

## Missile Defense and the Bush Administration

By Yoichi Nishimura

U.S. President George W. Bush clarified his plans for a comprehensive national missile defense system in a speech on May 1. The system proposed by his predecessor, Bill Clinton, was more limited, comprising between 20 and 100 missiles, intended to intercept enemy missiles in mid-flight, deployed at ground bases in Alaska and other locations. Bush emphasized his system's effectiveness, but did not clarify what form it would take. It is safe to say, however, that Bush would like to see interceptors based at sea and in space, as well as on the ground. He is also interested in boost-phase interception, or destroying missiles just after they are launched. It seems that Bush is leaving his options open, and is happy to invest in both systems and see which one turns out to be more viable.

The "Bush system" is different from the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), nicknamed "Star Wars," proposed by the administration of Ronald Reagan. It is right, though, to call it the "son of Star Wars," as the U.S. administration has resumed all of the various missile defense studies — at considerable cost in terms of money, time and human resources — that began with SDI.

Bush intended his May 1 speech as reassurance for Russia, a challenge to China, and a screwball to his allies, notably Japan and European countries. He said: "We (The United States and Russia) are not and must not be strategic adversaries." He went on: "We should work together to replace this (the Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past." The Bush administration has rejected the ABM treaty as "residue" from the Cold War, while Russia continues to adhere to it. For Russia, the Bush administration's renouncement of the treaty was inevitable. Bush, however, did not dare say as much during his speech. His intention was to leave the door open for Moscow to take part in building a new framework.

The Bush administration has dismissed Clinton's Russia policy as "romanticism," and is set on policy reform. Russia, which has been given the diplomatic cold shoulder by the Bush administration, was certainly intrigued by the speech and stressed the possibilities for discussion with Washington. Sergei Stepashin, the former Russian prime minister, said he did not want to see a repeat of the arms race he believed the Soviet Union had been dragged into by Reagan's "Star Wars." Sergei Markov, a Russian political analyst, said Bush said the bare minimum about his plans, but added that it was the kind of speech Russia had been waiting for. His comments support the view that Russia is not about to turn its back on the United States.

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Bush referred to China only in passing. When the Clinton administration delayed a decision on the deployment of national missile defense (NMD), the then U.S. National Security Adviser, Samuel Berger, told reporters: "One of the concerns about an NMD system is the impact it will have particularly in Asia, where, although the Chinese already have plans to increase their ICBM program, it's not inconceivable that that system would accelerate those plans. That could have an effect on India, that could have an effect on Pakistan, Japan, et cetera." However, the Bush administration seems ready to ignore China's feelings. As one U.S. Department of Defense official put it, China will strengthen its missile arsenal regardless of what the United States decides to do.

China appears unconvinced by American claims that NMD is not a direct challenge to its missiles. Furthermore, China is concerned that the possible deployment of a theater missile defense (TMD) system in Taiwan would give the independence movement greater momentum. To Beijing, a United States that is already a powerful nuclear force, with a missile defense shield at home and in Taiwan, would be more likely to take bold military steps in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Straits.

Japan and European countries, meanwhile, have been left to reflect on Bush's belief that NMD would protect them, too. In his speech, Bush said: "Today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states — states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world." His remarks were intended to warn European and Asian allies that they, not the United States, are most at risk of ballistic missile attacks, and thus would benefit from the protection offered by NMD. This represents a change in emphasis compared with the Clinton administration, which began looking at NMD halfway through its tenure in response to Republican pressure.

The device for the boost-phase interception of missiles, a new piece in the NMD jigsaw to have appeared since Bush became president, would theoretically be positioned aboard a U.S. warship located off the Korean Peninsula, ready to intercept North Korean long-range missiles immediately after they are launched. Although its technical effectiveness has not been proved, it is clear that the United States expects such a system would also be used to defend Japan.

Other developments have drawn U.S. allies into missile defense plans. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has suggested removing the distinction between national and theater missile defense. By doing so, he hopes to address European criticisms that NMD and TMD constitute separate defense plans for the United States and Europe. Instead, the Bush administration is beginning to combine NMD and TMD in its quest for a truly global missile shield.

The Japanese government has so far expressed only an "understanding" of NMD, while focusing on TMD, which, it says, is technically different and needs to be properly understood since it has ramifications for the defense of Japan. However, as long as the United States continues to blur the differences between the two systems, Japan's stance will become increasingly untenable.

*Nishimura is Deputy Foreign News Editor at The Asahi Shimbun.*

# Obstacles to Inter-Korean Dialogue

By Scott Snyder

Many events have been organized in South Korea in June to commemorate the first anniversary of the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000, which remains an historic high point in the inter-Korean dialogue process. However, the surprisingly strong momentum of last summer and autumn has ground to a virtual halt, and these commemorations may now seem more like a death watch rather than a celebration of inter-Korean reconciliation efforts. Many analysts, including Pyongyang's blustery Korean Central News Agency and some South Korean analysts, have targeted the new Bush administration as the cause of the slowdown, but there are many other factors standing in the way of renewed progress in the inter-Korean dialogue.

The most significant obstacles are economic. The fundamental inducement for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to come to the negotiating table with South Korea in the first place was the promise of economic benefits as a vehicle for tension reduction. The first step in this process was the initiation of the Hyundai tourism project at Mount Keumgang, which was launched at the end of 1998. The North Koreans initially received cash payments of US\$25 million a month in return for allowing South Korean tourists to take hiking trips to the North to see beautiful mountain views that had been immortalized in proverbs and landscape paintings for hundreds of years.

The Mount Keumgang project was never financially viable, but it was politically important to jumpstart inter-Korean dialogue. It also had sentimental value for recently deceased Hyundai Group Chairman Chung Ju Yung, who negotiated the project directly with DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Il. The Hyundai Asan company does not have the cash flow to sustain regular payments to North Korea. Hyundai Group companies can no longer provide financial or in-kind subsidies to the project as they face their own problems of restructuring and financial survival, and tourist demand has dropped by at least half since the project began. A bailout of the project by the South Korean government would be greeted with suspicion and would contradict corporate restructuring principles that are central to the Korean economy's overall health and attractiveness to foreign investors. The future of the Mount Keumgang tourism project is very much undecided.

Plans to assist North Korea's economic rehabilitation by providing Social Overhead Capital (SOC) — essential if the North is to have the infrastructure to be globally competitive — have also ground to a halt.

The most visible symbol of renewed links between North and South Korea has been the proposed rebuilding of an inter-Korean railroad and highway connection across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). But this project appears unlikely to go forward as the North Koreans have made no effort to begin construction work on their side of the DMZ, despite the fact that de-mining and railway construction work have begun in South Korea. The inter-Korean military agreements that were necessary to determine jurisdictional and safety procedures for workers inside the DMZ have also not been ratified, despite initial progress at the working level.

The railway project is important because it would provide a direct link to North Korea and to the proposed Kaesong Industrial Zone envisioned by Hyundai Group Chairman Chung Ju Yung. Although the government-owned Koland Corp. has taken over planning for that project, South Korea's own economic slump has dampened public enthusiasm for it.

The "Berlin Declaration," in which President Kim Dae Jung pledged that South Korea would provide wide-ranging help to rebuild North Korea's economic infrastructure, was a catalyst for inter-Korean summit preparations. However, North Korean demands for two million kilowatts of energy assistance put forward at the last round of ministerial-level dialogue last December were not accepted by the South Korean side; rather, the South proposed a survey of North Korea's current energy needs and infrastructure to determine how best to respond. Moreover, the North Korean proposal raised American concerns that North Korea's request for energy was a way of side-stepping its nuclear obligations under the Geneva Agreed Framework, which includes a pledge by the United States to provide energy to North Korea in return for the dismantling of Pyongyang's indigenous nuclear program.

These economic obstacles are now being overtaken by political problems that could derail inter-Korean dialogue for a long time. The first political obstacle is low public approval for President Kim Dae Jung's government, which is widely viewed as having failed to solve South Korea's most pressing economic and social problems. Many blame Kim Dae Jung for pursuing inter-Korean progress at the expense of South Korea's domestic agenda. Second, domestic pre-positioning for the next South Korean presidential election has already begun, distracting Korean attention from the North to other issues. Third, political coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea remains critical, but has been overtaken by domestic issues in all three countries.

Finally, the DPRK has made a strategic error in linking progress in inter-Korean relations to the policy review of the new Bush administration, further complicating prospects for inter-Korean dialogue. Progress in inter-Korean relations will inevitably draw the United States into dialogue with the North on a range of issues and create positive momentum; however, the lack of inter-Korean dialogue is good evidence for those who feel that the North's intentions deserve a skeptical response. Moreover, the Bush administration will expect new progress in inter-Korean dialogue to move forward in conjunction with its own renewed negotiations with the DPRK. In addition, the DPRK's consistent targeting of Japan for criticism is a tactical and strategic error, given that it will need Japanese capital to support its own rehabilitation.

The success or failure of the current dialogue does not rest with the United States; the ball is clearly in North Korea's court. In fact, South Korea has served almost the entire game and has used up almost all of the balls in play, with only a few returns by the North. As a result, the game may be almost over. The big gamble Kim Dae Jung took in depending on Kim Jong Il for his own political success could prove to have been a starry-eyed failure.

Only the leadership in Pyongyang can open the door to true progress, verification, and greater transparency in dialogue with South Korea, the United States, and Japan, laying the foundations for a relationship built on trust. Neither Kim Dae Jung nor President Bush is in a position to pull the door open without some positive, concrete, and substantive moves by Pyongyang.

*Scott Snyder is the Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation and author of "Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior." The views contained here are his own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Foundation.*

## Nuclear Issues in China, Russia and South Asia, and a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in the Northern Hemisphere

The Hiroshima Peace Institute's *Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century* held four meetings between January and April 2001. The meetings featured presentations by project members and guest speakers. Following is a summary of the presentations.

### ● The 8th meeting (Jan. 26)

**Guest speaker:** *Yoshio Endo*, assistant professor, Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University

**Title:** "Nuclear Issue in South Asia — A View from Pakistan —"

"Global Trends 2015," a report recently released by the CIA for the Bush administration, makes several predictions about Indo-Pakistan relations. It says:

- 1) That India will expand its counterattack capability based on "minimum deterrence;"
- 2) that Pakistan will deploy nuclear weapons and missiles based on "minimum deterrence," and that its arsenal will not necessarily reflect the size of India's; and
- 3) that India and Pakistan will build up their nuclear and missile forces over the next 15 years, making theirs the world's most serious nuclear problem.

India and Pakistan both became nuclear states following their tests in 1998, and developed their own theories of minimum deterrence. India proposed a No-first-use (NFU) Pact, insisting that it would use nuclear weapons only in retaliation, while Pakistan proposed a No-war Pact, virtually asserting its right to strike first with nuclear weapons. Pakistan has been promoting itself at home and abroad as a responsible nuclear-weapon state, having established the National Command Authority (NCA) and the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA). India, meanwhile, has pushed its policy of isolating Pakistan by opposing Afghan terrorism, improving its nuclear missile technology, and conducting tests on a new type of missile, the Agni-II.

A greater effort is required at the global level to establish a more inclusive Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and, at the regional level, to foster better relations between India and Pakistan.

### ● The 9th meeting (Feb. 13)

**Guest speaker:** *Yasuhide Yamanouchi*, professor, Center for Global Communications, International University of Japan

**Title:** "Japanese Nuclear Security Cooperation with the CIS Countries: Present Situation and Prospect"

After the end of Cold War, the Group of Eight (G8) nations became more aware of the need to dismantle warheads in the former Soviet Union. The G8 spent about \$2.7 billion on the denuclearization of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) between 1992 and 1999 under the Mutual Threat Reduction (MTR) Program. Japan contributed \$300 million. That sum included \$200 million pledged by Japan at the G8 summit in Cologne in 1999. It has been used to dispose of plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads in fast breeder reactors and to help decommission Russia's Far East fleet of submarines.

Japan's diplomatic contributions are diverse and include:

- 1) An MTR program led by the United States at the global level and implemented in cooperation with the rest of the G8;
- 2) nuclear disarmament in the Russian Far East, which in turn affects U.S.-Japan security ties;
- 3) the promotion of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, an important issue for Japan; and

4) the use of nuclear fuel-cycle technology in dismantling warheads. However, dismantlement projects will face difficulties if the Bush administration's attitude toward the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty continues to harden and Russia continues its support for Iran's nuclear energy program.

**Guest speaker:** *Hisako Iizuka*, lecturer, Musashino Junior College

**Title:** "Nuclear Development in China"

Since it became a communist state in 1949, China has regarded nuclear development as integral to its modernization. It has also been an important factor in sustaining the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule.

The decision to develop a nuclear capability was made by Mao Zedong in January 1955, prompted, no doubt, by the knowledge that the United States had considered using nuclear weapons during the Korean War. China's nuclear development, however, proceeded without Russian technology as a result of Sino-Soviet tensions and Nikita Khrushchev's wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the United States. China's belief in the necessity of nuclear weapons increased after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It tested its first atomic bomb in 1964 and carried out a successful test on a hydrogen bomb only three years later.

Although many scientists were persecuted during the Great Cultural Revolution, Mao and Zhou Enlai protected those closely involved in the nuclear development program. China and the United States began exchanging nuclear technology during the presidency of Richard Nixon following a rise in Sino-Soviet tensions in 1969 and Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1971. During the era of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China reinforced its defense technology and conducted one or two nuclear tests a year from 1980 to 1996, while attempting to reassure the rest of the world with references to "no-first-use," "preservation of peace" and "self-defense." But the 1991 Gulf War forced China to admit that its weaponry was outdated. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union showed the perils of relying too heavily on military might for political legitimacy.

China's nuclear development program has continued, and is intended as a deterrent to U.S. nuclear forces. China, in tandem with Russia, will continue to oppose American unilateralism and Washington's plans for national missile defense.

### ● The 10th meeting (Mar. 30)

**Speaker:** *Tadaakira Joh*, professor, Hiroshima Shudo University and project member

**Title:** "Recent Movement Toward the Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones in the Northern Hemisphere"

According to a resolution passed by the UN General Assembly in 1975, nuclear-weapon free zones must have strictly fixed boundaries; be inspected by international teams before the countries concerned can comply with treaty obligations; and be respected by nuclear weapon states.

Nuclear-weapon free zones are designed to:

- 1) Provide negative security assurance for non-nuclear weapon states;
- 2) promote regional disarmament;
- 3) strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime; and
- 4) promote confidence building and preventive diplomacy.

Nuclear-weapon free zone treaties were signed in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa, with the first three having come into effect. In the Northern Hemisphere, a nuclear-weapon free zone in Mongolia was recognized by a UN General Assembly resolution in 1988.

Five Central Asian countries are currently negotiating a nuclear-weapon free zone. The parties wish to:

- 1) Maintain their security in the post-Soviet era;
- 2) dismantle strategic nuclear weapons possessed by Kazakhstan and complete that country's denuclearization;
- 3) avoid a repeat of the Chernobyl nuclear accident; and
- 4) deal with the effects of radiation from a former nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.

However, the existence of a security treaty between Kazakhstan and Russia that includes nuclear issues is proving to be an obstacle to negotiations. Western and Central Europe should also think seriously about establishing nuclear-weapon free zones.

**Speaker: Nobumasa Akiyama, research associate, Hiroshima Peace Institute and project member**

**Title: "The Complexities of Nuclear Issues in North Korea: Non-proliferation, Containment, and Energy Supply"**

The North Korean nuclear issue comprises three main elements: its geographical spread, which encompasses East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East; its policy ramifications, ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to the security of Asia; and economic and energy issues in North Korea itself and their linkages with other issues, such as missiles and nuclear weapons, economic aid and non-proliferation, disarmament and the strengthening of alliances, and disarmament and missile defense.

Concern over North Korea's nuclear program grew in the early

1990s when Pyongyang refused to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect the Yonbyon nuclear facility and announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the United States and North Korea managed to reach a compromise in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Nonetheless, the framework itself is problematic: Its aim is not disarmament but non-proliferation; it accepts a continuation of the current situation in North Korea; and it does not obligate either party to comply with the agreement.

North Korea regards nuclear weapons and missiles not as military hardware per se but as bargaining chips. The Bush administration has indicated that it wishes to cooperate with the North, but has switched the United States' emphasis from dialogue to deterrence. It supports Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy," and emphasizes close cooperation with Japan and South Korea. Missile defense will, of course, have a considerable bearing on U.S.-North Korean relations.

### ● The 11th meeting (Apr. 27)

**Guest speaker: Junichi Abe, senior research fellow, the Kazankai Foundation**

**Title: "Chinese Nuclear Arsenal: Its Build-up Process and Problems"**

China's nuclear development began around 1955, and grew out of mistrust of the Soviet Union which feared being involved in a war with the United States — a fear born of the Korean War. China initially expected support from the Soviet Union, but was left with no choice

## New-interventionism Project Mission Visits East Timor

By Nobumasa Akiyama

A research mission formed by the project on the legitimacy and rationality of new-interventionism visited East Timor from Feb. 14 to 21. Its aims were to observe the work of the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the areas of peace-keeping, peace-building, and reconciliation in post-conflict East Timor, and to gauge the contributions made toward peace and stability in the area by the international community. The mission also surveyed problems that might arise as a result of the involvement of international actors. Below is a brief report on the mission's activities, commentary on attempts to rebuild East Timor's society, and some remarks on the "Timorization" of the country's social system. Particular attention will be paid to the role of NGOs.

### Reconstruction in Dili

The mission flew into Dili, the capital, from Denpasar. It took ages to clear passport control, which was administered by local officials supervised by UNTAET. Timorization, or the process of handing over all administrative functions to local staff by the international staff of UNTAET was under way. Passport control is one of the new functions of the state to have emerged with the withdrawal of Indonesian forces. Currently, however, East Timor is under the control of UNTAET, whose name was stamped on our passports by immigration officials. We did not need a visa to enter the country.

We stayed at a hotel owned and operated by Australians. There, we met engineers and specialists dispatched by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The hotel was a simple structure: The bedrooms resembled freight containers — only they had a window, a door and air-conditioning. We shared shower and toilet facilities with other guests. The restaurant was in a nearby cottage. The town itself appeared safe, although we came across lots of buildings that had been gutted by the Indonesian military

and the Timorese militia. Some of them were being rebuilt. Chinese and Portuguese restaurants were open for business, and we even saw several Internet cafes opened for UN and international aid workers. I did not notice a marked shortage of goods at marketplaces, and supermarkets were open for business.

However, prices remained very unstable, and much of the emerging economic activity was targeted at the international staff of UNTAET and NGOs. The economic gap between them and local people had created a distorted economic structure. Among the locals, too, a gap had opened up between those working for or serving UNTAET and NGOs, on the one hand, and those who were not, on the other. Some earned money by renting their property to UNTAET staff at outrageously high rates. The situation outside Dili was far worse. In Ainaro and Cova Lima, which we visited, power lines were down and electricity was in very short supply, while markets were short of goods.

### Importance of NGOs

The mission conducted interviews with UNTAET and NGO staff and aid workers. We were greatly impressed with the commitment shown by NGOs to building peace in post-conflict East Timor. One UNTAET member called East Timor a "showcase" for NGO aid activities. That comment was no doubt inspired by the sheer scale and variety of their activities. Such groups were engaged not only in the distribution of aid but also in civic education, the building of social infrastructure, and the prevention of further conflict through reconciliation. Their presence was integral to UNTAET's reconstruction and reconciliation efforts, since they could collect useful and detailed information on the ground that could later be used by UNTAET.

One NGO, for instance, took advantage of its role in handing out aid to find out about conflicts over the distribution of aid and

but to continue its nuclear development program alone. It conducted its first successful nuclear test, on a steel tower, in 1964, followed by an airborne test a year later and a hydrogen bomb test in 1966.

China abides by what it calls a “minimum deterrence strategy,” which promises nuclear retaliation against urban centers in the hostile nation. It has also pledged “no-first-use” — neither use nor threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states — but Taiwan appears to have been excluded from that pledge. China seems likely to shift its nuclear strategy to one of “limited deterrence,” enabling it to address threats from several types of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic.

China’s nuclear arsenal consists of about 400 weapons, two-thirds of which are missile warheads, usually unloaded. Most of its missiles are of the old type that use liquid fuel and do not have a first-strike capability. Its tactical missiles are stationary and unlikely to survive an attack and be used in retaliation. China is in a transitional phase, developing a new generation of missiles that ignore disarmament and control regimes. Its priority is modernizing its nuclear force, borne of a belief that it cannot call itself truly developed unless it has nuclear weapons and missiles.

**Guest speaker: Kori Urayama, research assistant, the Tokyo Foundation  
Title: “U.S.-Japan Perception Gap over Missile Defense Cooperation”**

Since North Korea test-launched a Taepodong missile in 1998, the Japanese government has shown a positive attitude toward U.S.-Japan joint technology research on theater missile defense (TMD). In

1999, the two countries issued a memorandum of understanding that included an agreement to begin studying the feasibility of an upper-tier Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system, a component of TMD. However, doubts about the feasibility of missile defense have dogged the project from the outset.

Supporters of TMD say that it would reinforce the U.S. nuclear umbrella and strengthen defense cooperation between Washington and Tokyo. They argue that TMD would enhance regional stability by preventing China from becoming the dominant regional power and neutralize nuclear capabilities, thereby acting as a form of arms control.

Critics say, however, that TMD would increase Japan’s dependence on the United States, and that other American allies, too, would be relegated to a more passive role. Bilateral talks would be nominal, they say, adding that a serious gap exists between the “global” missile defense system advocated by President Bush and existing the level of missile defense technology.

Finally, there is a perception gap over missile defense between Japan and the United States. Washington appears to believe that there is widespread public support for missile defense in Japan, since no strong opposition has been voiced. In truth, however, Japan has yet to clear a proper debate on the pros and cons of missile defense and, as a result, its position is unclear. It is time Japan had that debate and adopted an equivocal stance on missile defense.

*By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI*

#### *New-interventionism Project Mission Visits East Timor*

attendant tensions within individual communities. The organization did not attempt to prevent trouble from happening, but rather assessed, through observation, the real cause or causes of the problem, thereby enabling the communities concerned to resolve their differences at a more fundamental level and restore long-term mutual trust. That, it seemed, was the real path toward reconciliation. For this and many other reasons, NGOs were playing a vital role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of East Timorese society.

Yet the NGOs have reached a turning point. They may now have to redirect the focus of their work as the situation in East Timor shifts from its emergency phase — in which the provision of food and shelter has been the top priority — to one of development, which emphasizes the importance of infrastructure and economic activity. Concerns exist, too, about the extent to which East Timor depends on foreign aid. While foreign agencies have achieved much to be proud of, their presence has given rise to fatigue and frustration on the part of local people and foreigners alike. Graffiti on a wall in Dili read: “UN Go To Hell.” We also heard an argument over the wisdom of levying a tax on showy NGO activities. Many NGO members appeared aware of these resentments and their potential for trouble, and were mindful of the need to readjust their activities toward promoting sustainable self-reliance among the Timorese.

Another matter of concern is the level of cooperation between UNTAET and NGOs, and among NGOs themselves. Public health and sanitation policy offers a good example. Many NGOs operate in this field in different regions and work according to their own criteria and methods. Organizations involved in policy planning and project operations differ from one region to another, and their activities are not very well coordinated. No single policy framework or standard for NGO operations exists in East Timor. For instance, in public health policy, NGOs also tend to concentrate policy resources to provide full services in one or a few specifically targeted areas, while UNTAET wishes to implement comprehensive, nationwide programs even though they do not satisfy the sufficient level of services. Although UNTAET and NGOs share a common

goal — that of building a viable East Timorese state — their methods are different. There is an important lesson here: The need for more serious consideration of how international agencies can carry out effective assistance activities in a coordinated way.

#### **Final Remarks**

The economy of East Timor is in fact in worse shape than it was under Indonesian rule, and it is natural to suppose that some in the country prefer things the way they were. But the most serious obstacle to real progress is the country’s shortage of human resources. East Timor has fewer than 20 medical doctors and only two qualified lawyers. More high school teachers and public sector managers are also urgently needed, since Indonesians dominated these areas before independence. As a result, East Timor lacks the social infrastructure to make independence work. Some observers argue that the country’s independence came far too early to be of any real benefit. However, the international community was asked to provide help to East Timorese in their quest for independence and freedom, despite the many difficulties they faced. International society knew that would be no easy task, but it could not ignore the desire of local people for independence and their fervent wish to be free from violence and to secure social and political rights. Being in East Timor itself and talking to people on the ground made us feel that any discussion of the appropriateness and timing of independence was irrelevant. We also believe that we ought to be aware of the realities of the situation in East Timor while conducting research on theoretical aspects of peace-building and international assistance.

*The mission was led by Toshiya Hoshino of Osaka University. He was accompanied by Jun Tsubouchi of Yamanashi University, and Nobumasa Akiyama of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, who acted as coordinator.*

*Akiyama is a research associate at HPI.*

# Building Peace and Stability in the Balkans

— The European Center's Research-Educational Project —

By Todor Mirkovic

The Balkans, the least developed region of Europe and one of the most unstable areas in the world, is faced with numerous, mostly unpredictable, threats and challenges. Recent events in the Balkans — the demise of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, the international sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia, and NATO's military actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and against Yugoslavia in 1999 — had widespread economic, social, ecological and other consequences.

The European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD) at the University for Peace (San Jose, Costa Rica) has included in its mid-term plan and program of work a very complex and multidisciplinary project titled "THE BALKANS IN THE 21st CENTURY — Possibilities of Building Ways and Conditions for Peace and Stability in the Balkans." The ECPD intends to use its 15 years of experience and all of the intellectual and other skills at its disposal to help lead the Balkans out of their current situation toward one in which new conflicts are prevented and peace, development and cooperation promoted. Building a culture of peace, tolerance, coexistence and better understanding among ethnic and religious groups and nations is

among the ECPD's prime objectives. The project will be implemented through a variety of activities, including: 1) the development and implementation of a program for peace education in the Balkans; 2) carrying-out research projects and/or case studies on crucial issues in the region; and 3) organizing international conferences and consultative and other meetings aimed at realizing the project's aims.

The ECPD is giving priority to the elaboration and implementation of the program of education for peace and research on problems of the environment and sustainable development, including irradiation generated by industrial, medical, research and military activities. The ECPD has launched this significant project to benefit Europe in general and the Balkans in particular, and expects to win the support of domestic and international organizations that are interested in bringing peace and stability to this part of the world.

*Dr. Todor Mirkovic is Special Adviser for Peace Studies and Project Manager at the European Center for Peace and Development, the University for Peace, which was established by the United Nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.*

## Research Project on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism

### Intervention's Negative Legacy; the Involvement of NGOs

The seventh meeting of *Research Project on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism* was held on Feb. 27 in Hiroshima. The eighth meeting was held on April 12 in Tokyo. The theme of the former was the legitimacy of intervention under international law. Akiho Shibata, associate professor of international law at Okayama University and a project member, made a presentation titled "Intervention as International Law Enforcement? — Doctrinal Development in Japan." Maiko Ozawa, a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, made a speech titled "Humanitarian Intervention in the Modern World: International Conflict or Internal Conflict?"

Shibata analyzed why acceptance of "intervention" had not taken root in the Japanese academic community of international law specialists. He focused on how many Japanese academics have come to question intervention as a means of law enforcement or forcible conflict settlement and why they regard their negative view as representative of the mainstream interpretation of international law. He discussed the history of the theoretical study of international law and the way social changes in postwar Japan have nurtured an aversion to the use of military force. The existing system, some argue, is defective in the way it confirms violations of international law as well as in the selection of executors and execution of the law. Nevertheless, they do not rule out the possibility of intervention to uphold international law in situations where peaceful settlement of conflicts is unsuccessful.

Ozawa made a presentation on the judicial precedent set by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1986 over the American intervention in Nicaragua. She discussed Nicaragua's contention that the United States violated international law by using military force, and the counterargument made by the United States that it was simply exercising its right to collective self-defense. She touched on related issues, such as the principles of noninterference in the domestic affairs of another country and of the protection of human rights. She offered an interpretation of international conflict settlement and collective self-defense as described in the UN Charter. Post-Cold War changes

in the concept of humanitarian interference, as demonstrated in Kosovo, were also discussed.

At the project's eighth meeting, Yukie Osa, secretary general of the Association for Aid and Relief and a project member, gave a presentation titled "By-product of Humanitarian Intervention: Cluster Munitions Deployed in Kosovo." Hiroaki Ishii from the Tokyo office of Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) made a presentation titled "Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of Peace Winds Japan — Kosovo's Case." He also talked about *Japan Platform*, a new initiative to coordinate the efforts of Japanese NGOs, businesses and government bodies in the area of emergency assistance.

Osa argued that unexploded cluster bombs were a negative legacy of humanitarian intervention. Cluster bombs comprise quantities of smaller explosives, which break up while airborne and scatter across targets on the ground. Some of them fail to explode, creating a risk to civilians similar to that posed by land mines. They can be found both in rural and urban areas, impacting the lives of large numbers of people. Critics say dropping non-guided cluster bombs from a high altitude is simply shifting the risk away from the pilot to the civilians below. Osa questioned the legitimacy of such a method of military intervention for humanitarian purposes that itself poses a threat to life by leaving such negative legacies as cluster bombs. Further consideration should be given not simply to the legitimacy of intervention but also to who will handle the negative legacies of intervention, she said.

Ishii talked about PWJ's activities in Kosovo, and offered useful suggestions regarding the feasibility, limits and methods of NGO involvement in post-conflict emergency humanitarian aid. He outlined an ideal framework for Japanese NGOs and discussed how their activities should proceed alongside military action. He made a solid case for greater involvement of NGOs in government activities and supported his argument with references to PWJ's experience in Kosovo.

*By Nobumasa Akiyama, research associate at HPI*

# Chemical Weapons and Japan

A research forum on Japan's role in disposing of chemical weapons was held at the Hiroshima Peace Institute on May 7, 2001. The forum, organized by the HPI, included discussions on weapons containing chemical gas abandoned in China by the former Japanese Army. The keynote speaker was Shuji Shimokoji, deputy director of the Center for the Promotion of the Disarmament and Non-proliferation at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The forum was attended by more than 20 researchers, experts and journalists with an interest in poisonous gas weapons produced in Okunojima island in Hiroshima Prefecture before and during World War II. Shimokoji talked about the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons by the Japanese government, and future challenges. Following are the main points of the discussion:

Broadly speaking, chemical weapons are those designed to cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm, according to the CWC. The treaty bans two kinds of chemical agents: harassing agents and casualty agents. The production of chemical weapons began in the second half of the 19th century. Mustard gas (Yperit), so named because of its smell, was developed in 1917 during World War I, and marked the beginning of the full-scale use of poisonous gas in battle. About 100,000 people died from and an estimated million people experienced long-term side effects of the mustard gas used in World War I.

Controls on the use of chemical weapons appeared at about the same time. Their use was banned at the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. However, loopholes remained, as many signatories reserved the right to use them in retaliation and against non-signatories. In the 1930s, Italy used chemical weapons in Ethiopia, and Japan was rumored to have done so during the Sino-Japanese war. After World War II, harassing agents were used during

the civil war in Yemen and the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Casualty agents were used in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. An outright ban on chemical weapons was negotiated for the first time at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in 1968. The CWC, which prohibits the use, development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, was concluded in 1993.

Japan ratified the convention in 1995, with its obligations under the treaty going into effect two years later. Since it obligates its signatories to dispose of chemical weapons abandoned on foreign soil, the Japanese government is responsible for disposing of the massive quantities of weapons abandoned in China by the former Japanese Army. In 1990, the Chinese government notified Japan of the whereabouts and amounts of the abandoned chemical weapons. Since 1991, Japan has conducted 16 on-site surveys, but has faced several problems.

First, the number of the abandoned weapons is enormous. China estimates there are two million shells, while Japan puts the number at 700,000. Safely disposing of them will not be easy. Second, the majority of them are buried and need to be dug up. Third, the weapons are very old. Deformed, cracked and/or rusting shells are extremely difficult to dispose of. Fourth, special disposal technology will be needed as many of the shells contain arsenic.

The 20-member Office for Abandoned Chemical Weapons, part of the Prime Minister's Office, is responsible for the disposal of these weapons. Such operations, however, must be carried out with the cooperation of citizens. The amount of time, cost and technical difficulties involved mean that the disposal of the chemical weapons in China will be no easy task.

*By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI*

## INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

### Where Does "Unequivocal Undertaking" Stand?

#### — The Current Situations and Japan's Responsibilities in Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

More than a year has passed since the five nuclear-weapon states pledged an "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" at the 2000 NPT review conference. How is that undertaking reflected in the current situation? What can Japan do as a non-nuclear weapon state? Six panelists, including overseas experts from the United States and Russia, a diplomat from one of the New Agenda Coalition countries — which are calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons — and the head of an international NGO will suggest ways in which to realize this important undertaking. Members of the audience will be encouraged to participate in the debate.

#### Panelists:

Dr. Lawrence Scheinman

Distinguished Professor of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies office in Washington, D.C., Monterey Institute of International Studies

Amb. Roland M. Timerbaev

Chairman of the board and senior advisor at the Center for Policy Studies, Russia  
Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP),  
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Mr. Tariq Rauf

Amb. Darach MacFhionnbhairr

Director of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs,  
Government of Ireland

Ms. Rebecca Johnson

Executive director of the Acronym Institute, UK

Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa

Professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

Date and time: July 28, 2001 1:30 p.m. ~ 4:30 p.m.

Venue: The Himawari room, second basement floor (B2), International Conference Center, Hiroshima

Organizer: Hiroshima Peace Institute

# DIARY

March 1, 2001 - June 30, 2001

## March 4 - 10

Nobumasa Akiyama visits the United States to attend a preparatory meeting of an international seminar organized by the Association for Communication of Transcultural Study.

## March 9 - 11

Masamichi Kamiya participates in the 13th United Nations Regional Conference on Disarmament in Katmandu, Nepal, organized by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs.

## March 13 - 14

Kamiya attends an international symposium titled "Culture of Prevention — Multi-Actor Coordination from the UN to Civil Society," organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

## March 15

Akiyama attends a workshop on disarmament and security organized by the Center for Global Communications at the International University of Japan.

## March 16

Akiyama attends an international symposium, "Challenges Facing Japan in the Twenty-First Century," organized by the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) in Tokyo.

## March 19

Kazumi Mizumoto attends an international workshop on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation organized by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

## March 19 - 29

Kamiya acts as an advisor at the third preparatory committee for the UN conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, held at the United Nations in New York.

## March 23

Akiyama participates in a workshop on the Caspian Basin, organized by the Research Institute for Peace and Security.

## March 26

Akiyama participates in a meeting on the Caspian Basin, organized by the Research Institute for Peace and Security.

## March 30

HPI's project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its 10th meeting.

## April 2-6

Mizumoto visits the Truman Library in Kansas City, Miss., to study reasons for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima for a Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum project.

## April 4

Akiyama participates in a workshop on preventive diplomacy organized by Prof. Yukio Kawamura of Waseda University at Waseda University.

## April 11

HPI President Haruhiro Fukui meets representatives of seven A-bomb survivors' organizations. Fukui also visits with Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa of the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, and Mr. Toshiya Hoshino, an associate professor at the school.

## April 12

Fukui meets Mr. Tomoya Kawamura, director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs; Dr. Akio Watanabe, director of the Research Institute for Peace and Security; and Dr. Yasushi Akashi, chairman of the Japan Center for Preventive Diplomacy.

HPI's project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism holds its 8th meeting.

## April 13

Fukui meets Amb. Hisashi Owada, president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs; Amb. Yuji Miyamoto, director-general for arms control and scientific affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Dr. Toshiki Mogami, professor of International Christian University; and Dr. Sadako Ogata, former UN high commissioner for refugees.

Mizumoto and Akiyama attend the 39th Afternoon Seminar of the Tokyo Foundation. The seminar featured a lecture on the situation on the Korean Peninsula from the viewpoint of China by Mr. Jiang Longfan, vice president of the Northeast Asia Research Institute, Yanbian University.

## April 25

Mizumoto attends the 40th Afternoon Seminar of the Tokyo Foundation. The

seminar featured a lecture on the current situation in Okinawa and proposals by Mr. Ryunosuke Megumi, a journalist.

Mizumoto attends the 31st Forum on New Thinking on Security Issues, organized by the Tokyo Foundation. The forum featured a lecture, "Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law and the Japan-U.S. Alliance," by Cmdr. Mark Taylor Staples.

## April 26

Fukui meets Prof. Makoto Katsumata, president of the International Peace Research Institute, Meiji Gakuin University; and Prof. Tomohisa Sakanaka, former director of the Research Institute for Peace and Security.

Mizumoto attends the 41st Afternoon Seminar of the Tokyo Foundation. The forum featured a lecture on public-private partnership in the United States by Prof. Shinichi Ueyama of Georgetown University's graduate school.

## April 27

Fukui meets Dr. Lee Jong Won, professor of international politics at Rikkyo University; and Dr. Takeshi Ishida, professor emeritus of political science at Tokyo University.

HPI's project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its 11th meeting.

## May 11

Mizumoto and Akiyama attend the 42nd Afternoon Seminar of the Tokyo Foundation. The seminar featured a lecture, "The Bush Administration and Asian Policy of the United States," by Dr. Mike Mochizuki, associate professor at George Washington University.

## May 18 - 20

Mizumoto (May 18 only) and Ikuko Togo attend the annual convention of the Japan Association for International Relations at Kazusa Akademia Park in Chiba.

## May 24 - June 2

Akiyama attends an international conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, on the country's economic development, sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. He later makes a speech at Tafaccur University.

## May 25

HPI's project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its 12th meeting.

## May 30

Fukui attends a meeting on the preservation and use of the building that was once the Hiroshima branch of the Bank of Japan.

## June 2 - 3

Mizumoto attends the semiannual conference of the Peace Studies Association of Japan at Seikei University.

## June 8

Togo attends the preliminary meeting of the human security team, which is part of the international visitor program organized by the U.S. Department of State, at the Tokyo American Center.

## June 14

Akiyama delivers a lecture on the politics and administration of Japan at a general orientation meeting for participants in a training program operated by the Japan International Cooperation Agency.

## June 16

Mizumoto gives a lecture on the current situation and problems of peace research, held at and organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Nursing Association.

## June 22

HPI's project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism holds its 9th meeting.

## — Visitors to HPI —

### March 21

Takayuki Miyashita, press secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

### May 2

Prof. Takao Takahara of the department of international studies, Meiji Gakuin University

Students from the University of California

### May 29

Dr. Johannes Preisinger, consul general of Germany

### June 14

The Education and Research Corps for East Asian Studies, Korea University

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TEL +81-82-544-7570 FAX +81-82-544-7573

Hiroshima Mitsui Bldg. 12<sup>th</sup> Floor 2-7-10 Otemachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051 JAPAN E-mail: office-peace@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp

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