.5 |
| 2014 | アメリカ | イギリス | カナダ | ノルウェイ | オーストラリア | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 300,671,805 | 155,129,268 | 79,796,770 | 49,808,970 | 49,795,934 | 7,040,000 | 635,202,747 | 61.5 |
| 2015 | アメリカ | イギリス | ナイジェリア | カナダ | ノルウェイ | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 305,744,839 | 195,678,335 | 67,610,799 | 47,158,403 | 41,961,543 | 2,857,811 | 658,153,919 | 64.5 |
| 2016 | アメリカ | イギリス | 日本 | ドイツ | オーストラリア | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 324,156,696 | 133,843,104 | 68,247,123 | 39,662,977 | 39,660,593 | 5,170,000 | 605,570,493 | 65.8 |
| 2017 | アメリカ | イギリス | ドイツ | 日本 | ノルウェイ | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 401,108,929 | 163,734,475 | 89,942,082 | 46,726,068 | 41,631,561 | 10,584,499 | 743,143,115 | 71.4 |
| 2018 | アメリカ | イギリス | ドイツ | 日本 | クウェート | 中国 | | |
| 任意拠出額 | 281,063,159 | 205,262,406 | 154,538,249 | 86,516,036 | 60,500,000 | 6,315,132 | 787,879,850 | 67.6 |

※表4のWHO資料を基に筆者作成。

るのだろうか。任意拠出額の大きい上位5カ国と非国家主体を取り上げる。表5（2000-2018年加盟国任意拠出金上位5カ国及び中国、割合）は2000年から2018年までの加盟国任意拠出額の上位5カ国及び中国の年次推移である。中国は後の分析のため例外的に抽出した。上位5カ国の任意拠出額や総計に大きな傾向はみられないが、加盟国任意拠出金に占める上位5カ国の割合は常に6割を超えており、加盟国任意拠出金は、主に上位5カ国に支えられていることがわかる。その中でも重要な加盟国を指摘すれば、アメリカとイギリスとなろう。両国は2002年から2018年まで常に加盟国任意拠出金の最大拠出国であった。

続いて、表6（2000-2018年非国家主体任意拠出金上位5団体、割合）は2000年から2018年までの非国家主体任意拠出額の上位5団体の年次推移である。多様な非国家主体が拠出しているが、非国家主体任意拠出金に占める上位5団体の割合は例外はあるが6割程度となっている。非国家主体任意拠出金も、加盟国任意拠出金と同様に、主に上位5団体が支えている。また、2000年と2018年を比較する

表6：2000-2018年非国家主体任意拠出金上位5団体、割合（米ドル）

| | 任意拠出額上位5団体 | | | | | 上位5団体 総計 | 非国家主体任意拠 出金に占める上位5 団体総計の割合(%) |
|-----------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2000-2001 | UNICEF USA | RI | UNFIP | World Bank | Kobe Group | 355,745,901 | 76.7 |
| 任意拠出額 | 198,325,904 | 61,808,714 | 60,770,697 | 21,707,895 | 13,132,691 | | |
| 2002-2003 | GS | BMGF | UNIFIP | RI | UNAIDS | 184,442,516 | 51.7 |
| 任意拠出額 | 43,497,610 | 40,886,824 | 39,870,584 | 35,213,809 | 24,973,689 | | |
| 2004-2005 | CEC | UNDP* | UNFIP | BMGF | RI | 367,796,404 | 61.5 |
| 任意拠出額 | 115,982,518 | 82,446,318 | 71,923,926 | 61,804,897 | 35,638,745 | | |
| 2006-2007 | World Bank** | BMGF | CEC | UNIFIP | UNCERF | 640,542,537 | 49.0 |
| 任意拠出額 | 208,964,320 | 148,174,632 | 128,127,194 | 92,596,354 | 62,680,037 | | |
| 2008-2009 | BMGF | RI | EC | GAVI | HLR | 757,162,170 | 64.4 |
| 任意拠出額 | 338,737,334 | 155,669,958 | 93,569,572 | 85,185,306 | 84,000,000 | | |
| 2010-2011 | BMGF | RI | UNDP | GAVI | EC | 868,017,292 | 64.9 |
| 任意拠出額 | 446,161,801 | 116,565,898 | 109,890,218 | 98,832,852 | 96,566,523 | | |
| 2012 | BMGF | GAVI | EC | UNCERF | RI | 520,649,316 | 67.5 |
| 任意拠出額 | 266,405,630 | 92,582,495 | 63,786,386 | 54,937,681 | 42,937,124 | | |
| 2013 | BMGF | GAVI | UNCERF | EC | UNDP | 562,080,050 | 63.1 |
| 任意拠出額 | 301,338,333 | 130,356,707 | 50,095,877 | 41,787,631 | 38,501,502 | | |
| 2014 | BMGF | GAVI | RI | EC | UNDP | 565,890,308 | 58.4 |
| 任意拠出額 | 256,521,237 | 127,754,707 | 66,516,459 | 58,639,262 | 56,458,643 | | |
| 2015 | BMGF | GAVI | NPT | RI | UNDP | 501,470,814 | 61.4 |
| 任意拠出額 | 185,272,525 | 126,421,673 | 86,252,168 | 56,302,924 | 47,221,524 | | |
| 2016 | BMGF | GAVI | NPT | RI | EC | 516,344,194 | 64.8 |
| 任意拠出額 | 275,858,618 | 75,420,327 | 66,650,000 | 52,842,093 | 45,573,156 | | |
| 2017 | BMGF | World Bank | GAVI | EC | RI | 747,655,671 | 69.9 |
| 任意拠出額 | 324,654,317 | 145,568,331 | 133,365,051 | 81,956,035 | 62,111,937 | | |
| 2018 | BMGF | GAVI | UNOCHA | NPT | RI | 690,688,421 | 64.0 |
| 任意拠出額 | 228,970,196 | 158,545,964 | 135,922,608 | 85,820,188 | 81,429,465 | | |

※表4のWHO資料を基に筆者作成。

*UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund

**Fund from GAVI Fund Affiliate

CEC: Commission of the European Communities, EC: European Commission, GS: Glaxo Smithkline, HLR: Hoffmann-La Roche, NPT: National Philanthropic Trust, RI: Rotary International, UNICEF: UN Central Emergency Response Fund

と WHO プログラム予算に占める上位 5 団体の任意拠出金の割合は18%から25%に増加した。近年、加盟国に加え、これらの非国家主体も WHO 財政の中で重要な役割を担いつつあることを改めて指摘できる。これら非国家主体の中でも BMGF と GAVI は大きな影響力を持っている。両主体は2006年から2018年にかけて拠出額で上位 5 非国家主体の中に常に位置づけられている。特に BMGF は2008年から現在まで非国家主体任意拠出金の最大拠出主体である。先に任意拠出金の一般的性質として財政を不安定化せしめる効果を指摘したが、この 2 つの非国家主体については、多くの任意拠出金を安定的に拠出しているため、その意味で任意拠出金にもかかわらず、これまで WHO 予算の安定化に寄与していると位置づけられる。

以上、WHO 予算の推移や任意拠出金の性質を検討することで、2000年以降、任意拠出金の重要性が高まり、その中でも主要な主体としてアメリカ、イギリス BMGF、GAVI の存在が明らかとなった。

2. 世界保健機関ネットワークの変容

(1) アメリカとイギリスの任意拠出金の特徴

第 2 章では、アメリカ、イギリス、BMGF、GAVI の任意拠出金の特徴やその関係性を検討する。ここではアメリカとイギリスの任意拠出金の特徴を明らかにする。

表 7 (2010-2018年アメリカ、イギリス、中国項目別任意拠出金) は2010年から2018年までのアメリカ、イギリス、中国の任意拠出額と項目別拠出額が示されている¹²。この表 7 で初めに指摘できる点は、任意拠出金の内訳が現在では 8 項目に細分化されている点である。この枠組みは、任意拠出金受入側の WHO と拠出元の加盟国それぞれの立場で異なる効果を持つ。WHO からこの枠組みを捉えれば、8 項目に細分化された任意拠出金は予め使途が分類されており、任意拠出金の増額は各項目の活動を充実させる資金となるが、任意拠出金の増額それ自体が WHO の裁量権を拡大させる効果は持たない。他方、拠出元の加盟国からこの枠組みを捉えると、予め任意拠出金の使途を分類することができ、自らの理念や国益を反映することが可能な枠組みとして機能する。この特徴は、加盟国分担金と比較すると一層明らかとなる。WHO から加盟国分担金を捉えると使途を WHO の裁量で配分できる資金として位置づけられる。反対に分担金支払い国にとっては、加盟国分担金は、使途を指定できず、任意拠出金に比べ影響力を発揮しにくい資金として特徴づけられる。加盟国分担金の不払い問題などが生じた背景に、このような加盟国分担金と任意拠出金の性質の違いも指摘できよう。この特徴を踏まえば、2000年以降、WHO 予算の重心が任意拠出金に移動したことは、財政

表7：2010-2018年アメリカ、イギリス、中国項目別任意拠出金（米ドル）

| | | 任意拠出額 | A | A' | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
|------------------|-----------|--------------------|-------------|-------|------------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| | 2010-2011 | 438,285,781 | 428,885,161 | 97.9 | 0 | 6,104,522 | 3,296,000 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| ア メ リ カ | 2012 | 214,918,652 | 208,109,268 | 96.8 | 497,175 | 5,710,587 | 601,525 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| | 2013 | 179,744,441 | 179,577,482 | 99.9 | 0 | 166,859 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| | 2014 | 300,671,905 | 299,443,006 | 99.6 | 844,350 | -223,627 | 608,076 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| | 2015 | 305,744,939 | 304,890,489 | 99.7 | 247,175 | 0 | 607,175 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2016 | 324,156,728 | 169,089,776 | 52.2 | 879,512 | - | 628,103 | 90,641,308 | 62,917,977 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2017 | 401,108,972 | 172,683,699 | 43.1 | 575,617 | - | 1,254,350 | 106,089,211 | 120,506,052 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2018 | 281,063,206 | 132,951,856 | 47.3 | 41,904 | - | 697,175 | 70,243,619 | 77,128,605 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2010-2011 | 288,952,468 | 217,258,416 | 75.2 | 10,003,861 | 9,576,403 | 11,103,995 | - | - | 39,298,146 | 1,711,572 | - |
| イ ギ リ ス | 2012 | 115,690,084 | 84,206,067 | 72.8 | 6,893,116 | 1,208,314 | 3,804,033 | - | - | 19,778,481 | 0 | - |
| | 2013 | 270,558,618 | 235,366,004 | 87.0 | 5,857,104 | 1,543,210 | 6,010,768 | - | - | 21,781,445 | 0 | - |
| | 2014 | 155,129,346 | 121,084,960 | 78.1 | 3,664,123 | 2,314,815 | 3,816,793 | - | - | 24,248,577 | 0 | - |
| | 2015 | 195,678,415 | 156,864,701 | 80.2 | 3,664,122 | 0 | 3,816,794 | - | - | 21,895,884 | 0 | 9,436,834 |
| | 2016 | 133,843,142 | 51,066,586 | 38.2 | 3,664,122 | - | 3,053,435 | 36,625,090 | 21,308,871 | 18,125,000 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2017 | 163,734,497 | 36,115,276 | 22.1 | 3,664,122 | - | 3,726,383 | 75,881,155 | 18,097,558 | 18,438,573 | 6,711,408 | 1,100,000 |
| | 2018 | 205,282,431 | 52,289,473 | 25.5 | 6,067,813 | - | 5,740,861 | 60,686,016 | 36,380,596 | 31,744,488 | 6,711,410 | 5,641,749 |
| | 2010-2011 | 2,951,240 | 2,681,149 | 90.9 | 110,000 | 50,000 | 110,000 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| 中 国 | 2012 | 1,710,091 | 1,550,000 | 90.6 | 55,000 | 50,000 | 55,000 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| | 2013 | 6,057,162 | 6,057,062 | 100.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| | 2014 | 7,040,097 | 6,820,000 | 96.9 | 110,000 | 0 | 110,000 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| | 2015 | 2,857,937 | 747,811 | 26.2 | 55,000 | 0 | 55,000 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 2,000,000 |
| | 2016 | 5,170,059 | 3,060,000 | 59.2 | 55,000 | - | 55,000 | 0 | 2,000,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2017 | 10,584,570 | 7,474,499 | 70.6 | 55,000 | - | 55,000 | 0 | 3,000,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 2018 | 6,315,214 | 5,205,132 | 82.4 | 55,000 | - | 55,000 | 0 | 1,000,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

※表4のWHO資料、特に2012年以降刊行の資料を基に筆者作成。

A: 使途指定 (Voluntary contributions - specified), A': 任意拠出額に占めるAの割合 (%)

B: 人の生殖分野 (Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction)

C: 結核予防分野 (Stop TB Partnership) (2015年までの項目)

D: 熱帯医学分野 (Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases)

E: 準備・調整分野 (Special Programmes and Collaborative Arrangements) (2016年以降の項目)

F: 感染症対策分野 (Outbreak and Crisis Response) (2016年以降の項目)

G: 用途指定なし (Core voluntary contributions account)

H: 使用範囲指定 (Voluntary contributions - core) (2015年までは Other voluntary contributions - core と表記)

I: 臨時・緊急分野 (Contingency Fund for Emergencies) (2015年以降の項目)

面での WHO の裁量権が相対的に縮小し、国際機関としての自立性が一定程度低下、または活動が硬直化していることを指摘できる。

加えて、任意拠出金は、拠出元の各加盟国で異なる特徴を持っている。アメリカは最大の任意拠出金の拠出国であり、その大部分を用途を指定した資金（表 7：A）として拠出してきた。2016年からは、WHO の活動の準備・調整分野（表 7：E）や感染症対策分野（表 7：F）に拠出を開始している。イギリスは、アメリカに次ぐ任意拠出額であるが、近年は各項目に偏りなく拠出している。アメリカと同様に2016年以降は、WHO の活動の準備・調整分野（表 7：E）や感染症対策分野（表 7：F）に拠出している。英米共に任意拠出金は用途を予め指定した資金（表 7：A）が多くを占めるが、イギリスは、WHO 側が用途を決定できる資金（表 7：G, H）にも拠出している点がアメリカとの違いである¹³。中国は近年、任意拠出金を増加させているが、英米に比べると未だ少なく、加盟国任意拠出額上位に位置するまでには至っていない。2018年で英米中を比較すれば、アメリカは中国の45倍、イギリスは33倍の任意拠出金を拠出した計算になる。中国も英米と同じく主に用途を指定した資金（表 7：A）として拠出している。3カ国を比較すれば、米中は用途を指定した資金（表 7：A）を中心に拠出し、イギリスは WHO が裁量権を持つ項目（表 7：G, H）にも拠出している特徴を指摘できる。

それでは、これらの加盟国任意拠出金は、拠出元の加盟国から見てどのように位置づけられるのだろうか。各国の保健衛生分野の開発援助額から検討する¹⁴。アメリカは2018年に保健衛生分野の開発援助として総額132億ドルを支援した。そのうち51%が2国間援助であった。国連関連機関へは5.9%、7億7,360万ドルを拠出した。後述する GAVI には2億3,380万ドル拠出した。NGO（国内含む）には34%、45億ドルの支援を行った。アメリカの2018年加盟国任意拠出額は2億8,100万ドルであり、国連関連機関への拠出はアメリカの保健衛生分野の開発援助額のごく一部を占めているにすぎない。次にイギリスは2018年に総額33億ドルを支援した。そのうち25%が2国間援助であった。国連関連機関へは14%、4億7,600万ドル拠出した。後述する GAVI には2億9,630万ドル拠出した。イギリスの開発援助額はアメリカの4分の1程度であるが、GAVI への援助額ではアメリカを上回る資金を拠出している。最後に中国は2018年に6億4,470万ドルを支援した。そのうち88.8%、5億7,280万ドルが2国間援助であった。国連関連機関へは5.4%、3,500万ドル拠出している。

拠出元の加盟国から2018年の加盟国任意拠出金を捉え直すと、各国の保健衛生分野の開発援助額の一部を占めるにすぎないこと、英米中の保健衛生分野の開発援助は2国間援助が主軸であるが、多様な経路を通じて援助が展開されていることが明らかとなる。

(2) BMGF と GAVI の任意拠出金の特徴

次に BMGF と GAVI の任意拠出金の特徴を検討する。BMGF は2000年にゲイツ夫妻によって設立された¹⁵。保健衛生分野の幅広い課題、エイズ、マラリア、結核、家族計画、たばこ、栄養、ワクチンなどの解決を支援している。GAVI は2000年に設立された保健衛生分野の官民パートナーシップである¹⁶。各国政府、WHO、ユニセフ、世界銀行、BMGF などが参加している。発展途上国での予防接種率を向上させることで人々の健康を守ることを目的に据えている。2018年には6,600万人の子供に予防接種を行った実績を持っている¹⁷。

それでは表 8（2010-2018年 BMGF、GAVI 項目別任意拠出金）で特徴を検討する。表 7 と同じく2010年から2018年までの BMGF 及び GAVI の任意拠出額と項目別拠出額が示されている。BMGF と GAVI 共に、大部分を用途を指定した資金（表 8：A）として拠出している共通点がある。BMGF は、2008年から非国家主体の中で最大の拠出主体であり、人の生殖分野や熱帯医学分野（表 8：B, D）へも拠出している点が GAVI と異なる。2016年からは WHO の活動の準備・調整分野（表 8：E）に最高額の配分を行う傾向に変化した。他方、GAVI はその設立目的から明らかなように、ほぼすべてを用途を指定した資金として拠出している。

これら非国家主体任意拠出金をそれぞれの保健衛生分野の開発援助の中に位置づけたい¹⁸。BMGF は2018年に保健衛生分野の開発援助として32億ドルを支援した。そのうち67%、22億ドルを援助を必要とする主体に直接拠出した。国連関連機関へは3億7,100万ドル、GAVI に3億4,104万ドル拠出している。2018年は英米を超える資金を GAVI に拠出した計算となる。WHO を含む国連関連機関への拠出は2018年の開発援助額の1割程度であり、BMGF の WHO への任意拠出は援助の一部を占めているにすぎない。GAVI は2018年の活動のために15億ドルを支出した。GAVI には2016年から2020年にかけて92億ドルが拠出される予定であるが、イギリス（23億ドル）、BMGF（15.5億ドル）、アメリカ（10.9億ドル）、ノルウェー（8.7億ドル）、ドイツ（6.9億ドル）の拠出上位5主体で58億ドルを拠出する計画になっている¹⁹。本稿で取り上げたイギリス、アメリカ、BMGF がここでも重要な役割を果たしている。

以上から WHO への任意拠出は、2000年以降 WHO と加盟国の相対関係だけでは捉えきれない相互作用が存在することを指摘できる。WHO への任意拠出は、加盟国のみならず、非国家主体を含めた多様な主体及び、それら主体を経由するなど複数の経路から拠出され、複雑な関係が構築されていることが浮かび上がる。

表 8 : 2010-2018年 BMGF、GAVI 項目別任意拠出金 (米ドル)

| | 任意拠出額 | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I |
|---------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|------------|---|---|---|
| 2010-11 | 446,161,801 | 437,253,849 | 1,089,654 | 1,779,127 | 6,039,171 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| 2012 | 266,405,630 | 264,167,356 | 1,722,090 | 0 | 516,184 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| B | 301,338,333 | 297,714,926 | 3,623,407 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| M | 256,521,237 | 253,658,387 | 1,924,568 | 0 | 938,282 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| G | 185,272,525 | 181,820,644 | 1,484,778 | 0 | 1,967,103 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| F | 275,858,618 | 94,819,101 | 5,417,796 | - | 2,080,582 | 170,041,139 | 3,500,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2017 | 324,654,317 | 94,870,611 | 4,005,577 | - | 1,338,325 | 224,439,804 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2018 | 228,970,196 | 99,051,511 | 3,738,560 | - | 1,968,153 | 112,211,972 | 12,000,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2010-11 | 98,832,852 | 98,782,852 | 0 | 0 | 50,000 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| 2012 | 92,582,495 | 92,582,495 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| G | 130,356,707 | 130,356,707 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| A | 127,754,707 | 127,754,707 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | - |
| V | 126,421,673 | 126,421,673 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| I | 75,420,327 | 70,866,364 | 0 | - | 0 | 4,553,963 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2017 | 133,365,051 | 121,164,226 | 0 | - | 0 | 2,516,130 | 9,684,695 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2018 | 158,545,964 | 140,356,949 | 0 | - | 0 | 4,125,143 | 14,063,872 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

※表4のWHO資料、特に2012年以降刊行の資料を基に筆者作成。

- A: 使途指定(Voluntary contributions- specified)
B: 人の生殖分野(Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction)
C: 結核予防分野(Stop TB Partnership)(2015年までの項目)
D: 熱帯医学分野(Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases)
E: 準備・調整分野(Special Programmes and Collaborative Arrangements)(2016年以降の項目)
F: 感染症対策分野(Outbreak and Crisis Response)(2016年以降の項目)
G: 用途指定なし(Core voluntary contributions account)
H: 用途範囲指定(Voluntary contributions- core)(2015年まではOther voluntary contributions- coreと表記)
I: 臨時・緊急分野(Contingency Fund for Emergencies)(2015年以降の項目)

(3) スター型からメッシュ型ネットワークへ

上記のような WHO と加盟国、非国家主体の関係を WHO ネットワークの変容として捉え直したい。WHO がスター型からメッシュ型ネットワークへ変容したことを指摘する。

はじめに各ネットワークの特徴を整理する。スター型ネットワークは、図 1（ネットワーク概念図）に示されるように WHO を中心に加盟国が WHO を介して相互作用する特徴を持っている。WHO が中心となり加盟国と協力する形態である。2000年までの加盟国分担金が WHO 予算の主軸を担っていた時期は、このネットワークとして活動していた。スター型ネットワークにおいては、加盟国が主体性を発揮する場面は限られており、むしろ WHO がどのような優先順位や行動計画で活動するのか、がより重要であり、WHO が主体的な役割を担っていた。

一方、任意拠出金の割合が増加した2000年以降は、メッシュ型ネットワークへ変化したと位置づけられる。メッシュ型ネットワークは図 1 に示されるように WHO は重要な主体であるが、必ずしも中心点として機能するわけではない。多様な主体間で複数のネットワークが構築されている。2000年以降は、WHO 予算の重心が任意拠出金へ移り、英米、BMGF、GAVI の存在感が高まった。WHO やこれら主体が複数のネットワーク回路を持つハブとして機能している。そこでは WHO を介した相互作用もあれば、WHO を介さず相互作用が発生する可能性も生じうる複雑な関係が構築されている。メッシュ型ネットワークにおいても WHO は重要な主体であることは間違いないが、アメリカ、イギリス、BMGF、GAVI などと連携し、活動する必要が生じていると言える。WHO は解決を主導する主体性よりも調整的役割を求められていると位置づけられる²⁰。

このネットワーク形態の変容は、保健衛生分野の開発援助総額の年次推移からも裏付けられる。保健衛生分野の開発援助額は1990年77億ドル、1995年106億ドル、2000年134億ドル、2005年214億ドル、2010年350億ドル、2015年376億ドル、




図 1：ネットワーク概念図

2020年389億ドルと推移している²¹。注目すべき点は、2000年から10年間の援助総額の増加である。この時期はグローバル化を基調に BMGF や GAVI が設立され、健康の安全保障の概念化の影響も手伝って、WHO 予算の性質が変化した。加えて、2003年には SARS が世界的に流行し、2005年に国際保健規則が改訂された。このような国際的な課題の浮上とその対応に伴い、援助総額が急増したと考えられる。本稿で取り上げた主体以外にこの開発援助額の増加を支えた主体として NGO や世界エイズ・結核・マラリア対策基金（グローバルファンド）を指摘できる²²。NGO の保健衛生分野の開発援助は2000年には16億ドル規模であったが、2010年には103億ドルにまで増加した。グローバルファンドは2002年に設置され、2010年には36億ドルの支援規模に成長している。BMGF や GAVI 以外にも多様な主体が保健衛生分野に参画し、連携を深めている様子が伺える。それは同時に、保健衛生分野の開発援助総額に占める WHO 予算の相対的な割合の低下やネットワークがスター型からメッシュ型へ移行したことを意味するだろう。その過程で WHO は主体的役割に代わり、より調整的役割を求められるようになったのである。WHO は2000年以降、徐々に予算の性質やネットワーク形態など内的な変容を遂げていた。

3. 世界保健機関と新型コロナウイルス感染症

(1) ネットワークの変化パターン

第3章では、COVID-19への対応や課題を検討する。COVID-19の流行により2020年12月23日現在までに世界で7,791万人が罹患し、約171万人が犠牲となった²³。重症急性呼吸器症候群コロナウイルス2（SARS-CoV-2）が引き起こしたCOVID-19は世界の平和や人間の安全を脅かしたのみならず、社会、経済、文化などあらゆる側面に影響を及ぼしている。

はじめに本稿で位置づけたメッシュ型ネットワークがCOVID-19によってどのように変化しうるのが、整理したい。図2（ネットワークの変化パターン）では理念型としてWHOネットワークの3つの変化パターンを示した。①ネットワーク強化・拡大、②ネットワーク部分切断、③ネットワーク全切断である。①の強化・拡大は、COVID-19によってメッシュ型ネットワークが強化される、もしくは拡大するパターンである。主体間の連携が強化されれば、ネットワークは次第に太くなり、容易に切断できない特性を備えるようになる。また、新たな主体がネットワークに参加していくという変化である。②の部分切断は、何らかの原因により主体間のネットワークの一部が切断するパターンである。このパターンではある程度、国際協力は維持されるが、ネットワークから切り離される主体も出てくる。③全切断は、主体間の連携はなく、独自にCOVID-19に対応するパターンで




図2：ネットワークの変化パターン

ある。この他、より詳細に変化を検討すれば、ネットワークがそのまま維持される変化なしパターンやネットワークの一部が切断し、新たなネットワークが生まれる①と②を合わせたパターンなどが想定できるが、いずれも理想型の派生パターンとして位置づけられよう。

これら理想型を踏まえ、COVID-19への対応を3つの変化パターンの中で整理する。例えば、各国が水際対策や自国へのワクチン優先確保などの単独主義的な行動を進め、WHOやその他主体との連携の優先順位が低下すれば、メッシュ型ネットワークは図2の②部分切断に変化していく。それに加え、台湾などメッシュ型ネットワークから切り離される主体が増加し、アメリカのWHO脱退（2020年7月脱退通知）が現実になれば、ネットワークを再編するため③全切断のパターンに変化する可能性も生じる。他方、中国は2020年5月18、19日に開催された第73回世界保健総会において今後2年間にわたり、20億ドルを拠出することを表明した²⁴。拠出金の内訳などにより性質は変化しうるが、WHO財政の強化は、①ネットワーク強化・拡大に繋がることが予想できる。WHOも自らCOVID-19に対応するため、WHOのための新型コロナウイルス感染症連帯対応基金（COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund for WHO）を立ち上げた²⁵。個人や団体などが直接WHOを支援するための枠組みであり、2020年12月23日までに2億3,889万ドルが65万を越える個人や団体から拠出された。WHOメッシュ型ネットワークを強化する動きとして位置づけられる。今後もWHOメッシュ型ネットワークは、COVID-19によって既に生じた、あるいは生じうる出来事によって理想型の3パターンの間を浮動すると考えられる。

（2）WHOの役割とは何か？

最後にCOVID-19流行下におけるWHOの役割を改めて考えたい。WHOのCOVID-19への対応については、中立性への疑義や機能不全、その他課題などが指摘されている²⁶。WHOが役割を果たしていないという指摘は、エボラ出血熱流行

時にも存在した²⁷。これら感染症対策における批判は、WHO がこれまで天然痘の撲滅宣言、ポリオ撲滅活動に代表される多くの成果を残してきたゆえに生じたものと言える。つまり、これら批判を逆から捉えれば、WHO が感染症対策で主導的役割を演じ、COVID-19に効果的に対応できるという、期待の高さの表れともとれる。他方で、WHO の専門的な知見の提供や共有、ガイドラインの策定、感染状況のモニタリング、ワクチン供給枠組みである COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access) の構築などの活動に鑑みれば、WHO は COVID-19にも適切に対処しているとも考えられる。WHO が、どのような役割を担うべきなのか、という問題が浮上してきているのである。

本稿が検討した財政、ネットワークという視角から WHO の役割を位置づければ、WHO は2000年以降、徐々に予算の性質やネットワーク形態など内的な変容を遂げ、調整的役割を求められるようになっていた。WHO が感染症の世界的な流行対策で主導的役割を果たすべきという現実の要請と加盟国の協力を基礎に調整的役割を担う WHO の役割が乖離していることが COVID-19への対応の中で顕在化したと言えるのではないか。過去に流行した感染症からも明らかのように、COVID-19の世界的流行に個別主体で対応することは困難であり、WHO が感染症対策で負うべき役割は大きい。しかし、本稿で指摘した WHO メッシュ型ネットワークは危機が到来した際に自律的に動き出すメカニズムとは言えない²⁸。加盟国が国際協力を始めることで初めて WHO が調整的役割を発揮し、メッシュ型ネットワークが機能する。WHO の役割は、今後の国際社会の要請、WHO の特徴、参画する主体の役割などの相互作用の中で調整され、再定位されていくものと考えられる。COVID-19は WHO が果たすべき役割とは何か、国際機関の存在意義そのものを問い直す必要性を明らかにした。

おわりに

本稿では、WHO の財政やネットワーク、COVID-19への対応を検討した。2000年以降、WHO はその内実を変化させながら、保健衛生分野や COVID-19へ対応してきたことが明らかとなった。

改めて保健衛生分野から世界の平和と人間の安全保障の関係を考察したい。保健衛生分野は、公衆衛生国際事務局の設立など機能的協力の歴史に鑑みれば、これまで国際協力が成立しやすい分野として位置づけられてきた。そして WHO が掲げる、すべての人民が可能な最高の健康水準に到達するという目的は、人間の安全保障と調和し、WHO は、これまで人間の健康の増進と安全の確保に大きく貢献している。一方で、COVID-19への対応においては、そのような国際協力に加え、国家による単独主義的な行動も一部で目立っている。それは解決を主導でき

る主体や枠組みが主導権を握る望ましい協力の形として捉えられるが、国家が主導する問題解決は、これまでの協力方法に修正を迫り、その範囲や内容を変容させる契機も含んでいる。保健衛生分野で培われた技術や知見を基に国際協力のあり方やその関係性を絶え間なく調整し、COVID-19に対処できる国際協力の形を構築していくことが望まれる。翻って、新たな課題が生じた際に解決方法やそれら関係性を問い直していく思考法は、保健衛生分野に限らず、本号のテーマ「世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威」についても求められていると言えるのではないだろうか。

注

- ¹ 例えば、『人間開発報告書1994』では、人間の安全に対する脅威を7種類、1. 経済、2. 食糧、3. 健康、4. 環境、5. 個人、6. 地域社会、7. 政治の安全保障に分類している。UNDP. *Human Development Report 1994* (NY: Oxford Univ. Pre., 1994), 24-25.
- ² 吉川元『国際平和とは何か』中央公論新社、2015年、414頁。
- ³ 人間の安全保障委員会『安全保障の今日的課題』朝日新聞社、2003年、179-212頁。
- ⁴ PHEIC (Public Health Emergency of International Concern) 宣言はこれまで5回宣言された。2009年4月の新型インフルエンザで初宣言以降、2014年5月の野生型ポリオウイルス、2014年8月のエボラ出血熱、2016年2月のジカ熱、2019年9月エボラ出血熱（コンゴ共和国）である。
- ⁵ 国際機関財政の研究として、田所昌幸『国連財政—予算から見た国連の実像』有斐閣、1996年が上げられる
- ⁶ WHO 資料では、表1の1992年から1996年までの加盟国分担金は、Effective working budget と記載され、任意拠出金は、Voluntary fund for health promotion と記載されている。
- ⁷ WHO の任意拠出金の重要性を指摘した研究として、田所昌幸、城山英明編『国際機関と日本』日本経済評論社、2004年、第8章「WHO」、283-308頁や Vaughan, J. Patrick et al. “Financing the World Health Organisation: global importance of extrabudgetary funds,” *Health Policy*, 35 (1996), 229-245. を上げられる。しかし、いずれも研究も本稿が主に対象にしている2000年代以降の WHO 財政は分析していない。
- ⁸ 表2は Global Policy Forum (GPF) のデータを参照して作成したため、本稿が用いた WHO 資料と任意拠出額が異なる場合がある。表2は、GPF の1992年時点の任意拠出金の上位5国連専門機関を抽出して作成した。GPF では1971年から2017年までの13の国連専門機関の任意拠出金の年次推移及び任意拠出金総計が示されている。
- ⁹ WHA72 (2019a), 18.
- ¹⁰ 1955年の任意拠出金は0と計上されている。
- ¹¹ Lee, Kelley. *The World Health Organization* (GB: Routledge, 2009), 42.
- ¹² 各項目の年次推移が比較可能な2010年以降のデータを抽出した。それ以前、例えば、2009年の項目は、全8項目1.Voluntary contributions- specified, 2.Special Programme of Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, 3.Stop TB Partnership, 4.Special Programme on Research, Development and Training in Human Reproduction, 5.Roll Back Malaria Partnership, 6.Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council, 7.Core voluntary contributions account, 8.Other voluntary contributions- core となっている。WHA63 (2010b), 4-23.

- ¹³ WHO 側から捉える任意拠出金の自由度は G (Core voluntary contributions account) が一番高く、H (Voluntary contributions- core)、A (Voluntary contributions- specified) の順に低くなる。拠出元から捉えれば、A (Voluntary contributions- specified) が自らの考えを最も反映できる項目となる。WHA72 (2019b), 2.
- ¹⁴ Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). *Financing Global Health 2018: Countries and Programs in Transition* (Seattle, WA: IHME, 2019). (http://www.healthdata.org/sites/default/files/files/policy_report/FGH/2019/FGH_2018_full-report.pdf) (2020年7月10日最終閲覧), 53-54, 57.
- ¹⁵ Harman, Sophie. *Global Health Governance* (GB: Routledge, 2012), 61-65.
- ¹⁶ Adlidge, Geoff et al. “Public-Private Partnership to Promote Health: The GAVI Alliance Experience,” in Clapham, Andrew et al. *Realizing the Right to Health (Swiss Human Rights Book Vol.3)* (Berne: rüffer&rub, 2009), 539-547.
- ¹⁷ GAVI Facts & figures (updated June 2020). (<https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/document/2020/Gavi-Facts-and-figures-June.pdf>) (2020年8月10日最終閲覧)
- ¹⁸ IHME, op.cit., 60-61.
- ¹⁹ Current period 2016-2020. (<https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/funding/current-period-2016-2020>) (2020年7月8日最終閲覧)
- ²⁰ 図1はネットワークを概念的に示したにすぎないが、WHO ネットワークの一部をマッピングした研究も存在する。Hoffman, Steven J. et al. *Mapping Global Health Architecture to Inform the Future (Research Paper)* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2015). (https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150120GlobalHealthArchitectureHoffmanColePearcey.pdf) (2020年6月27日最終閲覧)
- ²¹ IHME, op.cit., 145.
- ²² グローバルファンド (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) は2002年設立の官民パートナーシップ。発展途上国へ世界三大疾病と言われるエイズ、結核、マラリア対策の資金を提供している。
<https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html> (2020年12月23日最終閲覧)
- ²³ <https://www.who.int/about/governance/world-health-assembly/seventy-third-world-health-assembly> (2020年8月24日最終閲覧) 習近平の演説は2020年5月18日 Session1 (12:00-18:15) の21分8秒から32分9秒。
- ²⁴ <https://covid19responsefund.org/en/> (2020年12月23日最終閲覧)
- ²⁵ 例えば、詫摩佳代「アメリカと WHO ～新型コロナを巡って浮上した国際保健協力の課題～」2020年7月21日 (<https://www.tkfd.or.jp/research/detail.php?id=3488>) (2020年7月23日最終閲覧)、秋山信将「新型コロナウイルス対応から見る WHO の危機対応体制の課題」2020年5月17日 (<https://www.jiia.or.jp/column/challenges-for-WHO.html.html>) (2020年6月8日最終閲覧)。
- ²⁶ WHO の機能不全については、2009年の新型インフルエンザや2014年のエボラ出血熱流行時にも同様の指摘がなされている。Cueto, Marcos, Brown, Theodore M., Fee, Elizabeth. *The World Health Organization: A History* (UK: Cambridge Univ. Pre., 2019), 320-326.
- ²⁷ スチュワート・パトリック「グローバルパンデミックと WHO」『フォーリン・アフェアーズ・リポート』2020年、No.8、90-100頁。

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特集論文

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」

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はじめに

欧州における冷戦を終結させた要因の一つは、1975年に調印されたヘルシンキ最終議定書に始まる欧州安全保障協力会議（CSCE）である。1990年以降、様々な会議・文書・宣言において民主主義理念（民主主義規範）に対する確認を行っており、特に中東欧諸国において全体主義の復活を防止し民主主義規範の浸透を図るために、CSCE では自由選挙事務所の設置や使節団の派遣などを通じ、民主主義規範を確固たるものとすることを試みた。このように CSCE、欧州安全保障協力機構（OSCE）では1990年パリ憲章以降、民主主義及び人権の国際規範化が進展し、1999年に合意された OSCE イスタンブール宣言では、本来は国内管轄事項であるはずの国内の政治体制が国際の平和と安定と相互連関係にある、とされた。これは「包括的安全保障（Comprehensive Security）」概念であり、冷戦終結以降の OSCE 諸活動の総括でもあった。

しかし一方で、OSCE では1994年に開催された CSCE ブダペスト首脳会議でエリツィン（Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin）ロシア大統領が指摘するように、西側の価値観であるとみなされてきた民主主義規範の「押し付け」に対する抵抗もみられた。この「西側の価値観の押し付け」がいわゆる「ウィーンの東（East of Vienna）」問題である。当該概念に関しては、すでにエリツィン・ロシア大統領の「冷たい平和（Cold Peace）」演説に代表されるように、1990年代に EU・NATO への加盟の可能性が低い CIS 諸国を中心に指摘が行われてきた。このような「ウィーンの東」諸国では、OSCE のいう「民主主義規範」を表面上は遵守しているように見せかけている。例えばロシアを含めた CIS 諸国では定期的に議会や大統領選挙を実施し、形式的には複数政党制からなる民主主義制度が導入されている。しかし実態として野党は弾圧されるか、もしくは政府系メディアや行政府などが与党に有利なように行動し、与野党間に不均衡が存在するいわゆる「競争型権威主義体制」となっていることが多い¹。即ち、選挙の定期的な開催などで形式的には遵守されているように見え OSCE の民主主義規範は、事実上 CIS 諸国では形式化され、かつその形式化に関して OSCE やアメリカ、EU 諸国からはしばしば批判をされる。

この競争型権威主義体制はロシアのみならず CIS 諸国で広汎にみられる事象で

あり、欧州連合（EU）や北大西洋条約機構（NATO）に加盟、もしくは加盟候補国である中東欧諸国やバルカン諸国では民主主義規範が確立されているといえるが、CIS 諸国ではアメリカの NGO フリーダム・ハウスの統計資料でも明らかなように、競争的権威主義化の一途をたどっている。ソ連崩壊時には権威主義的政府の多い中央アジアにおける民主化の旗手と期待されたキルギスタンのアカエフ（Askar Akayevich Akayev）大統領が、政権末期には権威主義化していき最終的には2005年に発生した革命によって政権が打倒されたことをその一例としてあげることができる。

近年のこのような動きに対して、吉川元は「分断される OSCE 安全保障共同体」²と指摘を行っている。即ち、CIS 諸国と欧州諸国の分裂は、はたしてどのように発生したのか。東欧革命以降の CSCE の諸文書では少なくとも分裂を表面上確認することはできないこととの矛盾は、なぜ、どのようにして発生したのか。現状では明確に分裂傾向を見せている欧州国際政治の規範的亀裂を OSCE はなぜ止められなかったのか、そして止めなかったのか。本論文では、欧州の民主主義規範の履行・不履行の明らかな差異、即ち規範の「分断」がなぜ生じうるのか、という点を分析するものである。

1. CSCE における「民主主義」と「安全保障」

1-1. 冷戦期 CSCE プロセスにおける「民主主義」

多くの CSCE 研究者が言及するように、CSCE は1954年に開催されたアメリカ、ソ連、イギリス、フランスの4大国首脳会談におけるソ連外相モロトフ提案であった。前年のスターリン（Joseph Stalin）の死去及び後継者であるフルシチョフ（Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev）の東西両陣営の共存政策に伴い、東西両陣営の軍事的な緊張緩和を目的とするものであった³。

1973年から開始された CSCE 交渉においては、軍備管理や緊張緩和のみならず環境問題や経済協力など様々な分野の問題が討議対象となった。特に後のヘルシンキ最終議定書では第1バスケットとされた安全保障問題の中に、様々な内容が含まれることとなった。この中には第7原則において自由主義が西側の主張により盛り込まれることになったが、後に OSCE の規範として人権と並んで重要視される国家体制を問うことになる民主主義そのものに関して問題となることはなかった。また、安全保障問題がいわゆる「ハイ・ポリティクス」とみなされる一方で、人権問題などが「ロー・ポリティクス」とみなされており、関連性に関して議論されることはなかった⁴。

1-2. 冷戦終結期の「民主主義」と「平和」

1989年5月に開催されたCSCE ロンドン情報フォーラム、6月に開催されたCSCE パリ人的側面会議において、東側諸国の分裂は明確となっていた。この会合では西側のみならず東側諸国の一つであるハンガリー代表団にメディア代表が入るなど、東側諸国間においても自由化が進展しつつあったハンガリー、ポーランド及びソ連と、東ドイツ、ブルガリア、ルーマニア及びチェコスロヴァキアとの間に分断が生じつつあった⁵。

ソ連はこの会合の冒頭で、「全欧州情報審議会（Pan-European Information Council）」の設立を提案している⁶。当該提案の中ではソ連は「審議会は相互理解の促進や信頼醸成を行う」としており、またその方法に関してもジャーナリストの行動規範やジャーナリストの権利保護に関しても触れている。一方でチェコスロヴァキアや東ドイツはネオナチの取締りなど、東側諸国の従来の主張を繰り返していた⁷。この点に関する最強硬派であったルーマニアにいたっては、情報の交換が信頼醸成に有用である点を述べつつも、「それ（情報の交換：筆者注）はまた相互の国家の経済的、社会的そして文化的発展の度合いを反映するべきであり、また人々の関心や、安全保障や平和に十分に資することに焦点を当てなければならない」と述べ、従来の東側の見解を反映したものであった⁸。

このように東西の隔たりが大きく、かつ東側ブロックがかつてのように一枚岩でないことも反映し、最終合意文書提案は東側からはなく、西側提案並びに非同盟・中立ブロック提案のみであった⁹。ルーマニアなどが最終文書の採択に反対したこともあり、ロンドン情報フォーラムでは最終合意文書の採択が見送られることとなった。またパリ人的側面会議においても同様の事態によって最終合意文書の採択が見送られており、東側諸国における分裂は進展していた。

1989年11月のチェコスロヴァキア、ブルガリア、12月のルーマニアのチャウシェスク政権崩壊に至る一連の東欧革命が終了した後の、1990年6月に開催されたCSCE コペンハーゲン人的側面会議では東欧諸国の代表団は相次いで共産党政権が付していたCSCEの様々な留保に関して撤回を行った¹⁰。このことは東西両陣営間において「民主主義」に関して対立がもはや存在しない、ということであり、西側の「民主主義」が東西両陣営の共通認識となっていたのである。換言すると、西側の「民主主義」が全欧州の「民主主義規範」としてみなされたということである。

1990年8月に始まるパリ憲章準備会合は、途中に湾岸戦争対応を主としたニューヨーク閣僚級会合を挟み、10月まで開催された。この会議では、単に言葉として「民主主義」を唱えるのではなく、コペンハーゲン人的側面会議における具体的な決定内容としての「民主主義」の監視を明確化することとなった。

そのために導入されたのが、選挙監視である。コペンハーゲン人的側面会議に

おける決定事項の CSCE 参加各国へ順守しているかどうかという点に関し、その点を監視する機関として、自由選挙事務所の設置が決定され、それまで体制翼賛選挙の経験しかなかった中東欧諸国に対し、自由選挙事務所は自由選挙に関する行動規範などを教育した¹¹。またその行動規範に対する逸脱行為の有無に関して、選挙準備段階から数度にわたり専門家を派遣して監視にあたり、その報告書は CSCE 事務局高級実務者委員会（CSCE Committee of Senior Officials：CSO）を通じて参加国すべてに回覧されるようにした。

このように、パリ首脳会議並びにパリ憲章では「民主主義」並びにそれを表象するものとしての「選挙」、そしてそれらを制度的に担保する役割を担う選挙監視に関して全参加国の合意形成がなされた。共産主義体制崩壊後の自由選挙が一巡した1991年夏ごろには、自由選挙事務所に対し新たな権限を付与することを求める参加国が登場した。その議論の契機はオスロ民主制度専門家会議であった。

オスロ会合では、多数の参加国が自由選挙事務所の選挙監視の実績に対し好意的な姿勢を見せ、自由選挙事務所の選挙監視メカニズムをさらに制度化することを求めた。ただし、オスロ専門家会議はあくまで「専門家会合」であるために、フランスやアメリカは各国政府の関与による決定を求めている。そのため、オスロ専門家会議では「求める」という表現にとどまるものであった。特にフランスは、欧州評議会との権限重複問題に対し懸念を示していた。従来西欧諸国での枠組みでは、選挙などの民主制度に関する問題は欧州審議会が関与するものであった。しかしここで自由選挙事務所の選挙監視に関して権限強化が実現すると、欧州審議会とどのように調整を図るのか、という問題が存在したが、これは1月以降に開催されるプラハ閣僚級会合、ヘルシンキ首脳会議における検討課題とされた。

民主制度・人権事務所が成立したのは、1992年3月から開始されたヘルシンキ首脳会議準備会合における議論の結果であった。ヘルシンキ準備会合では、自由選挙事務所に従来付与されていた選挙監視機能に人権に関する総合的な監視メカニズムを付与し、民主制度・人権事務所として発展的解消を遂げることとなった。このように、コペンハーゲン CHD やパリ憲章において参加国間で合意形成がなされてきた民主主義規範は、1999年に開催されたイスタンブール首脳会議における「欧州安全保障憲章（Charter for European Security）」における包括的安全保障（Comprehensive Security）概念へとつながっていくのである¹²。

2. 「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」

しかしながら、このような民主主義規範は CSCE/OSCE の全ての参加国に共有されてきたわけではない。本来ならば合意形成した以上、すべての参加国が順

守を期待される規範であるが、その規範に対して反発する国も存在してきた。冒頭にも論じたように1994年に開催された CSCE ブダペスト首脳会議において、当時のロシア大統領エリツィンが「冷たい平和」と発言したように、既にロシアなどの CIS 諸国からは、西側主導である CSCE の規範形成に対して批判的な視線が向けられていた。

特に1990年代後半からは、西側主導の規範形成とともに CIS 諸国と西側における OSCE の対応の相違などに関して批判が行われるようになった。2000年代に入ってから「ウィーンの東」という語を用いて、「教師のようにふるまう西側諸国」と「生徒である『ウィーンの東』諸国」の対比が存在し、西側諸国が「教師のように」規範を東側に押し付ける構図を描き出して批判を繰り返した¹³。具体的には民主制度・人権事務所の選挙監視活動や長期滞在型使節団の活動などにその矛先が向けられてきた。2003年のロシア議会選挙における民主制度・人権事務所、OSCE 議員総会及び欧州審議会議員総会三者合同報告書による選挙批判が、ロシアの態度硬化並びに民主制度・人権事務所への批判のターニング・ポイントとなった¹⁴。特にロシアを中心とする「ウィーンの東」諸国は常設理事会の場において繰り返し民主制度・人権事務所の政治化に対し批判を重ね、2004年ソフィア閣僚級理事会ではロシアを中心とする 8 カ国外相、2007年マドリッド閣僚級理事会ではロシア外相ラブロフ (Sergey Lavrov) が再度民主制度・人権事務所を名指しで取り上げる事態にまで発展した¹⁵。このようなロシアや CIS 諸国の民主制度・人権事務所に対する批判はそのまま OSCE 本体への批判であり、また OSCE が築き上げてきた民主主義規範に対する批判でもあった。

このような「教師」としての OSCE 及び「ウィーンの西」諸国と、「生徒」としての「ウィーンの東」諸国の対立の構図は、長期滞在型使節団に関しても同様の批判が存在した。CSCE/OSCE では、1992年に展開が始まった OSCE コソヴォ・サンジャック・ヴォイヴォディナ使節団、OSCE スコピエ使節団を皮切りに、1990年代後半からは紛争地域ではない中央アジア地域などにも長期滞在型使節団が展開するようになった。旧ソ連諸国でも1992年にはエストニア、1993年にはラトヴィアに使節団が展開し、その後 CIS 諸国へと使節団が派遣されている¹⁶。

長期滞在型使節団はその使節団毎に任務が異なるものではあるが、基本的には OSCE 常設理事会において反対がなければ半年ごとに任期が更新される。バルト三国でもリトアニアと異なり、エストニア、ラトヴィアは国内にラトヴィア・エストニア在住スラヴ系市民の市民権問題が存在していた¹⁷。使節団はその任務にそのような問題への対処も含有されていたが、2001年にはラトヴィア使節団、エストニア使節団共に撤退する¹⁸。この撤退に関してはそのスラヴ系市民の市民権問題が十分な解決を見ていないにもかかわらず、EU 加盟に伴い撤退したことで、ロシアや CIS 諸国側の OSCE の二重基準批判に一定の正当性を与えてしまうこと

| 地域・国名 | OSCE 使節団名 ²⁰ | 設立年 | 終了年 |
|------------------|--|-------|---------------------|
| バルカン | | | |
| クロアチア | OSCE クロアチア使節団 | 1996年 | 2007年 |
| | OSCE ザグレブ事務所 | 2007年 | 2011年 |
| アルバニア | OSCE アルバニア使節団 | 1997年 | 継続 |
| ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナ | ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナにおける OSCE 議長国議長個人代表 ²¹ | 1995年 | 2015年 |
| | OSCE サラエヴォ使節団 ²² | 1994年 | 1995年 |
| | OSCE ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナ使節団 ²³ | 1995年 | 継続 |
| コソヴォ | OSCE コソヴォ検証使節団 | 1998年 | 1999年 |
| | OSCE コソヴォ使節団 ²⁴ | 1999年 | 継続 |
| モンテネグロ | OSCE モンテネグロ使節団 ²⁵ | 2006年 | 継続 |
| セルビア | OSCE セルビア使節団 | 2001年 | 継続 |
| セルビア・コソヴォ | OSCE コソヴォ・サンジャック・ヴォイヴォディナ使節団 | 1992年 | 1993年 ²⁶ |
| 北マケドニア | OSCE スコピエ使節団 ²⁷ | 1992年 | 継続 |
| 東欧 ²⁸ | | | |
| モルドヴァ | OSCE モルドヴァ使節団 | 1993年 | 継続 |
| ウクライナ | OSCE ウクライナ使節団 | 1994年 | 1999年 |
| | OSCE ウクライナ・プロジェクト調整官事務所 | 1999年 | 継続 |
| | OSCE ウクライナ特別監視使節団 | 2014年 | 継続 |
| | グコヴァ及びドネツクにおけるロシア・チェックポイント監視使節団 | 2014年 | 継続 |
| ベラルーシ | OSCE ミンスク事務所 | 2002年 | 2010年 |
| | OSCE ベラルーシ助言・監視グループ | 1997年 | 2002年 |
| 南カフカス | | | |
| アルメニア | OSCE エレバン事務所 | 1999年 | 2017年 |
| アゼルバイジャン | バクー・プロジェクト調整官事務所 | 2000年 | 2015年 |
| ジョージア | OSCE グルジア使節団 | 1992年 | 2009年 |
| ナゴルノ・カラバフ | OSCE ミンスク会議における紛争に関する議長国議長個人代表 | 1995年 | 継続 |

| | | | |
|----------|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| チェチェン | OSCE チェチェン・アシスタント・グループ ²⁹ | 1995年 | 2003年 |
| バルト三国 | | | |
| ラトヴィア | OSCE ラトヴィア使節団 | 1993年 | 2001年 |
| | OSCE スクルンダ・レーダー基地に関する共同委員会代表 | 1994年 | 1999年 |
| エストニア | OSCE エストニア使節団 | 1992年 | 2001年 |
| | OSCE 軍人恩給に関するエストニア専門家委員会代表 | 1994年 | 2006年 |
| 中央アジア | | | |
| トルクメニスタン | OSCE アシハバード・センター | 1998年 | 継続 |
| カザフスタン | OSCE スルスタン・プログラム事務所 ³⁰ | 1998年 | 継続 |
| キルギス | OSCE ビシュケク・プログラム事務所 ³¹ | 1998年 | 継続 |
| タジキスタン | OSCE ドウシャンベ・センター ³² | 1993年 | 2008年 |
| | OSCE ドウシャンベ・プログラム事務所 ³³ | 2008年 | 継続 |
| ウズベキスタン | OSCE タシュケント・センター ³⁴ | 2000年 | 2006年 |
| | OSCE ウズベキスタン・プロジェクト調整官事務所 | 2006年 | 継続 |

表 1. OSCE 歴代使節団一覧³⁵

| 国名 | 選挙監視回数 | 国名 | 選挙監視回数 |
|--------------------------------|--------|--------------|---------|
| 旧西側・冷戦期からの欧州審議会加盟国 (ウィーンの西) | | 旧東側 (ウィーンの東) | |
| アイスランド | 2 (2) | アルバニア | 8 (0) |
| アイルランド | 0 | エストニア | 4 (4) |
| イギリス | 5 (5) | スロヴァキア | 4 (4) |
| イタリア | 3 (3) | チェコ | 2 (2) |
| オーストリア | 4 (4) | ハンガリー | 3 (1) |
| オランダ | 4 (4) | ブルガリア | 8 (2) |
| ギリシア | 3 (3) | ポーランド | 5 (4) |
| スイス | 3 (3) | ラトヴィア | 4 (1) |
| スウェーデン | 0 | リトアニア | 3 (3) |
| スペイン | 4 (4) | ルーマニア | 4 (4) |
| デンマーク | 0 | 合計 (10カ国) | 45 (25) |
| ドイツ | 2 (2) | | |

| | | | |
|-----------|---------|---------------------|---------|
| トルコ | 9 (4) | 旧ユーゴスラヴィア | |
| ノルウェー | 3 (3) | クロアチア | 5 (2) |
| フィンランド | 1 (1) | スロヴェニア | 2 (2) |
| フランス | 3 (3) | セルビア | 9 (2) |
| ベルギー | 2 (2) | ボスニア | 5 (0) |
| ポルトガル | 1 (1) | 北マケドニア ¹ | 11 (1) |
| ルクセンブルク | 0 | モンテネグロ | 7 (0) |
| 小計 (19カ国) | 49 (44) | 合計 (6カ国) | 39 (7) |
| | | | |
| 北アメリカ | | 旧ソ連・CIS (ウィーンの前) | |
| アメリカ | 5 (1) | アゼルバイジャン | 6 (1) |
| カナダ | 2 (2) | アルメニア | 6 (1) |
| 小計 | 7 (3) | ウクライナ | 11 (1) |
| 合計 (21カ国) | 56 (47) | ウズベキスタン | 6 (1) |
| | | カザフスタン | 8 (0) |
| 非同盟・中立 | | キルギス | 11 (0) |
| アンドラ | 0 | ジョージア | 10 (1) |
| キプロス | 2 (2) | タジキスタン | 7 (3) |
| サンマリノ | 0 | トルクメニスタン | 2 (2) |
| バチカン | 0 | ベラルーシ | 8 (0) |
| マルタ | 2 (2) | モルドヴァ ² | 13 (0) |
| モナコ | 1 (1) | ロシア | 3 (0) |
| リヒテンシュタイン | 0 | 合計 (12カ国) | 69 (10) |
| 合計 (7カ国) | 5 (5) | | |
| | | その他 | |
| アジア | | アフガニスタン | 1 (0) |
| モンゴル | 3 (0) | 欧州連合 (欧州議会) | 1 (1) |
| 合計 | 3 (0) | 合計 | 2 (1) |

表2. OSCE 選挙監視の回数 (2005年1月1日～2021年12月31日、2021年は予定を含む)³⁶
 () 内は、選挙監視活動のうち EAMs、EET の回数である。(OSCE ODIHR 年報より筆者作成)³⁷

¹ マケドニア・旧ユーゴスラヴィア共和国 (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM) がギリシアとの交渉を経て、2019年に北マケドニア共和国の名称の使用を開始した。

² 2006年にガガウズ地域にて実施。

になった。即ち、CIS 諸国側からはエストニアやラトヴィアでは人権遵守が不十分であるのに、EU 加盟国であるがゆえに民主主義規範を遵守していると OSCE や民主制度・人権事務所はみなしたと考えたのである¹⁹。

表 2. は、民主制度・人権事務所によって実施された選挙監視の回数である。この表から明白なことは、旧ソ連圏のうち、CIS 諸国の選挙監視実施回数と比較して、「ウィーンの西」諸国の選挙監視回数が極端に少ないことである。またその選挙監視の内容に関しても2000年以降、「ウィーンの西」諸国へも選挙監視を実施しているが、トルコを除き選挙当日のみの監視活動（Limited Election Observations: LEOM）、選挙評価使節団（Election Assessment Missions: EAMs）、選挙専門家チーム（Election Expert Team:EET）の派遣にとどまっており、この傾向は旧東側諸国であっても EU 加盟国にも同様の傾向がみられる。一方で、CIS 諸国などの「ウィーンの東」諸国ではフルサイズ選挙監視が実施されており、「ウィーン」の東西での不均衡となっている。

エストニア、ラトヴィア使節団撤退や、選挙監視の不均衡と並んで「ウィーンの東」諸国から批判が起きた背景には、OSCE 内部の人事問題も挙げることができる。OSCE の民主制度・人権事務所長、少数民族高等弁務官、自由メディア代表並びに OSCE 議長国、いずれの機関も「ウィーンの西」諸国で占められている³⁸。議長国は「ウィーンの東」諸国からは2010年のカザフスタン、2013年のウクライナが選出されているが、それ以外はすべて「ウィーンの西」諸国である。

| 年 | 国 | 年 | 国 | 年 | 国 | 年 | 国 |
|------|----------------|------|--------|------|--------|------|---------------------|
| 1991 | ドイツ | 2001 | ルーマニア | 2011 | リトアニア | 2021 | スウェーデン |
| 1992 | チェコ・スロ ヴァキア | 2002 | ポルトガル | 2012 | アイルランド | 2022 | ポーランド ⁴⁰ |
| 1993 | スウェーデン | 2003 | オランダ | 2013 | ウクライナ | | |
| 1994 | イタリア | 2004 | ブルガリア | 2014 | スイス | | |
| 1995 | ハンガリー | 2005 | スロヴェニア | 2015 | セルビア | | |
| 1996 | スイス | 2006 | ベルギー | 2016 | ドイツ | | |
| 1997 | デンマーク | 2007 | スペイン | 2017 | オーストリア | | |
| 1998 | ポーランド | 2008 | アイスランド | 2018 | イタリア | | |
| 1999 | ノルウェー | 2009 | ギリシア | 2019 | スロヴァキア | | |
| 2000 | オーストリア | 2010 | カザフスタン | 2020 | アルバニア | | |

表 3. OSCE 議長国一覧⁴¹

しかも2016年からは「ウィーンの西」諸国が二巡目の議長国となっており、カザフスタンとウクライナを除外した CIS 諸国は議長国の選出から排除されているのである³⁹。

3. OSCE における「分断」と民主主義

以上に検討してきたように、OSCE においては「ウィーンの西」と「ウィーンの東」に分断されていることは、参加国の認識からも実際の活動からも明らかである。それでは、なぜ OSCE では合意形成されたはずの民主主義規範に反するような「分断」が生じたのであろうか。

まず一点目には、規範接続の面から分析することが可能である。規範の確立及び受容に関しては、対人地雷の全廃プロセスについて地雷使用に関する規範の成立過程を分析し、いかに規範がアクターの間で認識され受容されたのか、という点を分析したプライス (Richard Price) の研究が存在している⁴²。このプライスの規範に関する研究によると、類似もしくは隣接する規範の接着 (接続) が行われることによって、規範の受容がアクターによって行われることがあり、また第三国 (者) による規範受容要求に関しても被要求国の受容可能性を高める、とする。このプライスの議論を OSCE の議論に演繹すると、OSCE と EU 加盟候補国の民主主義規範受容に関し検討し分析することが可能となる。

OSCE の民主主義規範は前節にて検討してきたように、特に東欧革命以降に展開し確立されてきたものである。そしてその参加国への規範受容に関しては、CSCE・OSCE の会合などで数度に渡り合意形成がなされ、そして民主制度・人権事務所などの諸機関も設置され、選挙監視なども行われている。しかしながらプライスの議論にあるように、そのような規範受容性を高めるには、OSCE 単体のみの力ではなく、OSCE からは第三者の国際機構である EU や NATO の規範受容への要求が大きなものであったと考えることができる。冷戦終結後に旧東側諸国が NATO や EU に加盟申請を行った際、NATO も EU も国内統治に関する民主主義的正当性を要求した。特に EU は1993年のコペンハーゲン欧州理事会において、EU の東方拡大に関して EU のアキ・コミュニテールの国内法との整合性を求めると同時に、民主主義体制の確立を加盟条件とした、コペンハーゲン基準 (Copenhagen Criteria) を策定した。ワルシャワ条約機構解体後に生じた力の空白、ソ連解体後のロシアの政治的不安定化や旧ユーゴスラヴィアでの民族紛争の発生など、旧東側諸国ではそれら諸問題に対処するために EU や NATO への加盟を最大の目標とし、国内の改革を実施した。もちろん CSCE・OSCE の規範創造者としての力は無視することはできないが、同じく第三者である EU の要求が、EU 加盟候補国であり且つ OSCE 参加国が規範を受容する大きな動機となったと考えることができ

る。

一方で、ロシアが「近い外国」とみなすバルト三国を除く CIS 諸国では、近い将来の EU・NATO 加盟に関してその可能性は低い。EU 加盟候補国であった中東欧諸国とは異なり、「規範受容を要求する」第三者が存在しない。従ってそれらの諸国では、民主主義規範の受容に関して積極的姿勢を示す必要がなかった。即ち、「ウィーンの前」と「ウィーンの後」では、民主主義の規範接続に関する外部からの要因の有無によりその国内的規範受容の対応が相違したのである。

第二に、第一の要因でも検討した「規範」そのものに関する相違である。そもそも OSCE の民主主義規範とは別の規範をロシアや CIS 諸国が自国の行動の正当化要因として用いることで、分断が生じていると考えることが可能である。換言すると、OSCE の民主主義規範（規範 A）が OSCE の諸活動を正当化し、かつ「ウィーンの後」諸国による「ウィーンの前」諸国への批判を正当化する。これに対し、ロシアや CIS 諸国はそれらの活動や批判に対抗するために「対抗規範（規範 B）」を主張し、自国の諸活動に対する正当化を図っているのである。OSCE のいう規範が包括的安全保障概念であるのに対し、CIS 諸国が重視する対抗規範とは、内政不干渉政策などの従来の欧州以外の地域で展開されている国際規範ともいえるものである。

この規範の衝突の典型例は、選挙監視活動である。選挙監視活動は OSCE などの民主主義規範創設者による、規範遵守監視活動である。しかしロシアや CIS 諸国の対抗規範国は、そのような規範遵守活動に関して制約を行うのではなく、CIS 選挙監視団や CIS 選挙監視基準などの創設によって対抗的規範である規範 B を創設し、自国の民主主義規範への抵触を OSCE などの民主主義規範（規範 A）への対抗を行うと同時に自国の行為の正当化を図っている。CIS 諸国は CIS 独自に選挙監視団を派遣し、選挙結果に関して評価を行う。しかし、その評価は常に「公正な選挙であった」とするものであり、OSCE、欧州審議会や EU などの「ウィーンの後」諸国による選挙監視報告書がしばしば選挙結果の公正性に疑問を示すものであることと対照的である⁴³。

即ち規範挑戦国である「ウィーンの前」諸国はそのような CIS 選挙監視団の選挙監視報告書を元に自国の政治体制の正当性を主張し、OSCE や「ウィーンの後」諸国の民主主義規範に対抗する内政不干渉原則に基づく新たな規範（規範 B）を創設している。この新たな規範を正当性根拠として政権維持の一つの手段としており、OSCE の民主主義規範（規範 A）に関して対抗していると考えることが可能である。

おわりに

OSCEにおける規範の分断が、なぜ止められなかったのだろうか。その理由として考えられることは、一つには規範が生じた理由にもつながるが、EUやNATOの東方拡大によるOSCE自体の影響力の低下である。EUやNATOの東方拡大が欧州の政治構造や安全保障構造に大きな影響を与えたことは、多くの研究者の指摘するところである。また先にも検討した通り、エストニアやラトヴィアに展開していた使節団は、スラヴ系住民の市民権問題が依然として大きな問題として存在していたにも関わらず、両国のEU加盟を前にして撤退した。さらにクロアチア使節団は、その撤退理由を明確にクロアチアのEU加盟のためとしている。即ちEU加盟によってそのような使節団が派遣されていた国家は、OSCEの民主主義規範を遵守するものとしてOSCE側はみなしていると考えることが可能である。

このようにOSCE側が考えている証左としては、先にも検討を行った選挙監視活動の回数である。確かにEU加盟国にも選挙監視活動は実施されている。しかしながら、その回数や内容はCIS諸国よりも少なくより軽度な選挙監視活動であり、OSCE側から見るとCISの選挙は不十分なものであり、それにCIS諸国側も反発している構造がある。この構造がCIS側に独自の選挙監視基準などを設けさせることになった。この不均衡はこのようにOSCEの民主主義規範自体の分断を招き、それが長期化することとなったと考えられる。

2020年に入り感染症（COVID-19）が世界的に拡大し、各国はその対応に追われることになった。この感染症の封じ込めのために各国はロックダウンなどを実施し、また政府は様々な危機管理対応を行っている。OSCEでも3月には自由メディア代表が「パンデミックとメディアの自由」として、政府は真実の情報を流すべきであり、インターネットの遮断はしてはならないなどのメディアの勧告を行っている。また、民主制度・人権事務所も人との接触を避けるために選挙監視体制を制限するなど対応を行っている。

危機管理体制は民主主義や人権の制限につながる可能性があり、「ウィーンの東」諸国のみならず、本来であれば「ウィーンの西」諸国であるハンガリーのオルバン政権が政府権限を無制限・無期間で認める非常事態宣言を出している⁴⁴。これに対し民主制度・人権事務所は名指しはしないものの、「人権の制限に関しては期間制限と議会の関与を盛り込むべきである」とし、モスクワ人的側面会議に盛り込まれた緊急事態における人権に関する条項を示し、懸念を示す事態となっている⁴⁵。

OSCEにおける規範の分裂は、このように従来は「ウィーンの西」であるとされた国、特にハンガリーのようにEU・NATO加盟国であり北大西洋安全保障共同体であるとされる国にも及びつつある。奇しくもCSCEはブダペスト首脳会議で、

国際機構化が決定された。その OSCE が築き上げてきた民主主義規範が同じブダペストの地で揺れているのは、今後の欧州政治規範を検討していくうえで興味深い事項である。

注

- ¹ ロシアの例ではないが、競争型権威主義体制に関する国内の研究としては、久保慶一（2013）「権威主義体制における議会と選挙の役割」『アジア経済』第54巻第5号、2-10頁。
- ² 吉川元（2011）「分断される OSCE 安全保障共同体—安全保障戦略をめぐる対立と相克の軌跡」日本国際連合学会（編）『国連研究』第12号、95-122頁。
- ³ 東西両陣営の「共存」は一面では、アジア・アフリカの新興独立国において、東西どちらの体制を採用するのかという、陣営間の体制間競争であった。また米ソをはじめとした東西両陣営の援助競争は一面では、その国の体制を問うものではなかった。このことは欧州においても同様であった。また、陣営内の諸問題に関しても他の陣営は介入をしない、という暗黙の了解が存在していた。
- ⁴ 冷戦期 CSCE プロセスでは西側諸国は東側諸国における自由権の侵害を批判し、東側諸国は「社会権」をもとに西側諸国の失業などに関して批判を行っている。しかしながらコペンハーゲン人的側面会議以降、CSCE/OSCE では「人権」に関しては「自由権」が重視されるようになっており、西側「人権」と西側「民主主義」は個別のイシューとして俎上に上った。
- ⁵ この会合で、ハンガリーはポーランドと共同提案（CSCE/LIF.6、1989年5月1日）を行うなど、共同歩調をとっている。
- ⁶ CSCE/LIF.2、1989年4月26日、ソ連提案。
- ⁷ CSCE/LIF.17、1989年5月2日、東ドイツ、チェコスロヴァキア提案。
- ⁸ CSCE/LIF.58、1989年5月8日、ルーマニア提案。
- ⁹ 西側提案は CSCE/LIF.59、1989年5月8日。提案国はスペイン、共同提案国はベルギーカナダ、デンマーク、フランス、西ドイツ、ギリシア、アイスランド、アイルランド、イタリア、ルクセンブルク、オランダ、ノルウェー、ポルトガル、トルコ、イギリス、アメリカ。また、もう一点の提案は CSCE/LIF.67、1989年5月9日。提案国は西ドイツ、オーストリア、ハンガリー、イタリア、リヒテンシュタイン、ノルウェー、ポーランド、スイス。
- ¹⁰ Copenhagen Inf.2,4,5,6. ブルガリア、東ドイツ、チェコスロヴァキアは、前年のパリ人的側面会議において提出していた提案を撤回する旨、参加国に対して通知を行っている。
- ¹¹ Rob Zaagman (1994) Institutional Aspects of the CSCE Human Dimension after Helsinki-II, in Arie Bloed & Pieter van Djik (eds) (1994) *The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit and its aftermath*, Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 240-241. また、選挙管理担当者を対象に、選挙セミナーの開催なども行っている。吉川元（1994）『ヨーロッパ安全保障協力会議（CSCE）』三嶺書房、403頁。
- ¹² 欧州安全保障憲章第9条。
- ¹³ 「ウィーンの前」問題に関しては、欧州では2000年代に入ってから取り上げられ、研究がはじめられた問題である。我が国においては2011年の吉川元論文においてはじめて、OSCE における分断の分析が行われている。吉川元（2011）前掲論文、95-122頁。また、玉井雅隆（2019）「「ウィーンの前」と「ウィーンの後」—OSCE における分断とその要因」『グローバル・ガバナンス』第5号、22-44頁において「ウィーンの前」に関して論じている。なお当該論文では、CIS 諸国（ウィーンの前）側がなぜ OSCE の選挙監視を受け入れるのか、

という点に関して CIS 側の事情と OSCE 側の事情から分析を実施している。

- ¹⁴ Frank Evers (2010) OSCE Election Observation – Commitments, Methodology, Criticism, in Kurt P. Tudyka (ed) (2010) *OSCE-Yearbook 2009*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp.235-255.
- ¹⁵ MC.DEL/24/00 (2000年11月20日)、ロシア・ベラルーシ共同提案がある。この他、ソフィア閣僚級理事会の前に開催された常設理事会では、PC.DEL/630/04 (2004年7月8日提出)、PC.DEL/1022/04、PC.DEL/1023/04 (いずれも2004年10月27日提出)。ソフィア会合閣僚級理事会では C.DEL/1025/04/Corr.1 (2004年12月1日提出)。
- ¹⁶ 1990年代前半の旧ユーゴスラヴィアにおける長期滞在型使節団に関しては、ローザス (Alain Rosas) (1997) らの研究によると、OSCE の使節団の役割は 4 点に集約される。まず一点目が紛争予防ないし危機管理であり、二点目が平和維持活動、三点目が紛争の仲介、そして四点目が人的側面に関する事項である。ただし、これらの機能の比重は各使節団によって相違するが、旧ユーゴスラヴィアの紛争地域に派遣された使節団以外は、四点目の民主主義規範の順守を含めた人的側面に関する履行状況を監視する役割が大きいものであった。Allan Rosas & Timo Lahelma (1997) OSCE Long-term missions, in Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas (eds) (1997) *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security*, The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 178、及び Antonio Rafael Rubio Plo (2009) *La OSCE y su concepcion de la seguridad. La convergencia de las Organizaciones Regionales Europeas y de la OSCE en torno a una concepcion integral de la Seguridad*, Madrid:Ministerio de Defensa, 117
- ¹⁷ エストニアに関しては Rob Zaagman (1999) Conflict Prevention in the Baltic Area: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, 1993-1999, *International Helsinki Monitor*, 10 (3), 30-44. ラトヴィアに関しては、Guntis Ulmanis (2001) Experience of Co-operating with the OSCE HCNM: The Case in Latvia, *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 8 (1), 75-77
- ¹⁸ なお、エストニア、ラトヴィア両使節団の任務には明確には「スラヴ系住民」や「マイノリティ」とは書かれていない。しかしながら、「政府と地方自治体レベルの適任な当局との間で、市民権 (citizenship)、移民 (migration)、言語 (language) (中略) などの問題に関して接触を保ち、維持すること (エストニア使節団)」とされており、これらの問題はスラヴ系市民に関する問題であり、明言を避けているがスラヴ系市民の市民権問題も問題の一つとして取り扱うことになる。
- ¹⁹ EU 加盟交渉に伴うスラヴ系住民の問題に関しては、Smith, David J. (2003) Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: the Case of Estonia, *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 2003 (1), 1-37. なお、クロアチア使節団撤退に際しては明確に「EU 加盟のため」としている。
- ²⁰ OSCE の長期滞在型使節団の名称は使節団 (Mission)、事務所 (Office) など様々であるが、これは対象国の要請によるものである。
- ²¹ 正式には Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for Article IV, Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- ²² 1995年12月より、ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナ使節団に改組、吸収。
- ²³ 1994年～1995年の間は、OSCE サラエヴォ使節団 (OSCE Mission in Sarajevo)。
- ²⁴ コソヴォ使節団はコソヴォ検証使節団及びコソヴォ・タスクフォースの任務・権限を継承している (PC.DEC/305)。
- ²⁵ 2001年～2006年の間は、OSCE ボドゴリツァ事務所 (OSCE Office in Podgorica)
- ²⁶ 公式には2001年に OSCE ユーゴスラヴィア使節団 (The OSCE Mission to Yugoslavia、後の OSCE セルビア使節団) 設立を以て終了とされている。PC.DEC/411参照。

- ²⁷ 1992年～2010年の間は、OSCE スコピエ紛争波及防止使節団（OSCE Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje）。
- ²⁸ OSCE では参加国の区分として、ベラルーシ、ウクライナ、モルドヴァの三カ国を「東欧（Eastern Europe）」としている。なお、OSCE の地域区分に関しては例えば OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre（2018）*Survey of OSCE Field Operations*（SEC.GAL/110/18, 25 June 2018）参照。
- ²⁹ この使節団の名称に関しては、ロシアの合意を得るために、「使節団」ではなく「アシスタント・グループ」と名称を変更したものである。Allan Rosas and Timo Lahelma（1997）*ibid.*, 171.
- ³⁰ 第1221回常設理事会（2019年3月28日）にて名称変更を決定。2019年3月にカザフスタンの首都であるアスタナがヌルスルタンに改名したことにより、使節団の名称も OSCE アスタナ・プログラム事務所（The OSCE Programme Office in Astana）から変更された。なお権限などの変更がなく名称変更のみであるので、会合冒頭に議長国議長（Chairperson-in-Office）のスロヴェニアから口頭で伝達、承認された（PC.JOUR/1221）。第1031回常設理事会（2015年12月18日）にて、OSCE アスタナセンター（OSCE Centre in Astana）から変更された（PC.DEC/1153/Corr.1）。
- ³¹ 第1130回常設理事会（2017年1月27日）にて、OSCE ビシュケクセンター（OSCE Centre in Bishkek）から変更された（PC.DEC/1238）。
- ³² 1993年に OSCE Mission to Tajikistan として設立、その後第418回常設理事会（2002年10月31日）にてドゥシャンベ・センターに変更された（PC.DEC/500/Corr.1）。
- ³³ 第1130回常設理事会（2017年1月27日）にて、OSCE タジキスタン事務所（OSCE Office in Tajikistan）から変更された（PC.DEC/1238）。
- ³⁴ 1995年～2000年まで、OSCE 中央アジア連絡事務所（OSCE Liaison Office in Central Asia）。2000年に名称を変更した。
- ³⁵ OSCE 紛争予防センター『OSCE 現地活動団調査』（OSCE Conflict Prevent Centre（2018）*Survey of OSCE Field Operations*（SEC.GAL/110/18））、OSCE 紛争予防センター『OSCE 現地活動団調査』（OSCE Conflict Prevent Centre（2020）*Survey of OSCE Field Operations*（SEC.GAL/111/20/Corr.1*））より筆者作成。
- ³⁶ 表中の数字には、NAM（Need Assessment Mission）は回数に含まない。選挙監視の回数には長期型及び短期型使節団、限定された選挙監視に関する選挙当日のみの監視活動、選挙評価使節団、選挙専門家チームを含む。なお、表中回数0であるアイルランド、スウェーデン、デンマーク、ルクセンブルク、アンドラ、サンマリノ、バチカン、リヒテンシュタインのうち、バチカン以外にはNAMが行われている。なお、玉井（2019）前掲論文、31頁より筆者改編・加筆。
- ³⁷ OSCE の選挙監視は必要性に関する調査使節団によって選挙監視の必要性、選挙監視団派遣の期間並びに規模に関して報告が実施され、民主制度・人権事務所が長期型選挙監視団もしくは短期型選挙監視団の派遣を決定する。また、これらは準備段階からの監視活動になるが、選挙当日のみの監視活動や必要性に関する報告書によって選挙の信頼性に問題がないとみなされている場合には、選挙評価使節団が派遣される。この他、選挙専門家チームも派遣される。
- ³⁸ 議長国議長に関しては、1991年の創設時よりアメリカ、ロシアの両大国並びに地理的に欧州に存在しないカナダは議長国議長にならないとする暗黙の了解が見られる。その外の CIS 諸国に関しては、ベラルーシは OSCE との関係がミンスク事務所の職員の入国を拒否するなど、OSCE との関係性がよくない点がある。また OSCE の常設理事会が全会一致制をとっているために、民主主義規範に関して様々な問題を抱える CIS 諸国の議長国議長就

任に関して、「ウィーンの西」諸国の賛同が得られないと考えられる。

- ³⁹ この他に、「ウィーンの西」諸国ではバチカン、サンマリノ、モナコ、アンドラ、リヒテンシュタイン、ルクセンブルク、マルタが議長国とはなっていないが、いずれもいわゆる「ミニ・ステート」に類する諸国であり、議長国になるための人的資源が不足している。
- ⁴⁰ 2021年のスウェーデン、2022年のポーランドは予定である。なお、2016年のドイツからは二巡目となる。
- ⁴¹ OSCE ホームページ (<https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/former-chairpersons-in-office>) より筆者作成。最終アクセス日は2020年10月26日。表3は、玉井雅隆（2019）前掲論文、25頁を改編・加筆。
- ⁴² Richard Price（1998）"Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines" - *International Organization*, 52（3）, 613-644.
- ⁴³ 例えば2004年のウズベキスタン議会選挙では、CIS選挙監視団はその選挙を「正統性、自由そして透明性が存在している」と評するのに対し、OSCE選挙監視団は「OSCEやその他の民主的選挙に関する国際基準の重大な欠如に陥っている」とし、批判を加えているCIS側の評価に関しては、http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/030111d3b474a94cc3256f790042f6f9?OpenDocument（2020年9月10日アクセス）、民主制度・人権事務所の評価に関しては www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/41950（2020年9月10日アクセス）。
- ⁴⁴ 『コロナ非常事態宣言の無期限延長可能に、ハンガリーに欧州各国が懸念』 <https://www.afpbb.com/articles/-/3276990>（2020年12月10日アクセス）。
- ⁴⁵ <https://www.osce.org/odihr/449311>（2020年10月1日アクセス）。

Special Feature**Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order****Haruko Satoh****Co-Director****IAFOR Research Centre, Osaka School of International Public Policy****Osaka University**

The COVID-19 pandemic struck early in 2020, amidst intensifying trade war between the United States and China and speculations that a cold war may be descending between the two (Kaplan 2019). The timing of the pandemic could not have been worse, as the prospect of great power rivalry returning seemed more tangible after a decade of rapid expansion of Chinese influence in global affairs and declining American hegemony. Indeed, as if to put the current international system under a stress test, the global health crisis highlighted the fundamental weakness of the United Nations (UN) system to facilitate international cooperation when it is beset by great power discord and rivalry. The UN's global health body, the World Health Organization (WHO) was the first to fall victim, as it failed to rise above the blame game between China, the source of the new coronavirus, and the US under the helm of an impetuous "America First" president Donald Trump, who each had a major hand in crippling the organisation's ability to guide the world in fighting the new coronavirus. The fate that befell on the WHO echoed the situation at the UN, as the Secretary General Antonio Guterres' warning in April 2020 that the global health crisis was "the gravest test since the founding of the Organisation" and that the "unity and resolve of the Security Council was critical" (Guterres 2020) fell on deaf American ears in particular.¹

However, what happened to the WHO or the UN was neither new nor unforeseen. Great power competition, particularly among the permanent five members of the UN Security Council who have the veto power, has always been and still is a major factor in how the UN functions. The UN as an organisation of inter-governmental dialogue and consensus-building has evolved and maintained its relevance in part because of the veto which, as Stoessinger observed during the Cold War when the veto gained its notoriety in the context of US-Soviet rivalry, "has been not an insurmountable obstacle, but a constant incentive toward greater inventiveness and improvisation in international problem-solving" (Stoessinger 1973). Rather, the current crisis of the UN system induced by the specter of US-China rivalry speaks of a more complex and comprehensive challenge to the interna-

tional system itself, which is the increasingly complex nature of security threats—traditional and non-traditional—in a globalised world, and the pressing need for great power relations that facilitate rather than obstruct international cooperation. As Richard Haass summarised the situation: “What makes this a crisis is that the need for international cooperation is great. We face not only the revival of great power rivalry but also multiple global challenges, from pandemics and climate change to nuclear proliferation and terrorism, for which there are no unilateral answers” (Haass 2020).²

The US-China competition has now spilled well over from the economic sphere, and it will be transformative to the US-led international liberal order. This article argues that, while US-China rivalry is of great concern in itself, it should not be seen or explained through the lens of the previous great or superpower rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, while how their relationship develops has bearing on the future of the international order, discussing great power relations as something to be managed or balanced is rather like seeing the tree and not the forest that is also moving. The nature of the international system and how it operates have changed rapidly in the past 30 years as a result of the global expansion of the liberal international order. Great power relations and rivalry are interlocked in a larger the process of transforming this liberal international order toward a “World Order 2.0” (Haass 2017)³ that reflects the contemporary world of a global community that now has elements of a post-Westphalian construct of the world, and in this picture great powers should (ideally) find in their interest to cooperate rather than compete against each other. This is particularly so for great powers that are able to influence or coerce the behaviour of other smaller states, and by extension facilitate or obstruct, as the US and China have done over COVID-19, international cooperation that is crucial to addressing the challenges of non-traditional security issues.

The Cold War and now: the security order

The end of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar structure brought back a world where security conditions are not as tightly disciplined and restrained (Bertram 1995; Cooper 2002; Kagan, 2002).⁴ The high tension of the Cold War meant that any small provocation or the misreading of the other’s intention or moves by either the US or the Soviet Union, or by their allies, would trigger a chain of highly charged and frantic diplomatic manoeuvres to prevent either side from pushing the nuclear button, as in the Cuban missile crisis of 1961. The tense security environment also meant that the other major powers, particularly Britain and France in the Western alli-

ance, had little to no autonomy in their security policy decision-making, even though both countries tried to maintain a façade of greatness or grandeur despite signs of diminishing international standing and influence vis-à-vis the superpower US, a poignant point that became clear over the American intervention in the 1956-7 Suez Crisis.

The world today is not divided by ideology nor controlled by the tight leash the two Cold War superpowers kept on the behaviour of other powers and smaller states. Instead, the non-free world of the eastern camp became liberated from Soviet control, and joined the “free” world of the West, creating a world connected by a single economic system, capitalism. But it is no more peaceful than the world of strategic, cold peace under the constant fear of nuclear annihilation; rather, it is the opposite. What we have been witnessing since the 1990s is the remilitarisation of international politics among the hitherto-bound smaller states or powers that became unhinged from the iron grip of superpower discipline, “uninhibited by the prospect of an eventual superpower confrontation” (Rothschild 1995). If the Cold War temporarily stopped the national, regional or subregional clocks from ticking, freezing free interaction (peaceful or otherwise) and evolution of relations between nation-states—most born out of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s and not necessarily amicable to each other—then the end of it ushered in the “return of history” (Kagan, 2002) and a world of anarchy. From the disintegration of Yugoslavia to ethnic, tribal and religious conflicts that erupted in Africa, the Middle East to Asia, liberation also meant re-activating older fault lines and feuds, both within and between states. This, combined with the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among authoritarian states and international terrorist groups, like al Qaeda and ISIS, make a potent new cocktail of security threats.

In this new international condition there may be excessive “securitisation” of all aspects of everyday life. But an all out war between great powers is unlikely compared to localised conflicts, such as in the Middle East and Africa. The logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) that kept large scale wars between the US and the Soviet Union at bay is still operative, and nuclear deterrence remains important to the strategic stability between the nuclear powers (the P-5 of the UN Security Council: China, Britain, France, Russia and the US) and America’s non-nuclear ally powers, such as Germany, Japan and South Korea. Thus, the two main US-led regional security set-ups that survived the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and hub-and-spokes system in the Asia-Pacific, continue to function as pillars of order and stability for the respective regions. Countries in these alliances have the greatest interest in maintaining the liberal international order.

However, the new revisionist powers, particularly China and Russia and *de facto* nuclear states like Iran and North Korea, bring new uncertainties to how the security order might be organised. To say that the world has simply returned to the age of balance of power does not accurately describe the complexity of the power struggle in this post-Cold War world and beyond.

Moreover, the pandemic made it plainly known that the threats to peace and security do not come in the form of inter- or intra-state conflict alone, they cannot be combatted with guns and bombs, and that existential threats to societies and states are now more complex than ever. The UN Secretary General Guterres repeatedly warned that the COVID-19 pandemic is a “major stressor” in conflict or weaker states and a threat to global peace and security, a point he reiterated in his speech at the UN General Assembly in September.⁵ The wide-ranging impact of the pandemic on the politics, economy and society of states and relations between states was a clarion call for the international community to upgrade efforts to address non-traditional security (NTS) threats that require concerted international action. Whether they are terrorists, pandemics or climate change, non-traditional security threats are so called because they cannot be met by one state and require functional, international cooperation.

Needless to say, globalisation had a major part in creating this complex security environment and compounding the challenges for states and the international system to cope. The unbridled expansion of the neoliberal capitalist model of growth, driven by the financial markets trading on “derivatives”, flooded the world market with money, created ultra-rich billionaires, and gave face-lifts to urban landscapes globally, but it also impoverished the poorer and widened the gap between the rich and the poor even in better off countries, from Europe to Asia, especially after the Lehman shock in 2008. The rise of populism and demagoguery in democracies, the slide to authoritarianism in weaker states, and the resurgence of nationalism globally were political symptoms of the cumulative impact of globalisation.

Open and liberal economic system propelled global movements of labour, capital and goods, but this borderlessness also had its downsides, where crime, diseases, terrorism to ‘illegal’ migrants, refugees, and incessant exploitation of the natural environment were also going global: “what goes on inside a country can no longer be the concern of that country alone” (Haass, 2017). The point about today’s notion of security is in its scope, variation of actors and nature of threats they pose, in that security threats do not come from states

alone, and nor are they only of a military nature. Terrorist threats to states and society have elicited unconventional responses from states. Post-9.11 America's global "war against terrorism", from the Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq to the Philippines or Indonesia, has far exceeded the conventional understanding of war in its geographical and operational scope as well as the nebulous nature of the "enemy" (Dalpino 2001; Daalder & Lindsay 2001).⁶

The global community and sovereign obligations

Perhaps more than climate change, the deadliness of the pandemic struck a chord in the minds of policymakers and ordinary people alike of the dangers of living in an inter-connected world, especially without international cooperation to mitigate them. As a *problematique* for the international system and the global community, it has certainly called into question the concept of "security" that still prioritises nation-state security over non-traditional, human security concerns at all levels of policy making, from the local, national to the international. The idea that the state-centric notion of security of the Westphalian system cannot adequately address them is already well established, at least in academic discourse and particularly the EU policy circles for whom multilateralism is the norm. This approach gained prominence in the 1990s, where "the concept of security [has] extended... from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or 'human' security" (Rothschild 1995)⁷. The UNDP *Human Development Report* is a cornerstone document that introduced the term, "human security" that put human protection from "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" as the referent object of security to the international community. It reflects an imagined global community where the state is not the only actor nor "central to the whole concept of security," and international organisations, civil societies, institutions and multilateralism serve to temper the egotistic behaviour of states to pursue common interests, such as protecting the planet from environmental catastrophe.

In this conception of international relations, the state itself is a far more compromised and complex construct today; it is a multifaceted phenomenon (Buzan 1991) that makes the securing of it an equally complicated task. The nature of the state today sits in the "struggle" between two main systemic forces (or schools of thought in international relations) that inform state behaviour and international relations: the Westphalian system of sovereign states (the realists) and the realm of international society of international institutions and multilateralism (the idealists/internationalists or the English school). The two paradigms of international relations are not parallel universes, but they are distinct from each other in the way they define the notion of sovereignty, which in turn defines the nature of the state and

relations between states in their conceptual universes. The former operates on the classical notion of sovereignty being absolute and indivisible; in the latter, sovereignty is divisible and can be diffused and receded to the background. International organisations like the UN are a halfway house of the paradox between the two world constructs, because they uphold state sovereignty on the one hand and yet require member states to surrender it on the other in order for the organisations to function. In this description of international politics, the conventional balance of power between states constitutes only a part of a more complex, simultaneous equations to maintain international peace and security, however fundamental and overriding it still may be to framing international relations as geopolitical competition. Indeed, Akira Iriye has also noted that international organisations that are central to the global community have played a significant role in easing tension in relations between antagonistic powers, be they among great powers in Europe before 1945 or the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Iriye 2002).

That states can and are willing to surrender sovereign rights is fundamental to the UN system, not to mention the European Union (EU). This notion of sovereignty is fundamental to the conception and expansion of international society or global community. But Robert Cooper notes that in Europe's state system this goes even further in breaking down the "absolutist tradition of state sovereignty" and going beyond nation-states, where states have acquired "postmodern" characteristics. The defining element of the state, the monopoly on force is subject to "international — but self-imposed constraints", and imposing democracy and human rights as qualifying conditions to be part of this system throws out the idea of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others. In sum, "[a] postmodern system does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs" (Cooper 2002). Haass' aforementioned World Order 2.0, where "states have not just rights but also obligations to others" is a similar conception. (Haass 2017).

However, Cooper also crucially notes that parts of the world are not yet ready to leave the modern world, and that how to spread the "postmodern idea" is precisely the challenge to upgrade the world order to version 2.0. Revisionist states like China and India are independent-minded and sovereignty-conscious, with a high priority on strong national defence that adds to their prestige. They are establishing their foothold as great powers with the view to challenging the Western dominated status quo, the liberal international order. This also reflects a deeper, historical tectonic plate that influences today's international politics. For, regional conflicts, civil wars and threats of international terrorism are in some respects

violent manifestations of the desire for recognition and respect by the nations and peoples hitherto marginalised or subjugated in the last 200 years, while their world was being organised and ruled first by Western imperial powers and then by the superpowers during the Cold War. The rising new powers, particularly China, have the strong desire to have a say in how the world should be organised. The US is also a sovereignty-conscious power, and is capable of behaving unilaterally, as has been prominently so during the Trump administration. But US unilateralism is not unknown. What makes the US appear as if it is different from the other sovereignty-conscious, revisionist powers is that it is a hegemonic power in the current liberal international order. The emergent great power rivalry between the US and China, thus, has the facet of a struggle over the current liberal international order.

Great powers behaving badly

—America's self-destruction

The next US president-to-be, Joe Biden, has iterated time and again during the presidential election campaign that one of the first things he would do when he assumes office is to get the US to rejoin the Paris climate accords and the WHO that Trump had US withdraw from. Biden has made it clear that in foreign policy his administration's mission is to restore US relations with allies, re-commit to multilateralism and free trade, and show the US capability to lead the world again (Biden 2020). How much of these can be successfully achieved is up for speculation, because America itself is deeply divided as never before; over 70 million voted for Trump who has embraced autocracy, cronyism, irrationality, and bigotry, and sold the idea of American greatness based on the unbridled expression of free will. To convince these Trumpians that free trade is better, working with democratic allies is better, and that America is great because of its ability to shape and lead the world is not an enviable task in the political culture of hyper bipartisanship.

We must also be mindful that “Americans have never been enamored with the liberal international order” (Wright 2018), constituted by alliances, institutions and the US military security guarantee to protect them. This would also include America's global role in protecting “public goods” to keep an open and ruled based order, such as freedom of navigation. As Thomas Wright points out, in reference to the post-1945 phase of the reconstruction of Europe and Asia, the internationalist-minded “policy elites... couldn't drum up enough political support for the idea until they could sell it as a vital part of the struggle with the Soviets” (Wright 2018). In the post-Cold War era of US unipolarism,

Americans have time and again expressed frustration that the US cannot be the policeman of the world. The perception that the security burden is not shared proportionately has been a perennial problem between the US and its NATO allies and Japan. From the League of Nations before 1945 to the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS), the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court,⁸ the US has opted out of some key international treaties and accords. Even though the liberal international order is its creation, the US is not necessarily a natural multilateral player nor consciously bearing the responsibility to protect the world out of a sense of altruism; it does so to the extent that Americans are able to accept that the cost and burden of US leadership to protect others ultimately serve US national interests.

But a striking aspect of Trump's America has been the senseless destruction of the liberal international order of alliances and institutions that the US led to build, to the detriment of America's own position *vis-à-vis* China and Russia, the two revisionist powers that find the liberal international order threatening to their regimes. Trump has been obsessing with checking China's growing influence in trade, finance and technology, which in itself is not surprising. But his strategy has contributed to actually weakening America's strategic bargaining position *vis-à-vis* China in his all out "America First" policy that made no sense. He imposed tariffs on allies and friends, from Canada, Mexico and Japan to the EU. He pulled the US out of a string of international treaties and agreements, from the Paris Accord, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the so-called Iran nuclear agreement), to the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty. Trump's dislike of multilateralism and disregard for fact-based reality and science, the two traits that were problematic from the beginning of his presidency, were especially consequential. His misleading tweets and dysfunctional COVID-19 task force that ignored the advice of public health officials and epidemiology experts abetted in making the US one of the worst hit countries in the world. As the world watched in disbelief the rising death tolls in the US, Trump's America sent out the message that the most powerful nation had neither the inclination nor the capability to lead the world out of the pandemic.

—China's self-destruction

Xi Jinping's China, on the other hand, had its own challenge in winning the trust from the rest of the world in the absence of US leadership, as the country was implicated in controlling the information about the new virus coming out of the WHO in order to save face, as succinctly summarised in the article in *The Atlantic* (Gilsinan 2020):

The most notorious example came in the form of a single tweet from the WHO account on January 14: “Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to- human transmission of the novel #coronavirus.” That same day, the Wuhan Health Commission’s public bulletin declared, “We have not found proof for human-to-human transmission.” But by that point even the Chinese government was offering caveats not included in the WHO tweet. “The possibility of limited human-to-human transmission cannot be excluded,” the bulletin said, “but the risk of sustained transmission is low.”⁹

No amount of subsequent charm diplomacy to help affected countries, such as sending face mask and testing kits to Europe or promising vaccines to weaker states from Africa to Southeast Asia, has been enough to shake off the suspicion toward the authoritarian regime, let alone be seen as a desirable alternative to the US as a global leader. In 2017, Xi Jinping impressed some to speculate that China may be the “new champion”¹⁰ of the liberal international order for his keynote to the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he defended globalisation in an ostensible jibe at Trump’s turning toward protectionism and trade wars. However, the pandemic struck at a time when the downside of China’s growing global influence was finding its way to international conversations and commentaries about the country’s hubris and coercive behaviour. In the seventh year since the launch in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) began to lose its initial appeal as China’s altruistic contribution to global economic development, as the project became increasingly identified as a vehicle of Chinese debt-trap (or crony) diplomacy and “salami-slicing” strategy. The consequences of the over-reliance of the world’s economies — from Europe, Africa to Asia, not to mention the Americas—on Chinese money and supply chains have been relative losses of political, economic and geostrategic freedom from Chinese influence for the “client” states.

Furthermore, mounting accusations of human rights abuse toward the Uyghurs and Tibetans, political unrest in Hong Kong over Beijing’s breaching of the international agreement of “one country, two systems” until 2047, and the threatening tone and actions toward Taiwan since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen were all painting a poor, if not dangerous, picture of China in the eyes of the international community. China’s effort to exclude Taiwan from the WHO has been received particularly poorly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Countries as well as businesses and academic institutions are pressured to treat Taiwan or Tibet “correctly”, to acknowledge them as part of China and not a separate entity, often with threats to withdraw financial support or trade deals. The bullying side of

China's "wolf warrior diplomacy" has done little to enhance the "soft power" appeal that the country so craves. In addition, the coronavirus outbreak attracted international attention to China's domestic conditions, from poor hygiene in wet markets, government information control, propaganda and surveillance, and persecutions of "dissenters" by the authorities (such as the whistle-blower doctor in Wuhan). The lack of transparency and accountability in the country's public health governing structure only added to China's trust-deficit. If China was aspiring to challenge US hegemony in the liberal international order, Xi Jinping was doing a poor job: As a hegemon, the US (even under Trump) appears far more "benign" than China being one.

—*Others in sober reflection*

The absence of US leadership and China's inability to fill the global leadership gap during the pandemic not only put the future of the liberal international order in doubt, but put other major powers in Asia and Europe to recalibrate, although more as cautious adjustments than overhauls, their relationships with both the US and China. Two related issues regarding the US stand out as pivotal for those with a higher stake in the maintenance liberal international order, America's "democratic" allies in Europe and Asia.

First, the Trump administration's foreign policy shook America's standing with traditional security allies. Trump's disdain for NATO as "obsolete"¹¹ aside, his demands on America's security allies in Europe and Asia (particularly Japan and South Korea) to share more of the security burden by increasing their defence spending, are not especially new. Previous four presidents have all expressed similar frustrations with reluctant allies, particularly Germany and Japan that are the richest of US allies but also highly dependent on US security guarantee. Donald Trump, however, did it in a shockingly undiplomatic manner accompanied by damaging actions, such as withdrawing from the INF and announcing to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (that includes Russia), not to mention the abrupt withdrawal of US special forces from Syria in the autumn of 2019 without informing the NATO allies who also had troops. But what added insult to injury and deepened the mistrust of Trump's views toward alliances was his unabashed boasting of friendly relations with autocrats and authoritarian regimes, who have been and are considered adversaries to democracy and open society.¹² German Chancellor Angela Merkel drew the line when she refused to attend the G-7 meeting hosted by Trump that would include the Russian President Vladimir Putin.

These US actions not only belittled relations with allies and friends and ignored con-

fidence building measures with adversaries, but also undermined the long-term strategic cohesion of America's trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific security communities that allow the US to project power across the globe. Francois Godement and Gudrun Wacker describe the problems as manifested in relation to China: "[Fairly] convergent views on China's domestic and international trends have been overshadowed in the last years by debates on multilateral institutions and alliance politics. This, and perceived differences over values, has impacted large sectors of European public opinion – in some cases, almost as large as China's authoritarian and aggressive behavior. US demands to the EU or member states for alignment with the US agenda (including threats of secondary sanctions, end of cooperation and information sharing, etc.) have not been helpful" (Godement & Wacker 2020).¹³

This brings us to the second point, which is about the role of democracy in US leadership. For the self-appointed custodians of the liberal international order, particularly the Western powers, the Brexit movement in the UK to leave the European Union (EU) and the "Make America Great Again" Trumpsim in the US were an ominous sign for openness and democracy as the underpinning principles for the economic and political aspects of the liberal order (Ikenberry 2011; Kundnani 2017), as both countries saw the hollowing out of their democratic institutions and the closing of "borders" by their own leaders. And the security dimension of the order was in peril after 4 years of the Trump administration's often impetuous and transactional foreign and security policy decisions. Trump's incessant attack on the government agencies and institutions of democracy in the US itself, including the media which he infamously declared are the "enemy of the people", was deeply worrisome. Facts and truth became contestable with the news outlets divided over partisan lines, and with the Republican Party refusing to call out Trump's authoritarian behaviour based on lies and cronyism, disoriented the public's relationship with government agencies, from the police, the intelligence community to public health authorities. The success with which he had managed to incite hatred and violence and deepen the cleavage in American society, particularly over race, became apparent in the presidential election in November. Although Joe Biden has won, the closeness of the race has not been an inspirational moment for American democracy, although the number of votes for both men exceeded previous records. The critical issue here is that the erosion of the image of America as a strong democracy weakens its "soft power" appeal and the legitimacy base of the country to be the leader of the liberal international order.

In Asia, the geopolitical situation is both diverse and tense, and the regional order is in flux. Moreover, the order is not organised around principles of human rights and democratic

values as in Europe. In the absence of an overarching security architecture, principles of non-interference and respect of state sovereignty in the classical Westphalian sense have a stronger meaning in the conduct of relations between states. Here it has been China's ruthless pursuit of great power status and economic and military threats towards countries that resist or question Chinese actions that stirred the region's anxiety about US leadership. From territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, the authoritarian takeover of governance in Hong Kong, the diplomatic steps to isolate Taiwan and to the retaliatory intimidation of Australia that called for transparency regarding the origins of the coronavirus, there are few states that have been spared of the Chinese attempt to shake the post-war status quo of the US's hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances and the San Francisco system. The impact of unfettered Chinese expansion of political and economic influence without effective US counterbalancing policies and actions is most prevalent in this region. The Trump administration has abetted in China's adopting a more aggressive diplomatic and military behaviour in the region by waging a trade war and portraying China as the next "evil" enemy, and shaking the confidence of allies and friends in the US by forcing them to choose sides. But this situation had actually been developing since George W Bush's "strategic engagement" and Barack Obama administration's ambiguous "Pivot to Asia" policies that essentially gave China manoeuvring space to develop militarily than acting as a leash that other Asians, especially Japan, may have preferred.

The countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the only regional grouping that is remotely comparable to the European Union (EU), are particularly wary of their manoeuvrability to hedge between the larger powers to the north, namely China, Japan and the US being choked by Chinese dominance. To be fair, they have always tried to avoid entanglement in great power rivalries since the Cold War days, and to that extent ASEAN states have been wary of taking the side of US as well. However, this cautious stance toward the US is nothing comparable to the sense of threat and suspicion that ASEAN harbours toward China. The figures in the annual survey conducted by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore prove it: 52.2% acknowledge that China is the most influential political and strategic power in Southeast Asia, while the number is 28.7% for the US. Yet, at the same time, 53.5% see China as a threat to ASEAN country's interests and sovereignty, compared to 21.8% for the US, 5.0% for Japan, and 3.5% for the EU. On the other hand, in the question regarding ASEAN's options in US-China rivalry, 48% chose "enhance ASEAN resilience and unity", while 31.1% chose "not siding with China or US". In terms of confidence to "do the right thing to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance", over 60% have little or no confidence in China and just under 50%

for the US. In this question, Japan and the EU receive 61.2% and 38.7% confidence rating respectively. In fact, only 10.5% see China as a “responsible stakeholder that respects and champions international law,” compared to 15.4% for the US, 51% for Japan, and 68% for the EU.¹⁴ As ASEAN’s preferences for multilateralism and rule-based international order demonstrate, as reflected in the high expectations toward Japan and the EU to “do the right thing”, the restoration of trust in the US is a challenge for the next Biden administration.

Middle powers and the reform of the liberal international order

Europe has recently woken up to the threatening aspect of working with China without a reliable US, and began to revise their global strategy,¹⁵ as individual states and collectively as the EU. Any illusion in the early 2000s that the liberal international order can transform anti-West (or US) great powers, China and Russia, to become responsible stakeholders and become “more like us” is now gone. Instead, they have chosen to engage China where cooperation is possible and desirable, such as in the UN Conference on Climate Change (COP 21) and the nuclear agreement with Iran, while strengthening their defence against China on issues that concern the coherence and security of the entire bloc, from telecom, critical infrastructure, business ownership to the upholding of democracy and human rights. In this strategic outlook, there is a conscious effort of European states, notably France, Germany and the Netherlands, to be engaged in the Indo-Pacific, and to work with Asian powers, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and ASEAN in areas of security as well as on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Europe appears also more mindful of reforming the liberal international order, where in the past the inconsistencies and controversial aspects have gone ignored, especially where the notion of liberal and open are concerned.

The liberal international order has the element of Western liberal thought based on the universality of human rights and “liberal” democracy. The wave of democratization that has swept across the globe in post-Cold War decades has often been understood as the triumph of the Western liberal order over the socialist model of political economy.¹⁶ Wealth creation through capitalism and political liberalization (or democratization) were supposed to go hand in hand, and at the end of the road history is supposed to ‘end’ with the proliferation of liberal democracies. This Western-centric idea of how the world should be organised (or where the world should be headed), based on the notion that liberal values are universal, has been buttressed by the institutions, norms, rule and regulations of Western design that bind—and indeed organize—international politics today. This part of the liberal international order package is not necessarily appreciated as “universal” as the West would like

to think by the rest of the world (Kundnani 2017).¹⁷ This includes the democratic countries such as Japan and South Korea that have a greater stake in maintaining this order because of their role as US security allies.

Indeed, human rights and liberal values are arguably central to the discourse between West and the rest, notably revisionist, authoritarian powers like China and Russia but not just them, as an area of negotiation, if not outright contestation, in the course of a more complex and intense intercourse between the West and the rest. For example, both the developing and developed states in East Asia question a list of universal values, especially those enshrined as basic human rights that need to be respected, not because they necessarily disagree with the Western proposition, but because they are embedded as codes of conduct in international agreement and institutions with penalties (such as sanctions and intervention) for violation and abuse in the current UN system. Moreover, this universalist pretention has been perceived as privileging the status quo of the affluent West (or the haves), if not as a legacy of colonial domination. The discomfort had less to do with the validity of the actual values *per se*, but more to do with how they are expressed, promoted or protected in the international arena, such as the liberal logic of humanitarian intervention (or R2P) that allows the transgression of state sovereignty by the “international community” because of the universality of human rights. It is no accident that Japan, which is an ardent supporter of the UN and the concept of human security, keeps its distance from the concept of R2P in part because it permits the overriding of state sovereignty (the other reason being R2P risks military intervention).

This situation reflects the broader problem of the hypocrisy in the UN system, where the disagreement over who has the power or even the authority to ensure compliance on a cluster of internationally protected human rights (at least on paper) needs to be ironed out. Improving international institutions and regimes, such as the make-up of the permanent members of the UN Security Council or who sits on the UN’s human rights commission, to better reflect the reality today that has morphed beyond recognition from the original set up is certainly an important international political agenda toward restoring a sense of global community. Asians, now more confident than they have ever been in modern times, have had reasons to bemoan and defy Western dominance over issues of cultural, political and even philosophical import to any political society. This is their post-colonial era position, and one that would include Japan because its experience with modernisation was status seeking in the Western dominated world. And, as European powers seek enhanced strategic cooperation with the powers in Asia to reform and maintain the rule-based international

order, they need to be mindful that democracy's path in Asia may not lead to the liberal democratic model in the West, but that it is being shaped out of the social and political struggle in pushing back postcolonial legacies, including the strong role of the military, resisting the Western imposition of "universal" values while keeping a guarded stance against China.

Conclusion

The US-China rivalry has made apparent that there is a need for a more robust international consensus on the extended definition of security, especially among great powers, where the referent object is not just the sovereign state. Another aspect of this systemic change would involve conscious efforts to address issues in the post-colonial dimension of global politics today, where the legacies of Western domination and subjugation of the world persist and inform the toxic Manichean worldview of the West versus the rest, or Us versus the Others. Japan once tried to impose its reactionary, Occidentalist order through the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and failed catastrophically. China, in principle an anti-colonial regime and mindful of this Japanese past, negotiated the anti-hegemonic clause in the joint statement in 1972 that normalised relations between the two. But the irony is that China is behaving in almost the same way as Imperial Japan did 80 years ago. China appears driven to seek great power status with ultra-patriotism and nationalist pride, fed by the narrative to restore Chinese greatness by overcoming 100 years of humiliation. In this picture, how the current liberal international order evolves would be contingent upon two things: how the post-Trump US engages with China, in relation to America's allies and friends, and how China can avoid the trap of repeating Japan's mistake.

Needless to say, the theoretical and philosophical discussions for this less state-centric definition of security are anchored in the English school and liberal internationalists. But more often than not their contribution is obscured by the disagreements within the academic discipline of international relations theory, if they are not pitted against the dominant realists and neo-realists to compete for an authoritative voice. A discernable challenge is how much impact the academic, theoretical debates have on policymakers, particularly those in the foreign and security policy community of great powers. This is not to say that the theoretical world that offers a more nuanced approach to international relations has had no bearing on the real policy world and conducts of great powers. Nor do the realists, particularly prevalent in the US, only see the world in the classical balance of military power terms, if only because of the "discovery" of the utility of power of persuasion, or soft power, as an effective tool of American diplomacy in winning friends in the Cold War.

But in mainstream policy discussions about geopolitical competition between the US and China, there appears little room for nuance.

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Special Feature

Toward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects

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Introduction

Much has been written about human security (Hanlon and Christie 2016; MacFarland and Khong 2006; Peou 2019a, 2014a), but more work is still needed to help us assess the overall impact of this concept on human life over the last 25 years. The 1990s was one of the most optimistic decades in world history. In 1989, the UN General Assembly declared the 1990s as “the decade of international law.” The decade is also known as the “sanctions decade,” as the number of sanctions imposed on regimes that violated international law increased exponentially (Cortright and Lepez 2002, 2000). In the middle of that decade, human security as a concept and a global policy objective also emerged. Proponents of this concept also developed a vision for a new system of global governance capable of addressing global challenges, such as threats to human security (Commission on Global Governance 1995). Human security and global governance together gave rise to what may be called global human security governance (GHSG). Overall, the 1990s looked set to bring a greater sense of optimism about the future of humanity.

This article takes stock of GHSG and argues that the last two decades have witnessed an overall decline of activity in the idea of human security, as a global policy commitment to making the world more humane has weakened. Evidence points to the growing reality that the idea of securing people has once again been succumbing to the traditional concepts of national security and regime security, as it did after World War II. Part of the problem can be found in a lack of conceptual clarity and some of the policy instruments adopted by proponents of human security. Economic development, sanctions, military intervention, peacebuilding and criminal prosecution, regarded as policy instruments to protect people or promote human security, have proved to be either insufficient or ineffective and might have been counter-productive.

Global Human Security Governance

This section sheds light on human security as a concept and briefly discusses its historical development. The concept is distinct from others also related to security, most notably national security, regime security, collective security, common security, comprehensive security, cooperative, and global security (Peou 2014a; Capie and Evans 2002). Although the terms used to characterize human security are not completely new, the concept was formalized only in the mid-1990s at the time when the concepts of global security and global governance also emerged.

The concept of human security can be disguised from other concepts of security by answering four basic questions: What is the referent object of security? What is being secured against? Who provides for security? How is security provided? (Terriff et al. 1999). Based on these questions, human security is not the same as national security. The realist referent object of national security is states, which function as the primary actors in international politics under anarchy. National security is about the security of states, which have been legally recognized as sovereign since the Westphalian Peace Treaty was signed in 1648. States are subject to no higher body of authority and in need of protection from external and internal threats to their interests, the most important of which is survival. In order to ensure their survival, states are assumed by political realists to pursue the policy of maximizing their security or power through the building of national defense systems and military alliances, as well as through maintaining adversarial but stable balance-of-power or balance-of-terror systems. Nuclear deterrence is an important military doctrine. The accumulation of national wealth is another state priority. The term of economic security has also been used to redefine national security, not only associated with the security of states but also of their populations or national citizens (Leffler 1990).

Critics of national security point to the reality in many states in which political regimes are insecure. Regime insecurity is one related to political regimes that exist in institutionally weak, failing and failed states because of their lack of political legitimacy. Such regimes are usually illegitimate because they are not democratically elected or come to power by coercive means and then resort to repressive violence as the method of maintaining power and security. For instance, they may even use biological and chemical weapons in response to internal security threats like military coups, insurgencies, and domestic rivals (Koblentz 2013).

Human security is not the same as collective security either. The latter concept is based on the assumption that the *preponderance* of power (not the balance of power) helps maintain international peace and security (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991, 1998). The inter-

national community has the collective power based on international law to protect states and punish state aggression. As one scholar puts it, "Collective security operates on the strength of an authoritative decision by a body of the international community" (Dinstein 2005: 278). States can still protect their national interests (such as ensuring their survival based on the principle of self-defense) but can do so by forming an international community in which they all are under the universal obligation to act collectively when one of them behaves aggressively in violation of international law. The United Nations (and its predecessor the League of Nations) represents that community whose members are assumed to comply with international law and take collective action to punish any aggressor state regardless of whether it is an ally to any of them.

Common security as another concept is also different from national and collective security in that more emphasis is placed on international disarmament and arms control, as well as a commitment by states to their joint survival. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security (1982) was the first to develop this concept under the chairmanship of Olof Palme, whose report stresses that no state can ensure its security at the expense of another's. The Commission states that, "*A doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction*" (*Ibid.*: 139, italics original). Proponents of this concept do not seek to abolish military force immediately but seek to temper it with the process of diplomatic reassurance. Military deterrence is still relevant but must be balanced by the need for states to reassure one another of non-offensive intentions by also adopting the strategy of "non-provocative defense." Ultimately, however, the concept of common security necessitates real policy steps toward nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament.

The economic component of security receives greater emphasis in the concept of *comprehensive* security, which was first coined by Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1980. Although it remains state-centric, the concept is broadened and deepened to include economic security and diplomacy (Akaha 1991). In the 1980s, Japan became known as a "trading state" and was not known as a military power. As a resource-poor country in need of natural resources from other countries in order to produce and export manufactured and high-tech goods, Japan placed its priority on economic development without at the same time sacrificing the need for military security. A major component of economic security is energy security, which has also been associated with the idea of environmental security.

The end of the Cold War further witnessed global efforts to promote the concept of *cooperative* security, based on the assumption that state security can only be achieved

through cooperation rather than competition or self-defence alone. Like common security, cooperative security recognizes the need for arms control and disarmament; however, the latter places more emphasis on the need to promote multilateral cooperation among states through various policy measures and instruments such as non-proliferation of weapons, security- and confidence-building measures, peace operations, and economic development. The objective is to either reduce damage caused by war or prevent war from breaking out and to build and maintain peace, which can be achieved when states in this security framework recognize that they have an equal right to security and that their security is mutually interdependent (Zellner 2010).

The concepts of security discussed so far are largely state-centric, but one of the two concepts that is more people-centered are global security and human security. Although one can make the case that the two concepts are two sides of the same coin, it is worth emphasizing that global security is more comprehensive than human security in that it covers just about everything, from military to nonmilitary security. For instance, the Commission on Global Governance defines global security as inclusive of national, international and human security, as well as the security of our planet earth. National security includes the protection of boundaries, institutions and values but is not exclusive of human protection, more than just ruling elites. Survival of states is still recognized, but the security of people is just as or more important. According to the Commission, “the security of people must be regarded as a goal as important as the security of states. Ultimately, the two objectives are not in conflict: states cannot be secure for long unless their citizens are secure” (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 81).

Upon closer examination, the concept of human security has been regarded as more important than national security in that the latter cannot be used to justify political leaders taking action to consolidate power by silencing the domestic opposition and suppressing their citizens or their human rights. However, it may also be useful to clarify here that human rights and human security are not quite the same, although some of their conceptual elements overlap. Human rights are concerned with the way in which governments treat their own citizens who are assumed to enjoy such individual rights as civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, international human rights law is quite broad and has a long list of its violations, not all of which are about human security. Adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly and part of international human rights law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains rights, including two fundamental elements of human security. Its Preamble states that, “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and

freedom from fear and *want* has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people” (Italics added). These human rights can also be traced back to 1941 when U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) delivered a major speech that laid out four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, *freedom from want*, and *freedom from fear* (Engel 2016; italics added). Human security is more specifically about *freedom from fear* and *want*, as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994).

Freedom from both fear and want refers to the idea that individual human beings, not just states or their leaders, are the key referent object of security. According to UNDP, “human security is *people-centred*” (UNDP 1994: 23. Italics added). Proponents do not say that all humans are equally insecure, as some more secure than others. They pay most of their attention to civilian populations who are most vulnerable to physical and non-physical violence, such as victims of war and mass atrocities as well as other serious forms of deprivation, such as unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, hunger, poor health, and lack of medical care.

The UNDP idea of human security has led proponents in two different but arguably mutually reinforcing approaches: development-based” and “protection-based” (MacFarland and Khong 2006). Freedom from fear means freedom from direct or physical violence, which includes a number of threats to community security and personal security such as sectarian and ethnic violence, threats from the state (physical torture), threats from other states (war), threats from other group of people (ethnic tension), threats from individuals or gangs against other individuals or gangs (crime and street violence), and threats directed at children based on their vulnerability and dependence (child abuse). Proponents of freedom from fear pay close attention to the tragic events after the end of the Cold War, such as intra-state armed conflicts and mass atrocities that took place in countries like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where unarmed civilian populations based on their religious and ethnic backgrounds were subject to what came to be known as mass atrocities like war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. In short, the legal foundation of freedom from fear is built not only on international human rights law but also on various other institutions such as international humanitarian law and international criminal law and global norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Bellamy 2011).

The development-based approach gives priority to freedom from want or the absence of indirect or nonphysical violence. This aspect of human security is centered on the idea of prevention rather than intervention, bottom-up rather than top-down, placing emphasis on social-economic and human development rather than coercive international intervention. Proponents of this freedom also pay much attention to the threat of environmental degradation as a major threat to human survival (Mohajan 2015). They adopted the idea

of “sustainable development,” formulated by the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987:8) making the case that development is “sustainable” when it “meets the [human] needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Global climate change and the loss of biodiversity have given rise to the politics of scarcity. Thus, there is a need to preserve our global commons and ensure environmental security if our human welfare and security are to be maintained. There is also a sense of urgency to get different actors to take collective action that would reverse environmental threats (Brainard *et al.* 2009). In September 2015, for instance, 193 UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with 17 goals to ensure world peace and prosperity for people and the planet.

The policy instruments designed to ensure and enhance freedom from fear and freedom from want include the following: smart sanctions, military intervention (peace enforcement and peacekeeping), and peacebuilding (democratic and rule-of-law institution building as well as international criminal justice through the work of international criminal tribunals and courts, such as the International Criminal Court or ICC), and economic development (Peou 2019a, 2014a). The role of other nonstate actors such as global civil society organizations (such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and various international development organizations) play a formal and informal role in helping to protect people and contributing to their socioeconomic wellbeing.

In short, GHSG is narrower than what some scholars refer to as global security governance (Sperling 2007) in that human beings are the key referent object of security. Broadly defined, GHSG is a system of governance made up of formal and informal institutions (i.e., international law) and processes in and through which different actors (state and nonstate) take collective action to address threats to human freedom from both fear and want. States and nonstate actors (especially international organizations like the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, and the ICC) are capable of taking collective action through relying on the above policy instruments to ensure and enhance the twins of freedom.

Mission Accomplished?

The extent to which individual human beings around the world have become more secure since the mid-1990s when the concept of human security was formalized and entered the security lexicon is a matter of debate and further research. What is clear is that the idea of human security has been confronted by several major challenges and appears to be on the

decline in terms of policy practice, as the concepts of national and regime security have regained momentum.

On one hand, some proponents of human security have observed some positive developments in recent years. In the Asia-Pacific, for instance, they highlight what major countries like Australia, Japan and South Korea have done to improve human security. Australia is said to have coordinated with Japan, Indonesia and the Pacific Islands Forum on this front. Japan has engaged in peacebuilding in fragile states. Some Japanese writers characterize the Japanese approach to human security on the basis of the “Tokyo Consensus” (Hoshino and Satoh 2016). Even sovereign-centric states like China appear to be moving slowly in this direction, despite the fact that human security has yet to appear on the government’s policy agenda and despite China’s “people-first” doctrine (Tow 2016; Ren and Li 2016; Zhang and Zeng 2016).

On the other hand, much of what has been positively observed tends to highlight freedom from want in terms of policy commitment to such issues as health care, energy security, and sustainable development, and yet few of these have been accomplished in various parts of the world. A proponent of development-based human security has this to say, “despite the commissions, resolutions, reports, declarations and a multimillion-dollar Trust Fund, and despite the consensus of like-minded countries on the protection of people, human security is far from having been achieved, or even adopted as a global – let alone national – goal” (Tadjbakhsh 2014: 2). In her assessment, “the term ‘human security’ still courts rejection twenty years after its inception” (*Ibid.*). This is not to suggest that no progress has been made in terms of human development. One indicator of this progress is poverty reduction: “global poverty has fallen substantially, with a major portion of the decline attributable to China. Even when China is omitted from the sample, poverty reduction is still considerable” (Fosu 2017: 306).

But efforts at meeting human security objectives are far from ideal, as the policy objective to promote freedom from want has been met with growing challenges. When broadly defined, the promise of human security as a global policy agenda also remains unfulfilled. While the general human development index shows an overall improvement, global poverty remains a threat to people. Although “[p]overty rates in the developing world have decreased dramatically over the past decades” (Wietzke 2019), many people remain poor. According to the United Nations, more than 700 million people still live under the international poverty line of \$1.90 a day and most of them belong to Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. High poverty rates remain evident in conflict-affected countries (UNDP 2016). By 2018, many of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals remain unfulfilled. Even in the Asia-Pacific, where economic growth has been impressive, states are

not even on track to achieving any of the goals in 2030. According to a UN report (ESCAP 2019), for instance, progress in some areas (such as ending poverty, access to quality education, as well as affordable and clean energy) remains limited; however, trends in other areas have even been negative. Clean water and sanitation, economic growth and decent work, as well as responsible consumption and production show negative trends.

Other developments have not been particularly encouraging either. The system of global health governance, for instance, has come under challenge when Covid-19 became a global pandemic early in 2020. By early 2021, the virus had infected almost 100 million people and claimed more than two million lives. Lack of international cooperation to mitigate the threat quickly became evident. A group of scholars have this to say about the lack of coordination on global health: “COVID-19 has highlighted the need for action at local and national scales, as well as cooperation that is multilateral for providing global public goods” and “closer coordination” among states in the area of economic nationalism is required (Oldekop et al. 2020: 3). Global trade governance has weakened since the Doha Round of trade negotiations began to stall and has since made no progress, giving way to regional and bilateral trade agreements (Cohn 2016: 260). The trade ‘war’ between China and the United States escalated, proving to be harmful to multilateral trade, and is likely to cause collateral damage in the Asia-Pacific. Global energy governance also has to confront with the reality of growing geopolitical competition among states, as finite energy resources are fast-depleting (Lehmann 2017).

Geopolitics appears to be making a comeback (Walt 2018; Mead 2014; Kaplan 2014; Mearsheimer 2014 and 2006). The terror attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 turned world politics backward: more war on terrorism with a renewed emphasis on national security. The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were driven by the United States’ alleged policy to reassert its hegemonic position in world politics (Butt 2019) and produced deadly consequences, such as the global spread of terrorism, the rise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), counterterrorism, and an internationalized civil war in Syria. Major flashpoints around the world continue unabated. In the Near East and Middle East, the major flashpoints include the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, the threat of Iran’s regional ambitions and its nuclear program. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 exacerbated difficult relations between Russia and the West (Mearsheimer 2014). In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear threat continues. In South Asia, the standoff and territorial disputes among three nuclear protagonists – China, India and Pakistan – remain unresolved.

The rise of China has also complicated relations among states in and outside East Asia, as territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas as well as the Taiwan Strait

have escalated in recent years. Under President Xi Jinping who claims to be committed to the SDG agenda, China continues to spend much on defence and protects political regimes that are undemocratic, corrupt, and abusive of human rights. Beijing has sought to build a “world-class military” by 2049 (Fravel 2019). China has been accused of using its development assistance to promote its national interests, establish security alliances, and undermine efforts by Western democracies to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance (Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Naim 2007; Tull 2006). For its part, Japan has been transformed from a state once characterized by commercial pacifism to one that shows an inclination toward realism (Peou 2021; Green 2001). Tokyo has built its first aircraft carriers and plans to buy more advanced military aircraft (42 F-35s and 105 F-35As) over the next 10 years. Japan, whose military alliance with the United States has survived the Cold War, is reevaluating its dependence on the latter’s security guarantees as it is confronted with the possibility it might need to prepare for war (Smith 2019).

Since the turn of the 21st century, global military spending has also increased. Total global military spending in 2018, for instance, rose to \$1,822 billion. China (with \$250 billion) and the United States (with \$649 billion) alone represent half of the amount (SIPRI 2019a). Global arms sales are still moving in a similar upward trend. In 2017, arms sales and military services by the world’s top 100 arms-producing and military services companies reached \$398.2 billion, representing an increase of 44% since 2002. The companies based in the United States (with \$226.6 billion) accounted for 57% of the amount, followed by those based in Russia (with \$37.7 billion) (SIPRI 2018). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The volume of international transfers of major arms in 2014–18 was 7.8 per cent higher than in 2009–13 and 23 per cent higher than in 2004–2008” (SPRI 2019). In Asia and Oceania, to where 40% of global arms sales went from 2014 to 2018, the five top importers were India, Australia, China, South Korea, and Vietnam. The second largest importer region was the Middle East, which received 40% of global arms imports in the same period (SIPRI 2019b).

At the same time, global spending on peace operations is nowhere close to global defence spending. Global efforts at global peacekeeping and peacebuilding remain woefully limited (Peou 2014b). Currently the UN Department of Peace Operations leads 14 peacekeeping missions around the world, most of which are in Africa. As noted, global military spending has increased and far exceeded spending on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The UN budget approved for the 14 peacekeeping operations deployed around the world, most of which were in Africa (from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019) was comparatively miniscule: only \$6.69 billion. Between 2006 and 2017, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, which was designed to prevent a relapse into violent conflict, allocated only \$772 million to 41

countries (UN 2019).

Meanwhile, armed conflicts and political violence around the world (especially in the Middle East and North Africa) as well as other nontraditional sources of insecurity continue. They have produced large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees who are among the world's most vulnerable and insecure groups. More than 70 million people had been forced out of their home by 2018 and nearly 30 million of them were refugees. According to a UN report, "the world is witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record" (UN n.d.a.). A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime also shows that homicidal violence in 2017 killed far more people worldwide (464,000) than armed conflict (89,000) and terrorist violence (26,000) in the same year, representing an increase from 362,000 in 1990. According to the report, "Between 2015 and 2017 the total number of homicide victims worldwide increased by 4 per cent, or around 19,000 victims." "If this trend continues," says the report, "target 16.1 ('significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere') under Sustainable Development Goal 16...set in 2015, will not be met by 2030" (UNODC 2019: 11).

Overall, according to the global peace index of the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP 2020: 1), which measures global peacefulness by covering 99.7 percent of the world's population, "the level of global peacefulness deteriorated, with the average country score falling by 0.34 per cent. This is the ninth deterioration in peacefulness in the last twelve years." The largest factors that contributed to the deterioration in peacefulness are terrorism and internal conflict, despite a decline in terrorism-related deaths. The number of natural disasters has also seen a threefold increase in the last four decades and the total economic cost associated with this phenomenon jumped to \$200 billion in the 2010s from \$50 billion in the 1980s (*Ibid.*: 1).

The question remains: Why is it that the idea of human security appears to have made no significant impact? There may be many reasons, some of which can be readily identified. Conceptually, there is no global consensus on what human security means, and this makes it difficult for the global policy community to take collective action to address threats to human security. Critics have pointed to the lack of conceptual clarity. Roland Paris (2001) was among the first critics to make the case against the concept by questioning its usefulness because it lacks a precise definition and because its proponents prefer to keep the concept expansive and vague. The concept of human security is something that most people can talk about, but one of the main challenges is the extent to which it can be operationalized. One of the questions is: If human security covers almost everything, what is not human security? The concept has certainly opened a Pandora's Box: it almost means different things to different people. This concept has become amorphous to the point

where any collective action required for ensuring the security of individual human beings has become extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be taken. As noted, the concepts of national and regime security have become increasingly pervasive.

Theoretically and empirically, scholars and policy makers disagree on how to implement the human security agenda. Some advocate a “bottom-up” approach (Hanlon and Christie 2016). Others adopt a “top-down” approach in favor of military intervention, economic sanctions, and judicial deterrence (Peou 2014). States, especially powerful ones, continue to maximize their power and security far more extensively than what they have done for humanity. The world is not decisively moving toward global human security governance. Some progress has been reversed. Realism continues to cast a shadow over the vision for a more humane world.

Challenges to Human Security: Global Actors and International Policy Instruments

In spite of their noble vision for a more humane world, proponents of human security have largely engaged in making normative arguments, one of which is that states alone cannot address global challenges such as armed conflicts and mass atrocities and that nonstate actors should play a greater role. Evidence appears to challenge this thinking and the policy instruments developed to realize the vision are limited in terms of effectiveness or even counterproductive.

The trouble with the normative thinking on human security is that it tends to overstate the utility of nonstate actors, most notably intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, international nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations. In fact, an argument can still be made: States remain the best provider of human security. Barry Buzan still makes a compelling argument when making the following remark: states remain “a necessary condition for individual security because without the state it is not clear what the other agency is to act on behalf of individuals” (Buzan 2001: 589). While the state remains the best, if insufficient, actor in ensuring human security, national governments have yet to place the security of individuals beyond their national borders as a top priority on their policy agendas.

Even countries that keep human security on their policy agendas still largely adhere to national security. With the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, anti-EU populism, illiberal nationalism and the inability of EU members to speak with one voice on major foreign and defence policy issues, regional integration in Europe has become unraveled (Walt 2019; Gramer 2019). Although many democratic states within the European

Union are treated as post-Westphalian, those in the Asia-Pacific are not moving in this direction. In the Asia-Pacific whose countries are known for their economic ‘miracles,’ states remain Westphalian in policy orientation as they remain wedded to state sovereignty and security, still “preoccupied with protecting autonomy and independence, retaining a gatekeeping role, and avoiding external interference in domestic and constitutional arrangements” (Sperling 2007:282). According to William Tow, “in the Asia-Pacific context, the state largely remains the referent object of security and the securitizing agent” (Tow 2016: 10). National security also continues to shape Australia’s foreign policy agenda (Walton and Akimoto 2016). In short, governments in various regions of the world remain committed to the concept of national security or regime security, moving nowhere much closer to the idea of human security.

Moreover, the idea of human security appears to suffer from implementing certain policy measures that have proved to be insufficient, ineffective, and even counterproductive. It is interesting to recall that Franklin Roosevelt’s idea of freedoms did not pave the way for the development of human security after World War II and may have contributed to the strengthening of national security, the emergence of the Cold War, global terrorism and the war on terrorists around the world, and possibly the post-Cold War resurgence of geopolitics. The American president’s idea was evidently designed to prepare the Americans for a collective war against the Axis Powers and survived his presidency. The fear of holocaust, the fear of communism and the enlargement of national security were instead justified in American foreign policy. The four freedoms were pursued “everywhere in the world” (Hitchcock 2016) but may have produced unintended consequences. The U.S. policy ended up reinforcing and reiterating American exceptionalism, as well as stimulating American imperialism that sparked “hatred intense enough to motivate terrorist attacks on the United States” (Costigliola 2016: 186).

It is also questionable whether economic growth would produce the overall enhancement of human security. On one hand, economic growth in various parts of the world appears to be insufficient in ensuring the security of people because of poor national governance, as evidenced by the challenges that states in Africa still face (Peou 2019a: 175-76). On the other hand, impressive economic growth in East Asia has not made people in the region fully secure either. States that are economically developed or developing (such as Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam) tend to increase defence spending or maintain high defence expenditures. Most noteworthy is the fact that Japan, one of the world’s most developed countries, used its newfound wealth to complete its rearmament in the late 1980s by turning its Self-Defence Forces into a modern, technologically advanced force (Smith 2019). More can be said about China: Driven by economic growth,

it has increased defence spending.

Smart sanctions as a policy instrument have been adopted by the United Nations and its members, such as those in the European Union and the United States, to change state behavior or stop human rights violations, and to counter to terrorism committed by non-state actors, but it remains a controversial measure. As pointed by one writer, “a targeted sanctions regime is now the preferred Security Council sanctions instrument. Indeed, all of the recent sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council have been targeted” (Stephanides 2002: ix). Since the mid-1990s, this policy tool has been refined and implemented to avoid collateral damage (Cortright and Lepez 2002). It is assumed that this policy tool has been effective not only in minimizing pain for vulnerable civilian populations in target countries but also in improving human rights in non-target countries (Carneiro, Christiane De Andradelucena 2014). Some findings, however, suggest that civilian populations in target countries suffer, but those in non-target countries benefit from sanctions. As one scholar puts it, “sanction activity may yield increases in respect for human rights at the global level, but that increase likely comes at the expense of those that live in states where human rights sanctions are imposed” (Clay 2018: 134). Overall, however, some scholars even talk about the end-times of human rights (Hopgood 2014). Others point to the world-wide retreat of liberal democracy (Freedom House 2019; Economist 2018).

What is clear is that the “sanctions decade” has not given rise to a global system in which the concept of human security prevails upon those of national and regime security. In fact, sanctions have exacerbated geopolitical competition to the detriment of human security. The recent U.S. sanctions on Iran imposed by the Trump administration, for instance, have not only harmed the Iranian economy but also “empowered anti-US forces within Iranian politics, and armed conflict with the US remains a possible outcome” (IISS 2019). The sanctions imposed on Syria have resulted in human suffering, despite the fact that its government has been the target. Nour Samaha (2019) is correct in making the conclusion that “sanctions can never be ‘smart’.” Instead of weakening the repressive regime in Syria, the U.S. and E.U. sanctions have strengthened it. The West “needs to be far more honest about the counter-productiveness of a tool, and particularly sectoral sanctions, which will produce little in its stated intentions and instead have a detrimental impact on the wider population” (Samaha 2019). The cases of North Korea and Myanmar show smart sanctions still cause human insecurity (Peou 2019b).

Military intervention for human protection has been a controversial topic. As noted above, the amount of spending on international peacekeeping is miniscule when compared to global military spending. Even some democratic countries like Canada and Norway that used to embrace human security also have no longer explicitly embraced the concept (Peou

2009). When it came to power in 2006, the conservative government shelved the concept and slashed the funding. The country “dropped out of sight internationally as a promoter of the concept” (Small 2016: 1). The liberal government, formed after the 2015 election, did better in terms of its commitment to human rights, but the Canadian contribution to peace-keeping diminished substantially: only 68 troops in 2017 and 112 in 2016. During the Cold War and into the 1990s, Canada was the world’s top contributor to UN peace operations (with over 3,000 troops).

For proponents of human security who embrace the norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the use of force is necessary when civilian populations are being massacred or come under the threat of mass murder; however, outcomes are not always desirable. For instance, they view NATO’s military attacks on Libya in 2011 as the first instance of R2P in action, this was “the first time that the Security Council has authorized the use of military force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state” (Bellamy 2011: 263). The NATO intervention in Libya proved to be harmful to many people in this country and globally divisive. It has now become clear that the intervention has yet to make the people of Libya more secure. Bellamy writes: “the form of intervention in Libya was *highly imperfect*, that it delivered indirect and patchy protection at best, and that it *placed the region’s long-term stability in the hands of fractious rebels about whom little is known*” (*Ibid.* 269. Italics added). Developments since 2011 have been detrimental to human security. According to Mark Curtis (2019), “the West’s war in Libya spurred terrorism into 14 countries.” Alan Kuperman (2015) regards the military action as an “abject failure”: Not only has the country “failed to evolve into a democracy,” but it also “has devolved into a failed state.” According to a report by Amnesty International (2019: 1), “Militias, armed groups and security forces continued to commit with impunity crimes under international law and gross human rights violations and abuses, including war crimes, throughout the year. Clashes between competing militias resulted in an increased number of civilian casualties. Thousands of people were held indefinitely without any judicial process following arbitrary arrest, including many detained since 2011.” Human Rights Watch (2018) also paint a grim picture of post-2011 Libya. Worse still, no collective action has been taken in the name of R2P to put an end to the civil war that broke out in 2014 in Syria (Nasser-Eddine, M. 2012), a country that has become a major battleground for geopolitical competition between major powers, most notably Russia and the United States. NATO’s intervention in Libya angered Russia, but its failure has also emboldened the latter to play a more active role in the Middle East and Northern Africa (O’Conner 2017).

The pursuit of international criminal justice also does not appear to become more effective than the use of military force and economic sanctions, despite the optimistic

assumption that international criminal tribunals and courts would be able to help end armed conflicts and mass atrocities or deter them. The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 does not seem to have produced any significant effects on the actions of political regimes that violate human rights or threaten the security of their own people. The ICC and other criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia have not yet made many parts of the world safer for civilian populations. Cambodia has moved away from a nascent democracy back toward a one-party state (Peou 2019). Many countries in East Asia are still under authoritarian rule. Ethnic violence is still pervasive in Myanmar, where ethnic cleansing has been committed by the military-dominated regime against Rohingya civilians. According to one scholar, “neither the ICC nor R2P can confront the underlying causes of many conflicts: to do that requires a commitment to radical change in international economics, not international politics or international law” (Ainley 2015: 53).

All in all, the global use of economic, military and judicial threat to change bad political behavior since the 1990s has not given rise to an international system based on the idea of human security. From Cambodia to Indonesia and East Timor and from Myanmar to North Korea, the threat of judicial punishment directed at ruling elites tend to be ineffective or detrimental to the security of civilian populations (David and Holliday 2006; Peou 2016, 2014a). Instead of giving up power, authoritarian leaders dig their heels in when coming under threat and hold on to power even if it means causing human suffering. According to their work on Myanmar, for instance, Roman David and Ian Holliday (2012: 136) argue that, “our experts defied much activist opinion in holding that revoking both policies had the best chance of promoting thoroughgoing reform inside the country.” Their experts advocated a combination of policy actions: the lifting of sanctions and guarantees of non-prosecution. Thus, proponents of sanctions, judicial punishment or its threat and military humanitarian intervention may need to reflect more critically on the fact these policy tools have been ineffective and may even contribute to human insecurity.

Conclusion

Overall, the last decade of the 20th century ushered in the idea of human security but the first two decades of the 21st century began to witness an overall decline of policy interest in the promotion of human security. The future for global human security governance is far from ideal since states are far from obsolete and international organizations as well as other non-state actors have not yet become the primary agents of change. The vision for a more

humane world appears to have been sliding back to the old world where states continue to pursue their national interests and political regimes in many weak states seek to enhance their security at the expense of human interest, as they spend more on national defence than on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Part of the problem is that the concept of human security is ambitious but amorphous, thus making it difficult for states and other actors to take effective collective action. Moreover, policy instruments such as smart sanctions, military intervention for human protection, and international criminal justice have not delivered decisive results. In fact, they have proved to be either ineffective or even counterproductive. In short, it is not an over-exaggeration to conclude that the vision for a world governed by human security continues to grow dim. Global human security governance needs to be strengthened, but much more must be done. One of the steps that needs to be taken now is to draw lessons from past failures by closely and honestly examining what has gone wrong, including the way policy instruments were designed and implemented.

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Special Feature

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia

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1. Security in a Changing Global Environment

Much has changed in the notion of security, brought on and defined by the significant changes in the global environment. In the post-Cold War era, the state centric, military orientated understanding of security was critiqued to be inadequate as new threats emerged that were detrimental to the national security. Issues like environmental degradation, economic security and energy security began to gain attention in international policy discourses and international relations as these issues were deemed to be drivers of domestic unrest and international conflicts (Mathews 1989, Ullman 1983). Mathews (1989) for instance argued that resource mismanagement could result in acute transboundary challenges such as forced migration, which in turn, could result in social and ecological stresses to receiving communities. Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999) went further to argue that there is a causal relationship between environmental stress and violent conflicts noting that the impact of environmental stress on affected, marginalized communities generate frustration and resentment expressed in violent actions.

Changes in the global security environment did not only result in an expansion of the notion of security beyond military threats to states but also drew attention to threats to individuals as the other referent object of security. As the incidence of interstate conflicts dramatically decreased while the number internal conflicts surged, the security concerns of individuals and communities compelled a new thinking on security (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). From the pre-occupation of national (read state) security came a new security concept called human security which argued for paying more attention to threats faced by individuals, groups and communities (UNDP 2004, Hampson 2002, Paris 2001, Newman 2010). According to Mahbuh Ul Haq, we “*need to fashion a new concept of human security*

that is reflected in the lives of our people, not in the weapons of our country” (Ul Haq cited in Bajpai 2000).¹ The 1994 UNDP operationalizing of the concept outlined 7 threats to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security, and clustered along “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” (UNDP 1994: 23).

In the last two decades since the adoption of the human security in academic and policy platforms, the kinds of threats to human security have expanded, largely driven by evolving changes in the global environment. The looming threats of climate change have drawn attention to extreme weather events, catastrophic natural disasters, massive displacement of population, and food and health security among others. That these issues have shown to have transborder impact and scope, as well as compound human security threats have significantly reinforced the need to take a multilateral approach to address these transboundary challenges. The rationale being that unless the impacts of these transnational challenges are addressed and mitigated collectively, these issues can escalate into threats to global peace and security.

The transnationality of these threats to human security further led to the introduction of the concept of non-traditional security (NTS). Conceptually, NTS shares the conceptual space of human security, but regards threats to human security like climate change and environment as challenges to the well-being and security of not only individuals but also states. As defined, non-traditional security issues are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, environment degradation and resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime. It is in this conceptualization that human security is explicitly linked to non-traditional security issues; that human needs are best met and protected when the economy is functioning well, pollution levels are low, food, water and energy are adequately available, society is resilient to disasters, and criminal activities are curbed. These cross-cutting issues often defies unilateral remedies and require comprehensive – political, economic, social – responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force (NTS-Asia, cited in Caballero-Anthony, 2016).

Against this background, this article looks at the kinds of non-traditional security issues endangering human security and examines how these threats are addressed in South-east Asia. By focusing on climate change and environmental issues, we argue that while

regional states through ASEAN have put in a lot of effort in addressing these challenges collectively, more can certainly be done to deal with these issues comprehensively. These include confronting difficult challenges such as resources, working around the norms of non-interference and sovereignty and recognizing the environment as an important referent of security. At the very least, these comprehensive approaches help ensure human security.

2. Dealing with transnational security challenges in Southeast Asia and beyond

Transnational security threats like climate change bring dire consequences to both societies and states. These threats are often complex and cross-cutting in nature, and their impact are difficult to reverse when we look at desertification and loss of habitat caused by climate change. More importantly, national solutions are often inadequate to respond to these complex and transborder threats and would thus require regional and multilateral cooperation (Caballero-Anthony 2016).

The need to foster and strengthen regional cooperation in dealing with transnational, non-traditional security threats has gained a lot of traction in the ASEAN region and beyond. This is reflected in the official deliberations in ASEAN and the ASEAN-led regional institutions such as the ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and the East Asia Summit. Civil society groups across the region and track-two networks like the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) have also been advocating for greater regional and international cooperation in their various policy platforms. More significantly, non-traditional security has now become part of the security lexicon not only within Asia but also beyond the region.

Adopting a comprehensive regional approach to security challenges has been the ASEAN story. For most of its 53-year history, the security thinking in ASEAN is that security can only be achieved comprehensively, with economic development and political cooperation being the core pillars of regional peace and security. The close nexus between security and development and the need to have a comprehensive approach have been notable features in ASEAN's security practices. This approach remained consistent over the years but was recalibrated with the adoption of the 3-pillared ASEAN community, namely: the ASEAN Political-Security community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) in 2003.

The APSC and its relations to the other Community pillars are interesting as it is significant. Mindful of the changing nature of security threats confronting the region that were becoming transnational such as environmental degradation and irregular migration, the APSC was geared to raise the level of political and security cooperation in ASEAN to a higher plane. In its latest iteration, the APSC is seen as a means to “ensure a rules-based and inclusive community in which peoples enjoy human rights, fundamental freedoms and social justice, live in a safe and secure environment with enhanced capacity to respond effectively to emerging challenges...” (ASEAN 2015). It has 4 constituent elements: (1) a rules-based, people oriented, people-centred community bound by shared values and norms, (2) a resilient community...with enhanced capacity to respond effectively and in a timely manner to challenges for the common good, (3) an outward-looking community that deepens cooperation with external parties, and (4) a community with strengthened institutional capacity through improved ASEAN processes and coordination with ASEAN institutions (ASEAN 2015).

The APSC is significant in that it revealed the decision of ASEAN member states to re-think and calibrate their security practices in order to make the association more relevant in changing times and enhance its capacity to respond effectively and in timely manner to emerging transnational threats. In effect, the APSC is both a normative and functional framework of security cooperation. It is an approach that also encourages regional solutions to regional problems, based on the understanding that ensuring national and regional security requires working beyond borders.

The approach of the APSC in stepping up cooperation on security issues is the same approach that informs the modalities in the other 2 pillars of the ASEAN community. This is particularly important to the ASCC as well given that issues like the environment and climate change are placed under this pillar. ASEAN has also been promoting the so-called cross-pillar approach to dealing with transnational challenges giving the cross-cutting nature of these threats. In brief, the 3-pillars can also be regarded as the pathways to peace and human security.

3. Threats to regional peace and human security: why regional and multilateral cooperation matter?

There is a long list of non-traditional, transnational issues that pose threats to regional peace and security in Southeast Asia. In this section, we highlight threats that revolve around the

issue of environmental security and climate change. We discuss why these issues threaten the security and well-being of states and societies across borders. We then examine why these transnational issues require regional, multilateral approaches and assess how these have been addressed at the regional level. Reflecting on these experiences, we then attempt to engage the current conceptualization of human security in light of environmental security. Instead of treating it as a one-way relationship where environmental security acts as a pre-requisite and contributor to human security, we suggest that the interaction between the two needs to be bi-directional. This means that ensuring environmental security necessarily requires humans to be aware of environmental limitations and treat the environment as another referent of security that needs protection.

3.1 Haze

Forest fires and attendant transboundary haze are a recurring issue in Southeast Asia. This issue has its historical beginnings in the early 1980s (Gellert 1998) and repeated itself frequently with the most recent being in 2019. Although not occurring uniquely in Indonesia, forest fires resulting in major episodes of transboundary haze pollution have been the ones originated from the country. The clearing of lands, most notably peatlands, for palm oil planting purposes through burning is believed to be the main reason behind the intractable problem. Burning is largely perceived as the most cost-effective means to clearing lands, and factors that may lead to uncontrollable fires include weak law enforcement, inadequate regulations against forest burning, overlapping rules and regulations across government agencies, strong patronage culture in the plantation sector, draining of peatlands, and a lack of resources for firefighting capability (Sunchindah 2015). It was suggested that an overwhelming majority of these forest fires were deliberately set by private companies and their sub-contractors instead of small farmers doing slash-and-burn (Varkkey 2012). Ultimately, the various economic interests in the plantation sector are seen to be the major driver that significantly weakens other priorities, including commitments to protect the environment.

The fire incidences have brought serious environmental, health, economic and political consequences. During the 2015 haze episode, hundreds of thousands of people suffered from respiratory infections in different provinces in Sumatra and Kalimantan islands of Indonesia (The Jakarta Post 2015). The number of asthma cases in some areas of Malaysia doubled during the same period (O'Callaghan 2013). Concerns over health implications also led to a temporary closure of schools in Malaysia and Singapore (Today 2015; Lee et al. 2016). The latest incident in 2019 in Indonesia saw the deaths of a 69-year-old resident in the Riau Province who tried to quench fires that reached his farmland, two siblings of

7 and 11 in West Kalimantan Province, one fire-fighter in Jambi province, and at least six farmers in Riau, West Kalimantan, and Central Kalimantan provinces (Rayda, 2019). In September 2019, the air quality index reached hazardous levels of 580 in Pekanbaru, Riau Province, and 347 in Jambi province, forcing schools to close and residents to stay indoors (Rayda 2019).

The economic implications are equally concerning. The smoke haze has repeatedly forced flight cancellations and hurt the tourism industry (Kojima 2016). The 1997 forest fires exacted about USD 3.1 billion in damages on agriculture and forestry and USD 1 billion on short-term health and the tourism sector (Glover and Jessup 1999). Indonesia suffered USD 4.1 billion worth of damages whereas Malaysia and Singapore incurred about USD 321 million and up to USD 78.8 million losses respectively (Glover and Jessup 1999).

The situation was worse in 2015, as Indonesia's economic losses reached USD 16.1 billion (The World Bank 2016). Agriculture, forestry, and environment were among the hardest hit with losses and damages totalling USD 13.0 billion (The World Bank 2016). Companies and small-holder farmers of estate crops such as palm oil, rubber and coconut suffered an estimated USD 3.1 billion of losses (The World Bank 2016). Farmers' livelihoods were similarly affected with USD 1.7 billion of losses in food crops, which signified lower incomes for farmers and subsequent implications in their capacity to secure food (The World Bank 2016). In the health sector, the Indonesian government registered 19 deaths and more than 500,000 acute respiratory infection cases within two months after the start of the haze (Agence France-Presse 2015). Immediate health costs amounted to USD 151 million with additional lost wages due to sickness standing at USD 3.8 billion (The World Bank, 2016).² Challenges in managing forest fires and attendant transboundary smog are mostly evident in their recurrence. Regardless of various measures that have been taken at the national level, the regional reach of the otherwise domestic issue prompted Southeast Asian countries to take a collective approach to solve the problem. Following the 1997 haze crisis, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states drafted the 1997 Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) that devised regional cooperation measures in three areas: prevention, monitoring and mitigation of land and forest fires (ASEAN-Singapore Secretariat 1997). It sought to strengthen the capacity of the existing ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) for early warning and monitoring system and establish a mechanism to deploy regional fire-fighting operations.

In 2002, the ASEAN member states adopted the first legally binding “ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution” (“Haze Agreement”) that sets provisions for monitoring, assessment, prevention and response, technical cooperation and scientific research, institutional arrangements and procedures (ASEAN 2002). Aside from envisioning a joint emergency response, the Haze Agreement calls for the establishment of the “ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control” to facilitate cooperation and coordination among ASEAN member states to manage forest fire and haze issues.

After all ASEAN member states ratified the Haze Agreement, with Indonesia being the last one to do so in 2014, the Roadmap on ASEAN Cooperation towards Transboundary Haze Pollution Control with Means of Implementation (“Roadmap”) was first drafted in 2016. The Roadmap aims for transboundary haze-free ASEAN by 2020. It identifies eight strategic areas that include implementing the Haze Agreement, sustainable management of peatlands, agricultural land and forest, strengthening regulations and their implementations, enhancing cooperation in information and technology, public awareness and cross-sectoral and stakeholders’ participation, securing adequate resources, and reducing health and environmental risks and protection of global environment.

Although the 11th Meeting of the “Conference of the Parties to the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution” on 29 October 2015 in Hanoi has endorsed Indonesia’s request to host such a Centre (ASEAN 2015a), and the Roadmap envisioning it to be fully operational in 2018, the Centre is yet to be established up to the present time. This signals challenges in implementing the regional treaty, which is further evidenced in a series of forest fire incidents that continued to occur even after the adoption of the Haze Agreement in 2002. The Agreement’s limited reach in influencing and transforming the domestic contexts, such as overlapping land use and weak environmental law enforcement in Indonesia, could be the reason behind its apparent ineffectiveness from stopping the fires from recurring. The current Indonesian President Joko Widodo, however, has taken improved measures to address the problem, especially after the major fire in 2015. These include the establishment of the Peatland Restoration Agency (Badan Restorasi Gambut or BRG) in 2016 (Humas 2016), the launching of One Map Policy in 2018 (Mufti 2018) which idea was initiated by then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2011 (Aqil 2020), the moratorium of palm oil concessions in 2018 (Sapiie 2018), and the permanent moratorium on new forest clearance in 2019 (Today, 2019). The BRG aims to rehabilitate about 2 million hectares of degraded peatlands in seven Indonesian provinces within five years (Reuters Staff 2016), and the One Map Policy envisions to solve overlapping land claims in the country. Both initiatives are due for completion this year.

Regardless of the absence of a Centre, ASEAN member states continue their cooperation on forest fires and transboundary haze through existing mechanisms such as regular meetings among environmental ministers or officials. In times of very serious forest fires, member states have also rendered assistance to the affected neighbour by sending in their firefighters to help douse the fires.

3.2. Climate change

Climate change has been framed as a threat multiplier, given the cross-cutting and grave impact that a change in the global temperature above 1.5 degrees centigrade. Like economic security, the impacts of climate change such as more frequent and intense weather events threaten human lives and livelihood which directly affect millions of people across the world. The multiplicity of risks associated with climate change like food and water security are also well-established drivers of conflict, that can in turn destabilise already vulnerable regions, including Southeast Asia.

Climate change therefore has received lot of attention in ASEAN not least because of the region's vulnerability to the risks of the changing climate that include increased frequency of unprecedented heat extremes and heavy rainfall events leading to intensified flooding (ADB 2017), and their potential socio-economic implications particularly, but not limited to, food security. The frequency and intensity of weather-related disasters such as floods, tropical storms and landslides have increased in the last half a century, and economic losses have consequently been on the rise (The ASEAN Secretariat 2017).

In Southeast Asia, 362,000 lives had been lost as result of natural disasters between 2000 and 2016 and had affected 250 million people (ESCAP 2017). The economic loss had also been staggering. For example, Thailand's floods in 2011 caused more than USD 45 billion in economic loss and damage whereas the Philippines' Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 inflicted USD 10 billion in loss and damage (ESCAP 2017). Floods in Thailand that started in July 2011 and lasted for a few months were the worst in fifty years prior (Reuters Staff 2011). The flood crisis inundated large parts of human settlements, farms, infrastructures, and many other areas, affecting 12.8 million people (Poaponsakorn and Meethom 2013), displacing more than 165,000 (The World Bank 2012), and resulting in 728 deaths (Poaponsakorn and Meethom 2013). Some 9,859 factories were affected, and 600,000 jobs were lost (Poaponsakorn and Meethom 2013), triggering fear of further economic hardship for individuals and families. Moreover, considering Thailand's role as the world's top rice exporter, the flooding that affected 16,558.55 km² of agricultural area (Ministry of Agri-

culture and Cooperatives 2011) rose concerns over rice shortage and food security. Health impacts saw more than 700 cases of food poisoning or diarrhea, 12 cases of leptospirosis, 7 cases of chicken pox, 2 events of chemical intoxication, 26 cases of conjunctivitis, and 2 cases of measles between October and early December 2011 (Department of Disease Control 2011).

Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 was the fastest moving and strongest typhoon ever measured since 1945 whose recurrence is estimated to be within 200 years (Takagi and Estaban 2016). The sheer scale of the disaster saw more than 7,000 deaths, more than 4 million people displaced, 1.1 million homes destroyed (Sherwood et al. 2015), 14 million people affected, and 6 million people losing their sources of income (BBC 2014). Health concerns included treating the injured, attending to pregnant and nursing women and newborn children, breaking out of diseases such as measles, polio, dengue, and typhoid, treating non-communicable diseases such as heart attacks and diabetes, as well as trauma and other mental health problems (WHO 2014). Additionally, 1.1 million tonnes of crops that included coconut, rice and corn, were similarly affected (FAO n.d.) thereby posing food security concerns.

Challenges posed by climate change are being addressed at multiple levels in ASEAN. In response to the frequency of natural disasters happening in the region as a result of climate change, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) which came into force in 2009. AADMER is a legally binding agreement that allows ASEAN to establish a number of regional mechanisms to help its member states cope with the devastating impact of natural disasters and provide critical assistance in disaster response and assistance (The ASEAN Secretariat 2010). These mechanisms include the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management (AHA Centre) which was launched in 2011 as the operational and technical body of AADMER. The AHA Centre essentially facilitates the cooperation and coordination among ASEAN members of states, with the United Nations, other international organisations and dialogue partners of ASEAN for disaster assistance and emergency response in the region. The AHA Centre also works closely with the national disaster offices of every ASEAN state. In times of disasters, the AHA Centre deploys the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) and coordinates the deployment of relief items to disaster-affected areas in the region (The AHA Centre 2018).

ASEAN also conduct disaster simulation exercises to test, practice, review and assess ASEAN's emergency response. These exercises are the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF DiRex). In order to test interoperability of disaster relief forces, the ARDEX, in particular, helps to improve the Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP). The ARF DiRex, on the other hand, is a large-scale disaster scale exercise bringing all 27 participating members and involving multiple partners and stakeholders. Both exercises which are held every two years also serve to promote capacity building through exchanges of skills and expertise in the field of disaster relief.

The challenge of improving the adaptive capacity of states and communities to respond to the different impacts of climate change is also addressed on several fronts and at different levels. At the national level, various legislations and initiatives are being done. Collectively, ASEAN member states express their commitments, aspirations and positions on climate change through various declarations and statements.³ The regional cooperation on climate change is not manifested in jointly-agreed actions such as establishing a legally binding emission reduction target or commitment to set aside a certain budget for decarbonisation efforts. Rather, it aims at building national capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change through sharing of knowledge and best practices at the regional level, technology transfer, finance and investment (ASEAN 2012), and collaborative time-bound projects with extra-regional partners. Examples include projects with partners on the Sustainable Use of Peatland and Haze Mitigation in ASEAN (2018-2023), the ASEAN Peatland Forests Project (APFP) (2009-2014), and SEAPEAT, and two projects with India that aimed at enhancing ASEAN capacity for climate change projections, assessments of impacts, and adaptation. ASEAN also put forward a Programme on Sustainable Management of Peatland Ecosystem (APSMPE) (2014-2020) in support of the implementation of the ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy (2006-2020).

The main body in charge of various aspects of climate change cooperation is the ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change (AWGCC) established in 2009. The AWGCC is also tasked to serve as a consultative forum that brings together different ASEAN Sectoral Bodies whose work relate to climate issues such as energy, forestry, agriculture, transportation, science and technology, and disaster management. To support the operationalisation of the ASCC Blueprint 2025, the AWGCC Action Plan was formulated and was integrated into the ASEAN Strategic Plan on Environment (ASPEN) 2016-2025. The

AWGCC Action Plan identifies five programmatic areas namely adaptation and resilience, mitigation, technology transfer, climate finance, and cross-sectoral coordination and global partnerships (ASEAN n.d.(a)). Lead countries are to develop detailed workplans to implement proposed activities within the five programmatic areas, implement them in coordination with other ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat, and update the AWGCC of progress regularly. Similar to the usual approaches in ASEAN, the proposed activities listed in the AWGCC Action Plan also heavily focus on capacity building that includes conducting assessments and studies, forums and dialogues, trainings and workshops, as well as producing handbooks and reports.

In addition to the AWGCC, climate change is also considered in the plans of other ASEAN Sectoral Bodies (Letchumanan 2010). For example, in the energy sector, ASEAN aspires to have 23 percent of renewable energy (including hydropower of all forms and sizes) in the total primary energy supply (TPES) by 2025, 35 percent of the renewable energy share in ASEAN's installed power capacity by 2025, and 35 percent energy intensity reduction based on 2005 level (ACE 2020). The implementation of the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025 (ACE 2015) is divided into two periods namely the first phase (2016-2020) that focuses on energy security, and the second phase (2021-2025) that emphasises on energy transition. Similar to the AWCCG Action Plans, the APAEC's strategy for renewable energy is primarily geared towards capacity building through network creation and information sharing through dialogues, trainings, guidelines, and studies.

Another example is in the transportation sector. The ASEAN Transport Strategic Plan 2016-2025 identifies pursuing sustainable transport as part of its strategic goals (The ASEAN Secretariat 2015). Regional cooperation for sustainable transport aims at crafting policy framework for cleaner fuels and vehicles and environmentally friendly ships, green freight and logistics, in addition to conducting trainings and seminars, and developing guidelines and monitoring framework.

The 2016-2025 Vision and Strategic Plan for ASEAN Cooperation in Food, Agriculture and Forestry includes climate change adaptation as one of its strategic thrusts. Listed action programmes highlight the importance of developing capacity at the national level. These include increasing R&D investments, promoting good agriculture practices, building the capacity of small-scale producers, managing and maintaining natural resources, pursuing resilient agro-forestry system, integrating gender issues, and providing access to

climate-related financing (ASEAN 2015b).

Part of the regional efforts done by ASEAN to mitigate the impact of climate change on food security, particularly with regard to availability and access, is the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) mechanism, which provides a 'virtual stock-pile' of rice that is made up of rice pledges/commitments by ASEAN Plus Three countries (i.e., ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea). There is also the ASEAN Food Security Information System (AFSIS), which focuses on systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of food security related information as part of its early-warning mechanisms on food security.

3.3. Marine Pollution

One environmental concern that does not often get much attention in marine pollution. Marine pollution, especially plastics, emerged as a major issue in ASEAN following an influential study that shows Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia being ranked among the top 10 polluters in the world in 2010 (Jambeck et al. 2015). Annually, 8 million metric tons of plastics enter the ocean in addition to the existing 150 million metric tons already trapped in the marine environment (Ocean Conservancy n.d.). Of 4.8 to 12.7 million metric tons of plastic waste entering the oceans in 2010, the five countries contributed about 28% of the total amount (Jambeck et al. 2015).

Waste can enter the oceans as a result of sea-based activities, such as through discharges from ocean vessels, military operations and ship casualties, as well as land-based activities, including effluents of untreated domestic and industrial waste, port and harbour operations, agricultural and aquaculture production, and mining activity. Marine pollution affects not only the marine life such as marine mammals (Jones 1995), turtles (Bjorndal et al. 1994), seabirds (Azzarello and Vanvleet 1987; Moser and Lee 1992) and crustaceans (Laist 1997), but also poses threats to food security for many people in Southeast Asia who depend on marine harvest for their food sources (Vo 2013). Plastic debris may transfer toxic materials to the food chain (Teuten et al. 2009), thereby causing health issues for those who consume contaminated seafood (Wu et al. 2017). The fishing and tourism sectors, which contribute significantly to the regional economy (Moore 2008; Gregory 2009), are similarly be affected.

ASEAN member states recognised the transboundary nature of marine pollution challenges and convened Conference on Reducing Marine Debris in ASEAN Region in 2017

(ASEAN Cooperation on Environment 2017) to discuss the matters collectively. It was then followed up by a series of regional meetings to promote opportunities for cooperation such as the 5th Our Ocean Conference that was hosted by Indonesia in October 2018. The issue also made it into the agenda of the 13th East Asia Summit held in Singapore in November 2018 (ASEAN 2018).

In 2019, ASEAN issued two landmark documents on marine pollution, namely the Bangkok Declaration on Combating Marine Debris (“Declaration”) and the ASEAN Framework of Action on Marine Debris (“Framework”). The Declaration highlights commitments to reduce marine waste, particularly from land-based activities, by strengthening national laws and regulations, engaging private sector, promoting innovative solutions and circular economy, strengthening the role of science, research and development, increasing public awareness, and enhancing regional, international, and inter-sectoral cooperation and collaboration (ASEAN 2019). The Framework identifies four priority areas, namely policy support and planning; research, innovation and capacity building; public awareness, education and outreach; and private sector engagement (ASEAN n.d.(b)). Among suggested activities that include capacity building through trainings, and information exchange through dialogues and information sharing, and translating relevant international laws, the Framework also puts forward a potential collaborative action by establishing the ASEAN Centre on Combating Marine Debris and developing an ASEAN agreement on management of marine debris pollution.

4. Conclusion

The discussion above on how ASEAN has dealt with transnational environmental threats, including climate change, presents a number of observations on how regional organisations advance regional solutions to transnational security problems. Based on ASEAN’s comprehensive approach to security, and seen through the adoption of the APSC and interwoven with the ASCC and AEC, ASEAN has committed to a number of regional agreements and established a number of regional mechanisms geared to raise the level of cooperation to a higher plane (The ASEAN Secretariat 2019). The regional cooperation on these different environmental challenges reflects the desire of ASEAN member states to address them collectively given their transboundary repercussions on human security and thus build regional capacity to respond effectively.

A decade since the adoption of the APSC and the 2 other community pillars, regional

agreements like the AADMER for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in response and the Haze Agreement were adopted and ratified. These agreements allowed ASEAN to establish mechanisms like the AHA Centre, institutionalize the ARDEX and DiRex; and institutionalize regular consultations and assistance in dealing with forest fires and mitigating the impact of transboundary haze. We also see regional frameworks and action plans being crafted like the ASEAN Framework of Action on Marine Debris aimed at beefing up regional capacity through trainings, and information exchange through dialogues and information sharing. In sum, it can be argued that these Agreements are the building blocks of the evolving normative structure that underpins the APSC as a rules-based community that is able to respond effectively to transnational security challenges. They inform shared thinking, develop shared practices and strengthen norms to manage regional challenges.

Nonetheless, implementation of many of these regional commitments/agreements face significant challenges. While there are remarkable efforts in implementing AADMER in the area of HADR, particularly the establishment of the AHA Centre, plans to establish a dedicated Centre for transboundary Haze that will coordinate joint responses is yet to be realized. Whether a dedicated regional agreement and a Centre will also be set up to address marine debris pollution remains to be seen. Moreover, even with the progress made by the AHA Centre in dealing with natural disasters, there are pressures to review its mandate to expand its work to deal with man-made disasters like the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar's Rakhine state and provide assistance to Rohingya refugees. In this regard, collective responses to transboundary challenges compel ASEAN members to also confront challenges to its norms of non-interference while preventing internal conflicts to escalate and become serious threats to regional peace and security.

The heavy emphasis placed on assisting national governments instead of focusing on regional positions on difficult issues like humanitarian crisis reflects the limits of ASEAN as an inter-governmental organization advancing regional solutions to transboundary issues. It further underscores the thinking that national responses play the most critical role in addressing various security challenges facing the region, including environmental threats. It is important to note that regional approaches are not necessarily able to reach and address the underlying challenges that have rendered existing national initiatives less effective in the first place. These include competing priorities and other specific problems at the domestic level. As such, although ASEAN might have formulated regional frameworks to guide national actions, created platforms to enable exchanges of information and best practices, and forged collaborative projects with partners and donors, their progress on enhancing

human security in the region has been modest. Thus, the goal of APSC to raise regional cooperation to a higher level would need much more commitment from member states while confronting and balancing difficult and competing priorities.

As this paper has argued, environmental security is arguably the most important determinant of human security considering the ubiquitous utilisation of environmental provisions in human life. Yet, at the practical level of policies and actions, the current approach in dealing with the complexity of environmental challenges remains sectoral in nature. This siloed approach also explains the generally slow progress at the national, regional, and global levels. In other words, addressing environmental problems within sectoral agenda means sectoral priorities sits at the front and centre of policy-making processes, subject to delays in endless negotiation and accommodation of interests while the environment is left to adjust or manage accordingly.

At the regional level, ASEAN has acknowledged the cross-sectoral nature of environmental problems, and has perceived that a task-force that acts as a consultative and coordinating body may be better able to streamline approaches to environmental problems that multiple ASEAN sectoral bodies are attempting to deal with either directly and indirectly.⁴ It is argued, however, that unless the definition of environmental and human securities are harmonised and understood as an integral unit, the tension between competing needs is likely to remain.

In light of numerous existing environmental challenges that are expected to further intensify given greater pressures coming from increasing population and economic growth, the conceptual approach to environmental security may therefore need an urgent rethinking. While human security has been a useful concept and approach to policy thinking to ensure human security, there is also a need to frame the environment as a security object that needs protection for humans. In other words, the means to achieve human security must be done also with the framework of ensuring environmental security. Respecting the limits of human action is arguably what environmental security is all about.

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Notes

- ¹ Mahbub ul Haq, "New Imperatives of Human Security", RGICS Paper No. 7, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies (RG(CS)), Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi, 1994, cited in Kanti Bajpai, *Human Security: Concept and Measurement*, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #19, OP*1, August 2000.
- ² The World Bank, *The Cost of Fire: An Economic Analysis of Indonesia's 2015 Fire Crisis*, February 2016, Jakarta: The World Bank, <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/643781465442350600/Indonesia-forest-fire-notes.pdf>
- ³ These include ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability (13th ASEAN Summit in 2007), ASEAN Declaration on COP-13 to the UNFCCC and CMP-3 to the Kyoto Protocol (13th ASEAN Summit in 2007), Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment (3rd EAS Summit in 2007), Joint Ministerial Statement of the 1st EAS Energy Ministers Meeting (2007), Ministerial Statement of the Inaugural EAS Environment Ministers Meeting (2008), ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to COP-15 to the UNFCCC and CMP-5 to the Kyoto Protocol (15th ASEAN Summit in 2009), Singapore Resolution on Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change (11th AMME in 2009), ASEAN Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change (12th AMME in 2012), Declaration on Institutionalising the Resilience of ASEAN and its Communities and Peoples to Disasters and Climate Change (26th ASEAN Summit in 2015), and Declaration on ASEAN Post-2015 Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change Agenda (27th ASEAN Summit in 2015).

⁴ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Fifth ASEAN State of the Environment Report, Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2017 <http://environment.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/SOER5.pdf>

独立論文

マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定： 福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して

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序論

1977年8月、福田赳夫首相は東南アジア諸国を訪問し、その最後の歴訪地マニラでのスピーチ（以下、マニラスピーチと略記）で、いわゆる福田ドクトリンを発表した。なかでも、ドクトリン第一原則は、以下の通りである。

第一に、わが国は、平和に徹し軍事大国にはならないことを決意しており、そのような立場から、東南アジアひいては世界の平和と繁栄に貢献する¹。

同ドクトリンは、東南アジア、ひいてはそこからさらに拡大した領域での国際秩序形成に、日本が経済のみならず政治分野にまで踏み込んで取り組む姿勢を示した、「大国」外交および積極外交の理念としての重要性を有する²。なかでも第一原則に対する ASEAN 諸国指導者による評価は高く、実際、例えばマニラで福田がスピーチした際、軍事大国にならないとのくだりに最大の拍手があったとされる³。同スピーチを現場で聞いたフィリピン大統領フェルディナンド・マルコス（Ferdinand Marcos）は、ASEAN 諸国民が、経済大国日本の軍国化および核武装化について懸念を持っていると率直に語ったうえで、それを否定した福田ドクトリンを高く評価した⁴。歴訪後に現地報道を分析した外務省報道課も、ドクトリンのなかで第一原則におおむね一致して高い評価が与えられたとした⁵。

マニラスピーチに第一原則を盛り込むようイニシアティブを発揮したのは、ほかならぬ福田自身である。外務省が用意したスピーチの第一稿に軍事大国のくだりはなかったが、これを読んだ福田が加えるよう指示し、しかも諸原則のうちの第一にするよう注文づけたのである⁶。その意味で第一原則は、外務省の草案にあったその他の原則と性格がやや異なるといえよう。福田はさらに第一原則を、マニラスピーチの「中心」と位置づけるほどだったが⁷、軍事大国化の否定は、当然のことを言っているに過ぎないとも解釈できる。平和主義は戦後日本外交の一貫した原則であり、国内世論に鑑みても、あるいは隣国や同盟国米国との関係に鑑みても、当時の日本が「軍事大国」を目指す政治的選択肢は、ほぼなかったか

らである。また、自民党内の右派・タカ派としばしばみなされ⁸、改憲派にも与していた福田が、マニラスピーチでは憲法9条の理念に則った原則を謳ったことについての違和感もしばしば指摘される⁹。福田は、なぜ第一原則をマニラスピーチに盛り込んだのだろうか。

本稿は、福田が数々の論考で発表していた外交理念を手掛かりとして、上記課題を解こうとするものである（実際、彼の外交理念は、マニラスピーチに強く反映されている）。すなわち、①福田の外交理念の内容や主旨、生まれた経緯を明らかにしたうえで、②それが他の政権による平和主義外交といかなる意味で性格を異としたかを明確化し、そのうえで、③福田の東南アジア歴訪に至る過程で、軍事大国化の否定がいかなるかたちで論じられ、マニラスピーチに盛り込まれたかを説明する。軍事大国にならないとの決意は、第一原則だけでなく、マニラスピーチの他の個所でも述べられているため、そこで示された理念も分析対象とする。また、第一原則は、日本が軍事大国とならないことを宣言すると同時に、「そのような立場から、東南アジアひいては世界の平和と繁栄に貢献する」とも述べている。つまり、日本は軍事大国化せず平和に徹するという理念と、その国力にふさわしい平和と繁栄に関する国際貢献をするとの理念が、有機的に結び付けられて表明されている。そのため、こうした「平和と繁栄」への貢献に関する福田の理念も、本稿は説明対象とする¹⁰。

先行研究の多くは、分析レベルが福田個人に設定されておらず¹¹、これを明らかにできない。政策決定者のアイデアに注目する須藤の研究もあるが¹²、その焦点は、福田というより外務省の政策企画者（policy entrepreneur）に当てられている。歴訪を通じて「平和国家」日本のイメージが発信されたと指摘する昇の研究もあるが¹³、これも福田個人の理念を分析対象にしているわけではない。一方で、福田の理念や思想を分析対象とした研究として、「全方位外交」の具体的表れが福田ドクトリンであるとする若月の研究や、福田の外交思想を取り上げた井上の研究もある。両者は、日本が軍事大国にならず、その余力を途上国への援助に向けるという福田の考えが、佐藤栄作政権に遡ることを指摘し、また、福田の考えを知る手掛かりとして、1972年に福田が発表した『平和大国の設計』を取り上げている¹⁴。しかし、同文書で表明された福田の外交理念は、佐藤政権以前から形成されていた形跡があり、その点は研究の空白となっている。

そこで本研究は、以下四節にわたって、福田の外交理念が、いかに軍事大国化の否定をめぐるマニラスピーチの原則に盛り込まれたかを分析する。第一節は、軍事大国にならないとする福田の外交理念の概要を論じ、第二節では、そうした理念に佐藤政権が与えた影響を整理する。ここでは、日本が軍事大国化するのではないかとの言説に対し、佐藤政権がしばしば反論しており、同政権で要職を務めた福田もそれに加わっていたことを概観する。第三節は、そうした福田の外交

理念と、同じく平和主義や軍事大国化の否定を訴えていた田中角栄政権のそれが、いかなる意味で異なったか論じる。そのうえで第四節は、福田政権において、軍事大国化の否定がいかに語られたかを、彼の東南アジア歴訪に至る過程を概観しながら検討する。資料については、福田やその他関連する政治的指導者の執筆した論考や、外務省外交史料館所蔵資料その他の行政文書を中心に用いる。また、必要に応じて、新聞や福田に関する論考をこれに加えたい。

1. 福田の外交理念

(1) 国内開発の観点からの軍事大国への反対

1929年に大蔵省へ入省し、48年に退職した福田の官僚時代は、恐慌から日本が戦争に突入していき、その惨禍を経験し、その後の混乱から復興していく時期と重なる。福田の外交理念も、大蔵官僚として経済の最前線からこれを目撃し、諸問題に取り組んだ経験に起因したことが多い。日本の軍事大国化と関連するものとしては、戦時中に軍部から大蔵省に対する予算要求が「天井知らずに増えていく」過程を目の当たりにしたことが挙げられよう。その例として福田は、昭和11年度と12年度の国家予算（決算ベース）と軍事費を回顧録で紹介している。すなわち、11年度は総枠22億82百万円のうち、10億78百万円47.2%が軍事費だったのが、翌12年度には、47億42百万円に総枠が跳ね上がり、しかも軍事費が32億71百万円と、69.0%を占めるに至ったのである¹⁵。

戦後、福田は、これが国内経済や開発に問題を引き起こしたことを根拠に、日本の軍事大国化に反対している。福田によると、戦前の日本の経済力は、例えば72年の15分の1に過ぎなかったが、それでも日本は世界一を誇る帝政および共産ロシアの大陸軍に匹敵する陸軍を持ち、かつ、世界一の米国海軍、世界二の英国海軍を合わせて相手にするに足る海軍を持とうとした。戦前の平時基準年次でも国家予算のうち軍事費が45%を占め、当時、極めて重要性が高いとされていた鉄の生産量のうち7割が軍需、準軍需に充てられたのである。こうした軍事優先政策により、鉄道、道路、上水道、下水道、住宅など、国土建設や都市づくりの面で、日本は欧米先進国から数十年遅れてしまったというのである¹⁶。

(2) 憲法の平和主義

政治家となった福田は、やがて日本民主党に参加し、岸信介の側近として改憲派に与していった。1955年の保守合同時には、中村梅吉や井出一太郎らとともに日本民主党の政策協定の起草委員に名を連ね、自主憲法の制定を自民党の政綱に盛り込むのに一役買っている。福田によれば憲法は、「銃と剣で押し付けられたもの」であり¹⁷、例えば英語の直訳調たる日本語等は問題であるから、日本人の手

によって作り直すべきものだった¹⁸。占領下で制定された憲法は、例えばフランスでは無効とされ、ドイツでは独立後に効力を失うと規定されており、これは憲法の性質上当然の考え方だと福田は論じた。福田によると、独立国となった日本の国民は、日本国憲法に対し、「全面的にこれを再検討して、真に国民のものとするか、或いは改定するか破棄するかという発言の機会を与えられた」のである¹⁹。

しかしながら、福田は改憲に積極的であっても、平和主義に変更を加える意図を持たなかった。実際、福田は、他国への侵略や、軍勢力を背景とした外交を可能にするような改憲には反対だとし、平和主義や国際協調主義は堅持すると明言している²⁰。しかも、その後の福田は改憲について、必要性は感じるものの、実現しようとすれば大変な「消耗」を引き起こすため、「今は適当な時期ではない」という姿勢をとるようになり²¹、ついぞその「適当な時期」が訪れたとして、改憲のイニシアティブをとることはなかった。観念上はありうる改憲だが、大きな犠牲と労力を払い、他の多くの問題を棚上げして取り組んだとしても、どれほど時間がかかるか見えない不確かなものに福田の目には映ったのである²²。改憲に関するこうした趣旨の発言は、60年代から政界引退後に至るまで、散発的になされていることから、福田のこうした消極姿勢は、一貫していたと考えられる。したがって福田がマニラスピーチで憲法の一節を引用し、憲法9条の理念を誇り高く謳っていることと、自身が改憲主義者であることは、福田にとっては矛盾しない。

(3) 核兵器保有に反対する観点からの軍事大国化の否定

また、福田による「軍事大国」化の否定は、核保有への反対にも起因する²³。これは、日本国民に広がる強い反核感情はもちろんのこと、核兵器の発達により「相手国への攻撃あるいは報復が、同時に自国の破滅を招くという事態」になること²⁴、さらには核を使用した大規模戦争が、「人類の死滅であり、地球の終わり」にすらなるため、第三次世界大戦は当面起こりえないという観点からも呈されていた²⁵。実際、例えば SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: 戦略兵器制限交渉) で1972年に合意が成立し、それにともなって東西の緊張緩和が進んだことを、核を使用しない、また、その開発に多額の資金を注入して国民を破たんさせてはならないという動きの結果だと福田は論じた²⁶。また、核攻撃が当事国(民)あるいは人類全体を危機に陥れるという見方の広がり根拠に、もはや核を含む強大な軍勢力をただ単に持てばよい時代ではなく、そうした科学のあり方を政治が「指導」する時代だとも福田は述べている。こうした「時代の変化と新時代の意義を明確に認識することが、新しい日本の進むべき道を決める根本」であるがゆえに、「新しい日本が強大な軍備を持つことは愚かといわざるを得ません」としたのである²⁷。

福田の盟主、岸は、「反核外交」を展開したことで知られるが、そうした岸の影

響を福田の核に対する考え方にも見て取れる。岸は、平和利用に限定されている日本の核技術も、進歩すれば日本の核保有の潜在的可能性を強めることになり、それが、軍縮や核実験禁止問題などで日本の国際的発言力を強めると論じたことがある²⁸。これに対し福田は、岸のように日本の核保有の可能性に言及することはなかったものの、核兵器を持つに足る経済力と技術を有した日本が、あえて核を持たず、外国の侵略に対して守るに足る軍事力にとどめれば、国際平和、軍縮および核兵器の廃絶を訴えるうえで強い立場でいられると主張した²⁹。

ここで福田が重視したのが、核保有による「軍事大国化」をしないことで強調できる日本の稀有な立場である。すなわち第一に、核兵器を投下された唯一の国家であり、さらに非核三原則を有する唯一の国家という「特殊な立場」にある日本が、「核を持つことの愚かさを強調する」ことに意義があるとの指摘である³⁰。第二に、日本は「力がなくてただ口先だけで平和、平和、といっている国とはちょっと違う」³¹。当時、世界有数の経済力と科学技術を有した日本は、福田によると「米ソの核を含む強大な軍事力にも対抗し得る軍備は持てる」³²。つまり、世界でも一級の軍事大国になろうと思えばなれるし、仮にそれが実現すれば、そうした強大な軍事力を背景とした外交を推進し、相応の国益を獲得できるかもしれない。そんな日本が、他国の侵略から自国を守るに足る軍事力にとどめていることで、軍縮や核廃絶の訴えが「千金の重みを持つ発言」となり、平和や軍縮を論じるうえで非常に強い立場にあらしめると福田は主張した³³。つまり、福田の言葉を借りれば、「力もない国」が核保有しないのではなく、「力はあるけれども核は持たぬ、他の諸国も同調されたいという立場をとり得るのはわが日本だけ」なのである³⁴。これと関連して第三に、福田はこれを、世界における日本の「神聖な使命」だとか³⁵、日本が「世界を核の惨禍から救う大きな柱になる」³⁶などと表現し、核の脅威を取り除くという世界的な課題で、大きな発言権と推進力を有することを誇り高く謳った。

(4) 軍事大国に代替する国家像

一方、世界の核保有国が核武装をやめない限り日本の防衛は不可能であるので、そこは米国に頼らざるを得ないというのが福田の考えであった³⁷。福田は「自主防衛論者」であり、自らの身は自ら守り、最終的には米国の庇護から抜け出ることが必要だと訴えていたが、実際のところは、これについて国民的合意が形成されていないとして、日米安保体制を堅持する姿勢だった³⁸。また、彼が言うところの「自主防衛」とは、あくまで必要最小限度の防衛力整備にとどめるべきものであり、憲法の範囲内に限定すべきものだった³⁹。後年の福田の言葉を借りれば、日本は「虎や狼」になるべきではないが、「ハリネズミぐらいには」なるべく早くなるべきなのである⁴⁰。したがって、福田の自主防衛論は、日米安全保障体制を

否定するものでもなければ、軍事大国を目指すものでもないし、むしろ、核保有しない前提として日米安全保障体制が位置付けられていた。

一方、福田は、そうした米国の傘の下で「暖衣飽食」する日本の姿を非難した。日本は、重要資源や、輸出品市場の多くを海外に依存しているが、これを維持するには、世界中に平和で繁栄した市場が存在し、さらに海外諸国との友好および貿易が不可欠である。その意味で世界の平和と繁栄が、日本の平和と繁栄に不可欠なのだが⁴¹、経済の伸長にともない、そうした分野への国際的責任と役割が増しているにもかかわらず⁴²、日本は米国の庇護のもとに安住し、世界の平和と繁栄のために、実効ある努力をしていないとした⁴³。理念的には、「連帯」（磨きをかけた自身の能力を、社会公共や人のために尽くすべきだとする考え方）を唱え⁴⁴、これを国際社会にも当てはめて、自国の平和や繁栄のみを追求するのではなく、「あらゆる国との提携を深め、世界の繁栄の中に日本の繁栄を見出だそうとする国際連帯の姿勢」が必要だと論じた⁴⁵。また、福田は「世界の中の日本」や「アジアの中の日本」という語も用いて、国際社会の一員として、世界平和に対するできる限りの責任を遂行することを唱え⁴⁶、特に軍備を持たない日本としては「せめて後進国の開発に力を尽くすくらいことは当然の責務」だとして、途上国への経済開発援助を積極的に進めるべきだと主張した⁴⁷。

このように、経済的パワーの伸長を背景に、途上国への経済協力促進を福田が主張した背景には、外交を進めるうえで軍事力の相対的重要性が、以前ほど高くないという彼の考えもあった。たしかに、かつて「大国」は、強い軍事力を持つ国を意味していたし、実力ある発言をなし得るには軍事力が不可欠だった。しかし、戦争の勝者が国威を宣揚し、国際社会で尊敬を得られる時代ではなく、むしろ武力行使は弾劾され、武力で得た領土や権益も認められない大勢にある。こうして戦争を最後の切札としない外交のあり方が求められているなか⁴⁸、日本の軍事大国化は不適切としたのである。

こうして福田は、軍事大国になるより経済大国となり、その余力で途上国に奉仕する方が価値を持つとの理念を持つに至った⁴⁹。そうした国々の国民の生活を向上させ、社会を安定させるための援助を行うかたちで、世界の平和および繁栄に貢献すべきだし、できるという主張だった⁵⁰。上述の通り軍事力の重要性が相対的には低下するなか、世界の平和や繁栄に対する日本の貢献は、憲法9条ゆえに軍事力を通じてのものではないが、「それでいい時代になってきた」のである⁵¹。

2. 佐藤政権による軍事大国化の否定

日本は軍事大国にならないとする福田の理念は、彼が要職を務めた佐藤政権の影響も強く受けている。佐藤政権時、日本の軍事力拡大や、果ては「軍国主義復

活」を懸念する言説が、国際社会の一部に広がっており、同政権はその否定に取り組んでいた。例えば、60年代末から佐藤政権の外務大臣を務めた愛知揆一は、米英のアジアからの漸進的撤退が予想されるなか、日本が軍事力を拡大して空白を埋めるのではないかという見方があるとか、当時 GNP が世界三位に到達し、今後高い成長率が見込まれていた日本の国際政治面での方向性が、大きな国際的関心事となっていると指摘していた。愛知は、戦時中の記憶とあいまって、日本の方向性について「憂慮と危惧」の念を持つ海外論調が大部分であると論じ、なかには日本が軍事力強化に向かい、70年代末に核武装へ進むと予想するものまでであると指摘している⁵²。こうした懸念が生じるのは、愛知によると、日本のようにかつて「軍事的冒険」を試み、その後平和国家に変容した国家や、経済規模が大きいのに、それに見合う軍事力を持っていない国家に前例がないためである⁵³。

これに対して佐藤やその政権の閣僚は、日本の防衛予算が、対 GNP 比の 1 % にも満たないこと、平和憲法（およびそれに対する大部分の国民の支持や改正の難しさ）および非核三原則を強調して否定を繰り返している⁵⁴。例えば愛知は、上述の言説を、以下の理由を挙げながら「根拠のない誤解」と断じた⁵⁵。すなわち、日本は自主防衛拡充という方針の下、防衛支出を漸増させているものの、その伸び率は顕著なものではないし、対 GNP 比はむしろ減少している；平和主義を基礎とする憲法の制約により、日本は攻撃兵器を持ってないし、自衛隊の海外派兵も不可能であるうえ、国民の大多数がこの憲法を擁護している；さらに国民の大多数は、核兵器保有を明確に反対しており、政府もこうした国民の総意のうえに平和憲法擁護や非核三原則の遵守を打ち出し、核拡散防止条約にも署名しているからである⁵⁶。

同じく軍事大国化否定の典型例であり、かつ福田の外交理念に佐藤政権の与えた影響の大きさを端的に示す例が、1970年10月の、佐藤による国連25周年記念会期での演説である。佐藤はここで、強大な経済力を有する国がそれに見合う軍事力を保有するのは、世界の歴史において「普通の姿」だが、日本は国力の大部分を軍事目的に割く意思はないとした。日本としては、経済成長で得た余力をもって、世界の平和建設に貢献するとの決意であるとも述べている。また、佐藤は同演説で、全世界の繁栄と平和を図ることが、自国の安全と繁栄を確保する所以だと日本国民は確信しているとも論じている。さらに、日本は開発途上国との平和的な経済協力を重視しており、とりわけアジアの安定を実現するため、経済・社会的発展に協力するとも述べた⁵⁷。後に見るように、これらはいずれも、福田の外交理念と合致し、マニラスピーチとも共通点が多い。

こうした努力にもかかわらず、日本が軍事大国化するとの懸念は根強く残っていると、愛知の後、外務大臣に就いた福田は認識した。福田によると、彼がこの認識を強めた契機は、1971年の天皇訪欧である。これに外務大臣として随行した

福田は、訪問先の首脳らと会談する機会を得たが、その際、「日本はこれからどうするのです？いよいよ軍事の方に手を染めるのでしょうか？核を持つことになるのでしょうか」と「口をそろえて」言われたと証言している。しかもこうした日本の軍事大国論は、ヨーロッパだけでなく、米国の識者にも生じ始めていると福田は論じている⁵⁸。こうした福田の認識は、彼が首相に就任する以降も継続することとなった。

福田は、1972年の第68会国会において、「わが国は、諸国民の公正と信義に信頼してその安全と生存を確保しようとの理想をかかげ、経済上その力を持ちつつも、軍事大国への途は選ばないことを決意しております。これは史上類例をみない実験への挑戦であります」とする外交演説を行っている。これは憲法前文の文言を引用しつつ、軍事大国となる潜在性を持ちつつも、あえてそうはしないとする佐藤の国連演説に則った内容だった⁵⁹。また、この演説は、軍事大国にならないという選択を「史上類例をみない実験への挑戦」だとして、誇り高く謳う姿勢がみられる。福田の前任の外務大臣である愛知も、「経済力と軍事力との間のアンバランスがそのままで維持されることはあり得ないというのが、歴史の教訓から引出される経験的事実だというのなら、われわれは長い時間をかけても、軍事力なき経済大国が立派に存続し繁栄しうることを立証してみようではありませんか。」と、軍事大国化の否定を誇り高く発信している。愛知によれば、日本は「多くの点で歴史上自ら先例を作りつつある」のであり、「歴史の教訓は教訓としても、その前にすくんでしまってはならない」のである⁶⁰。その意味で、「誇り高き」福田の姿勢も、佐藤政権の影響が見て取れる。

3. 田中政権期との違い

東南アジア歴訪を成功させた福田としばしば対照的に語られるのが、自身の歴訪中に反日デモや暴動に直面した田中角栄政権である。もちろん平和外交は、歴代政権が採用してきた日本外交の支柱であり、田中政権もこれを踏襲していた。例えば田中は平和外交の内容として、①近隣諸国を中心とした国際緊張緩和の努力、②米国をはじめとする自由主義諸国との友好関係の維持・促進、③国連の平和維持機能の強化および国連を中心とする軍縮の促進および④とくに日本の安全と関係の深い極東および東南アジアの開発途上国に対する積極的経済援助を挙げている⁶¹。外務省も、軍事大国化する意識がないことを東南アジア諸国に向けてもアピールする必要性を認識していた。実際、田中の東南アジア歴訪を前に用意した発言メモで、「経済大国」は必ずしも「軍事大国」にならず、日本は憲法ゆえのみならず国民の意思として専守防衛に徹していることを説明する必要があると指摘するなど、佐藤政権の方針を踏襲していた⁶²。

しかしながら、軍事大国にならないという決意に関し、福田の外交理念と田中政権以降の外務省によるそれには、若干の差がみられる。というのも、日本の「軍事大国化」に関する懸念を福田は重く見ていたのに対し、田中政権期以来の外務省は、決定的な外交課題と認識していたとはいえないためである。たしかに、日本のような「経済大国は必然的に軍事大国化」するという見方は、国際社会において依然として強く、東南アジア諸国でもそうした懸念が生じる客観的要素が少なからずあると、外務省も認識していた。実際、日本にとってGNP比1%以下に抑制していた防衛費も、個々のASEAN諸国にとっては自国軍事費の10倍以上にのぼる。さらに、日本と東南アジアは地理的接近性が高く、日本の「軍事大国化」が東南アジアに深刻な安全保障上の脅威をもたらすことは、歴史が証明済みだった。また、占領期の日本兵による残虐行為の記憶や、家庭、学校およびマスメディア等から若者らが得た知識が、現地の反日感情や、「日本軍国主義復活」の懸念につながり得ることも、70年代半ばにはすでに外務省も把握していた。加えて、日米安全保障体制は、日本の軍勢力増強や核保有の必要性を低め、したがって「日本の軍事大国化」を抑制するとの見方もあったが⁶³、その存続が確かか、不安視する声もあった。グアム・ドクトリンや沖縄返還など、60年代末から米国は東南アジアでの軍事的コミットメントを低減させていたし、その過程で、様々な米国の政治家や高官が、日本の防衛体制の不十分さを指摘し、是正の必要性を訴えていたためである⁶⁴。こうして、日本が過度に「米国離れ」して自主外交志向を強め、核兵器保有を含む「軍事大国化」を成し遂げ現状変更勢力になるのではないかと、さらには「新たな大東亜共栄圏の構築」を図るのではないかとという懸念につながり得る状況にあった⁶⁵。

ただし、当時の外務省アジア局にとって、日本の「軍事大国化」に関する懸念は、誤解の産物に過ぎず、一定の配慮を要するとしても、決定的な課題ではなかった。実際、同局は、日本の再軍備に関し、憲法上の、あるいは政治上の強い制約があること、国民のほとんどが平和主義であることおよび徴兵制が敷かれていないことが現地指導者にある程度認識されていると論じている。また、太平洋戦争の終結から30年ほど経過しており、当時の記憶も徐々に薄れているとも指摘していた。むしろアジア局は、東南アジアにおける反日感情の主たる原因について、日本による経済的プレゼンスの高まりや、邦人のビヘイビアに対する現地民の反発等、非軍事的な要素をより強調していた。実際、東南アジアの反日感情に関する報告書でも、「日本の軍事大国」については、経済・文化・社会的要因と比べて言及が少ない⁶⁶。

また、福田政権とは対照的に田中政権期の外務省は、軍事はもちろん政治・経済面でも、日本の国際的役割を受動的かつ限定的なものと構想していた。その現状認識は、以下の通りである。すなわちアジアには米中ソ間の「利害の均衡」や、

それに基づく相互抑制の萌芽が存在する。これを、例えば米中接近により共産主義諸国相互の影響力を引き離すことで、西側陣営にとって有利に進展させる期待も持ち得る。しかし、これはあくまで米国を中心とする大国外交の領域であり、日本になし得ることは、「状況の変化に即応しつつ、かかる進展をエンカレッジすること」ととどまる。田中政権末期の地域政策課が、これらを「日常活動に徹する」ものと表現したように、外交政策に新味を持たせるような野心的な姿勢は感じられない⁶⁷。

その一方で地域政策課は、日本がアジアにおける上記の「均衡」を崩す存在にもなりうると論じていた。この地域における日本のウェイトの大きさは、経済力を主要因としてはいるものの、政治面・心理面・さらには軍事面においてすら影響力を有する可能性があり、地域のバランスの重要な構成要素となっているためである。なかでも軍事面の懸念として、日本に近いアジアの国々、とりわけ東南アジア諸国は、日本の「経済力の“ダイナモ”の行く方に疑念」を持っている。「大国」の割に軍事力を持たず政治的影響力も大きくない日本が、対外面の方向性に不明瞭な印象を与えることは、ある程度不可避であり、日本の国際情勢の変化に対する反応ぶりは、政治、経済、心理、さらには軍事面での「現状変更」を予想外に加速させる波及効果を持ちうる⁶⁸。

そのため同課は、日本が「アジアにおける既存のバランス」を急激に変更することのないように、自らのウェイトの大きさを意識した不断かつ細心の選択が必要と論じた⁶⁹。これは本来、受動的な役割であるものの、地域政策課によると、日本の場合にはむしろ積極的な意義を持ち得るとされた。なぜなら、米中ソ間に「利害の均衡」が成立したとしても、その均衡点は静態的でなく、大国相互の関係やアジアの情勢によって絶えず変化することが予想されるため、そうした変化が「暴走」や「逸脱」に至らぬよう「適当な重みを持つ「分銅」が必要だから」である。しかも、域外大間で利害関係の均衡が成熟すればするほど、政治的・軍事的影響力に限界のある日本でも、「この均衡の磁場における欠かせない要素となる」というのが、アジア局地域政策課の読みだった⁷⁰。そのため、日本が「能動的に大きく事を起こすよりも、賢明な баланサーとして機能することが、アジアの安全保障に寄与する道」とされた、その国際的地位に鑑みて日本は、「華々しい役割」を志向すべきでないのである⁷¹。

こうしたバランスの維持という観点から外務省は、既存の集团的、個別的安全保障枠組みを重視するとし、特に、日米安全保障体制をその基軸とした⁷²。これは、第一に、同体制が、アジアの自由主義諸国にとって安定要因となっており、さらに大国外の利害均衡に資するからである。実際、地域政策課は、米国のプレゼンスがもたらす「歯止めがなければ事態は均衡よりも流動化に向かう」と論じていた⁷³。それに加えて第二に、日米安全保障体制が、再軍備の可能性を含む日

本の影響力拡大をチェックする役割を担うからである。同課によると、中国はもちろん、東南アジア諸国もそうした認識を有していた⁷⁴。そのため外務省は、米国による東南アジアでのプレゼンスの維持、とりわけ、日米安全保障体制の維持による、同地域内の軍事的均衡を重視したのである⁷⁵。

このように日本の国際的役割を受動的なものにとどめる地域政策課の姿勢は、しかし、田中歴訪の一年後には改められることとなる。その理由として第一に、ASEAN 諸国側の対日姿勢が大きく転換した。インドシナ半島の国々が共産化したことに危機感を募らせた ASEAN 諸国が、相互の経済協力を活性化させ、日本の経済協力を歓迎するのはもちろん、積極的な姿勢でコミットするよう要望するまでになった。第二に、ベトナム戦争中は米国の路線から大きく外れることが困難だった外務省だったが、同戦争の終結とともに日本独自のイニシアティブが可能となった⁷⁶。そして第三に、1975年9月、西山健彦が地域政策課長に就任したためである。日本の国際的役割を明確化し、特に南北問題に積極的な貢献を日本が果たすべきと考える西山は、76年2月に第一回 ASEAN 首脳会議が開催された頃から対 ASEAN 積極外交を推進した。福田の東南アジア歴訪に関する研究では、西山のほか、アジア局の中江要介局長、枝村純郎審議官、谷野作太郎南東アジア第二課長および外務省と福田の連絡役を務めた小和田恆秘書官のイニシアティブが強調されるが⁷⁷、福田の首相就任前は、対 ASEAN 外交のイデオログと評された西山のイニシアティブが顕著であった。これら地域政策課による姿勢転換により、「連帯」や「世界の中の日本」を訴え、日本外交の受動的姿勢を改めようとする福田の理念と外務省の方向性との一致度は高まった。

とはいえ、日本が軍事力を強化するのではないかとの見方は、ASEAN 加盟国内にくすぶっていた。例えばフィリピン大統領マルコスや⁷⁸、同国外務長官カルロス・ロムロ（Carlos Romulo）もそうした指摘をしていた⁷⁹。インドネシア外相のアダム・マリク（Adam Malik）が述べたように、日本による東南アジアへの積極的コミットメントが要請されているとしても、軍事力強化や、軍事面での協力や援助は望まれていなかったのである⁸⁰。したがって、日本外交の受動的姿勢を改めようとしつつも、軍事大国化は拒否した福田の姿勢は時宜にかなったものであった。実際、第一原則は、日本がその突出した経済力を軍事力に転嫁し、その結果、「東南アジアで大国間の争いが起こり、地域が不安定化する」との懸念する一部の国々に安心感を与えることとなった⁸¹。

4. 歴訪まで

1976年末に首相となった福田は、東南アジアで日本の「軍事大国化」に関する懸念が、今もなおあると考えていた。後に福田が第一原則をマニラスピーチに盛

り込んだ理由として述べたように、経済大国日本が軍事大国になって、アジア諸国を侵略する事態を危惧する国家があると考えていたのである。マニラスピーチは、第一節で述べたような論拠をもって、こうした懸念を解消しようとするものだった。すなわち、「経済小国だったが軍事大国であった」戦前の日本と、GDPの0.88%しか軍備に充てていない今日を対比させ、「日本は戦争を機に、どの国がなんといおうと強力な軍備を持たない」との決意を今一度表明するものだった。そのうえで日本は、こうしてできた経済上・財政上の余力で世界の「遅れた」国々の社会を安定させようとしているのであり、「軍勢力以上に世界平和に貢献する」としたのである⁸²。ただし、その前提として、日本が核保有を含む軍事大国化を目指す必要性を減じる日米安全保障体制を維持する必要があった。

内閣成立から3ヶ月にも満たない1977年3月に福田は、首相就任後最初の外遊先として米国を訪問し、カーターとの首脳会談に臨んだ。その主眼は、大統領選挙戦で在韓米軍撤退を謳っていたカーターに、米国の東南アジアにおける軍事プレゼンス維持を確約させることにあった。そこで福田はカーターとの首脳会談で、在韓米軍撤退問題に慎重な対応をとることや、アジア太平洋での米国によるプレゼンス維持を確約するよう求めた⁸³。その際福田は、米国政権がアジアに引き続き関心を維持しているのか、アジアの非共産主義諸国が懸念しているようだとかカーターに伝えている⁸⁴。この結果、会議後に発表された日米共同声明では、日米協力関係が、アジア太平洋地域の「安定した国際政治構造にとって不可欠」であり、日米安全保障条約が、「極東の平和と安全の維持に大きく寄与してきていることに留意し、同条約を堅持することが両国の長期的利益に資するものであるとの確信を表明」した⁸⁵。さらに、同宣言でカーターは、「アメリカが、太平洋国家として、今後ともアジア・太平洋地域に強い関心を持ち、同地域において積極的かつ建設的な役割を引き続き果たすことを再確認」しつつ、「アメリカがその安全保障上の約束を遵守し、西太平洋において、均衡がとれ、かつ柔軟な軍事的存在を維持する意向」を述べた。在韓米地上軍の撤退に関してもカーターは、韓国のみならず日本とも協議した後に、朝鮮半島の平和を損なわない形で進め、米国は韓国の防衛に関する約束を引き続き守ると明言した⁸⁶。

翌4月には、フィリピンのマルコス大統領が訪日した。福田とマルコスの首脳会談は二度にわたったが、その両方でマルコスは、「執拗」なまでに米国のアジアにおける軍事的プレゼンスに関する福田の感触を引き出そうとした⁸⁷。すなわち、第一回首脳会談では、日本とASEANの安全保障が相互に影響しあう点を指摘しながら、米国によるフィリピンの軍事プレゼンスに関心を持つよう福田に要請した。そのうえで、カーター政権が、東南アジアにおける軍事プレゼンスを「どの程度まで、またいかなる段階を経て削減して行くのかがはっきりしない」と述べ、米国がどこまで軍事プレゼンスを継続するのかに疑問を呈した。これに対し福田

は、米国軍撤退後の同地域諸国による不安をふまえてカーターと議論したことや、その際大統領が、「アジアの安定のために約束したことは守る、またプレゼンスもこれを大きく変更することはない」と言っていたことを伝えた⁸⁸。第二回会談においてもマルコス、米国のフィリピンにおける軍事プレゼンスが維持されると見てよいかと福田に尋ねている。米国の軍事政策を述べる立場にない福田は、カーターが朝鮮半島その他のアジア諸国のコミットメントを守ると述べていたことをあらためてマルコスに伝えた⁸⁹。

さらに福田は、日本の専守防衛のあり方について詳しく説明した。第一回会談では、核について日本は米国に依存し、持たない方針であるとともに、日米の安全保障体制は維持されるとの見方を示している⁹⁰。さらに第二回会談では、日本は強大な軍備を持てるにもかかわらず、自衛のみを目指し、他国の脅威となっていないし、そうなることもないとの決意を強く示している：核兵器に関しては非核三原則を堅持しているが、これに他国が倣うことを期待するのは「あまりに理想主義的である」；そこで、世界の平和を維持するために、日本は日米安全保障体制を堅持しているし、これを変更する意図もない；防衛費をGNPの1%以内にとどめる考えである；これは、戦前の6%を大きく下回り、残った余力は国内開発（住宅や下水道など）および世界の諸国への協力に向けたい；経済協力をGNPの0.7%、そのうちODAは0.28%を77年の目標としている⁹¹。これらはいずれも、上述した福田の外交理念に則っていることがわかる。

1977年5月29日から6月1日までには、シンガポールのリー・クアンユー（Lee Kuan Yew）首相が訪日し、福田首相や鳩山外相らと会談した。リーも、カーター政権下の米国によるアジア安全保障政策の変更に不安と憂慮の念を持っており、福田はカーターとの会談について説明することで、その懸念払しょくに努めた。しかし、これらはリーの安心を得る説明足り得なかった。リーは、米国政府が在韓兵力の撤退を貫くと予想し、「我々は、去る3月の日米首脳会談で、福田総理がカーター大統領を説得してくれることを期待していたが、結局、米国側が在韓米地上軍の全面的撤退の方針を変更しなかったのには落胆させられた」と述べている⁹²。日本記者クラブでの会見では「アメリカに具体的な軍事的役割を期待することは、東南アジアのどの国にとっても利益にならない」と、もはや軍事的な意味でも米国は頼りにならないかのような発言をするほどであった⁹³。

ただし、リーは米国による軍事プレゼンス撤退後の日本の動向に懸念を示したりはせず、むしろ、米国によるアジア政策変更に対応するべく、ASEANの自助努力に日本をコミットさせることに熱心だった。リーは福田に、8月のASEAN首脳会議の目的を、「域内の経済協力を強めることを確認し、アメリカのアジア政策の変更に対処していく決意を世界に示すこと」と論じている⁹⁴。実際、8月のクアラルンプールでのASEAN首脳会談における最大の議題は何になるのだろう

か、と問うた鳩山に対しリーは、経済協力であろうと見方を示し、「自分はこれだけに限る」と述べている⁹⁵。したがってリーの関心は、経済協力だけに限られていた。

1977年8月に、福田は初の日本－ASEAN 首脳会議に出席した。日本のスタンスは、これまで述べてきたように、「経済力と技術を提供して経済発展に協力し、平和と繁栄の基礎造りに貢献する」というものであり、この考え方に基づけば、「軍事的役割を演ずることは絶対にありえない」⁹⁶。日本の軍事大国化を否定し、経済力を持って国際貢献する旨を福田は示したのである。まず、福田は、憲法の戦争放棄や非核三原則を挙げ、これを国民的総意であると論じた。さらに、経済力が戦前の25倍に達した現在の日本は、「仮に軍備を行うとしたら、この経済力と技術力では世界一の軍事力が保持しうるかも知れない」のに、実際は経済力の0.88%しか充てていない点を強調した。そのうえで、この余力を世界の民生安定に使用することで平和に貢献したい旨を明言したのである。すなわち、「一国の安全は軍事力によってではなく、民生の安定によって守るべきで、今後とも経済協力はさらに強化していきたい」とした⁹⁷。つまり、福田は、これまで述べてきた彼の理念の通り、軍事分野での支出増大よりも、開発途上国、特にASEAN に対する援助増大に努めたいと述べたのである。

その後、それぞれの東南アジア諸国訪問を経て、最後の訪問地フィリピンにおけるマニラスピーチにつながるのである。その内容は、これまで述べてきた福田の外交理念に一致している。すなわち、過去の歴史をみれば、経済大国は同時に軍事大国であったが、日本はその道を選ばない。その理由として、「諸国民の公正と信義に信頼してその安全と生存を保持」するという憲法前文の文言が、72年の外交演説と同様に用いられている。

さらに、この文言を「歴史上かつて例をみない理想を掲げ」たものだとし、また、核兵器を製造する経済・技術的能力を持ちながらも、その保有をあえて拒否している点を「史上類例を見ない実験への挑戦」だとして、誇り高く謳っている。矢野は、福田の東南アジア歴訪について、「日本は過去に悪いことをしたという自虐的な反省めいたものが影をひそめ」、「むしろ、前向きの自信を持って」臨んだと指摘したが⁹⁸、これが特に当てはまるのが第一原則なのである。アジア局参事官（当時）としてマニラスピーチの第一稿を執筆した枝村純郎も、第一原則に関する説明が「誇り高い調子で貫かれていて卑屈さの影もない」とし、経済大国が軍事大国にならないことを、「史上類例を見ない実験への挑戦」だと「格調高く謳いあげられている」ことを、その根拠に挙げている⁹⁹。こうした「誇り高さ」も、上記72年の外交演説を踏襲したものであり、さらには日本の軍事大国化を否定した際に愛知が見せたスタンスにも通じるものであった。

また、人口稠密で資源に乏しい日本は海外諸国との交流と協調が必要であるこ

と、軍事大国化を拒否する日本の選択が、アジア地域ひいては世界全体の基本的利益に資すること、日本は他国を脅かす存在にならず、持てる力を国内外の平和的建設と繁栄に向け、世界平和・安定・発展に貢献することがマニラスピーチで謳われている。これらも資源の輸入や製品の輸出を実現するため、世界中で繁栄した市場および海外諸国との友好が日本には肝要であり、そのためには、自国の平和や繁栄のみを追求するのではなく、あらゆる国々と提携を深めつつ、世界の平和・繁栄のなかに日本の平和・繁栄を見出だすべきとする福田の理念に合致していた。そしてこれらの議論が、福田ドクトリン第一原則としてまとめられているのである¹⁰⁰。

結論

以上、本稿は、軍事大国化を否定した福田ドクトリン第一原則の有する意味について、彼の外交理念を手掛かりに分析した。すなわち第一・二節は、マニラスピーチに盛り込まれた福田の外交理念について、外務官僚時代から岸政権を経て、佐藤政権での経験から強い影響を受けていたことを指摘した。第三節では、同じく軍事大国化を否定していた田中政権と、福田政権の違いを明らかにした。すなわち、田中政権の頃から外務省は、福田に比して日本の軍事大国化に関するASEAN諸国の懸念について深刻ではなかった。その一方、東南アジアにおいて受動的な国際的役割を構想していた田中政権期の外務省に対し、福田はより積極的な同地域における平和・繁栄への貢献を模索した。こうした役割が軍事分野に拡大するとの懸念が生じ得るところであったが、福田が軍事大国化の否定をそれまでの政権に増して強調したため、ASEAN諸国指導者に安心感を与えたのである。そのうえで第四節では、東南アジア歴訪に至る過程で、福田が軍事大国にならないとする理念を繰り返し述べたことを論じた。外務省にとっては確認するまでもない当然のこうした理念も、東南アジア諸国にとっては、確実なものではないことに福田は気付いており、その発信を愚直に繰り返したのである。

注

- ¹ 「福田総理大臣のマニラにおけるスピーチ（わが国の東南アジア政策）」1977年8月18日、マニラ、『わが外交の近況』22号、1978年8月、326-30頁。
- ² 矢野暢「福田歴訪および「福田ドクトリン」の背景—求められる日本の東南アジア政策の構築—」アジア調査会（編）『アジア時報』91号、1977年11月、2-3頁；須藤季夫「変動期の日本外交と東南アジア」日本政治学会編『危機の日本外交—70年代（年報政治学）』岩波書店、1997年、43頁、50-52頁；外務省『わが外交の近況』大蔵省出版局、1978年、44頁；小和田恆『参画から創造へ—日本外交の目指すもの』都市出版、1994年、44頁。
- ³ 枝村純郎「インドネシア・フィリピン訪問とマニラ・スピーチ」『外交フォーラム』2009年1月号、98頁。

- ⁴ Remarks of President Ferdinand E. Marcos during the Luncheon tendered by Prime Minister Fukuda, Manila Hotel, August 18, 1977. その他、例えば同国外務長官のロムロも軍事大国にならないという原則を高く評価した。御巫発外務大臣宛「総理の東南アジア諸国訪問（ロムロ外務長官と本使とのこん談）」、(TA) R054846 6594、1977年8月29日、外務省外交史料館所蔵文書、2010-0033, SA-1-3-1.
- ⁵ 「福田総理東南アジア歴訪の成果とマニラ声明—ASEAN 各国紙の報道と論評」昭和52年8月27日、報道課、外務省外交文書『福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問資料』、2010-0031。
- ⁶ 枝村純郎「物語「福田ドクトリン」から30年、第7回、「福田ドクトリン」の誕生」『外交フォーラム』2008年8月、82頁。
- ⁷ 福田赳夫『回顧九十年』、岩波書店、1995年、280頁。
- ⁸ 枚挙に暇がないが、例えば小宮山千秋「福田赳夫論」『政経人』第19巻第1号、1972年1月。
- ⁹ 例えば若月は、一般に党内右派と目された福田が、日本は「平和国家」として必要最小限度の軍備保有にとどめ、その経済的余力を途上国の自立および発展に使用することで、国際社会に貢献するという「穏当な方針」を掲げたことについて、「いささかの意外性を持つ者も少なくないであろう」と指摘している。また、井上は、一方では党内ナショナリストないし「タカ派」であり、他方ではそれと対照的な国際主義者や平和主義者という、福田をめぐる相反するイメージを挙げ、後者が実像だったと述べている。若月秀和『「全方位外交」の時代—冷戦変容期の日本とアジア・1971～80年』日本経済評論社、2006年、2-3頁；井上正也「福田赳夫—「連帯」の外交—」増田弘『戦後日本首相の外交思想—吉田茂から小泉純一郎まで—』ミネルヴァ書房、2016年；井上正也「福田赳夫首相の外交思想（講演会抄録 2014年現代史研究所連続研究講座：戦後日本首相の外交思想）」『現代史研究』東洋英和女学院大学現代史研究所、第11号、2015年、53頁。
- ¹⁰ 枝村純郎「「福田ドクトリン」から三十年—理念主導の外交」日本国際問題研究所ホームページ、<http://www.jiia.or.jp/column/200804/09-edamura.html> (accessed 23 Apr 2019)。
- ¹¹ 昇亜美子「東南アジアにおける日本イメージと日本外交—1970年代を中心に—」大石裕／山本信人編『イメージの中の日本：ソフトパワー再考』慶応義塾大学出版会、2008年；曹良鉉「1977年福田赳夫首相東南アジア歴訪と日本の東南アジア政策形成—「福田ドクトリン」をめぐる通説の批判的検討」『国際関係論研究』第22号、2004年；若月秀和「福田ドクトリン—ポスト冷戦外交の「予行演習」—」『国際政治』第108号、2000年；その他、田中康友「ポストベトナムの東南アジア安定化政策としての福田ドクトリン—外務省アジア局の政策形成プロセスに着目して—」『アジア研究』第45巻1号、1999年。
- ¹² Suetō Sudo, “The Road to Becoming a Regional Leader: Japanese Attempts in Southeast Asia, 1975-1980,” *Pacific Affairs*, 61 (1) 1988; Suetō Sudo, *Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992)；前掲、須藤「変動期の日本外交と東南アジア」；須藤季夫「「アイディア」と対外政策決定論—福田ドクトリンをめぐる日本の政策決定過程」『国際政治』第108号、1995年。
- ¹³ 前掲、昇「東南アジアにおける日本イメージと日本外交」
- ¹⁴ 前掲、若月『「全方位外交」の時代』4頁；前掲、井上「福田赳夫—「連帯」の外交—」250-1頁；前掲、井上「福田赳夫首相の外交思想」
- ¹⁵ 前掲、福田『回顧九十年』40-2頁。
- ¹⁶ 福田赳夫「当面の政局を語る」『経済時代』第37巻第10号、1972年10月、16頁；福田赳夫「先行すべきは民族改造—列島改造だけでは歪んだ社会が—」『政経人』第19巻第10号、1972年11月、20-1頁。
- ¹⁷ 『朝日新聞』1968年2月26日。

- 18 福田赳夫、白井吉見「倉石発言は日本のタメ息」『文芸春秋』1968年5月号、104頁。
- 19 福田赳夫「鳩山内閣民主党の公約は斯くして実行できる—国民生活はどうなる」『実業之世界』第52巻第5号、1955年5月、31-2頁。
- 20 岸信介、河野一郎、福田赳夫、後藤田正晴、田中角栄、中曽根康弘「私の履歴書—保守政権の担い手」日本経済新聞出版社、2007年、158-9頁；前掲、福田、白井「倉石発言は日本のタメ息」104-5頁。
- 21 『朝日新聞』1977年11月5日。
- 22 田原総一郎「福田赳夫：わが自民党とのたたかい」『中央公論』第110巻第1号、1995年、63頁。
- 23 福田赳夫「奇跡の発展の三つの推進力」『経済展望』1971年2月1日号、23頁。
- 24 田中宏編『福田赳夫：保守革命に賭ける』読売新聞社、1974年、170頁。
- 25 前掲、福田「当面の政局を語る」16頁。ただし、原水爆を用いた戦争が絶対ないというような楽観論に立っているわけでもない。田中角栄、福田赳夫、船田中「新春放談」『政策月報』自由民主党、第72号、1962年1月、60-1頁。
- 26 福田赳夫「今日の内外情勢と日本の進路」『経済時代』第38巻第11号、1973年11月号、16-7頁；福田赳夫「日本精神を再建する年」『経済展望』第46巻第1号、1974年新年号、27-8頁。
- 27 前掲、田中『福田赳夫』170-1頁。
- 28 岸信介『岸信介回顧録』廣済堂、1983年、395-6頁。
- 29 前掲、福田「当面の政局を語る」16頁。
- 30 瀬長亀次郎の質問に対する福田の答弁。「第八十回国会衆議院会議録」第四号、『官報号外』昭和五十二年二月四日。
- 31 福田赳夫「歴史の教訓に学ぶ平和大国への道」『朝日ジャーナル』Vol.27, No.45, 1983年、13頁。
- 32 福田赳夫、小竹即一「“党内革命”で党風を刷新—転換期を迎えた自民党—」『政経人』、第20巻第3号、1973年3月、40頁。
- 33 前掲、福田「当面の政局を語る」16頁。
- 34 竹入義勝の質問に対する答弁。「第八十回国会衆議院会議録」第四号、『官報号外』昭和五十二年二月四日。
- 35 前掲、福田「日本の財政と安保条約」7頁。
- 36 前掲、福田「七十年代の日本経済の課題」。
- 37 福田赳夫「日本の財政と安保条約」『実業之世界』第66巻第12号、1969年12月、7頁。
- 38 『朝日新聞』1969年10月3日。
- 39 『毎日新聞』1970年5月23日。
- 40 前掲、福田『回顧九十年』311頁。
- 41 前掲、福田「大事争うべし」15-8頁；前掲、福田「当面の政局を語る」16頁；福田赳夫「平和大国の設計」『経済時代』第37巻第7号、1972年7月号、9-10頁。
- 42 福田赳夫「転機を迎えた国際情勢と日本の国際的責任」『経済展望』1971年43巻1号、28頁。
- 43 福田赳夫「国民総理解で前進すべき時」『経済展望』40巻1号、1968年1月、26-7頁。同様の議論として、例えば福田赳夫「日本国民に課せられた今後の使命—社会、国、世界に対する責任を自覚せよ—」『経済時代』33巻2号、1968年2月、30-3頁。
- 44 同上；福田赳夫「インフレ克服が最大の急務—世界に誇れる平和福祉社会建設のために—」『政経人』第20巻第7号、1973年、22頁。
- 45 福田赳夫「挙党体制で難局を乗りきる」『経済時代』第38巻第1号、1973年、17-8頁。

- 46 衆議院本会議の代表質問、1965年1月27日、引用は、福田赳夫「使命遂行に当って自信と信念と勇気を」『経済時代』第30巻第3号、18頁。その他の例として、福田赳夫「激動する世界の中の日本」『経済展望』第37巻第10号、1965年6月、23頁。
- 47 福田赳夫「転機に立つ日本の進路 成年式を迎えた新日本と国民の覚悟」第37巻第2号、1965年2月、13頁。
- 48 福田赳夫「国際協調と日本」『実業之世界』、1972年1月、第69巻第1号、20頁。
- 49 福田赳夫「平和国家建設への道を誤るな」『政経人』第20巻第12号、1973年12月、23-4頁。
- 50 前掲、福田「今日の内外情勢と日本の進路」16-7頁；前掲、福田「日本精神を再建する年」27-8頁。
- 51 福田赳夫、多田実「新春対談 福田大蔵大臣にきく」『時の動き』1971年1/1、9頁。
- 52 愛知揆一「これからの日本外交」『世界の動き』、No.228、臨時増刊号、1970年9月、11-2頁；「第26回国連総会における愛知首席代表一般討論演説」ニューヨーク、1971年9月27日、『わが外交の近況』16号、424-33頁。
- 53 ジェームズ・レストン「佐藤首相会見記」『中央公論』昭和46年11月号、141、144-5頁。
- 54 同上。
- 55 「第26回国連総会における愛知首席代表一般討論演説」ニューヨーク、1971年9月27日、<https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1972/s47-shiryuu-2-1.htm> (accessed 31 Oct 2020)。
- 56 愛知揆一「これからの日本外交」『世界の動き』、No.228、臨時増刊号、1970年9月、11-12頁。
- 57 「国連25周年記念会期における佐藤総理大臣演説」昭和45年10月21日、<https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1971/s46-shiryuu-2-1.htm> (accessed 9 Aug. 2018)。
- 58 福田赳夫「大事争うべし」『世界と日本』No.10、1972年、14-5頁。
- 59 「第68回国会における福田外務大臣の外交演説」昭和47年1月29日、<https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1972/s47-shiryuu-1-5.htm#k331> (accessed 29 Sep. 2019)。
- 60 前掲、愛知「これからの日本外交」11-2頁。
- 61 「総理東南アジア訪問用発言メモ」昭和48年12月、アジア局、外務省外交文書「田中総理東南アジア諸国訪問」2010-5051。
- 62 同上。
- 63 例えば、久保卓也「日米安全保障条約を見直す」1972年、『データベース「世界と日本」』<http://www.ioc-u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19720600.OIJ.html> (accessed 14 Apr. 2014)。
- 64 例えば、田久保忠衛「手放しの楽観許さぬ日米関係：わが国への責任分担要請強まる」『世界週報』1976年11月16日4頁；田久保忠衛「日本外交、戦後最大の難関に：賢明な選択には知恵と勇気が必要」『世界週報』1976年2月24日4頁。
- 65 例えば、Telegram, American Embassy (Hereafter AM) Tokyo to secretary of State, Washington D.C. “US-Japanese Relationship, Problem of Readjustment,” 1st Oct. 1971, Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, Subject Numeric Files (hereafter SNF), 1970-73, POL JAPAN-US, Box 2407, National Archives II, College Park, MA (hereafter NA); Memorandum of Conversation, 20 September 1971, RG 59, SNF, 1970-73, POL JAPAN-US, Box 2406, NA; 「東南アジア及び韓国における対日批判問題 (1)―分析―」昭和49年3月31日、アジア局、外務省外交文書「ASEAN 諸国日本公館次席会議／対日批判問題」2010-0041、2-5頁、32-3頁。
- 66 前掲「東南アジア及び韓国における対日批判問題 (1)」4-5、24-8頁。
- 67 『アジアの安全保障と我が国の立場』昭和49年10月7日、ア地政、外務省外交文書「本邦外交政策／対アジア」2012-1483。

- 68 同上。
- 69 『インドシナ、ASEAN、ビルマ』昭和49年7月5日、ア地政、外務省外交文書「本邦外交政策／対アジア」2012-1483。
- 70 『アジアにおける我が国の政治的役割について』昭和49年10月8日日、ア地政長、外務省外交文書「本邦外交政策／対アジア」2012-1483。
- 71 前掲『インドシナ、ASEAN、ビルマ』。
- 72 『アジアの安全と平和』作成年月日不明 外務省外交文書、「奔放外交政策／対アジア」2012-1483；前掲『インドシナ、ASEAN、ビルマ』。
- 73 前掲『アジアの安全保障と我が国の立場』。
- 74 同上。
- 75 前掲『インドシナ、ASEAN、ビルマ』；前掲『アジアの安全と平和』。
- 76 友田錫『入門・現代日本外交』中央公論、1988年、60頁。
- 77 Sudo, “The Road to Becoming a Regional Leader,” *op cit*.
- 78 「マルコス大統領のものの考え方」アジア局、昭和52年7月、外務省外交史料館所蔵文書、「福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問／フィリピン」2010-0034。
- 79 御巫大使発外務大臣宛「総理の東南アジア諸国訪問（A）」1977年7月12日、(TA) R043615、外務省外交史料館所蔵文書、「福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問／フィリピン」2010-0033。
- 80 *Newsweek*, 20 Jun 1977。
- 81 ラム・ベンエ「福田ドクトリン30周年と日本・ASEAN 関係」『国際問題』No.565（2007年10月）、54頁。
- 82 『福田総理会見記録（EC 常駐記者）』、昭和52年9月20日、情報文化局海外広報課、外務省外交文書「本邦外交政策／対アジア」2012-1485。
- 83 若月秀和、2012、「福田赳夫研究——九七〇年代を中心に」『立教法学』第86号、154頁。
- 84 『福田総理内外合同記者会見想定問答集』、1977年8月、外務省、外務省外交文書「福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問」2011-0345。
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Research Article

Transformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process

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Abstract

This article explores how the justice aspect of peacebuilding has been dealt with through the Program for Normalization between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in relation to the Bangsamoro conflict and peace process in Mindanao. Using a transformative justice model of analysis, it is argued here that the early-stage implementation process of the Parties' normalization agreement demonstrates their transformative interpretation of justice, by addressing its political, socioeconomic, legal, and psychosocial dimensions. This article contextualizes these four elements of transformative justice through the implementation milestones of the peace process' normalization track: security, socioeconomic development, confidence-building measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation.

Introduction

A United Nations Security Council statement defined peacebuilding as a process “aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence, or continuation of armed conflict” through “a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.”¹ A successful peacebuilding strategy is one that meets the following criteria: “relevance, coherence and consistency of programmes and actions; the consent and cooperation of the authorities of the State concerned where they exist; continuity and conclusion of the process; cooperation and coordination among organizations and other actors involved; and cost effectiveness of the overall peacebuilding operation.” As a comprehensive effort aimed at sustainable peace, therefore, peacebuilding must involve mechanisms that aim for long-term transformation in a post-conflict society's security, political, economic, and legal dimensions. Mani (2002) argues that while it is mainly a political task, peacebuilding is a

process that “rebuilds fractured relationships between people” (15). Considering this comprehensive view of peacebuilding, Lambourne (2014) argues that justice “must [therefore] be seen as more than transitional: it must set up structures, institutions and relationships to promote sustainability” (22).

Transformative justice theory posits that, based on principles of transformative peacebuilding, justice is manifested through four key elements or aspects: accountability, or legal justice; psychosocial justice, including truth and healing; socioeconomic justice; and political justice (Lambourne 2014: 24). This article utilizes Lambourne’s transformative justice lens to analyze how the justice aspect of peacebuilding has been dealt with through the Program for Normalization between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in relation to the Bangsamoro conflict and peace process in Mindanao. The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro’s (CAB) implementation process has been divided into two main thrusts: the political-legislative track and the normalization track. The political-legislative track has achieved significant milestones through the passage of Republic Act No. 11054, or the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), on 27 July 2018, and the ratification of the Law through plebiscites conducted on 21 January and 6 February 2019. The BOL serves as the statute for the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) that replaces the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed the ratification of the BOL on 25 January 2019. With the ratification of the BOL, the MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) took over as the interim government that will exercise legislative and executive functions as stipulated in the BOL.

Meanwhile, the normalization track serves as a complementary process to the political-legal aspect of implementation. As defined by the Agreement, normalization is a process whereby conflict-affected communities can “return to conditions where they can achieve their desired quality of life, which includes the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods and political participation within a peaceful deliberative society.” A report from the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) further stipulates that “normalization aims to ensure human security in the Bangsamoro and to build a society that is committed to basic human rights where individuals are free from fear of violence or crime and where long-held traditions and values continue to be honored” (OPAPP Annual Report 2019: 20). This article analyzes the implementation process for the CAB’s Annex on Normalization, signed on 25 January 2014. It traces the implementation milestones of normalization since the fulfilment of the political-legal track’s objectives in January 2019 and argues that the process of normalization in the Bangsamoro peacebuilding project engenders a holistic,

‘transformative’ perception of justice, with the aim of sustaining political momentum for long-term peace.

This article is structured as follows. To set up the conceptual foundations of the approach taken in the analysis, it builds a framework based on literature explaining the relationship between peace agreement implementation and the normalization of political relations, as well as the intersection between justice and the transition to peace. Second, it illustrates the progress that the normalization track of the peace process has achieved since the ratification of the BOL in January 2019. This is deemed to be a significant juncture, with the BOL facilitating implementation of the CAB’s provisions, including those under the Annex on Normalization. This section looks at the aggregate implementation of the four aspects of the Annex: security, socio-economic development, confidence-building measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation. This is followed by an appraisal of how the implementation process of the Annex on Normalization has, so far, treated the conception of justice, through the lens of transformative justice theory’s four aspects: political, socio-economic, legal, and psychosocial justice. Fourth, the article returns to its argument that the early-phase, aggregate implementation of the normalization agreement for the Bangsamoro deals with the normalization-justice nexus through a transformative justice lens. Finally, the article concludes with recommendations for further research on the junctions between peace agreement implementation, normalization, and post-conflict justice.

1 Implementing Normalization and Justice

(1) Normalization through Peace Agreement Implementation

This article suggests that an analysis of the contents of a peace agreement, and its implementation process, can provide meaningful clues to understand the intersection between the normalization of political relations and the concept of justice in a post-conflict society. In order to understand the relationship between normalization provisions and post-conflict justice interpretations, this article, therefore, attempts to make sense of the structural and procedural aspects of the CAB’s Annex on Normalization. A peace agreement’s overall impact to the durability of peace depends on the dimensions of interactions it institutionalizes. More specifically, a peace agreement that addresses interactions in political, social, cultural, economic, and legal spheres “eradicates sources of noncompliance and, in consequence, improves the sustainability of cooperation” (Badran 2014: 214). The successful implementation of an agreement is also seen as a “concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace” which, according to the literature on civil war termination states, is enhanced by factors like the presence of a third-party actor guaranteeing compliance to the negoti-

ated settlements (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003b; Walter 1999; Stedman 1997), and a high level of economic development in the transitioning state (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003b; Doyle & Sambanis 2000).

The literature finds further that the following aspects of peace agreement design have a significant impact on viable implementation. First, the inclusion of provisions for political, military, territorial and economic power-sharing increases the likelihood of success because it signals conciliatory intent and stabilizes the transition process (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003a). Some studies find that while rebel-military integration may result in peacebuilding failures due to poor implementation (Glassmyer & Sambanis 2008), multiple dimensions of power-sharing institutions foster a sense of security between former belligerents and encourage self-enforcing peace (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003a). Other studies contend that besides transitional power-sharing institutions, two other safeguards that facilitate constructive relationships between former adversaries, and lead to more viable implementation, are dispute resolution and verification mechanisms (Joshi, et al. 2017). Lastly, given the literature's acknowledgement of the importance of power-sharing arrangements to implementation success, the scholarship has expanded towards a discussion on the exclusion-inclusion debate in peace agreement design discourses. Most civil war peace agreements contain provisions on territorial power-sharing in the form of autonomy grants. However, the grant of autonomy through territorial power-sharing does not always address the issue of non-dominant minorities within the sub-state level of governance in the autonomous territory (Wise 2018). Exclusion of these sub-state level minorities may pose a threat to the aggregate implementation of other peace agreement provisions. Also crucial to the debate on the exclusion-inclusion dichotomy is the involvement of civil society. Scholars argue that civil society participation increases the peace process' legitimacy by addressing the deficiencies of negotiations dominated by macro level actors (McGregor 2006), and addresses the exclusion problem through a range of options for involvement in Track One negotiations (Paffenholz 2014). Civil society actors help reduce the risk of relapse to conflict when they are part of negotiated settlements (Nilsson 2012).

Despite extensive provisions on power-sharing, both signatory and non-signatory actors can defect from their commitments when the concessions make them militarily or politically vulnerable compared to their adversary (Bekoe 2005). Commitment problems exist when parties do not trust each other and fear repercussions (Kirschner 2014), or when there is clear uncertainty on the part of certain actors—a situation that can be exploited by extremists (Kydd & Walter 2002). Spoilers inside and outside of the peace process can halt the momentum of implementation (Stedman 1997). While it can very well be a problem of commitment arising from mistrust and fear, spoiling can also be attributable to the vague-

ness of an agreement, causing actors to interpret it in different ways, and eventually, a potential deterioration of the political and security situation (Shedd 2008). These problems of commitment and potential spoiling led scholars to question whether negotiated settlements can, in fact, contribute to sustainable peace. In designing peace agreements, then, scholars suggest setting up and implementing proper security sector reform (SSR) (Toft 2009), and instituting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs that can identify incentives for returning to violence, to extend the durability of peace (Aghedo 2012).

The literature informs this article that the practice of designing and implementing a negotiated settlement is a complex undertaking which may or may not lead to sustainable peace depending on the suitability of its provisions, the inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders, and the ability to mitigate problems of commitment and spoiling. In terms of its immediate and long-term impact to the normalization of politics between former belligerents, peace agreement implementation can be seen as both “an integrated collection of parallel and reinforcing processes” (Joshi & Quinn 2015: 871), and “an outcome that normalizes political relations between hostile groups, solves commitment problems and addresses the root causes of civil conflict” (Ibid.: 869). Having established an implementation process’ ability to demonstrate former adversaries’ resolve in normalizing political relations, this article now examines how implementation addresses the core issues that caused the protraction of the conflict and peace process. At the heart of conflict resolution and peace agreement implementation are questions on how justice is understood in the context of normalizing politics, and how justice will be sought in the transition.

(2) Implementing Justice in the Transition

In a transition to democracy, agreements settle political violence by reforming the state, and create the political condition to transform the relationship between levels of government and post-conflict society (Zambakari 2013). A peacebuilding project after a civil war, on the other hand, faces practical challenges that are different from cases of transition from a repressive state. In such case of post-civil war transition, strategies of prosecution, truth-telling, reparations, and reform are not easily transferrable to deal with justice claims, “where the problem of ex-combatant integration requires at least consideration of local-level, restorative justice approaches,” (Arthur 2009: 360) to address complex issues of self-determination, power sharing, wealth sharing, re-integration of combatants, and war crimes. Peace agreement design and implementation, therefore, must consider both procedural justice (the process) and distributive justice (the outcome) and their relationship with the durability of peace (Druckman & Wagner 2019).


While it is widely recognized that some form of justice is necessary, confronting the past is especially challenging in contexts where “victims and perpetrators unavoidably interact, whether in the political arena or in the street” (Kritz 2004: 15). In some cases, ‘temporal distance’ is necessary in post-conflict efforts, whereby former belligerents allow a certain amount of time to pass before confronting past abuses to avoid a return to violence, whereas in others, avoidance in dealing with the past is seen as “a necessary price for obtaining a peace agreement” (Ibid.: 15-16) and a decision made based on the imperatives of *realpolitik*. In this context, recent practice by mediators and negotiators in transitions from civil wars has utilized the conceptual framework of ‘Dealing with the Past’ (DWP), developed by the Bern-based peace research institution swisspeace and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The DWP framework aims to be a holistic approach founded on four pillars: the right to know, the right to justice, the right to reparations, and the guarantee of non-recurrence. It recognizes that “every context has its own history, culture, religions, languages and traditions which influence the ways a society may choose and is able to deal with the past,” and argues that “top-down approaches and externally imposed measures will neither receive the needed legitimacy nor build a sustainable process” (A Conceptual Framework for Dealing with the Past 2016: 15). The contextual and inclusive nature of DWP allows it to be viewed as part of “a broader set of interconnected transformations” (Ibid.: 17). While it aims to transform relationships on a more collective, societal level through symbolic acts such as official apologies and commemorations, it may also endeavor to change political structures through constitutional reform. A DWP framework allows former belligerents to prioritize political stability and the silencing of weapons whilst acknowledging international norms of human rights and humanitarian law in their peace accords (Zoller 2004: 69). Indeed, the post-conflict phase is a complex period that may involve a comprehensive mixture of options for dealing with past abuses such as using tribunals and truth commissions, reinforcing prior efforts in the spheres of justice and the constitution, strengthening actors and public forums for dialogue and negotiation between civil society and government, and supporting the creation of a factual history of past events (Massard 2004: 13).

Given the complicated nature of the peace-justice nexus, Lambourne (2014) argues that justice “must therefore be seen as more than transitional: it must set up structures, institutions and relationships to promote sustainability” (22). The transformative justice framework she suggested incorporates locally relevant principles of “both retributive and restorative justice in accountability mechanisms, as well as structures and relationships to support future respect for human rights and the rule of law” (Ibid.: 21). There are four elements or aspects of transformative justice: accountability or legal justice; knowledge

and acknowledgement of truth; socioeconomic justice; and political justice (Ibid.: 24-32). This is the perspective of justice and peacebuilding espoused here. This article takes the view that the normalization of political relations in the peacebuilding process for the Bangsamoro exhibits transformative justice principles by not focusing solely on institutions and processes for accountability or legal justice. The Annex on Normalization of the CAB, therefore, is not just an agreement on the political structures and institutions that can facilitate an environment conducive to peacebuilding, but also a mechanism that speaks to proponents of transformative justice, who call on both sides of the conflict to address the legal, psychosocial, socioeconomic, and political aspects of justice.

2 The Annex on Normalization's Implementation: Through a Transformative Justice Lens

From a review of the literature above, this article builds a conceptual framework that weaves together the usefulness of peace agreement implementation analysis with emerging theories on the intersections between justice and peacebuilding. This conceptual framework is utilized in this examination of the presence of transformative justice elements in the normalization process for the Bangsamoro, as manifested in the Annex on Normalization of the CAB. The following analysis traces the implementation of the four aspects of the Annex (security, socioeconomic development, confidence-building measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation) by applying the four elements of transformative justice theory: political, socioeconomic, legal, and psychosocial justice. This framework is summarized in the figure below:



¹ Adapted from Lambourne's (2014) Elements of Transformative Justice

the political-legal track reaching a significant milestone through the passage and ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law and the creation of the BARMM. Executive Order No. 79, signed by President Rodrigo Duterte on 24 April 2019, set forth the implementation of the Annex on Normalization of the CAB and the creation of the Inter-Cabinet Cluster Mechanism on Normalization (ICCMN), the institution in charge of coordinating and mobilizing government agencies in the implementation of the Program for Normalization. The ICCMN operates through support from the international community,² and through the environment created by the ceasefire between the GPH and the MILF.³ The following section is an analysis of the progress of the Normalization Program since the completion of the political-legal track in January 2019. Based on the conceptual framework exhibited in the figure above, it traces how transformative justice principles manifest in the Annex on Normalization's four aspects of security, socio-economic development, confidence-building measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation. The following examination is founded on a review of the Annex on Normalization and related peace agreements, news articles detailing the recent progress of the Normalization Program, reports from the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) such as the Listening Process Report and the Land Report, official reports from the OPAPP, and interviews with key informants.⁴

(1) Ensuring Security: Joint Efforts in the Decommissioning Process

The security aspect of the Normalization Program under the BOL contains provisions on the creation of a Joint Peace and Security Team (JPST), the decommissioning process of MILF forces and weapons, the disbandment of private armed groups (PAGs), the program for small arms and light weapons management, the redeployment of the AFP, and the detection and clearance of unexploded landmines. The creation of the JPST is a crucial aspect of security transformation in the region. It is composed of members of the national government's military and police forces and the BIAF-MILF, as designated by the AFP, the PNP, and the BIAF-MILF. Camp Abubakar in Barira, Maguindanao, a former MILF camp, was turned over to the JPST, and will serve as its headquarters as it safeguards the weapons turned over during the decommissioning process under the auspices of an International Decommissioning Body. The construction of the facilities in the Camp Abubakar barracks was funded by the OPAPP and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). OPAPP Undersecretary David Diciano has stated that the turnover of the camp, and the other ten barracks that will be constructed later on, "symbolizes [their] desire to ensure the implementation of the security component of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)" (ABS-CBN News, 2020). The JPST and its personnel will serve until 2022, when the interim government ends its term in office (Pareno 2019).

These efforts to create a joint security institution conjointly functions with the decommissioning program for former MILF combatants. A multi-nation Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB), chaired by Turkey, and composed of three foreign (Turkey, Norway, and Brunei Darussalam) and four local experts, was tasked to conduct verification, validation, and decommissioning weapons. At the time of writing, 12,000 or about 30 percent of the estimated 40,000 firearms held by former MILF combatants have already been recovered. Observers have lauded the phased decommissioning process, but some have remarked that it can only help build sustainable peace if private armed groups in the region are also dismantled (Maitem & Navales 2020). In this regard, the BOL called upon the National Task Force for the Disbandment of the Private Armed Groups (NTF-DPAG) in the Bangsamoro Core Territory and the Adjacent Regions IX to XII. Under Memorandum Circular No. 83 (s.2015), the Task Force was created to oversee “policy planning and implementation of the program for the disbandment of the PAGs.” The NTF-DPAG’s mission is critical in the decommissioning process because there may still be weapons presently owned by individuals and families, who are reluctant to surrender weapons due to the security risks posed by private armed groups in Mindanao. To address these security concerns, the new BARMM authorities may need to conduct dialogues and negotiate agreements with private armed groups at the regional, provincial, or city/municipality levels (International Crisis Group 2019).

The success of the phased decommissioning process is crucial to the security aspect of the Normalization Program and is necessarily associated with the progress gained by the political-legal track of the peace process. The advancement of the Normalization Program, and the sustainability of peace in the BARMM itself, is contingent upon the political momentum for peace efforts from both the GPH and the MILF. Jimenez-Damary notes, for example, that reconstituting the GPH Peace Panel, such as at the beginning of a new administration, “puts things on hold” and poses “difficulties in getting back on the right track.” This, according to her, can be said about the implementation of the decommissioning process when the current Duterte administration replaced the Aquino government in 2016. Despite the “tricky” role that political will plays in the peace process, Jimenez-Damary finds hopeful prospects from the current administration’s decision to prioritize the creation of the BARMM and the BTA, and the schedule currently being followed by both parties in the decommissioning process. The current proposed Bill for the creation of a National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission for the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB) is also a significant breakthrough, but its passage into law will likewise depend on whether or not the government considers it a political priority. (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December 2020).

Whether political milestones lead to a more stable security environment will depend on their ability to address the concerns of conflict-affected communities and the other threats to peace on the ground. It should be noted that while changes in the political, legal, and institutional frameworks of the country are essential to begin the long process of healing and reconciliation, some are skeptical about the ability of laws and institutions to address the multiple drivers of armed conflict in Mindanao (Listening Process Report 2017: 164-165). Even as a joint security assessment is underway to prevent a security vacuum, and institutions such as the NTF-DPAG are put in place, potential threats to peace and security remain for stakeholders of the Normalization Program. Some observers perceive institutions like the JPST as merely an “ad hoc organization with unclear authorities and resources,” that gives the MILF fewer tools and legal authority to counter the growth of extremist armed groups in the region (Abuza & Lischin 2020: 18). Hence, the threat of violence from other militant Moro groups remains,⁵ especially from those that have pledged allegiance to Islamic State ideology. Furthermore, a United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Report mentions intra-Moro political competition through private armies of political dynasties, as an endemic security challenge for the Bangsamoro and the rest of Mindanao (Abuza & Lischin 2020: 14-17). Likewise, violence related to a culture of *rido* (inter-generational clan disputes) has, over the years, become intertwined with the conflict between rebels and the national government. Participants in the TJRC Listening Process have expressed mixed feelings concerning ‘blood revenge’ through *rido*. While some were in favor of some form of reparation as an alternative to retributive justice, others doubted the ability of reparations or livelihood support and financial assistance to create an environment for sustainable peace, claiming that the painful memory of the armed conflict has made them more vulnerable and “less human” (Listening Process Report 2017: 167-170).

(2) Socioeconomic Development: A Program for Camp Transformation

The BOL recognizes that a crucial aspect of transition and normalization is the acceleration of “implementation of development efforts for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the BARMM” (Philippine News Agency 2019). Community-based programs that reinforce social cohesion while addressing the needs of former combatants, internally displaced persons, and affected communities are recommended by the Law. The Annex on Normalization provides for a comprehensive plan to transform the six previously acknowledged MILF camps⁶ into productive communities. This process has been initiated prior to the formation of the BARMM administration and includes camp transformation projects “for basic and life sustenance, scholarships, school buildings, farm-to-market roads and other infrastructure components” (Ibid.). A Task Force for Decommissioned Combatants

and their Communities (TFDCC) was instituted to deliver socio-economic and development interventions for MILF decommissioned combatants and their communities to help them transition to civilian life. The TFDC's intervention program will be implemented in three stages⁷ through formal engagement between government agencies, and involves projects for social protection, capacity development, and livelihood assistance (OPAPP Annual Report 2019: 25). Meanwhile, a Working Group on Vulnerable Sectors was also instituted to recommend interventions for vulnerable sectors such as widows, orphans, people with disabilities, and detainees and their families (Ibid.: 26).

Key to the sustainability of socioeconomic development in former rebel camps are the funding initiatives aimed at helping address the poverty inextricably linked to the armed conflict. For example, the multi-donor Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) grant facility, administered by the World Bank, has been facilitating international development assistance since 2005. Donors such as the European Union, the Swedish International Development Agency, and the United States Agency for International Development have contributed to support community-driven economic development programs. The MTF has provided assistance in the form of livelihood and infrastructure, pre- and post-harvest facilities, bridges and water systems, and functional literacy programs to barangays within the six acknowledged MILF camps (Mindanao Trust Fund n.d.). The Fund also helped in training the Camps Transformation officers in community organizing and project monitoring, while also assisting people's organizations (Trust Fund Recipients) through capacity-building projects aimed at maintaining community infrastructures for enterprise and income generation (The World Bank 2018).

More recently, the EU, which is a major contributor to the MTF, together with the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) committed to a 60.5 million euro grant for two development projects in Mindanao. Part of the grant (35.5 million euro) will be used for the Mindanao Development Authority-operated Mindanao Peace and Development (MINPAD) program for agricultural cooperative financing and other infrastructure projects. The other 25 million euro will be allocated for the Support to Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA) program. The five-year SUBATRA project for capacity-building aims to help develop the three branches of the BARMM government: the executive branch, in its implementation of transitional policies; the BARMM Parliament, in its legislative, oversight, and representation capacity; and the Bangsamoro Justice System, in its adjudication competence based on international human rights standards (Inquirer.net 2020). Earlier in August 2019, the Duterte administration suspended negotiations for acceptance of such loans and grants from countries that co-sponsored and voted in favor of the 11 July 2019 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution that sought

a comprehensive report on the human rights situation in the Philippines, amidst charges of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. A memorandum lifting the suspension of loan and grant acceptance was issued on 27 February 2020, facilitating the EU grants for Mindanao and the BARMM.

The transformation of formerly rebel-dominated areas, through the government's efforts and the international community's support, is an important step towards attaining socioeconomic justice in the Bangsamoro. The focus on providing socioeconomic intervention programs for former combatants, and their families and communities, stems from an understanding of the pattern of exclusion that has stunted development opportunities for Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples. The TJRC's Listening Process sessions reveal that the deliberate withholding of public resources, the negative profiling of all Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples as 'bad elements' or 'rebels,' and the preferential treatment towards predominantly Christian communities in terms of access to basic services and development opportunities, are among the deep-rooted causes of economic marginalization in the region (Listening Process Report 2017: 98-102). These have not only led to widespread impoverishment but have also had a negative impact on the demographic landscape of the Bangsamoro and the rest of Mindanao. Some examples expressed in the Listening Process sessions are families migrating to places they deem safer than their war-torn communities, and female Moro migrant workers being exposed to exploitation abroad from foreign employers (Ibid.: 102).

(3) Confidence-Building Measures: Beyond Amnesty Grants

The search for legal justice is a contentious aspect of conflict transformation. Considering this, the Annex on Normalization provides that "the Government shall take immediate steps through amnesty, pardon, and other available processes towards the resolution of cases of persons charged with or convicted of crimes and offenses connected to the armed conflict in Mindanao." Safe conduct passes were issued to some MILF leaders to allow them to participate in formal matters related to the BTA. For example, MILF commanders who may have pending cases were given passes to attend the oath-taking of the BTA on 22 February 2019. Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, chair of the MILF and commander-in-chief of the decommissioned Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), stated that the nomination of BIAF officials for positions in the BTA is part of the organization's transformation from a revolutionary to a more governance-oriented organization. He explains that "the main target of transformation is the MILF top leadership both holding political and military assignments," and that for a revolutionary organization transitioning into an institution of governance, "there is no distinction between those holding political and military assignments" (Arguillas

2019). The OPAPP reported that it is coordinating with the Department of Justice regarding amnesty grants and pardons for MILF members. A joint Technical Working Group (TWG) will be formed to address issues concerning the issuance of amnesties and to consider other available processes through the Presidential Committee on Bail, Recognizance, and Pardon (OPAPP Report 2019: 28).

The granting of amnesties to former rebel leaders may be perceived as a removal of culpability for atrocities committed in relation to the conflict. However, it can be argued that the amnesty process has been delineated for its conditionality to the continuation of the peace process and the implementation of other aspects of the normalization process. Jimenez-Damary, an international law expert and human rights lawyer who was also the government designate to the TJRC, explains that while indeed, there are internationally recognized prohibitions on the granting of blanket amnesties, parties in peace process may have to agree on amnesty provisions as determined by the context of the conflict and the intended purpose of such grants. She further reiterates that transitional justice and reconciliation advocacy must not be affected by discussions on amnesties, and that the Peace Panels have agreed on efforts to have amnesty grants in line with international standards through the TWGs (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December 2020). Julkipli expressed concerns, however, regarding the difficulties associated with the processing of pending amnesty cases. He notes that a situation in which “the parties are close to the final phase of decommissioning, while questions on pending amnesty cases are still up in the air” is a significant hurdle for the normalization process’ goals of accountability and truth-telling. He further remarks that while “it is easy for the Parties to agree on and put out an amnesty proclamation,” there are thousands of amnesty cases that need to be processed in multiple courts. For the benefit of former combatants, the government must realize the urgency of these processes, and wield the same amount of commitment as in the decommissioning program (M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020).

Notably, the parties appear to interpret confidence-building as a process that manifests beyond the level of negotiations and related legal processes. Hence, they agreed that the Camp Transformation Program, and the formation of a Joint Task Forces on Camps Transformation (JTFACT), are equally necessary ‘confidence-building measures’ in the Annex on Normalization. By building “peaceful and productive communities” and providing “social and physical infrastructures and... access to economic opportunities,” the parties are ‘building confidence’ in the normalization process from the ground up. (OPAPP Annual Report 2019: 26). The logic behind this, according to Julkipli, is that the transformation of the former rebel camps is considered as one of the ‘initial steps’ that can happen while the Parties are determining how to roll out the security- and justice-related aspects of the Nor-

malization program (M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020). In essence, the parties consider ‘confidence-building’ not only as a provision for legal justice mechanisms that are necessary for the normalization of political relations, but also as an extension of socioeconomic development strategies for the Bangsamoro. Since 2015, the JTFCT has been in partnership with the government’s Department of Agriculture in distributing agricultural supplies and machineries and has delivered other infrastructures such as solar power systems and Alternative Learning Systems (ALS) for conflict-affected communities. Apart from these, capacity building of people’s organizations on project management and participatory area development are also being conducted. As per the 2019 OPAPP Report, the JTFCT, through its engagement with the Bangsamoro Planning and Development Authority (BPDA-BARMM), has been crafting the comprehensive development for Camp Bilal as the pilot area for the Camps Transformation Plan (Ibid.: 26).

As this section demonstrated, the parties in the Bangsamoro peace process, through the Annex on Normalization and the succeeding Executive Order that provides for its implementation, perceive confidence-building measures in two ways. First, the amnesty grants for MILF members had a strategic political purpose, in consideration of the long-term, broad political landscape of normalization. While this is an important indicator of the Parties’ commitment to normalization, the arduous amnesty grants process involving judicial mechanisms must be approached more seriously, so as not to affect the progress achieved in the decommissioning process. Second, building confidence can be a bottom-up, economically motivated approach towards a comprehensive peace process, as demonstrated by the inclusion of the Camps Transformation Program under the confidence-building measures provision of the Annex. Indeed, the parties, through the Annex on Normalization, move beyond the misperception that confidence-building measures are only relevant in the military field, and utilized them as mechanisms to “improve relationships, humanize the other, signal positive intentions and commitment, and avoid escalation” (Mason & Siegfried 2013: 57). At this early stage of the normalization process, both parties are carefully treading around the issue of dealing with accountability and impunity, given their potential implications to the sustainability of peace in the region. The parties’ careful attitude towards impunity concerns is mirrored in the TJRC’s “future-oriented approach to ‘dealing with the past,’ that is sensitive to the Bangsamoro and Filipino context” (Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2016: xviii). The TJRC’s utilization of a DWP framework proposes an “incremental and flexible approach that combines mutually reinforcing efforts in the fields of truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence, while promoting reconciliation initiatives on the national, regional, and local levels” (Ibid.: xx). While the TJRC explicitly recommended that the parties recognize

victims' right to a fair remedy and the state's duty to investigate and prosecute, a holistic DWP approach and its recommendations on the right to justice is only a component of a Bangsamoro and national peace agenda that will be sequentially implemented through short-, medium-, and long-term measures. As evidenced by the inclusion of the Camp Transformation Program, confidence-building is an ongoing long-term process that starts from the ground up and does not diminish in importance even when conflict parties have already built the political and legal foundations of sustainable peace.

(4) Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Dealing with the Past

Finally, this section concerns itself with how the parties have so far dealt with the provision on transitional justice during these early stages of the normalization process. Castillo (2014) argued that developing a transitional justice mechanism for conflict-affected peoples of different backgrounds in the Bangsamoro "must be informed by a knowledge of the diversity of understandings of the past and present, of various notions of truth(s) and the ability to tell it, the advantages and pitfalls of truth-telling, the weight of emotions, betrayal, mistrust and memory, as well as people's desires regarding justice, reparation, relationship with others, and reconciliation" (29-30). This argument is in line with the transformative justice model's psychosocial justice aspect espoused in this article. The theory explains that psychosocial justice must involve knowledge and acknowledgement of four different types of truth, as adopted from Parmentier's (2003) model of transitional justice: forensic or factual truth; personal or narrative truth; social or dialogical truth; and healing or restorative truth. Lambourne's (2014) model argues that perpetrators' acknowledgement of their atrocities, and their impact on victims, are crucial in justice, reconciliation, and peacebuilding (Lambourne 2014: 28). Hence, conflict parties, even during the early phase of a normalization process, must take appropriate measures to acknowledge their culpability for actions done in relation to the armed conflict.

Chaired by a Swiss expert and joined by one representative each delegated by the GPH and the MILF, the TJRC assumed the role of studying and recommending "appropriate mechanisms to address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people, correct historical injustices, and address human rights violations and marginalization through land dispossession, towards healing and reconciliation" (OPAPP Annual Report 2017: 28). The ICCMN was tasked to lead the implementation of the recommendations in the reports of the TJRC, while on 16 August 2019, the parties signed the Terms of Reference for a Transitional Working Group (TWG) on Transitional Justice and Reconciliation that will formulate a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations (OPAPP Annual Report 2019: 28). The establishment of the TJRC, as well as the DWP framework inherent in its

mandate, is critical for the parties' knowledge and acknowledgement of truth. Officially convened on 27 September 2014, the TJRC submitted a comprehensive report to the parties in December 2015 which was later released to the public in March 2016. Submitted to the Panels in February 2017, the 2016 Report was later followed by a Listening Process Report and two reports specifically focusing on matters of land dispossession.

The exclusive focus on land dispossession through two reports, *Dealing with the Past and Land Dispossession* and *Land: Territory, Domain, and Identity*, was in recognition of two important considerations, according to Julkipli. First, the issue of land dispossession involves fundamental technicalities, such as determination of hectarage and reassignment of borders, which require rigorous study. Second, the land issue is a critical component of not only Moros', but also of indigenous peoples', narrative of the conflict in Mindanao. Their story of being driven to the margins using land tenure mechanisms of colonial and post-colonial governments is central to the Bangsamoro conflict narrative (M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020). Further substantiating the importance of addressing land dispossession issues at the heart of the conflict, the Bangsamoro Parliament established the Office of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Land Reform of the BARMM (MAFAR-BARMM). The Office has distributed Certification of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) titles for a total of 1,200 hectares of land to pre-assessed farmer-recipients and Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC) in the region. The MAFAR-BARMM aims to distribute more CLOAs for some 2,000 hectares before 2020 ends (Maulana 2020).

To learn the technical aspects of utilizing the DWP framework, the GPH and MILF designates to the Bangsamoro TJRC attended capacity-building workshops facilitated by the Swiss Government and swisspeace. Jimenez-Damary recalls having reservations about the 'hard line' that separates victims and perpetrators in the original version of the framework, which was based on the Principles against Impunity Concept introduced by Louis Joinet and Diane Orentlicher. This understanding of the relationship between victims and perpetrators, however, does not always apply to the local realities of the Bangsamoro conflict. According to Julkipli, the absence of a rigid dichotomization between victims and perpetrators in Bangsamoro conflict narratives flows from "a very Filipino concept of victimhood," related to people's stories of resilience, bravery, sacrifice, and heroism as told in their version of conflict narrative. For example, there are people who were victimized by atrocities related to the conflict that will not claim to be 'victims' because it goes against their version of events in which they are supposed to be resilient and brave (M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020).

The TJRC, then, modified the DWP framework introduced by the Swiss into one that does not distinguish between victims and perpetrators in terms of their ability to access

their “right to know, right to justice, right to reparation, and the guarantee of non-recurrence.” The resulting framework, as it appears on the TJRC’s reports, is one that “ensures principles of applicability, ownership, and acceptance” (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December 2020) and “takes into account the dynamic relationship between victims and perpetrators” (Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2016: 77-78). As a future-oriented approach, the Framework requires short-, medium-, and long-term interventions to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations, thereby producing an environment that encourages reconciliation. Rather than being retributive, the Framework’s decidedly restorative nature aims to transform social and political identities of victimization into “a new sense of ‘belonging,’ by which individuals enjoy rights and duties of citizenship as part of a new social contract” (Ibid.: 78).

Considering this framework of conflict transformation, the TJRC’s Consultation and Listening Processes were crucial in identifying the four intertwined issues at the root of the conflict: “the Bangsamoro narrative of *historical injustice* frames their collective experience of *legitimate grievances*, in particular as they relate to the far-ranging effects of *marginalization through land dispossession* and widespread *human rights violations* [emphases added]” (Ibid.: 62). These four issues, which also became the foundation of the TJRC’s mandate, are the consequences of “three mutually reinforcing phenomena:” systemic violence expressed in political, socioeconomic, and cultural exclusion; a culture of impunity; and deep neglect by the state. To understand how these phenomena resulted in the four issues at the root of the conflict, the TJRC sought the expertise of facilitators and key informants coming from diverse backgrounds. The list of facilitators included both men and women, from academics to NGO staff, of either Moro, indigenous, or Christian background, with the ability to speak in the local language of participants from various areas of the Bangsamoro. This diversity among facilitators helped ensure participants’ comfort and security in sharing their truth about the conflict. The manuscripts that came out of these Listening Process sessions are now housed in the Swiss Embassy in Manila under the safekeeping of the Swiss Government. The findings from these sessions, then, became the basis for the TJRC’s recommendations to the Peace Panels (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December 2020).

The TJRC’s most important recommendation, however, is the creation of the NTJRCB, which will be charged with the implementation of a Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Program. From a psychosocial justice perspective, the recommendation to create an NTJRCB is aimed at operationalizing the DWP framework through the national body’s four proposed sub-commissions: Bangsamoro Historical Memory; Impunity and the Promotion of Accountability and Rule of Law in the Bangsamoro; Land Dispossession in

the Bangsamoro; and Bangsamoro Healing and Reconciliation (Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2016: 83). At the time of writing, a Bill (HB No. 4003) that will institutionalize the recommended NTJRCB is being discussed by the 18th Congress' Committee on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity, and is a refiled version of the one submitted during the 17th Congress, which did not prosper beyond the committee level. The recent refiling is considered a "timely" effort, coming in the wake of a violent incident in which at least nine Muslim farmers were shot dead by unknown perpetrators in Kabacan, North Cotabato on 28 August 2020. Ishak Mastura, the MILF representative in the TJRC, warned that such incidents "can flare up" without an institution that can investigate within a DWP framework (Quismorio 2020). Observers have noted, however, that the refiling of the Bill is currently not considered as one of the priority legislations for this Congress. According to Julkipli, it does not appear to have enough backing from the Peace Panels through the OPAPP and the BTA, thereby creating a disconnect between peace efforts from the legislative and executive branches of government (M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020). Jimenez-Damary notes that for this Bill to pass the committee level, there must be concerted effort from the government, through the administration's legislative liaisons in the Congress and the Senate, in making it a political priority. Another important consideration is ensuring that the Bill passes as proposed, without substantive additions that may dilute its purpose. Jimenez-Damary recalls a consultation session in Congress in which representatives suggested adding provisions to the Bill which are not directly related to the proposed mandate of the NTJRCB, as recommended by the TJRC. According to her, this is indicative of a "capacity gap in terms of understanding transitional justice" and its role in sustainable peace in the Bangsamoro. She remarks that there must be a comprehensive lobbying effort mainly from the Bangsamoro constituency, through the assistance of civil society organizations that are most active in the region, and from other constituencies that see a peaceful Bangsamoro as a manifestation of a national Filipino identity founded on principles of multiculturalism (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December 2020).

3 Transformative Justice amidst Normalization

This analysis of the intersection between justice and the process of normalizing political relations was perceived through a transformative lens. This perspective shifts the "focus on 'transition' as an interim process that links the past and the future, to 'transformation' which implies long-term sustainable processes embedded in society" (Lambourne 2014: 19). In long drawn-out peace processes, such as the Bangsamoro case, post-conflict society

may have multiple justice needs that require local, cultural sensitivities to co-exist with western worldviews of transitional legal justice (Ibid.: 19-20). Transformative justice, then, must exist within a sustainable process that pays “attention to the needs and expectations of local affected populations, as well as a coordinated focus on the multi-dimensional or multidisciplinary aspects of peacebuilding, incorporating attention to all the dimensions of human security” (Ibid.: 23). Placing transformative justice within the context of a normalization, therefore, implies going beyond the establishment of structures and formal mechanisms as benchmarks of successful conflict transformation.

This article investigated whether transformative justice has been apparent in the Bangsamoro peace process, through an analysis of the manifestations of political, socioeconomic, legal, and psychosocial justice in the Bangsamoro Normalization Program’s early phase of implementation. The examination of the Annex on Normalization’s implementation delivers the following findings. First, concerning the political element of transformative justice. Indeed, it can be argued that the Annex on Normalization and its four aspects (security, socio-economic development, confidence-building measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation) require some consideration of political justice for its successful implementation. This is because political justice involves institutional transformation by making the different branches of government accountable to the general population. Essentially, both the national government, the MILF through the BTA, and the rest of the BARMM leadership, must be answerable to Bangsamoro society through proper implementation of all aspects of the Annex on Normalization. In this article, political justice was contextualized through the Parties’ recent efforts to address peace and security concerns amidst the normalization process. Institutional transformation is expressed, mainly through established intergovernmental relations between the State and the BARMM, as well as the phased decommissioning process and the NTF-DPAG, tasked to deal with private armed groups, related to a culture of political dynasticism that is rampant in the region. The maintenance of peace and security is contingent upon the ability of the Parties to sustain political momentum for the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Second, socioeconomic justice, typically understood in terms of financial and material compensation, such as through restitution or reparation, was contextualized through the Parties’ recent efforts to direct socioeconomic transformation in communities where former MILF camps were located. The Camps Transformation Program has been complemented by international support through funding for economic development, with the aim of turning former camps into productive communities. Third is the aspect of legal justice or accountability. This comes from a recognition that “a focus on accountability and prosecutions for war crimes and other past human rights abuses that does not rebuild relationships through some kind of restorative

process, is unlikely to overcome the societal divisions that undermine peace and security” (Lambourne 2014: 25). This is, then, related to the fourth element of transformative justice: psychosocial justice, or the knowledge and acknowledgement of truth. Efforts towards the achievement of psychosocial justice were manifested in the formation of the TJRC, the implementation of its mandate within a DWP framework, as well as recent actions by the Parties to adhere to the TJRC’s recommendations, such as the refiling of the Bill that would create the NTJRCB. In the absence of this national institution for transitional justice and reconciliation, upholding psychosocial justice, and therefore the knowledge and acknowledgement of truth in post-conflict society, is contingent upon the political will of the state and other stakeholders, and their keenness to fully implement the justice-related aspects of the Annex on Normalization.

Scholars have investigated how political relations shape the implementation of transitional justice strategies in the form of both retributive and restorative mechanisms (Vinjamuri & Snyder 2015). Proponents of either reconciliation or traditional justice note that both options have confronted challenges in implementation (Ibid.: 316). In a process of normalizing political relations after protracted peace negotiations, the gradual response of conflict parties towards transitional justice and accountability claims can often be dismissed as politics “tainting the purity of the legal process” (Ibid.: 319). Furthermore, this transformative justice-guided analysis of the Annex on Normalization for the Bangsamoro peace process allowed this author to investigate the transitional justice-related elements of normalization in the context of an implementation process dominated by security- and socioeconomic-linked agreement provisions. In implementing normalization with justice in mind, as in the Bangsamoro peace process case, instituting transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms can be particularly difficult. Amidst the early-phase implementation process of normalization, legal and transitional justice concerns are being approached through a gradual, but holistic manner, consistent with a transformative justice view in peacebuilding. Predicting whether this approach leads to the advancement of post-conflict justice and the achievement of lasting peace is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it offers a way to assess how the Parties in the Bangsamoro peace process have, so far, viewed the relationship between post-conflict justice and the normalization of political relations. Justice and reconciliation amidst normalization may take a backseat against other aspects of the peace process due to temporal and sequencing considerations, but they must be upheld through efforts like truth-telling, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence (M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020). These efforts do not necessarily have to depend on the presence of a formal institution such as the proposed NTJRCB. Structures and formal institutions alone will not foretell the success of transitional justice

advocacy in a post-conflict society and must not be seen as an end in itself (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December 2020). While institutions can ultimately contribute to national healing, the process of normalization in the Bangsamoro can only be a fruitful and sustainable endeavor if the Parties commit to legal and psychosocial aspects of justice as much as its political and socioeconomic facets.

Conclusion

This article's argument about the manifestations of transformative justice in the implementation process of the Annex on Normalization makes limited claims about the finality of justice in relation to the Bangsamoro conflict. As an appraisal of the early-phase implementation of the normalization track in the peace process, the full implementation of the Annex on Normalization's provisions has yet to be determined; certainly, the milestones achieved in the first two years of the normalization track do not ascertain the Parties' ability to attend to justice claims or to sustain peace in the long term. In relation to this, the inability of the Parties to secure the creation of an NTJRCB in the early stages of the normalization track cannot be dismissed as a preference for the implementation of other aspects of the Normalization Program over its transitional justice element. The literature on sequencing of peace agreement implementation states that certain processes are implemented before others, as necessary preconditions. Because "different areas of accord content exert different effects at different stages of a peace process," (Joshi & Quinn 2015: 889) some provisions are deemed to have a more stabilizing effect on the peace process than others. This article, therefore, hopes to make a modest contribution to understanding how normalization politics affects perceptions of justice in the implementation phase of peace agreements, during which conflict parties have yet to institutionalize any post-conflict justice mechanisms. In the Bangsamoro case, the implementation of the Annex on Normalization facilitated a transformative view of justice, that considers not only accountability or the legal aspect, but also its political, socioeconomic, and psychosocial dimensions. This article encourages further research concerning the sequencing of implementation of peace agreements, as well as research on how justice is perceived in the absence of institutionalized transitional justice mechanisms for peacebuilding processes such as in the Bangsamoro. The simultaneous and sequential interactions between the politics of normalization and peace agreement implementation on the one hand, and justice on the other, may have significant implications in understanding how post-conflict justice institutions develop in cases of intractable conflicts.

Notes

- ¹ United Nations, Security Council, *Security Council Addresses Comprehensive Approach to Peace-building in Presidential Statement*. SC/7014, 20 February 2001, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7014.doc.htm>.
- ² A Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF) was created on 30 May 2016, organizing a multi-donor trust fund for the Normalization Program. The Peace Implementing Panels selected the World Bank as the Fund Manager, with the Australian Government and the European Union expressing their support for the Fund (OPAPP Annual Report, 2019: 29).
- ³ The Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities (ACGH), signed on 18 July 1997 during the onset of peace negotiations with the MILF, facilitated the creation of the following relevant institutions: the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), which ensures the implementation of the ceasefire and takes appropriate action when it is violated, and includes the Local Monitoring Teams (LMT), the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Posts (JCMP), and the Joint Task Forces (JTF); the International Monitoring Team (IMT), which is a third party mechanism composed of international military, police, and civilian monitors observing the ceasefire and conducting field verifications for reported violations; the Civilian Protection Component (CPC), which is an NGO-led mechanism of monitoring the Parties' compliance to their commitments, and helps protect civilian population and property; and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), which is a coordinative body between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) on the one hand, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces-MILF (BIAF-MILF) on the other, tasked with disseminating information on criminal activity within or near MILF communities (OPAPP Annual Report, 2019: 30-32).
- ⁴ Using an online video conferencing platform, interviews were conducted with key informants: Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, lawyer with specialization in human rights law and international humanitarian law and former GPH designate to the TJRC (7 December 2020), and Mohammad Al-Amin Julkipli, Moro lawyer and former GPH alternate to the TJRC (11 December 2020).
- ⁵ Islamic State Lanao (Maute Group), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Ansuar Khalifa Philippines, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) faction led by Abu Turaife are indigenous militant groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (Abuza & Lischin 2020: 17).
- ⁶ In February 1999, the government acknowledged six MILF camps: Camp Abubakar as-Siddique in Maguindanao, Camp Bilal in in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, Camp Omar ibn al-Khattab in Maguindanao, Camp Rajamuda in North Cotabato and Maguindanao, Camp Badre in Maguindanao, Camp Busrah Somiorang in Lanao del Sur.
- ⁷ The three-stage implementation process of the enhanced socio-economic program for decommissioned combatants and their families include: (1) settling in and transitioning for a year from the time of the final decommissioning; (2) normalizing and transforming spanning 7 to 18 months; and (3) stabilizing within 18 to 36/48 months. (OPAPP Annual Report, 2019: 25).

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『広島平和研究』 投稿規程

広島市立大学広島平和研究所の紀要『広島平和研究』の執筆に際しては、本投稿規程によるものとする。投稿された論文は匿名の査読者（レフリー）による査読に付される。

1. 使用言語

- (1) 日本語または英語で、オリジナルの、書き下ろしのものであること。
- (2) 邦文原稿の場合には、英文表記による表題と執筆者名を付すこと。

2. 原稿と文字数

- (1) 原稿は、原則としてマイクロソフト・ワードで作成すること。
- (2) 特集論文、独立論文は、邦文16,000～25,000文字、英文8,000～10,000ワードとする。
- (3) 研究ノートは、邦文14,000～20,000文字、英文3,000～5,000ワードとする。
- (4) 書評は、邦文4,000～5,000文字、英文600～1,000ワードとする。
- (5) 注、および図表等は制限字数内に含めること。

3. 原稿の書式

- (1) 邦文原稿の書式は A4横書き、36字×36行とすること。英文原稿の場合は、英語の投稿規程を参照すること。
- (2) 審査の都合上、論文には投稿者の氏名を掲載しないこと。論文とは別に、氏名、論文タイトル、所属と職名、Eメールアドレス、住所を記した文書を別ファイルとしてメールに添付して提出すること。

4. 文章、および章、節、項

- (1) 邦文原稿の文章は、新字体、新仮名づかいによるものとする。また、本文と注における句読点は点（、）と丸（。）とし、原則としてコンマ（,）は用いない。
- (2) 章、節、項の見出しの数字は、以下のように統一する。なお、序章（はじめに・序論など）と終章（おわりに・結論など）には数字を振らない。

章 1. 2. 3. / 節 (1) (2) (3) / 項 (a) (b) (c)

5. 注と図表

- (1) 注は原則として論文末に一括すること。
- (2) 注番号は本文の該当箇所の右上付きに1、2、3のように通し番号で入れること。末尾の注の一覧にも1、2、3の番号を付すこと。
- (3) 注における参考文献の示し方は、原則として、著者、書名、発行所、発行年（もしくは著者、論文タイトル、掲載誌、巻・号、発行年月）、頁数とすること。
- (4) 図表、写真等には、通し番号を付し、本文中に挿入位置を明示し、別紙に印刷するなどして提出すること。

6. 提出先

投稿原稿は電子メールで office-peace@m.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp に送付すること。

Hiroshima Peace Research Journal Submission Guidelines

This guideline details the format and the style for manuscript submissions to ensure consistency and clarity in editing and publication. Manuscript citations should follow the Chicago Manual of Style. All papers are subject to anonymous peer review.

1. Language

All papers must be written in English or Japanese and must be original scholarship.

2. Manuscript and the Length

- (1) Manuscripts should be prepared using Microsoft Word.
- (2) Article length should be between 8,000 and 10,000 words, including notes, statistics, photographs, etc.
- (3) Research notes and review essays should be between 3,000 and 5,000 words, including notes, statistics, photographs, etc.
- (4) Book reviews should be between 600 and 1,000 words.

3. Manuscript Format

- (1) The manuscript should be submitted digitally and should use a double-spaced 12 point font and A4 page formatting.
- (2) To facilitate the blind review process, your name should not appear on any page of the submitted article. Please submit a separate cover sheet that includes your name, article title, position, institution, e-mail address and a mailing address.

4. Numbering of Sections

Headings and sub-headings should be numbered according to the following system: Major headings: 1.2.3; First sub-headings: (1) (2) (3); Second sub-headings: (a) (b) (c).

5. Notes, Tables, Figures, etc.

- (1) Notes should be numbered sequentially throughout the text and inserted at the end of the text, rather than at the bottom of each page.
- (2) Notes should be indicated in the text by superscript figures and collected at the end of the article in numerical number.
- (3) Notes should follow this basic format:

Book: Author's given name or initial(s), author's family name, *title of book [italic]* (city of publication: publisher, year of publication), page numbers.

Journal article: Author's given name or initial(s), author's family name, "title of article," *name of journal [italic]*, volume number (year of publication): page numbers.

Article in book: Author's given name or initial(s), author's family name, "title of article," in *title of book [italic]*, editor(s) of book (city of publication: publisher, year of publication), page numbers.

- (4) Tables, figures, images, etc. should be numbered and have brief titles. Indicate locations in the text to insert tables and figures. Submit tables, figures and images on separate sheets.
- (5) A list of references in alphabetical order should be provided at the end of the article with family names appearing first.

6. Submission

Submission should be made via e-mail to: office-peace@m.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp

『広島平和研究』掲載原稿に係る審査規程

第1条 目的

『広島平和研究』に投稿される原稿に関する審査の公平性及び透明性を確保し、並びに査読手続を明確にするため、この規程を定める。

第2条 原稿の種類と審査対象

- (1) この規程に基づく審査の対象は、「論文」、「研究ノート」、「書評」に該当する原稿とする。
- (2) 「巻頭言」、「活動報告」及びその他原稿については、この規程に基づく審査の対象としないものの、編集委員会の裁量により編集上の修正を行うことができる。

第3条 審査及び掲載

- (1) 前条第1項に掲げる審査は、原則として、2名の匿名査読者による査読により行い、その結果に基づき、編集委員会が原稿の掲載の可否を決定する。
- (2) 査読者による査読の依頼に際しては、以下の点を考慮した上で査読者を選定する。
なお、外部査読者については、依頼条件を満たす場合には謝金を支払うこととする。
 - (a) 当該分野の専門乃至その分野に近い人を査読者候補とする。
 - (b) 原則として1名は学内から、他の1名は学外から選定する。
 - (c) 投稿者を指導した経験のある者は、原則として除外する。
- (3) 査読手続のための評価方法（評価シートの書式を含む）については別途編集委員会にて定める。

第4条 編集委員会による依頼原稿の審査

編集委員会が依頼する原稿については、査読者による査読を省略することができる。

第5条 改正

この規程の改正については、編集委員会が発議し、教授会による承認により決定する。

附則

この規程は、教授会の承認を得た日から起算して1箇月を経過した時点から施行する。
なお、同規程が施行されるまでの期間は、これまでの編集において確立された慣行に則った査読手続を適用する。

(2016年9月29日教授会承認。同年10月29日施行)

Regulation for Evaluating the Manuscripts Submitted for Publication in Hiroshima Peace Research Journal

I. Objectives

Article 1. This Regulation provides for the purpose of ensuring fairness and transparency in evaluating the articles submitted to the Hiroshima Peace Research Journal (HPRJ), as well as to clarify the peer review procedures.

II. Article Types and Areas of Evaluation

Article 2.

- (1) Types of articles to be evaluated based on the Regulation shall be “research paper,” “research note” and “book review.”
- (2) “Foreword,” “activity report” and other types of manuscripts are not subject to review based on the Regulation, but they can be edited at the discretion of the HPI Editorial Committee.

III. Evaluation and Publication

Article 3.

- (1) When carrying out evaluations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, the submitted articles are normally peer-reviewed by two anonymous reviewers, and the Editorial Committee shall decide if the articles should be accepted in accordance with the peer review results.
- (2) Upon request of peer review, reviewers shall be selected in consideration of the following criteria:
 - (a) Experts in the concerned field and/or reviewers whose area of expertise is close to the field.
 - (b) As a general rule, one reviewer will be selected from Hiroshima City University, and the other from outside the University.
 - (c) In principle, those who have taught the author shall be excluded.

It is to be noted that the honorarium will be paid to the external reviewers, in the case that the request condition is satisfied.
- (3) The Editorial Committee shall decide the evaluation method for the peer review procedures including the form of the evaluation sheet.

IV. Exemption from Evaluation

Article 4. Articles that the HPI Editorial Committee request to submit shall not be subject to peer review by reviewers.

V. Amendments

Article 5. Amendments of this Regulation shall be proposed by the Editorial Committee and be approved by the HPI Research Staff Meeting (RSM).

Supplementary Rule This Regulation is deemed to be in effect from the time that has elapsed one month from the date of the approval of the RSM. It should be noted that the peer review procedures in line with the established practice in the editing shall be applied until the Regulation enters into force.

(Approved by the Research Staff Meeting on the 29 September 2016 and in effect 29 October 2016)

編集後記

『広島平和研究』第8号は、「世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威」という、近年、ますます注目されている重要なテーマを扱っています。巻頭の「平和研究の窓」は、アジア太平洋平和研究学会（APPRO）の創設メンバーで平和学の分野で著名なタイの学者 Chaiwat Satha-Anand 教授からの寄稿です。同教授は、平和と様々な暴力の形態について考察し、暴力の被害者への対応のあり方について「3つの窓」という興味深い提案を行っています。

特集論文

本号は「世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威」を共通のテーマに、2本の和文論文と3本の英文論文、合わせて5本の特集論文を掲載しました。神戸学院大学の山越裕太氏は、世界保健機関（WHO）が果たしてきた役割、その変化、新たな課題を明らかにしています。新型コロナウイルス感染症の禍に苦しむ世界で、WHOへの期待が高まるなか、時宜にかなった論文であります。東北公益文科大学の玉井雅隆氏は、CIS 諸国と他の欧州諸国との間に次第に深まるウィーンの「東」と「西」の分断要因を、OSCE 地域共通の自由・民主主義規範の対立に焦点をあてて分析し、旧ソ連諸国の民主主義の危機を論じました。

3本の英文論文のうち、大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科（OSIPP）の佐藤治子氏による論文は、アクターとして国家中心のウェストファリア・システム内の国際関係の進化を分析した上で、国家安全保障を優先するウェストファリア・システムの下では人間の安全保障の達成がいかに困難であるかについて論じています。人間の安全保障に関する Sorpong Peou 氏の論文は、政治学における人間の安全保障研究がどのように進化したかについての広範な研究です。Peou 氏は、特にグローバルガバナンスに与える人間の安全保障概念の影響について悲観的な立場をとっています。シンガポールの南洋理工大学の Mely-Caballero Anthony 氏と Margareth Sembiring 氏との共著論文は、領土と主権に関心を有する国家優先の伝統的な安全保障概念との比較の上で、非伝統的な安全保障概念を検証しています。また、東南アジアに焦点を当てて環境安全保障の分野の現状も分析しています。

独立論文

名古屋大学の井原伸浩氏による福田ドクトリンに関する論文は、第二次世界大戦後の日本の東南アジア外交の転機となる福田ドクトリン、なかでも日本は軍事大国化せず、平和に徹するとする第一原則の外交理念の形成過程の分析です。最

後は、東京大学大学院研究生である Raymond Andaya 氏の論文です。彼は、フィリピンのバンサモロ和平プロセスを分析し、ドゥテルテ政府によって長年の反乱がどのように終結したかを検証しています。紛争解決に移行期正義の枠組みが応用されたことを論証した点が注目されます。

いずれの論文も現代の平和問題を考える上で、大変示唆的なものと思われます。是非ご一読下さい。

(編集委員会)

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