

Revision of the Fundamental Law of Education and Peace Education in Hiroshima Prefecture By Akira Yamama

The first educational reform after World War II, in which political parties were not involved, encouraged peace education in schools throughout Japan. This reform proceeded in faithful accordance with the Fundamental Law of Education to embody the spirit of the Japanese Constitution. Shortly after the armistice of the Korean War, in October, 1953, Hayato Ikeda, a special envoy of then Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, participated in the Ikeda-Robertson talks, discussing the rearmament of Japan. At the time Ikeda said "Peace education is so thorough in Japan that the feeling of 'Do not bear arms' is widespread and well-rooted in the Japanese people." But in the wake of the Korean War, political parties began blatantly to intervene in educational curricula. Japanese conservative governments considered peace education something to keep an eye on and to "correct."

In July 1968, about 20 years after Japan's defeat in World War II, volunteers, mainly education professionals who had been affected by the bombing of Hiroshima, conducted a questionnaire survey to investigate children's knowledge of the atomic bomb. The questionnaire, given to 2,000 students in the fifth and ninth grades, produced an alarming result. It revealed that 61% of the fifth graders and 29% of the ninth graders could not answer the exact year, month, date, and time of the atomic bombing. It also said that 90% of the fifth graders and 60% of the ninth graders had never heard of the song "Genbaku o yurusumaji" (Song of Hiroshima). In fact, it had been the students' inability to sing this song on a school bus trip, when it was suggested by a bus tour guide, that prompted the faculty to conduct the survey.

Shocked by the results of the survey, school personnel who had survived the atomic bombing set up Japan's first special subcommittee on peace education at the 18th Hiroshima Prefectural Education and Study Meeting, which was organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Teachers' Union in November, 1968. This subcommittee was a landmark development in that peace education programs, which had previously been implemented in an uncoordinated way by individual schools, began to be examined and discussed systematically.

We had five pillars in mind when we began our systematic examination. 1) Children had missed opportunities to learn about the A-bombing and war experiences. When and why were such opportunities missed? How could we do a better job of passing on knowledge of these experiences to students? 2) Why did World War II occur and why was the atomic bomb dropped? We needed to clarify the cause, and develop relevant teaching material. 3) Some people think that the War and the

atomic bombing are things of the past; they are just happy because it is peaceful now. We should consider such ideas in connection with the very real problems of A-bomb-related diseases, the second generation of A-bomb victims, U.S. military bases in Japan, the Okinawa issue, a build-up of the Self-Defense Forces, and the current situation with regard to nuclear arms. 4) How can we eliminate war, ban nuclear arms, and ensure peace? How can we generate the political power to accomplish these goals? 5) As the Hiroshima Teachers' Union, we should systematically clarify the content of peace education. How should we create such teaching material as part of our work?

Representatives of the Hiroshima Teachers' Union called for tackling the A-and H-bomb issues nationally at the 18th National Education and Study Meeting organized by the Japan Teachers' Union for January 25-28, 1969. They reported the results of the discussion on peace education at the 18th Hiroshima Prefectural Education and Study Meeting under the title of "Education with Special Attention," and in their appeal said that "Now is the time to actively take up the A-and H-bomb issues in every classroom in every region of Japan." The examination and implementation of peace education began to be discussed at the national level in Japan. Since then, freedom of education research has been guaranteed by the Fundamental Law of Education. Article 1 of Chapter 10 of the Fundamental Law of Education, dealing with school administration, stipulates that "Education shall not be subject to improper control, but shall be directly responsible to the whole people." Article 2 of the same chapter stipulates that "School administration shall, on the basis of this realization, aim at the adjustment and establishment of the various conditions required for the pursuit of the aim of education." As stated above, administrators were not encouraged to intervene directly in the educational content.

Peace education was dramatically enriched by the systematic discussion of its implementation. In Hiroshima Prefecture, supplementary teaching materials communicating the realities of A-bomb experiences to students were created. These materials included *Hiroshima: This is Our Cry* for elementary school students, *Hiroshima: Considering the Atomic Bomb* for junior high school students, *Hiroshima: Considering the Atomic Bomb* for junior high school teachers, *Hiroshima: Living in Today's Nuclear Age*, and a set of photographs to assemble for display entitled *Hiroshima and Nagasaki*. On the other hand, Hiroshima peace education centering on A-bomb experiences began to receive criticism as peace education expanded and deepened. Critics said that focusing only on the A-bomb experiences would end up overemphasizing the damage to Japan caused by the War. This criticism was a turning point and a new supplementary teaching text *Hiroshima: 15-year War and Hiroshima* was created, taking Japan's military aggression into account. Systematic study and discussion of peace education eventually turned sight-seeing school trips into opportunities for field work in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and for learning about the War and the atomic bombings.

Peace education in Hiroshima Prefecture was forced to transform itself by the direct "corrective instruction" of the government—more exactly, the Education Ministry—in 1998. The Hiroshima Prefectural Board of Education routinely prepares *Hiroshima Ken Kyoiku Shiryo* [Instruction Materials for Hiroshima Prefecture] to address problems regarding the practice of school education and distributes it to teachers in Hiroshima public schools. Material for fiscal year 1998 devoted 4

CONTENTS

Revision of the Fundamental Law of Education and Peace Education in Hiroshima Prefecture by Akira Yamama	1
Series: Reflections from Hiroshima	
The 50th Anniversary of HIDANKYO by Sunao Tsuboi	2~3
Special Feature: North Korean Nuclear Issue	
The North Korean Nuclear Test and Missile Launches by Motofumi Asai ..	4
North Korea's Nuclear Path by Sung Chull Kim	5
HPI's Fifth Lecture Series for Citizens of Hiroshima	6
HPI Research Forum	
How to Memorialize War for Peace by Mike Boehm/Hiroshi Fujimoto	7
What Do Americans Think About the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Why? by Robert Jacobs	7
Diary	8

Continued on Page 3

Sunao Tsuboi, Co-chairperson, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations The 50th Anniversary of HIDANKYO — Retrospect and Prospect

Interview by Motofumi Asai

1. History and Activities of Hidankyo

The year 2006 marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Hiroshima Prefectural Confederation of A-Bomb Sufferers Organizations (Hiroshima Hidankyo) and the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations (Nihon Hidankyo). Since then, the two confederations have consistently pursued activities with the aim of atomic bomb survivor relief and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

I am the fourth chair of the Board of Directors of Hiroshima Hidankyo. Its first chair, Dr. Ichiro Moritaki, filled the post for 38 years until his death in 1994 at the age of 92. In those days, most *hibakusha* (survivors of the atomic bombing) had difficulty making a living, and there was a growing call for their relief. Instead, Moritaki placed prime importance on nuclear abolition and made strong efforts to promote international exchange.

The second chair was Sakae Itoh, who had served as secretary general of the organization for many years. She served as chair for six years until 2000, when she died at the age of 88. She also served as co-chairperson of Nihon Hidankyo. Her successor, Kazuto Fujikawa, was appointed the third chair of Hiroshima Hidankyo in 2000 and resigned his post in 2004. I then succeeded him as the fourth chair, while serving concurrently as co-chairperson of Nihon Hidankyo.

What is most important for Hiroshima Hidankyo in pursuing its activities? I believe our first concern should always be the concerns of the *hibakusha*. I always do my best to attend to the *hibakusha*, many of whom are so openhearted that they are willing to consent to my ideas, saying "Let's do it because Tsuboi says so."

My first effort was a *shikishi* (message card) campaign conducted for one year, beginning in 2002. Its purpose was to encourage *hibakusha* to work with interest on expressing themselves. We asked the Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims to permanently keep the *shikishi* cards, on which messages were written by *hibakusha*. The Hall promised that those messages would be stored in the database. This campaign helped unify the *hibakusha*, who had been quite divided, and promoted more emotionally connected relationships among them.

In 2006, we launched a three-year project to conduct questionnaire surveys of *hibakusha* in an effort to fill a 10-year "blank" after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. In the history of the *hibakusha*, there is a 10-year "blank" from 1945 until 1956, when the Hidankyo was founded. As mentioned in the questionnaire, we aim to "pass on the history of the atomic bombing to future generations ... to serve as a useful guide," with the understanding that the invaluable experience of the first decade after the bombing is the point of departure for many *hibakusha*.

The initial questionnaire survey to be conducted this year consists of 20 items, including concerns of everyday life, barriers to marriage, changes in personality, involvement with other people, anxiety about the education system and poor academic performance, consultations during years prior to the founding of Hidankyo, responsibility for aiding the *hibakusha*, and what was lost and gained during the 10-year "blank." The respondents are requested to circle all the appropriate answers to the 20 questions, so someone else can fill in the questionnaire for any *hibakusha* who is sick in bed. In 2007, a descriptive questionnaire will be used to survey selected *hibakusha*, and in 2008, the findings of the

two surveys will be compiled into a booklet. About 70 to 80% of the publishing cost will be covered by grants provided as part of the central government's memorial project under the Hibakusha Aid Law.

What is most important in our activities—the *shikishi* campaign, the survey, and anything we do—is to win the hearts of *hibakusha*. Our fundamental policy is to grapple with our situation in a spirit of mutual encouragement. Hidankyo is an activist organization, and I acknowledge that I am an activist. I flatter myself by thinking that no one is more considerate of, or has more empathy for the oppressed than I do. I rarely feel down because this feeling or spirit is the driving force in my life.

With regard to politics and relations with political parties, we are strictly neutral. When lobbying, for example, we approach all political parties equally. I sometimes feel that things cannot be changed without political power. To unify our organization, however, we have to act with discretion and remain neutral, given that some heads or presidents of the 54 branches of Hiroshima Hidankyo are leaders of support groups for Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers, New Socialist Party members, or city council members.



2. The Spirit of Hiroshima

Which is more appropriate: to write "Hiroshima," in *kanji* (Chinese characters) or *katakana* (Japanese phonetic characters)? I believe that it is more appropriate to write Hiroshima in *katakana*. Until the moment of the atomic bombing, it was okay to write Hiroshima in *kanji* characters, especially when the city was being referred to in geographic terms or as a military capital. When thinking of Hiroshima in a future-oriented manner, however, it should be written in *katakana*. The future is my guide. I believe therefore that, in general, Hiroshima should be written in *katakana*, so as to invoke the spirit of Hiroshima.

"No More Hiroshimas!" is a key element of the spirit of Hiroshima. When asked which should be pursued, nuclear abolition or the elimination of nuclear weapons, I personally believe that all things nuclear should be abolished. It is said that nuclear power is safe, but as evidenced by the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident, it is hard to completely ensure the safety of nuclear power. Given that nuclear power accidents can have a longer, more profound impact than even atomic bombing, nuclear power poses a greater risk. As an organization, however, Hidankyo has focused its activities entirely on the elimination of nuclear weapons, giving consideration to friendly relations with pacifist organizations that are in favor of nuclear power (peaceful use of atomic energy).

"No More Wars!" is another key element of the spirit of Hiroshima, and of Japan's pacifist Constitution, specifically Article 9 of the Constitution—I personally think that Article 9 of the Constitution should be adopted by the rest of the world. The recent movement to change the Constitution has made my blood boil. As a *hibakusha*, I have been involved personally in various movements in defense of the Constitution. As I mentioned earlier, however, Hidankyo is an organization that makes it a rule not to be involved in politics.

When it comes to the spirit of Hiroshima, it is impossible to

discuss Hiroshima in isolation from Nagasaki. The two cities used to be characterized as “the Hiroshima of indignation” and “the Nagasaki of prayer.” This means that in Hiroshima, dynamic, aggressive peace movements emerged from the anger and profound hatred among the atomic bombing victims against the United States, while Nagasaki apparently endures more philosophically the agony of the atomic bombing devastation and even condones the bombings.

However, this comparison between Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been invalid since the 1980s at the latest. Now, there is not much point in distinguishing between the two cities. In Nagasaki, energetic efforts involve, for example, earnestly tackling issues concerning children or grandchildren of atomic bomb victims and promoting deeper exchange with atomic bomb victims in South Korea. In some cases, we see more aggressive peace movements in Nagasaki than in Hiroshima.

How to convey the spirit of Hiroshima to the world? I believe there are three keys to success. First, we need to appeal to people all over the world continuously and on a massive scale. It is important to increase public awareness of the spirit of Hiroshima by creating a ripple effect, rather than by distributing the message on an intermittent basis—only on the anniversary of the atomic bombing, for instance. To this end, the Japanese government should be involved more deeply, enough to provide a subsidy, as it does for the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers.

The second key is to make optimum use of media and information tools. Large numbers of visual aids—such as DVDs and photo collections—should be effectively used, as there is nothing better than appealing directly to the eye. The third key is related to arousing public demand. The full horror and destruction of nuclear weapons have not been fully conveyed throughout the world; there are still many areas that lack awareness of the threat. More pressure must be applied in such areas to enhance public awareness and generate a rapid groundswell of international public opinion favoring the elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. Observations of Hiroshima, Japan

No matter how extensive the efforts, it is hard to improve the situation in conservative Hiroshima. I do not understand why, and I continue to pose the question to myself.

Some explanations can be given. Since the Warring State Period (late 15th to late 16th century), people in Aki Province (present day Hiroshima) have tended to be fence sitters. It is often said that the local population’s poor spirit of adventure and enterprise can be attributed to the natural features of the area, our mild climate and lack of earthquakes. Another reason is that in Hiroshima, which used to be a military capital, the construction of a railroad by the central government and consecutive victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars also contributed to the area’s reputation for being a “good area.” In the wake of the atomic bombing, Hiroshima changed, as was evident in the election of innovative lawmakers. However, over the years, Hiroshima has since found itself restored to its former conservative state.

With regard to Japan’s current swing to the right, the problem is that the right is often connected with violence or terrorism. I cannot help but worry about the rising tendency to accept no complaints and offer no argument.

To put Japan back on a healthy track, it is essential to provide cultural enrichment for all the people. It will take time, but education is the key to achieving that end. Therefore, we must object to the current efforts to guide education in a limited, narrowly focused direction at the government’s command. This issue must be addressed not at the level of *hibakusha* but as an important matter of national concern.

Asai is president at HPI

Continued from Page 1

Revision of the Fundamental Law of Education and Peace Education in Hiroshima Prefecture

pages to peace education out of the 153 pages of the book. It prescribed the basic approach as “We have to deepen our understanding of the significance of peace, pray for lasting peace, and enrich education to cultivate students capable of contributing to international peace as residents of Hiroshima, which experienced the suffering of the first atomic bomb disaster in human history, and also as a people whose nation’s past conduct inflicted tremendous suffering and damage on people in neighboring Asian countries.” But since fiscal year 2000, the material has devoted only one page to peace education. The material for 2005 also has only 1 page for peace education in the 250 pages of the book. In addition, one finds expressions such as “Implement peace education according to the curriculum guidelines” and “Do not impose a one-sided view or perspective on students.” At the same time, the sentence beginning with “as a people whose nation’s past conduct inflicted tremendous suffering and damage on people in neighboring Asian countries” was completely deleted.

On April 19, 2006, the *Chugoku Shimbun* newspaper carried the results of a Hiroshima Municipal Board of Education survey of elementary and junior high school students in Hiroshima City regarding the atomic bombing. The survey targeted 2,491 students in total, or 1,499 students from fourth to sixth grades (elementary school students) and 992 students from seventh to ninth grades (junior high school students), chosen randomly in July 2005. The same kind of survey is conducted every five years and this was the third. We can compare these results with those of past surveys.

Students’ accuracy rate in naming the year, month, date, and time of the atomic bombing is as follows:

Elementary school students
46.9% (2005) 35.2% (2000) 55.7% (1995)

Junior high school students
67.6% (2005) 63.0% (2000) 74.7% (1995)

Why did the accuracy rate of both elementary and junior high school students drastically drop in 2000? This is probably because of the serious impact of the 1998 “corrective instruction” by the Education Ministry. I would like to draw your attention to the case as a concrete example that shows the consequences of direct government interference in educational content.

The governing party submitted a bill to “revise” the Fundamental Law of Education to the 164th ordinary session of the Diet. The bill has been carried over to the current extraordinary session of the Diet. The “revision” bill appears to gravely threaten peace education, which has been enriched and developed by voluntary and free practice. The government’s “revision” bill aims to strengthen state control over education. The revised bill’s Article 16 on school administration aims to control education by “law” as follows: “Education shall not be subject to improper control, but shall be provided as required by the Fundamental Law of Education or other laws.” However, it includes 20 stipulations, more than *Kyoiku Chokugo*, [the Imperial Rescript on Education.] It clearly seeks to prescribe educational content.

Up to now school personnel have developed peace education believing that they were guaranteed the freedom to do so, since the Fundamental Law of Education states that “Education shall not be subject to improper control, but shall be directly responsible to the whole people.” Enactment of the “revised” law, however, would compel educators to give top priority to national interests, and peace education in Hiroshima would undoubtedly come to an end.

Yamaima is chief director at Hiroshima Institute for Peace Education

The North Korean Nuclear Test and Missile Launches: Japan and Hiroshima

By Motofumi Asai

1. Do North Korea's Nuclear Test and Missile Launches Pose a Military Threat?

In considering the Japanese and Hiroshima's response to the nuclear test (on October 9) and missile launches (on July 5) by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), we first need to understand the military implications of these incidents. The careful choice of the missiles' landing sites, which formed an orderly line in the sea alongside the coast of the Asian continent, proves that there has been an improvement in the DPRK's missile launching technology, but does not necessarily mean that the military threat posed by North Korea towards Japan has dramatically increased.

The statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a July 6 news conference should serve as a useful reference in supporting my observation. According to a July 9 article in the *Shimbun Akahata*, a daily newspaper published by the Japanese Communist Party, Putin said, "There is no evidence that the North Korean missile program targeted Russia. Neither the offensive nor defensive military capabilities of North Korea are comparable with those of Russia."

American military prowess, along with that of Japan, greatly surpasses Russian military power, which shows how incongruous it is for the United States and Japan to raise such alarm over the DPRK's military threat.

Regarding the nuclear test, as of now, on October 11, there is yet no conclusion from the third parties' observations and analyses that the nuclear test was successful, except for the DPRK's claim that it was. Even if the test was not successful, the DPRK will no doubt continue its nuclear tests until success is confirmed. Therefore, I would like to discuss the issue, assuming that the nuclear test was successful.

The key point is whether the DPRK has successfully downsized the nuclear warhead so that it could be loaded on the Nodong missile, which covers Japanese territory. If they succeed in doing so, having proven sophistication of their missile technology, the DPRK can be said to have developed a nuclear missile capable of striking Japan. Based on the theory that a military threat exists when one country has both the intent and the capability to attack an adversary, the DPRK can be said to have acquired offensive capability.

But does the DPRK have the intention to recklessly use a nuclear missile against Japan? If North Korea launched missiles against Japan, the United States would crush North Korea in a matter of seconds, citing the missile provocation as the justification. Kim Jong-il could not possibly make the reckless decision to attack Japan with missiles as that would lead to the instant annihilation of himself and his country.

The same observation holds true for U.S. war scenarios. According to the war scenario stipulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense, the United States will start the war against North Korea with a preemptive strike. They envision no scenario in which North Korea provokes the U.S. first with a violent act leading to a war. Although the scenarios were written before the DPRK's nuclear test, their successful nuclear test would not influence or change American war scenarios.

2. Reflections on Japanese Reaction to North Korean Nuclear Test and Missile Launches

(1) What Lies Behind the Japanese Overreaction to North Korea's Missile Launches?

Japan overreacted to the missile test with clear political ends. The crux of the matter is that the United States and Japan have repeatedly used the "threat posed by North Korea" to achieve their political ends.

The argument that North Korea poses a threat, first raised by the crisis on the Korean Peninsula over the DPRK's suspected nuclear

development in 1993 and 1994, accelerated the establishment of the New Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997), the Law on Situations in the Areas Surrounding Japan (1999), and the Law on the Nation's Response to Foreign Military Attack (2003). After the DPRK's launch of the Taep'o-dong 1 in 1998, the United States and Japan took advantage of the arguments that North Korea poses a security threat to hasten cooperation in a missile defense program. The same argument being triggered by the DPRK's suspected uranium enrichment programs in 2002, the United States started the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003, in which Japan has participated.

The United States and Japan have clear political goals in staging their reactions to the current missile tests. The U.S. force realignment in Japan being advanced by both governments is a key element in U.S. plans to expand its global military power. If the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan suffers a setback, it will have a negative impact on worldwide U.S. military realignment efforts. Such a setback could lead to the failure of the U.S. war against terrorism.

In fact, the reorganization of U.S. forces in Japan faces strong resistance from local authorities and residents in places like Iwakuni, Okinawa, and Kanagawa. It is believed that the North Korean threat is again being used, as usual, to weaken or eliminate resistance against the realignment plans and to implement them as the U.S. and Japanese governments see fit.

Actually, a missile-related question was reportedly raised by the audience at a symposium on the Iwakuni U.S. military base organized by local leaders of western Hiroshima Prefecture in Hatsukaichi City on July 15 this year. This reveals that the justifications promoted by the U.S. and Japanese governments have gradually found their way into public consciousness.

(2) Hiroshima's Role in Facing North Korea's Nuclear Test

It is no wonder that the DPRK's nuclear test provoked severe reaction in Japan, considering the strong anti-nuclear sentiments held by Japanese people. On the other hand, vociferous calls to toughen the sanctions against North Korea, which dominates the Japanese government and the public, seems to lack important perspective.

Most of all, Hiroshima should give top priority to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. Nuclear destruction may be caused as follows in the worst case scenario: 1) U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea, 2) Japan and the U.S. strengthen the sanctions regime, 3) North Korea resists, 4) The U.S. preemptive attacks against North Korea starts a war, 5) Desperate North Korea resists and fights back, 6) North Korea attacks Japan with nuclear missiles and/or their saboteurs destroy nuclear power plants in Japan.

Hiroshima is required to return to the original starting point and reflect on why they have cried for "No More Hiroshimas." Hiroshima has called for nuclear abolition and protested against nuclear tests so as to prevent outbreak of nuclear wars at any cost. The idea held by Hiroshima should culminate in the determination that Hiroshima will never allow a situation in which Japan faces nuclear disaster again. Hiroshima is expected to send a strong message at home and abroad that we have to seek not hard-line policy against North Korea, but a solution through dialogue.

Meanwhile, it is necessary to recognize anew that, more than anything else, the Bush administration's all-out hard-line policy against North Korea has cornered North Korea to this extent. The American policy has caused today's nearly suicidal act by North Korea. In resolving this problem, we need to arouse international public opinion to fundamentally transform U.S. policy toward North Korea. I would like to emphasize that this is also a crucial task for Hiroshima.

Asai is president at HPI

North Korea's Nuclear Path

By Sung Chull Kim

The impact of North Korea's nuclear test on October 9, 2006, will be dreadful. The test is a suicidal act for North Korea. North Korean authorities may be proud of having military might temporarily, but for the general public, such pride will be at odds with unacceptable living conditions in the long run. Furthermore, the nuclear test might bring about fear of insecurity and an ensuing arms race, if not expansion of nuclear armament, in Northeast Asia.

North Korea has wanted to be treated as a nuclear state since October 2002. And North Korea has implicitly and explicitly established itself as a de facto nuclear state. The country has kept its political affairs clandestine but has never concealed its intention to continue the project of nuclear-weapons development since October 2002. It is said that at that time, North Korea admitted to James Kelly, then Assistant Secretary of the U.S. State Department, that it possessed an uranium-enrichment program. This admission was a calibrated act of defiance; it ran counter to the spirit of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, which abated the "first nuclear crisis" whereby North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for the provision of two light water reactors.

Starting in 2002, the "second nuclear crisis" strikingly differs from the first. The second crisis has proceeded with North Korea's provocative, and also defensive, statements and actions, as a reaction to American negligence and pressure. Since the eruption of the second nuclear crisis, North Korean behavior has been to a certain extent predictable. On April 18, 2003, North Korea's Foreign Ministry announced that the atomic agency of North Korea had opened 8,000 spent-fuel rods, which had been sealed in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework, and reprocessed them. On October 2, 2003, the Ministry again stated that North Korea had transformed the use of plutonium, obtained as a result of the reprocessing, for the strengthening of nuclear deterrence. On February 10, 2005, the Ministry proclaimed for the first time that North Korea had nuclear weapons. Since then, political authorities and the mass media in Pyongyang have reiterated that the U.S. confrontational policy forces North Korea to pursue nuclear-weapons development. On October 3, 2006, the Ministry declared that the country would conduct its first nuclear test by noting that "the U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war, sanctions, and pressure compel our country to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure for defense." On October 9, finally, the Korean Central News Agency reported that North Korean scientists "successfully conducted an underground nuclear test

under secure conditions."

Why has North Korea followed the path to nuclear statehood? On the one hand, the phenomenon is a historically driven result of North Korea's old confrontation with the United States since the division of Korea in 1945: the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and the U.S. nuclear threats during the Cold War period. The motive of North Korea's nuclear development can be traced back to the Cold War legacy of the American nuclear threat and nuclear predominance in the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, the phenomenon is also a consequence of North Korea's repeated failure to approach its key enemy, the United States, either by bypassing or sidelining South Korea in the post-Cold War period. It is noteworthy that there was an important shift in North Korea's posture: a shift from confrontation to the attempted approach to the United States. This shift took place in the process of North Korea's struggle for survival in the 1990s. For the shift, there were junctures: the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the death of North Korea's founding father Kim Il-sung in 1994, and a famine from 1996 to 1998. These junctures were critical. At the same time, the trajectory of the shift has emerged within certain broader limits that took shape in North Korea's hostility toward and fear of the United States. A distinctive development in these critical junctures was the so-called military-first politics, which is an adaptive mechanism to cope with fear of insecurity in domestic and external affairs. As the second nuclear crisis has spiraled since 2002, the military-first politics has gained prominence in North Korean society as an approach that contextualizes domestic and external policies. The nuclear test is the culmination of the military-first politics.

It seems that with the nuclear test, North Korea will have to cope with a greater challenge than any others in its history. The magnitude of the shock to North Korea itself is unpredictable. But it is certain that the shock will be an unbearable one to the country, because the isolation of North Korea by the international community will reach its peak. Sanctions alone will not suffice. There is no incentive for the neighboring countries, including the United States, to officially acknowledge North Korea's nuclear state status that the country has strenuously pursued in the past few years. North Korea is not a Pakistan that cooperates with the United States for the "war on terror"; it is not an India that may check China's expanding influence in Asia; nor is it an Iran with rich oil reserves. There are no intrinsic mitigating factors for American acceptance of the situation.

Kim is associate professor at HPI

Can Human Beings Coexist with Nuclear Weapons?: Seeking Ways to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

In 2006, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) decided to divide its public lecture series into two parts: five lectures each would be held in both the first and second semesters with each semester having its own theme. The lectures for the first semester, with the theme "Can Human Beings Coexist with Nuclear Weapons?: Seeking Ways to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons," were held on June 8, 15, and 22; and July 6 and 13.

More than 60 years have passed since human beings acquired nuclear weapons. During this time the United States and other nuclear powers have considered the atomic bombings symbolic of the end of World War II. They have justified themselves by advocating nuclear deterrence theory as if human beings were protected by nuclear weapons. The aim of this lecture series was to explore from various angles how to overcome this justification of nuclear weapons and eliminate nuclear weapons.

The first lecture was delivered by Mr. Hisaki Nakamura, former NHK reporter and currently freelance journalist, on the theme "The 60-Year History of Atomic Bomb Victims in South Korea." Nakamura argued that Japan's claim of being the world's only victim of a nuclear bombing shows a lack of awareness that about 10% of the atomic bomb victims were North and South Koreans. He also maintained that the partitioning of the Korean Peninsula was a result of U.S. strategies and that thinking about the North and South Korean *hibakusha* will pave the way for the unification of North and South Korea, eventually turning Asia into a nuclear-free zone and eliminating nuclear weapons.

The second lecture, on the theme "Nuclear War and Its Survivors as Described in American Films," was given by Dr. Robert Jacobs, who assumed his appointment at HPI in October 2005. Using visual aids, he explained how "strength," "wisdom," "violence" and "cruelty" have been emphasized when survivors of nuclear war are depicted in U.S. films, and how those accounts diverge from real-life nuclear war. He also pointed out that the U.S. government's optimistic civil defense planning, in which nuclear warfare is envisioned as if it were a natural disaster, has been reflected in those films.

In the third lecture, I (Hiroko Takahashi) gave a presentation on the theme "Problems of Research by the ABCC/Radiation Effects Research Foundation." In 1947, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) was launched to study the long-term effects of radiation on the human body by the U.S. Presidential directive from Harry Truman. However, the Commission's objective was not to provide relief for atomic bomb victims, but to obtain useful information for U.S. civilian/military defense in case of nuclear war. I talked about the harsh truths that emerged from official U.S. documents. I briefly discussed the problems arising from the fact that the research results obtained by a U.S.-oriented research organization have been considered the only "scientific" data available.

The fourth lecture was delivered by Dr. Shoji Sawada, A-bomb survivor, physicist and professor emeritus at Nagoya University. His theme was "The Danger of Mininukes: Serious Impacts of Internal Irradiation by Residual Radioactivity." The United States has covered up information on damage caused by residual radioactivity in order to justify its dropping of the atomic bombs. Postwar Japanese governments have followed U.S. government policy and dealt with issues pertaining to atomic bomb victims and the certification of radiation casualties using criteria far removed from reality. Consequently, class action suits have been initiated by A-bomb survivors across the nation, and these suits have revealed the serious consequences to the health of survivors from internalizing the residual radioactivity. He also pointed out that there is growing concern regarding the development and use by the United States of "easy-to-handle" mininukes, without any consideration given to the

influence of residual radioactivity on human beings.

The fifth lecture was given by Motofumi Asai, President of HPI, on the theme "Can Japan Coexist with Nuclear Weapons?: Seeking Ways to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Wars." Mr. Asai indicated that postwar Japanese governments have pursued policies that hinged on U.S. nuclear deterrence theory and obstructed campaigns for the elimination of nuclear weapons, while claiming that Japan, as "the only atomic bombed nation in the world," opposes nuclear weapons. He also argued that, as a prerequisite for arousing international public demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is important for Japan to radically change its politics. Japan must abandon its dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrence theory/policy, thoroughly review Japan's diplomatic/security policies, and clean up the political environment in which Japan denies its war responsibility.



Enrollment in this lecture series exceeded 90 persons, and each lecture attracted a large audience. The exchange of views at the lectures, the stated reasons for enrollment, the question lists, and a post-lecture questionnaire have yielded two important findings. Firstly, the majority reported learning facts that could not be learned directly from their usual sources of information. Secondly, many feel that HPI should have more opportunities to present to the public, in an easy-to-understand manner, the findings of research conducted by HPI researchers. These two issues are inextricably linked. The feedback obtained from the questionnaire shows that many people have further expectations for HPI projects, including the following requests for improvement:

- It is necessary to figure out some way to enhance public awareness regarding the issue of peace. Cablecasting the HPI lecture series was offered as an example.
- The lecture series for citizens should be broadcast on the Internet.
- A seminar series comprising about 12 lessons on a single theme should be offered to promote deeper understanding.
- Given the significant issues discussed in the lectures, the time was too short to obtain a sufficiently deep understanding.

I hope that the lecture series for citizens will continue to stimulate participants intellectually and inspire them to work together in seeking paths to achieve peace.

By Hiroko Takahashi, research associate at HPI

HPI Research Forum

July 31, 2006

Title: How to Memorialize War for Peace: A Vietnam War Veteran's My Lai Peace Park Project

Speakers: Mr. Mike Boehm, Director of the Madison Quakers Projects in Vietnam
Mr. Hiroshi Fujimoto, Professor of American Foreign Relations, Nanzan University



Mr. Hiroshi Fujimoto

Mike Boehm, a Vietnam veteran who heads the Madison Quakers Projects in Vietnam, served as the driving force behind the promotion of the "My Lai Peace Park Project." Its aim is to advance reconciliation and harmonious coexistence between Vietnam and the United States at the grassroots level, centering on My Lai, a hamlet of Son My, where occurred what is called the "Son My

Massacre," which came to symbolize the tragedies of the Vietnam War. At an HPI Research Forum Hiroshi Fujimoto, Professor of Nanzan University and Vietnam War expert, talked about the significance of the My Lai Peace Park Project. His speech was followed by Boehm's presentation on the project and his activities in Vietnam.

Boehm said that although there are many places in the U.S. and Vietnam that commemorate victory, this park was not built for that purpose. The park has many trees, flowers and a pond with fish, instead of weapons and other war monuments. Boehm also added that 25 Americans, including Vietnam War veterans who played a significant role in ending the massacre at Son My, attended the inauguration of My Lai Peace Park. Fujimoto took his students and

many Vietnam War protestors from Japan to the park to plant trees. Boehm considers the park to be a place for broadening the campaign to turn the horrors of the War toward the promotion of peace and hope for a better future.

During his service in the Vietnam War from 1968 to 1969, Boehm was not directly involved in the massacre. He said that through his activities in Vietnam and exchanges with the families of victims of the Son My massacre, however, he came to learn the truth. He had believed in the myth that America could not make a mistake, and that evil could be done only by those of abnormal character. It took him many years to realize that the only difference between him and those who committed the massacre at My Lai (Son My) (or at Auschwitz, Nanjing and Rwanda) was that, fortunately, he was not at the scene. He had to face the hard reality that everyone has the potential to do evil.

Boehm said that a common thread found in My Lai, scene of the massacre of many civilians, and Hiroshima, an atom-bombed city, is that both overcame great tragedy and were successfully reborn as places nurturing hope for a better future. I am worried about the trend today to highlight institutions and monuments that justify and glorify war, including the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan and the locations of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. I hope that places to pray for peace, as represented by the My Lai Peace Park and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, will play a more important role in promoting deeper relations among former enemies by confronting the tragedies of the past and preventing like events from ever happening again.



Mr. Mike Boehm

By Hiroko Takahashi, research associate at HPI

September 6, 2006

Title: What Do Americans Think About the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Why?

Speaker: Dr. Robert Jacobs

How can one see the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima as a humane act? Over 50 members of the Hiroshima community came together at HPI on the evening of September 6 to hear Jacobs address this question.

Jacobs approached the topic from a cultural narrative standpoint. He explained how Americans learn two basic stories about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan by the United States in World War II. The first story is that the bombs "ended the war." Most Americans were unaware that the Japanese Imperial government was in the process of attempting to secure surrender terms from the U.S., and saw the swift Japanese surrender following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as proof that the bombs forced the Japanese to surrender. This enshrined the bomb in American culture as a weapon that could single-handedly compel an enemy to capitulate.

The second story many Americans learn about the bombing is that it saved lives, both American and Japanese lives. This is because it ended the war before an imagined U.S. invasion of the Japanese home islands. Americans were told that this invasion would have resulted in up to 1,000,000 deaths of American servicemen, as well as larger numbers of Japanese deaths, and taken over a year to lead to an eventual Japanese surrender. Remember, the Allied forces had just driven all the way to Berlin to end the European half of World War II. The use of atomic bombs brought the war to a swift end, and avoided the invasion of the home islands. In this way, the use of the bombs

was "humane" because it spared all the lives that would otherwise have been lost on both sides.

For many Americans the story of the bombing of Hiroshima is a story of American greatness: great leaders make important decisions about a magical technology in order to alter history and bring the greatest benefit to the world. These stories were then shown to be embedded in and exert a powerful influence over much of U.S. policy towards its own nuclear arsenal and global nuclear proliferation.

Jacobs also discussed counter-narratives in American culture that regard the use of atomic bombs on Japan as war crimes, mentioning specifically the observance of Hiroshima Day in most U.S. cities and towns by Americans who are dedicated to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and warfare.

By Robert Jacobs, assistant professor at HPI



D I A R Y

July 1, 2006 - October 31, 2006

- ◆**Jul. 1** HPI President Motofumi Asai gives lecture on “Peace in Asia” at 37th regular general meeting organized by Japan Young Lawyers Association Attorneys and Academics Section, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Jul. 8** Asai gives lecture on “Peace and Article 9” at workshop for chief nurses organized by Health Co-operative Association of JCCU, held in Hiroshima; serves as panelist at symposium for 1st anniversary of Hiroshima Mass Media and Article 9 Association in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆**Jul. 9** Mikyoung Kim serves as panelist for 20th International Political Science Association World Congress in Fukuoka.
- ◆**Jul. 11** Sung Chull Kim delivers presentation on “Structural Coupling in Engagement Diplomacy” at 50th annual conference of International Society for Systems Sciences, California, U.S.
- ◆**Jul. 12-21** Kazumi Mizumoto visits Cambodia as member of reconstruction and aid project in Cambodia organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and JICA.
- ◆**Jul. 15** Asai gives lecture on “U.S. Military Realignment in Relevance to Iwakuni” at gathering on problems of Iwakuni U.S. military base organized by group to empower Iwakuni referendum on Iwakuni U.S. military base, held in Yamaguchi.
- ◆**Jul. 16** Asai gives lecture on “Peaceful Diplomacy” at Peace Course for Citizens organized by Itami City Central Community Center in Hyogo Prefecture, held in Hyogo.
- ◆**Jul. 18** HPI holds 1st meeting for new organization networking HPI and peace research organizations.
- ◆**Jul. 21** Asai gives lecture on “So-called Civil Protection Plan” at study meeting organized by Japan Congress Against A- and H-bombs (Gensuikin), held at PARC in Tokyo.
- ◆**Jul. 22** Mizumoto gives lecture on “Nuclear Weapons Today and Perceptions of the Atomic Bombings” at 2nd session of Peace Club for Junior High and High School Students at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆**Jul. 24** Narayanan Ganesan gives lecture on “The Defiant Prime Minister and Determined Opposition” at conference of Political Parties in Southeast Asia organized by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, held in Singapore.
- ◆**Jul. 29** Asai gives lecture on “The Roles of A-bombed Hiroshima” at meeting for peace and sign language interpretation organized by NPO Sign Language Center Hiroshima, held in Hiroshima.▽Mizumoto gives lecture on “Hiroshima and Peace” for training program for journalists organized by Hiroshima City, held at Hiroshima International Conference Center.
- ◆**Jul. 29-Aug. 22** Yoshiaki Sato visits Netherlands for research on Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
- ◆**Jul. 30** Asai gives lecture on “International Peace Seen from Hiroshima” at 37th National Convention of National Association of Democratic Studies in Hyogo.
- ◆**Jul. 31** Asai gives lecture on “No More Hiroshimas, No More Nagasakis and No More Wars” at meeting for nuclear abolition and peace organized by 7 A-bomb survivors’ organizations, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Aug. 2** Asai serves as chief judge at Contest for Junior High and High School Students to Appeal for Peace organized by Hiroshima Municipal Board of Education, held in Hiroshima.▽Yuki Tanaka gives lecture on “Terror from the Sky” to students of University of Tennessee at Martin participating in research trip to Hiroshima at Hiroshima Jogakuin University.
- ◆**Aug. 5** Asai gives lecture on “So-called Civil Protection Plan” at subcommittee of Gensuikin conference organized by Gensuikin, held in Hiroshima.▽Tanaka gives lecture on “Criminality of the Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” to students of American University participating in research trip to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, at HPI.▽Hiroko Takahashi gives lecture on “Atomic Bomb Materials in the United States” at “Global Hibakusha” study meeting at HPI.
- ◆**Aug. 8** Asai gives lecture on “Japan Rushing to be a Warmonger State” at Nagasaki Forum organized by United Congress of Nagasaki Mass-Media and Culture Worker’s Unions, held in Nagasaki.
- ◆**Aug. 9-Sep.14** Takahashi visits U.S. for research group on reference materials at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and for research sponsored by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research.
- ◆**Aug.10** Mizumoto gives table speech at regular meeting of Rotary Club of Hiroshima West, held at ANA Hotel Hiroshima.
- ◆**Aug.12** Asai gives lecture on “Warning to Japan Rushing to be a Warmonger State” at peace lecture meeting organized by planning committee of Masuda City Peace Lecture Meeting, held in Shimane.
- ◆**Aug.13** Asai gives lecture on “Peace in Relevance to Iwakuni” at Meeting for Remembrance and Peace on 39th Anniversary of Japan’s Defeat at World War II organized by bereaved families of Christians in western Chugoku region parish, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Aug.15** Asai gives lecture on “Peace in Asia and Our Future in Relevance to U.S. Military Realignment” at Meeting for Conveying War Experiences on Aug. 15 organized by Group for Conveying War Experiences on Aug. 15, held in Kagawa.
- ◆**Aug.16** Mizumoto gives lecture on “Atomic Bombing in Hiroshima, its

- Reconstruction, and Support for Cambodia” at Cambodia Japan Cooperation Center in Royal University of Phnom Penh in Cambodia.
- ◆**Aug.18** Robert Jacobs gives lecture on “Good Bomb/Bad Bomb” at conference of International Committee on History of Technology at University of Leicester, U.K.▽Mikyoung Kim gives lecture on “Japan-Korea History Textbook Controversies” at Kyushu University in Fukuoka.
- ◆**Aug.23** Asai gives lecture on “Preciousness of Peace” at 3rd peace study meeting organized by Hiroshima Rainbow Group in Japan Association of Community Workshops for Disabled Persons (Kyosaren), held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Aug.26-Sep. 10** Mikyoung Kim participates in Young Leaders Training & Research Program in Regional Cooperation on 2006 Northeast Asia Economic Forum Fellowship in Khabarovsk, Russia.
- ◆**Aug.30** Mikyoung Kim gives lecture on “Culture and Management” at Khabarovsk State Academy of Economics and Law in Russia.
- ◆**Sep. 10** Asai gives lecture on “Warning to Japan Rushing to be a Warmonger State” at Meeting for 4th Anniversary for Pyongyang Declaration organized by Nikkori Net, held in Kyoto.
- ◆**Sep. 15** Asai gives lecture on “U.S. Military Realignment and Japan’s Status in Asia” at workshop for secretaries in charge of policy in House of Councilors organized by Secretariat of House of Councilors, held in Tokyo.
- ◆**Sep. 16** Mizumoto gives lecture on “Pacifism in Japan and Security” at symposium “International Order for Whom?” organized by, held at Institute for Social Ethics, Nanzan University in Nagoya.
- ◆**Sep. 17** Asai gives lecture on “North Korea” at meeting on North Korean issues organized by Boomerang Net and holds talks with Yang Yonghi, film director, in Tokyo.
- ◆**Sep. 22** Asai gives lecture on “International Power Politics, Japan and Hiroshima” at lecture meeting organized by Article 9 Association (A9A) Group in Fukuyama, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Sep. 30** Asai gives lecture on “Japan’s Future from the Viewpoint of Residents” at 4th School for Local Governments in Kyoto organized by Kyoto Institute of Local Governments, held in Kyoto.
- ◆**Oct. 6** Mizumoto gives lecture on “Promotion of Peace by Hiroshima” at seminar on population and development sponsored by Asian Population and Development Association, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Oct. 7** Asai gives lecture on “Peace and Welfare” at preparatory meeting for national convention organized by Hiroshima branch of Kyosaren, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Oct. 10** Tanaka gives lecture on “Japan’s Kamikaze Pilots and Contemporary Suicide Bombers” at U.S.-Japan Relations Program, Harvard University, U.S.
- ◆**Oct. 11** Tanaka gives lecture on “Japan’s Kamikaze Pilots and Contemporary Suicide Bombers” at Peace and Justice Studies Program, Tufts University, U.S.
- ◆**Oct. 13** Sung Chull Kim delivers presentation on “North Korea’s Path to Nuclear Statehood” at conference on Nuclear Security in Northeast Asia, cosponsored by Center for World Affairs and Global Economy of University of Wisconsin-Madison in Washington, DC, U.S.
- ◆**Oct. 14** Asai gives lecture on “Role of Hiroshima and Expectations for Peace Education” at education workshop organized by Hiroshima Senior High School Teachers and Staff Union, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Oct. 15** Asai gives lecture on “Why Change Article 9 now?” at lecture meeting in commemoration of establishment of A9A Group in Mihara City, held in Hiroshima.
- ◆**Oct. 22** Asai serves as panelist at workshop of 3rd Nagasaki Global Citizens’ Assembly for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons organized by its planning committee, held in Nagasaki.
- ◆**Oct. 23** Asai gives lecture on “Problems of Civil Protection Plan Based on Civil Protection Law” at study meeting on civil protection plan organized by Kagawa Trade Union Congress for Peace and Democracy, held in Kagawa.
- ◆**Oct. 24** Takahashi gives lecture on “U.S. Government Attitude to Bikini Incident” at Tokyo Institute of Technology.
- ◆**Oct. 29** Asai gives lecture on “Japan’s Peace” at meeting on peace and health in Komoro organized by A9A Group in Komoro City, held in Nagano.
- ◆**Oct. 30** Mizumoto gives lecture titled “Atomic Bombing Experience and Peace in the Future” at public lecture meeting on peace organized by Shobara City, Hiroshima Prefecture.

– Visitors to HPI –

- ◆**Jul. 14** Dr. Akira Kimura, professor, Faculty of Law, Economics and the Humanities, Kagoshima University.
- ◆**Jul. 19** Sunao Tsuboi, Co-chairperson, Japan Confederation of A-and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations.
- ◆**Aug. 1** Wang Lin, deputy division chief for Asian, African and Oceania Affairs, Chinese Association for International Understanding, and Wang Changyong, deputy secretary general, and another member of Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS

Vol.9, No.2 November 28, 2006

Copyright 2006 HPI All rights reserved

● Publisher: Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University; Editor : Ayako Yoshida

TEL +81-82-544-7570 FAX +81-82-544-7573

Ote-machi Heiwa Bldg. 9F/10F 4-1-1 Ote-machi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051, Japan. E-mail:office-peace@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp

● Printed by Nishiki Print co., Ltd.