

Forty Years since the Reversion of Okinawa: Where Has Justice Gone?

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May 15 is the memorial day of Okinawa's reversion to Japanese sovereignty, and this year marks its 40th anniversary.

There have been a variety of changes observed in the past 40 years. Today many entertainers from Okinawa have gained fame and popularity, *Uchina-yamato Guchi* (a hybrid of the Okinawan language and Japanese) attracts people from the Japanese mainland, high school students from Okinawa compete well at the biannual national baseball tournaments, and Okinawan young people are proud of their Okinawan indigenous culture which was once regarded as "backward." Things which have not changed about Okinawa, however, include the vulnerable prefectural finances on which a number of public works are dependent, the weak local economy as represented by one of the lowest average income per capita in the country, and the US bases which have remained in Japan's southernmost prefecture for decades.

Local financial and economic situations may change, depending on factors such as the condition of the world economy, the "limited government" policy of Tokyo, changes in ruling party, and the domestic economic system. Local people in Okinawa may of course bring about changes by means of their own wisdom and innovation. In contrast, however, little change can be expected regarding the US bases in Okinawa whose existence are closely related to the issue of national security, which is determined by national politics. Politics is a process of decision-making by citizens, and is what determines the foundations of the country. In a sense, little change regarding the US bases in Okinawa may mean stable politics, as represented by the long-time government administration of the Liberal Democratic Party. The summer of 2009 witnessed a historic regime change in Tokyo; needless to say, this was a manifestation of the will of citizens. Nevertheless, up to the present time, it can still not be said that this political change has brought about changes to the US bases in Okinawa.

The US bases in Okinawa were reduced by 10 percent during the first decade since the reversion. This was implemented under a realignment plan which accompanied the reversion in the form of the transfer of control to the Self-Defense Forces or returning the land to local residents. At the same time, the actual implementation of this took as long as a decade due to the stipulated condition that alternative facilities needed to be built in other bases which could then carry out the functions to be transferred. Another reason related to the confused land ownership existing among local land owners. Confused land registration meant that lands could not be used even after they were returned, therefore ownership first needed to be clarified which required a significant period of time. The cause of this confusion can be attributed to the way the US paid the rents for these lands. These rents were covered by a budget allocated by the US government which was distributed according to areas claimed by local land owners. Through this process, the US hastened to construct bases without assuming the future return of the lands, thus leaving land ownership ambiguous. In fact, claims of a number of land owners were accepted without verification and were reflected in the land registration which ended up becoming confused. The resulting total area of lands claimed by the locals was larger than the actual area; nevertheless, this was settled within the budget that the US had allocated.

During the first decade following Okinawa's reversion, the US bases were indeed reduced. Nevertheless, the lands were

returned piecemeal, and as a consequence, not only the land owners but also the local government were unable to embark upon development of the returned lands. The resulting stalemate may stand as a lesson for what procedure should be pursued regarding the future return of US bases to Okinawa.

In 1996, a new US base realignment plan was announced after almost the same length of time as the US occupation of Okinawa, which was 27 years, had passed since Okinawa's reversion in 1972. The trigger for this was a rape committed by three US soldiers against a Japanese girl which occurred in September 1995. The incident drew much attention not only from within Japan but also from abroad, and the then Clinton and Hashimoto administrations swiftly took action.

The 1995 rape incident revealed to the world the high density of US bases in Okinawa and the burden this imposed on local society. As a consequence, however, the interest of people outside Okinawa focused solely on what had been going on in Okinawa since 1995, despite the fact that the present situation had been developing since 1945. On the other hand, when they talk about present-day Okinawa, the people of the prefecture begin from the Battle of Okinawa which took place in 1945. These days fewer and fewer people recall the Ryukyu Kingdom of the pre-modernization era which is now regarded as somewhat "unreal." The present-day Okinawa accommodating the US bases is apparently more "real" to the people of Okinawa.

Pressured by the call from Okinawan people for a realignment and reduction of the US bases which surged up following the rape incident, on April 16, 1996, the US and Japanese governments announced that they had agreed on the return of 20 percent of the US bases to Okinawa. This agreement was named the "SACO agreement" after the name of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa which brokered it. Out of the areas which were agreed to be returned, 80 percent were part of the Northern Training Area located in northern Okinawa. For the sake of political consideration, also included was the Futenma Base (a Marine Corps Air Station) which is located in the middle of an urban area in central Okinawa. Although the area of the Futenma Base represented less than 10 percent of the total areas agreed to be returned, it was hoped that its return would reduce a great deal of the danger, fear and noise problems that the local people had long been suffering.

The SACO agreement further included areas which had been left untouched due to the requirement for the provision of alternative facilities, as in the case of Naha Port, and delays in compensation payments or development of specific plans for the lands to be returned. The Northern Training Area and Futenma Base in particular were regarded as keys to the realignment of the US bases. Nevertheless, their return was conditional on the construction of alternative facilities within Okinawa Prefecture. Considering the difficulties in implementing the reduction plan during the first decade following the reversion, it may be reasonable to argue that the feasibility of the SACO agreement is decidedly problematic.

Sixteen years since the agreement was made, today a large portion of the areas already agreed to be returned remain untouched, with very little land returned and alternative facilities prepared for use. From the total of 5,002 hectares, the area that has actually been returned amounts to only 343 hectares or seven percent (as of March 2010). A notable example is the Futenma Base which has not yet been returned despite previous agreements. The reduction plan of US bases in Okinawa can be thought of as something like a

firework. When it is launched, it looks grandiose. However, its allure soon fades away in the dark, leaving only smoke. When it is seen from a distance, a dull bang is heard a little while after the allure fades away. To the eyes of the people of Okinawa, the ability of the US and Japanese governments regarding the realignment of US bases in Okinawa is only losing its allure.

The Bush administration which came to power in 2001 pursued an “Anything but Clinton” policy, which was particularly apparent with regard to security policy. In fact, the Bush administration embarked on a strengthening of US military power almost to the extent witnessed during the Cold War era. This was a policy shift from “responsive” to “active,” and was aimed at capacity improvement in order to overwhelm other countries, with a particular focus on missile defense and special force operations. The architect of this policy change was the then Secretary of Defense, Ronald Rumsfeld. It was reported that, when he visited Okinawa in November 2003 and observed the Futenma Base from the air, Rumsfeld recognized the dangers of the base and stated that it should be closed and the SACO agreement revised (*The Mainichi Shimbun*, February 13, 2004). Although the Japanese government subsequently denied his words, the dangers of the Futenma Base are palpable should one actually visit the site and perceive how close it is to residential areas.

The policy change aimed at strengthening US military power was expanded into a major realignment of US forces abroad. In this context, discussions between the US and Japanese governments regarding the US bases in Japan were first initiated towards the end of 2003, and gained momentum around the start of 2005. In February of that year the two governments held the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, or so-called “2 plus 2” meeting, between the Secretaries of State and Defense from the US side, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the Defense Agency from the Japanese side, in which a basic policy was confirmed and work towards realignment initiated. The outcomes of this meeting were first announced in October 2005, and then as a Joint Statement on May 1, 2006. The details of the realignment plan were called the “2006 Roadmap.”

The Roadmap describes the details of the realignment of US forces in Guam, Okinawa and on the Japanese mainland, which is to be completed by 2014. It also states that Japan is to be responsible for 60 percent of the estimated total operational costs of 10.3 billion dollars. This financial agreement was signed as the “Guam International Agreement,” and it was ratified in Japan in May of the same year. (No ratification was necessary by the US Congress since the agreement was an administrative agreement.) Thus, the financial burden on Japan was mortgaged for the cost of facility and infrastructure development in Guam.

The relocation of the US forces from Okinawa was described in the “2006 Roadmap” as follows: approximately 8,000 marine force personnel and their approximately 9,000 family dependents are to be transferred from Okinawa to Guam; at the same time, the Futenma Base is to be returned after its functions are transferred to the Camp Schwab area in northern Okinawa where new replacement facilities should first be constructed through the reclamation of adjacent marine areas. Regarding the number of personnel to be transferred, the figure that Japan originally suggested was lower which was 7,000 at the time of the report in 2005, but it was finally decided as 8,000. This final figure which was suggested from the US side may imply that there was a lower necessity for a large number of marine force personnel to be stationed in Okinawa, since Guam would henceforth be more appropriate for force deployment as a US security hub for areas including the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The “warrant” for the realignment as claimed by the US was the threat of an “Arc of Instability.” Nevertheless, the suspected nuclear development of Iran and the DPRK seems to be continuing, and the US administration is seeking the withdrawal of

US forces from Afghanistan scheduled for 2014 following that taking place in Iraq. In this context, this “warrant” is no longer being mentioned. It has already become an “old-fashioned” word.

The US bases in Okinawa that were planned to be reduced in the “2006 Roadmap” include those that were agreed to be returned in the SACO agreement but still remain unreturned, and also those newly added with the condition to prepare alternative facilities in Okinawa Prefecture and Guam. In other words, both the SACO agreement and the “2006 Roadmap” include those areas which were left unreturned despite their scheduled return and others with a condition to prepare alternative facilities. However, while the former stipulates the alternative facilities are to be constructed within Okinawa Prefecture, the latter stipulates the alternative sites are to be in Okinawa Prefecture and Guam. The US and Japanese governments are only repeating the still unrealized relocation plan which has been deadlocked due to the requirement for the provision of alternative facilities, with some newly added bases also to be returned.

The realignment brought forward under Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld began coming apart due to the issue of the financial burden on the US that was set out in the Guam International Agreement. While Japan accepted its own financial burden, the rationality of that for the US was questioned in the US Congress where the agreement was not put on the table for ratification. As a result, the expenditure was cut from the budget for the 2012 US fiscal year, leading to the suspension of the relocation plan itself.

On February 8, 2012, the US and Japanese governments announced that they had agreed to revise the “2006 Roadmap” in order to break this deadlock. This marks six years since the conclusion of the Roadmap which targeted the completion of relocation by 2014, and 16 years since the SACO agreement. Notwithstanding the recent announcement, as discussed earlier, only a small fraction of the US bases in Okinawa have been reduced since the SACO agreement, and with the Futenma Base also left unreturned, the lives of the residents in the vicinity are still endangered.

Since the announcement, the media has begun to report the possible contents of the revisions that the Noda and Obama administrations were likely to make. According to these reports, the two governments were going to announce part of the revision on April 25. Nevertheless, this was postponed since agreement by the US Congress had not been obtained. The revised contents that were expected to be announced included the provision that, while the Futenma Base would remain in use for the time being, the US bases in Okinawa would be returned either immediately, or after the transfer of the marine forces to Guam, or after the construction of alternative facilities elsewhere within Okinawa Prefecture. The bases to be returned are all included in the SACO agreement and the “2006 Roadmap” which have been left unreturned to date. Moreover, it is said that these bases which were originally split into five slots for return will be further split into smaller pieces numbering a total of 13.

Since the reversion of Okinawa, the realignment and reduction of US bases in Okinawa has long been a major issue, and the US and Japanese governments have concluded several agreements in the past. However, it has not yet been realized. The reasons for this are that the Japanese government does not firmly demand it, the plan encounters opposition from the US military, and that the sites for alternative facilities which are required for relocation are confined to within Okinawa Prefecture, especially on its main island. Moreover, it is also the responsibility of the Japanese people who have consistently overlooked the timid stance of their own government regarding this issue. The consequences of politics should be solved by politics. What we see now, however, is solely that justice has been lost.

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A Visit to Kaminoseki after 3/11

Masae Yuasa

In September last year, I visited Kaminoseki Town in the Kumage District of Yamaguchi Prefecture, where an electoral campaign for mayor was approaching its end. Kaminoseki is a quiet fishing town surrounded by the Seto Inland Sea. The town area extends to the south part of the Muroto Peninsula and islands. From the center of the nearest city Yanai it takes at least half an hour by car to reach Nagashima, the largest island connected to the peninsula by a bridge, where its town hall is situated.

I saw a group of seven or eight middle-aged men sitting on stone steps at the port near the town hall. They looked as though they were enjoying their chat under the clear, blue autumn sky. The laid-back atmosphere of a small fishing town was soon broken by a loud voice from a speaker attached to a campaign car. As the car of the incumbent Mayor Kashiwabara approached, the old men slowly stood up and waved their hands to welcome him. Three elderly women who were sitting on chairs across the road did the same. They had apparently gathered outside to welcome the candidate back to his office after a full day of campaigning. The candidate replied by repeating a formula phrase. "Thank you. I will do my best." After seeing off the campaign car, the men drifted away and the women sat back down and began chatting again.

The recent mayoral election marked the ninth time since the town mayor first presented a bid on a nuclear power plant planned by the Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. (*Chuden*) in 1982. During the past three decades, the residents of the town have been split into two groups over the plan. The central force of the opposing side is led by the residents of Iwaishima, which is a small island four kilometers from the planned construction site, Tanoura, across the sea. From Iwaishima, Tanoura is in full view, although it was invisible from any other area of the whole of Kaminoseki Town due to the mountains that lie in between. It means the residents will have to live literally "facing" the nuclear power plant every day. It is said that the residents have had doubts about the "safety" of the nuclear power plant from the beginning because quite a few men from the island who had worked at nuclear power plants in other prefectures revealed the reality of radiation effects on plant workers and the dangers of nuclear power plants.

This led to a decades-long opposition movement in order to protect the lives of the residents and the indispensable natural environment, such as fishing grounds and the wider ecosystem. Their past actions include the "Monday demonstration" which has taken place over 1,000 times, formal visits to appeal to *Chuden* and Yamaguchi Prefecture as well as the central government, sit-in protests at the construction site, lawsuits, and elections. The opposition movement has now become their lifework. Nevertheless, their voices reached neither *Chuden*, the central government, nor Japanese citizens. In 2009 *Chuden* submitted an application to construct nuclear reactors to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. It was a serious setback for the movement but the Fukushima nuclear accident has turned the tide. *Chuden* had to halt its landfill work. This gave the movement a hope of winning the recent mayoral election, although in the past, the eight candidates from the opposition group had all lost.

I asked the three elderly women whether they thought the construction would actually happen. They answered, "We don't know, but whatever the outcome, we won't be around to see it." The oldest among them, aged 94, lives alone in a house in front of the port. She looked happy when she talked about her granddaughter who commutes from Hikari City to a fishery cooperative in Kaminoseki, and has lunch with her every day. The town has serious aging and depopulation problems: about 50 percent of the population is over 65 and the number of residents has halved over the past 30 years and stands at only 3,500 today. With reduced fishing catches and no new industries coming in, the plan for a nuclear power plant has been regarded as the key to the future development of Kaminoseki. The town has to date received 4.5 billion yen from the

central government in the form of subsidies for the construction of a nuclear power plant, and another 2.4 billion yen from *Chuden* as a donation. Such "nuclear power plant money" was partly spent on the construction of a luxurious public bathing facility costing 900 million yen as a tourist resource. But it is also indispensable to the daily lives of the people of Kaminoseki. It has been used for building or maintaining a community meeting place, a dental clinic, and also to cover the costs of nurses and a local bus service.

A townsman who I met at one of the few sightseeing spots, *Shikairo*, said with resentment, "Even children now know that nuclear power plants are dangerous." Nevertheless, he said that he could not vote for the mayoral candidate who opposed the nuclear power plant because supporting that candidate would mean acknowledging that the nuclear policy of the town for the past 30 years had been a mistake. If Kaminoseki residents admit their own fault, they cannot demand that the central government and *Chuden* "take their responsibilities for having tossed Kaminoseki about," should the plan be abandoned. According to the man, the damage that Kaminoseki Town is going to suffer is not only financial but also psychological. It is not uncommon to find people whose families have split up due to their differing stances towards the plan. If the plan is not realized, he argued that the damage should be compensated somehow by those who are responsible.

In the end, the election concluded with the victory of Kashiwabara who supports the construction. His share of the votes was 67.4 percent, which was the highest amongst any of the former candidates. Despite this record-breaking figure, those residents who voted for him apparently had various reasons for doing so. According to a survey conducted by *The Chugoku Shimbum* at five polling stations, among supporters of Kashiwabara, 20.7 percent answered "against" or "no opinion" when asked about the construction plan.

In the prefectural assembly last June, Governor Nii of Yamaguchi Prefecture stated that he had no intention of extending the permission for *Chuden* to reclaim the land necessary for the plant, which expires in October 2012; in that case, a nuclear power plant can no longer be constructed on the proposed site. His announcement was made after 11 out of 13 municipal assemblies within the prefecture submitted written statements expressing their concern about the Kaminoseki construction plan, following the recent nuclear accident in Fukushima. It should be noted, however, that Governor Nii added the words "for the time being" to the above statement and he stressed that he would cooperate with the central government in its energy policy and also respect the local policy of Kaminoseki. Moreover, when the aforementioned permission expires in October, Nii will have retired and, therefore, will no longer have responsibility for actually putting his words into effect. At the same time, when he assumed the post last September, Prime Minister Noda stated that construction of a new nuclear power plant is "realistically speaking, difficult." However, in March this year he showed a flexible stance, stating that there could be instances in which decisions could be made on a case-by-case basis. In the same month, Kaminoseki Town gave permission to *Chuden* for continuous occupancy of the coastal area of Tanoura where the construction of the plant is being prepared. Although it has not been specified when the actual start of construction would take place, *Chuden* is maintaining its intention to push the plan forward while "asking for the understanding of local residents."

In the meantime, those who oppose the plan are continuing their battle. Four people have been sued for 47.92 million yen in damages for disrupting the landfilling process. One of the four, an Iwaishima resident, says with determination that he regrets nothing about the previous 30 years of painful struggle because the issue concerns a matter of life and death. His battle indeed relates to all the lives of those people who have been involved in the past, all living things alive now, and those that are yet to be born.

The tremendous damage caused by the Fukushima nuclear accident seems to be challenging each individual living in Hiroshima to ask what should be done about the nuclear power plant in Kaminoseki, which is planned by *Chuden*, whose head office is located in Hiroshima. We need to make a moral judgment regarding this issue.

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What Are the Intentions of North Korea?

Yeongho Kim

North Korea has a peculiar regime which cannot be found in any other country. That peculiarity is represented by its *Juche* ideology, military-first policy, and the recent hereditary power succession to the third generation. The reason why such a small nation-state draws attention in East Asia is due to North Korea's development and possession of nuclear warheads and long-range missiles.

Nevertheless, as in the case of many other countries, it seems that North Korea's behavior stems from not only coercion but also consensus, and is founded upon not only emotion but also interests. If this is the case, North Korea's behavior may be considered "rational" which is aimed at proving the legitimacy of its power.

This paper will examine North Korea's intentions based on a discussion of the legitimacy of its regime.

The *Juche* ideology, military-first policy, and hereditary system

North Korea's former leader Kim Jong-il, who was the General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and also Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea, passed away in December 2011 and was succeeded by his third son, Jong-un, who assumed the posts of First Secretary of the Workers' Party and First Chairman of the Defense Commission. According to Kim Jong-il's first son, Jong-nam, the late leader once said that he would not let his sons succeed him. However, a hereditary transfer of power has taken place for the second time. While the influence of Confucianism cannot be denied, the primary factor which led to this hereditary succession was the importance placed upon genealogy.

In North Korea, there has been no experience or idea of elections, revolution or coup d'état as a means of power transfer. The only possible warrant for power transfer was, as was the case when Kim Jong-il succeeded Kim Il-sung, the "brilliant succession to the *Juche* cause." In other words, the legitimacy of power transfer was given to hereditary succession based on genealogy.

While the warrant for power succession is genealogy, that for the use of power is the *Juche* ideology which emphasizes self-reliance in terms of philosophy, politics, economy and defense. This unique ideology emanates from North Korea's aversion to the *Sadae* ideology, or diplomatic policy of a subservient attitude, which was applied in modern Korea. In particular, this stance was a consequence of taking a balance between China and the USSR which were antagonistic towards each other during the 1960s. It can be argued that *Juche* represented a means to survive amid the antagonism between these two communist powers. It is noteworthy that the aversion to *Sadae* and inclination towards *Juche* was also observed in South Korea in the Cold War era, during which the southern half of the Korean Peninsula was under an authoritarian rule, as revealed by statements of Park Chung-hee.

Kim Jong-il further elevated the *Juche* ideology, which was originally developed by Kim Il-sung, to the nation's "sole ideological system." In the 1980s, it was further formulated into the "concept of a socio-political living organism." This concept holds that the Leader of the nation-state is the brain, the Workers' Party the nervous system, and the people are the body.

It also holds that while the life of a person's body is finite, that of the socio-political organism is eternal whose existence is inseparable from the Leader and the Party. During the first three years following Kim Il-sung's death and power succession by Kim Jong-il in 1994, North Korea was hit by flood disasters and economic turmoil. At that time, Kim Jong-il announced a new slogan under which he attempted to overcome the economic difficulties through military and spiritual strength. The name of the slogan was "the Arduous March" which was modeled on that undertaken by anti-Japanese partisans led by Kim Il-sung through a freezing blizzard.

The end of the "Arduous March" campaign was announced at the close of the 1990s; nevertheless, the military-first policy was not abandoned. Rather, it was strengthened so that "the military represents the people, the nation-state and the Party." Furthermore, the new 2009 Constitution stipulates that the *Juche* ideology and the military-first policy are North Korea's official state ideology. Thus, the military-first policy was elevated to the military-first "ideology" to which an equally high importance was attached as the *Juche* ideology, and North Korea's state system became a "military-first regime."

Why does North Korea still cling to the "military-first ideology"? The first reason for this is that North Korea apparently intended to utilize the military to block the spillover effects of democratization occurring abroad, such as the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Tiananmen Incident in China. North Korea attributed the collapse or weakening of the socialist state system in these countries to the fact that their militaries maintained a neutral position in domestic politics.

The second reason is North Korea's strong suspicions of foreign culture which may accompany the globalization of the market economy and external pressure for a "peaceful transition" of the North Korean political system. The Sunshine Policy which was first implemented by South Korea in 1998 was, for instance, firmly rejected by the North as a "philosophical and cultural infiltration of imperialism."

The third reason is North Korea's strong fear of the US which initiated wars against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively. This fear of the US dashed hopes for a normalization of North Korea's diplomatic relations which had arisen during occasions such as the Inter-Korean Summit and reciprocal visits of US and North Korean high officials in 2000, and also the Japan-North Korea Summit in 2002.

In modern times, economic development and income distribution, or "people's lives" in the North Korean sense, are indispensable factors for the legitimacy of political power. People's lives are naturally of great importance to the legitimacy of the North Korean regime. In fact, Kim Il-sung once said that he hoped his people could "have white rice and meat soup," and these words were taken by Kim Jong-il as important "teachings" of his father. As a consequence, the son set the political goal of "improving people's lives" which was attempted by means of "reform and opening up" of the country several times in the past. Notwithstanding this however, why is North Korea developing nuclear warheads and long-range missiles, and leaving its people to starve?

Development of nuclear warheads and long-range missiles

In North Korea, there is an acute shortage of energy, the operating ratio of factories is extremely low, military equipment is far from adequate, and military training is ineffective. As such, energy is vital to the North Korean economy. Therefore the continued nuclear development can be seen as coming about as a result of a weighted allocation of resources. It may be more precise to say that North Korea continues its nuclear development not “despite” but “because of” economic collapse.

Why then does it concentrate resources on nuclear development instead of economic improvement itself? This is due to the military might of the US and its security alliances with South Korea and Japan which pose a great threat to the survival, not to mention the prosperity, of North Korea.

When North Korea is seen on a map that is turned upside down, it is palpable that the country is surrounded on three sides by South Korea, Japan and the US, both by land and by sea. China and Russia which now lie below North Korea on the map do not play for it the role that the US does for South Korea and Japan. Both the Yellow Sea (or the West Sea in Korean) to the right of the country and the Sea of Japan (or the East Sea in Korean) to the left are frequently venues for US-South Korea or US-Japan joint military exercises. North Korea is militarily surrounded, with its “frontline” on the sea being the area where the recent sinking of the corvette Cheonan and military attack on Yeonpyeong Island occurred. This area lies only 100 kilometers from both Pyongyang and Seoul, and is only slightly farther than 10 kilometers off the nearest coastline of North Korea.

The threat that North Korea likely feels may be appreciated by imagining a similar scenario for Tokyo. China and Russia have recently implemented joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea. Had these exercises taken place only 100 kilometers from Tokyo, and also joined by North Korea, and these three states staged joint military operations which included nuclear attacks, Japan would almost certainly have got into an incomparably greater panic than that which occurred in the aftermath of North Korea’s recent satellite test. Such is the threat that North Korea may feel regarding joint military exercises by the US, Japan and South Korea, or possible preemptive, or even nuclear, attacks carried out by the US.

The Korean Peninsula, as well as Japan, is surrounded by nuclear superpowers, and North Korea has been a target of possible nuclear and preemptive attacks by the US, whether independently or in cooperation with South Korea or Japan. On the other hand, North Korea’s military capability is far from comparable to that of the US, even though it possesses Nodong missiles. This means that the threat to North Korea posed by the US, Japan and South Korea is far greater than vice versa. This can be seen as a “threat imbalance.” Moreover, the US has recently carried out preemptive attacks and the overthrow of regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite its often provocative announcements, North Korea may well have been intimidated by these military actions by the US.

One may argue that the military operations of the US, Japan and South Korea are defensive actions unlike those carried out by North Korea. This argument may not necessarily be valid when one considers the US “nuclear umbrella.” The use of the word “umbrella” may give the impression that it has some form of protective function like a “shield,” since an umbrella protects its user from the rain or the rays of the sun. However, the “nuclear umbrella” is merely one side of the same coin that is nuclear policy, with the other side being the “reliable nuclear

deterrence.” In this respect, the “nuclear umbrella” is actually not a “shield” but a “spear.” Therefore, it is not accurate to argue that North Korea is offensive and the US, Japan and South Korea are defensive, nor vice versa.

North Korea stresses that the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula was caused not by its own nuclear development, but by the US’ deployment of nuclear weapons and its antagonistic diplomacy since the 1950s. It is hard to deny this assertion. Although no nuclear weapon was used during the Korean War, North Korea suffered indiscriminate bombings and to this date, it has been exposed to the constant nuclear threat posed by the US. The US, Japan and South Korea have their respective collective memories relating to past wars, whether they focus on the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Vietnam War or the colonization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea similarly has its own collective memories. Since any nation-state pursues its survival as well as prosperity, it may be natural to assume that North Korea is pressing forward with nuclear development for the sake of survival, reflecting the threat imbalance and the country’s memories of former wars.

At the same time, as the foreign policy of a nation-state can be either hawkish or dovish, for the sake of its survival that of North Korea can also be either of the two. In fact, the second Japan-North Korea Summit in 2004, a series of agreements made in the Six-Party Talks since 2005, and the second Inter-Korean Summit in 2007 represent dovish actions, while North Korea’s missile and nuclear testing in 2006 and 2009 are hawkish. Despite such a possibility for dovish behavior, missile tests conducted by North Korea face criticism and sanction, while no similar criticism is made regarding those conducted by the non-signatories of the NPT, India and Pakistan. This double standard is attributable primarily to the troubled political relationship that exists between North Korea and the US which further leads to the former’s hawkish behavior. Therefore, it can be argued that such hawkish behavior does not necessarily amount to reckless provocation, but is rather derived from a pursuit of survival and sovereignty which is intended to support the legitimacy of the state.

Nevertheless, it is still true that the continued pursuit of nuclear power and missiles by North Korea will undermine efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, further aggravate US-North Korea relations, and destabilize the East Asian region. The US and North Korea have been in conflict for the sake of “peace” or for the purpose of “nuclear deterrence,” and other countries in the region have been fearing that this antagonism will lead to actual armed conflict.

In order to have North Korea choose dovish, instead of hawkish, behavior in pursuit of survival and prosperity, the related parties are also required to choose not only hawkish but also dovish behavior towards their “enemy.” More specifically, in order to achieve common security in East Asia, the armistice agreement of the Korean War needs to be changed to a peace accord, and comprehensive denuclearization pursued which requires efforts towards denuclearization not only from North Korea but also from the US, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. Although this may sound like a cliché, such efforts should produce far lower risk and cost than continuing to live with the decades-long cease-fire coupled with the risk of incidental armed conflict which could be caused by the “game of nuclear chicken” or of regime change facilitated by force of arms.

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While specializing in contemporary philosophy, Professor Nobuo Kazashi of Kobe University has for many years been involved in various Hiroshima-based activities that call for peace. On this occasion, Professor Kazashi who has previously taught at Hiroshima City University will discuss his personal activities which are the implementation of what is known as “exposure” in the field of Peace Studies.

Viewing the World by Uncovering “Hidden Realities”: No Peace without Justice

Nobuo Kazashi

Hiroshima as a place for “exposure”

“Exposure” is an approach advocated in Peace Studies by which one explores a way of solving issues through actually entering problematic areas and exposing oneself to that reality. In this respect, Hiroshima is a unique place for “exposure” since one may have opportunities to look into not only the city itself, but also the wider world through encounters with various people in Hiroshima. I have felt this on many occasions since moving to this A-bombed city in April 1994 as a member of the teaching staff at the newly-established Hiroshima City University.

The recent nuclear accident in Fukushima seems to call into question the roles that Peace Studies can actually play in society. Witnessing the still unforeseeable, unstable and perilous situation regarding the nuclear power plants, and having Peace Studies not as my core research area, I cannot help but hesitate discussing “my approach to Peace Studies.” Nevertheless, I would like to relate my experiences of being involved in various Hiroshima-based activities directed towards peace, or experiences of “exposure,” during the past ten years or so in the hope that by doing so I can make my humble contribution.

Peace education and differences at the individual level: the atomic bombings and the Holocaust

When I was in charge of a course entitled “Contemporary Thought” at Hiroshima City University, I often encountered surprising comments from students. At the university, more than half of the students come from Hiroshima City and have received “peace education” in some form or another. These students are surprised to hear that students from other prefectures have not experienced “peace education” at schools as they have.

This is an example of difference in perception. What further surprised me was that even students from Hiroshima have varying perspectives regarding so-called “A-bomb/peace education.” Some students saw the crucial importance of such education and hold dreams of working globally, such as for the United Nations. At the same time, quite a few others confessed that through “A-bomb education,” they had been simply overwhelmed by the woefulness of the atomic bombings and the severity of nuclear issues, and that the learning had left them with something of a negative psychological impression.

Moreover, there were even some students who said that their teachers were “not serious.” To their eyes, the teachers seemed to be only teaching what they had been told to do, and the students doubted whether the teachers themselves were actually seeking a means towards solving nuclear issues. I myself know of some teachers who are highly motivated and continuously seek ways to improve their teaching methods. However, it might often become difficult for adults, who have got more or less used to the reality of the nuclear age, to understand the cruelty of being instilled with an apocalyptic image about the earth which might be destroyed in a nuclear war, and thereby being deprived of a sense of unconditional trust in this world.

I pondered about a similar difficulty when I coordinated a gathering for Israeli writers and researchers in autumn 1999. I learned that in Israel education about the Holocaust is given significant weight in a similar respect as “A-bomb education” in Hiroshima and all students are required to visit the Holocaust History Museum in Jerusalem, and most importantly that each student receives psychological support from counselors both before and after the visits.¹

Depleted uranium (DU) ammunition: the military use of nuclear waste

After I moved to Kobe University in October 2001, my activities in Hiroshima calling for peace further intensified. This came about as a direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The then US President George W. Bush declared that if necessary he would not refrain from ordering a preemptive nuclear attack, so the world became further endangered by the threat of nuclear war. In response to this, between late April and early May 2002 a Hiroshima-Nagasaki anti-nuclear delegation for peace was organized which visited New York and some other cities in the US. Having received Takashi Morizumi’s book, *Children of the Gulf War*, from a friend prior to leaving Japan, I spoke about issues relating to DU ammunition at an anti-nuclear symposium held at American University in Washington, DC. But this event made me realize the need for English publications about DU. Upon returning from the US, I asked some of my friends to work together to publish an English version of Morizumi’s book.²

DU is nuclear waste which is a byproduct of the production of enriched uranium that can be used for nuclear weapons and in

nuclear power plants. There is an enormous amount of nuclear waste around the world totaling over 1.5 million tons, and, as everyone knows, how to dispose of this material has become a very serious problem. In the US studies were started, and one of the “solutions” was to use it in weapons. Because it is both very hard and heavy, DU is regarded as “ideal” material for penetrators of anti-tank rounds. Moreover, because it is nuclear waste, it can be obtained without incurring a financial burden on the military industry.

However, DU burns spontaneously on impact producing and emitting particles into the air, and these particles are highly toxic and possess approximately 60 percent of the radiation of natural uranium, with a half-life of 4.5 billion years. If DU particles enter the cells in the human body, those cells as well as surrounding ones will be exposed to alpha rays, causing internal exposure to radiation. At the same time, unexploded DU shells corrode and contaminate the surrounding area. In fact, in the Gulf War approximately 800,000 thirty-millimeter shells each containing about 300 grams of DU were used, and consequently over 300 tons of DU was dispersed into the environment. Such immoral munitions are being used in contemporary war.³ Subsequently, there has been an increase in the number of sufferers of cancer and congenital abnormality which are likely to have been caused by DU shells used not only on battlefields but also military training sites around the world and in production facilities in the US. Consequently, the indiscriminate damage that DU shells can inflict on the human body and the environment has caused these weapons to be regarded as inhumane weapons and become the subject of international debate.

The most severely damaged are children

Towards the end of 2002 when the outbreak of war in Iraq was becoming more likely, two medical doctors travelled all the way from Iraq to Japan. The two doctors, Dr. Jawad al-Ali of Basrah University and Dr. Hussam al-Jormakly of Baghdad University, also came to Hiroshima. The visit was made as a result of their desperate hope that the use of more DU shells in future war must be avoided at all costs in order to avoid a further increase in sufferers.

In response to their appeal, a “citizens’ investigation & peace delegation” was organized in mid-December of that year, and we visited Iraq in order to see for ourselves the damage caused by DU. Responding to an appeal by photo-journalist Naomi Toyoda, the delegation consisted of 16 members who included people born in Hiroshima and residents of the city such as Ms. Haruko Moritaki. During the 10-day stay in Baghdad and Basra, our days started early in the morning and ended late at night. We visited local hospitals and schools, and had opportunities to exchange opinions with local government officials and NGO members. One of the most memorable occasions was a visit to the “tank graveyard” where DU-destroyed and highly contaminated tanks have been dumped.

In Baghdad, we visited Al-Mansour Children’s Hospital, which was filled with an unusual, heavy atmosphere quite different to that in the surrounding city. The dim hospital was full of children who were lying in bed, accompanied by their families. Doctors took us to each ward where we were greeted by the mostly quiet family members of the patients. They seemed to be begging us to pass on what we saw there to the world — the reality that small children were suffering and dying.

Unlike the majority of the families, however, we also met a mother who raised her voice, “Many foreigners have been here and taken photos, but that has made no change at all!” All we could do was accept her sorrow and anger without a word. On

the other hand, some other mothers were willing to have their dying children photographed, or welcomed us with smiles and received the paper cranes and toys we had brought for them.

On March 2, 2003, in Hiroshima, 6,000 people gathered to form the human letters “NO WAR, NO DU!” and out of its organizing committee the “NO DU Hiroshima Project” was begun in June of the same year.⁴ Four months later, in October, we became more committed to the anti-DU campaign by participating in the launch of the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW).

Dilemma between common sense and international politics

On May 3 last year, a gathering took place in Hiroshima under the title “The Iraq War and Inhumane Weapons: Eight Years since the Iraq War,” with three medical doctors from Fallujah General Hospital in Iraq. In Fallujah, located 50 kilometers west of Baghdad, intense attacks by the US took place in 2004. Consequently, the incidence of congenital abnormality and other serious diseases showed an alarming increase. In November 2009 *The Guardian* reported that local medical doctors were deeply shocked by the severity of the situation and were pleading for help from international society,⁵ and, in April of the following year, it was reported that the WHO had finally announced that they would carry out an independent investigation in Iraq.

While their report on the real situation in Iraq was shocking, Dr. Samira al-Ani expressed her gratitude to “Japanese people who continued to help the people of Fallujah while the world seemed to have forgotten us.” She also expressed “a hope for the future of my hometown, Fallujah,” which she “could feel for the first time after seeing Hiroshima which has achieved an unbelievable recovery.” Less than a week later, however, the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear accident in Fukushima occurred, and the three Iraqi doctors were forced to return to their country in the middle of their training in Tokyo.

The UN General Assembly adopted DU-related resolutions in 2007, 2008 and 2010. Nevertheless, these resolutions are not demanding a ban on the use of DU weapons, but are merely requesting opinions on the issue from each member state and affiliated organization. This is a great disappointment for me, especially as I have long been involved in the international anti-DU campaign together with my colleagues from Hiroshima. In the international political arena it is not easy to gain approval for the common-sensical “precautionary principle.” However, the DU issue should be reconsidered as part of the entire “nuclear cycle” and some solution must be found for it: next year marks the 10th anniversary of the Iraq War.⁶

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- 1 For related information, please refer to Nobuo Kazashi, *The 21st Century for Philosophy: The First Step from Hiroshima*, Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, 1999.
- 2 This 34-page publication was circulated across the world by those people who were deeply concerned about the DU issue. The number of its copies exceeded 20,000.
- 3 Hiroaki Koide, “Why DU weapons must definitely be banned: Uranium is toxic” in Nobuo Kazashi, Katsumi Furitsu and Haruko Moritaki ed., *Towards a World without Uranium Weapons: Challenges Taken by ICBUW*, Tokyo: Godo-shuppan, 2008.
- 4 For more details, please refer to *Hiroshima Appeal for Banning DU Weapons*, Hiroshima: NO DU Hiroshima Project, Aug. 2003. The number of copies of this publication, in Japanese and English altogether, reached nearly 20,000.
- 5 On Mar. 4 of the following year, the BBC also reported the same story, but it was accompanied by a statement, “It has been suggested that they used white phosphorus and shells tipped with depleted uranium during the conflict [in Fallujah in 2004], but this has not been proven.”
- 6 For more details of the anti-DU campaign, please visit the following website: <http://icbuw-hiroshima.org/>

- ◆ **Mar. 1** Robert Jacobs facilitates, as part of his Global Hibakusha Project, a dialogue on Skype between students from the Marshall Islands and Hiroshima City University (HCU) about *hibakusha* issues, held at HCU.
- ◆ **Mar. 15-19** Narayanan Ganesan attends the Annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies and participates in a roundtable discussion on recent developments in Myanmar, held in Toronto, Canada.
- ◆ **Mar. 20** HPI Vice-President Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture “What to Learn from the Study Tour to Cambodia” at a review session of the Study Tour to Cambodia organized by the Hiroshima International Center (HIC), held at HIC.
- ◆ **Mar. 22** Mizumoto serves as the Vice-Chair at the 11th meeting of the Exhibition Review Committee of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, held at the museum.
- ◆ **Mar. 23** Mizumoto attends a meeting of the “reconstruction and peacebuilding” section of “A Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan, organized by Hiroshima Prefecture, held at the Hiroshima Prefectural Office.
- ◆ **Mar. 26** Mizumoto attends the annual meeting of the Advisory Research Group of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, held at the International Conference Center Hiroshima.
- ◆ **Mar. 28** Mizumoto attends as a Task Force member a meeting on “A Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan, organized by Hiroshima Prefecture, held at the Tokyo office of Hiroshima Prefecture.
- ◆ **Mar. 31** Makiko Takemoto presents paper “‘Peace’ and Peace Movements in 20th Century Germany” at the 22nd meeting of the Society of Modern German History of West Japan, held at Kagoshima University, Kagoshima.
- ◆ **Apr. 1** Mikyoung Kim presents paper “North Korean Human Rights in East Asia: Issues, Responses and Reactions” at the panel session “History, Structure, and Norms: Dynamic East Asia around the Korean Peninsula” during the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, held in San Diego, CA, US.
- ◆ **Apr. 2** Sung Chull Kim presents paper “Quasi-Alliance, US Intervention, and Domestic Politics: Controversies between Japan and South Korea” at the panel session “The Role of Alliances in Foreign Policy” during the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, held in San Diego, CA, US.
▽ Mikyoung Kim gives special lecture “North Korean Refugees in East Asia” at the Center for Asia and Pacific Studies, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, US.
- ◆ **Apr. 4-14** Ganesan conducts field research in Yangon, Myanmar.
- ◆ **Apr. 17** Mizumoto attends a meeting of the “reconstruction and peacebuilding” section of “A Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan, organized by Hiroshima Prefecture, held at the Hiroshima Prefectural Office.
- ◆ **Apr. 27** Mizumoto attends a meeting on human resource development for reconstruction and peacebuilding of “A Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan, organized by Hiroshima Prefecture, held at the Hiroshima Prefectural Office.
- ◆ **May 2** Mizumoto gives lecture “Hiroshima and the Danger of Nuclear Weapons” to a group of Japanese and American students on the California University Program of Meiji Gakuin University, held at Aster Plaza, Hiroshima.
- ◆ **May 3** Akihiro Kawakami gives lecture “The Peace Constitution: Tested and Challenged” at a meeting organized by the Prefectural Association of Kumamoto Citizens to Protect the Peace Constitution, held in Kumamoto.
- ◆ **May 12** Mizumoto gives lecture “The Meaning of Studying the Hiroshima Experience” at the Hiroshima Peace Forum organized by the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, held at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
- ◆ **May 12-13** Mizumoto and Sung Chull Kim present papers “The Framework of Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and its Realization: A Model of Security Cooperation” and “Immigration Policies in East Asia and Related Human Rights Issues” respectively, at a workshop “An Open Community in Asia,” sponsored by the One Asia Foundation, held at HPI.
- ◆ **May 20** Kawakami gives lecture “3/11 and Local Autonomy / Decentralization” at a meeting organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Headquarters of the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union, held at Workpia Hiroshima.
- ◆ **May 21-29** Ganesan conducts a research trip to Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son Province of Thailand to investigate exiled Myanmar ethnic communities.
- ◆ **May 29-Jun. 1** Mikyoung Kim participates in the Convention for Overseas Council Members of the National Unification Advisory Council of the Republic of Korea, held in Seoul, Korea.
- ◆ **Jun. 4-10** Ganesan participates as a member of a training team in a workshop on peace and reconciliation in Naypyidaw, Myanmar.
- ◆ **Jun. 7** Mikyoung Kim gives lecture “Japan’s Nuclear Pacifism: Seen from the Post-3/11 Perspective” to members of the Jinju City branch of the National Unification Advisory Council of the Republic of Korea, held in Fukuoka.
- ◆ **Jun. 18-30** Ganesan participates as a member of an international team in a training session for Myanmar academics and civil servants on public policy and Southeast Asian international relations, held in Yangon, Myanmar.
- ◆ **Jun. 22-26** Mikyoung Kim participates in the inaugural conference of the “Beyond the Korean War” project, sponsored by the University of Cambridge and organized by Yonsei University, held in Seoul, Korea.
- ◆ **Jun. 26** Mizumoto gives special lecture “The Current State and Tasks of Peace Research” at a training program for Level II Certified Nursing Administrators organized by the Hiroshima Nursing Association, held at the association.

—Visitors—

- ◆ **Mar. 6** Rotary Peace Fellows from the ICU Rotary Peace Center.
- ◆ **Mar. 8** Deputy Secretary General Huaifan Chen and four other members from the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament.
- ◆ **Mar. 29** Professor Carole J. Petersen, Director of the Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution, the University of Hawaii at Manoa.
- ◆ **May 18** Associate Professors Kyoko Amano and Cheryl Shore, and students from the University of Indianapolis, IN, US.

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