

Goodbye, HPI! Goodbye, Hiroshima! By Haruhiro Fukui

Time flies like an arrow, as the saying goes, and ever faster as one gets older. It is hard to believe that, as I write this, almost exactly four years have flown by since, in mid-December of 2000, I was officially introduced to the local press corps at Hiroshima City Hall as HPI's director-to-be. As reported next day by the *Mainichi Newspapers* (14 December 2000), it was already a little over a year at that time since I had been first contacted about the job in late November 1999 by a representative of Hiroshima City University. If that period of indecision and procrastination is added, not four but five years have flown by since my mental, as opposed to physical, association with HPI began. And yet, it feels as though all this happened only yesterday.

As I begin to prepare for my departure in a few months, I look back on my life and work in Hiroshima with mixed feelings. On one hand, I get considerable satisfaction from the growth and development of the Institute I helped nurture in its infancy. It had three scholars on its research staff when I arrived; it has seven as of this writing and will likely have several more by the end of this year as a result of the ongoing staff search. The increment may not be very impressive quantitatively, but it is qualitatively far more impressive; despite their modest number, the scholars are all highly talented, knowledgeable, and active, not only in strictly academic work within the ivory tower but also in research-based or -relevant outreach and community service activities. HPI's annual international symposia, bimonthly forums, public lecture series, and peace studies courses taught by HPI's scholars at the City University draw substantial and responsive, though uneven and fluctuating, audiences. I am no less impressed with the quality of clerical, secretarial, and logistic support for the scholars' activities that is provided by the highly motivated and hardworking office staff.

I should also mention that, to my great and pleasant surprise, my former colleagues, students, and office staff in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, whom I had, in a way, deserted 10 years ago, when I took early retirement on the spur of the moment and in the face of their unanimous opposition and protest, honored me with a big write-up in the spring 2002 issue of the departmental newsletter, *Political Science at UCSB*. Inset with the photographs of me and the Pyramid of Peace sculpture that stands in the lawn in front of the building housing the department, the article described HPI and its work and ended with a friendly pep talk: "His colleagues and friends wish him the greatest success." I have been thus morally supported and spurred on in my job at HPI not only by local colleagues and friends but also by those back in California who share HPI's and Hiroshima citizens' longing for and commitment to peace.

On the other hand, I am sad to leave my job at HPI only partially done. As widely reported in the local press at the time, I came to

Hiroshima with a wish or dream to build a "world-class" peace research institute that would produce and disseminate to the whole world original work of the highest possible scholarly quality on critical issues of war and peace. With its current seven-member research staff, however, the job to build such a major, if not the major, international center of peace research has only begun. To be sure, another year or two of my directorship would not finish the job, and yet I feel sorry and guilty about leaving at this stage of the ambitious institution-building project that I started. It pains me particularly to remember the passionate call for my commitment to attend to my new duties "until the day your [my] bones are buried in Hiroshima," a call heard during my first official appearance before leaders of the major local atomic bomb survivors organizations in early April 2001. To Secretary-General Akito Suemune of the Hiroshima Prefectural Federation of Atomic Bomb Survivors Organizations, who said so in so many words at the meeting, and to all those who felt the same way, I can only offer my sincere apologies and gratitude for their kind thoughts. I am quite confident, however, that HPI with its current staff and resources, limited as they are, is fully capable of not only surviving as it is but, more importantly, developing into a truly world-class peace research institute under my successor's direction.

I leave Hiroshima with some mixed feelings about the city itself, too. As I said upon my arrival as the HPI director-to-be four years ago, the city struck me then, and continues to strike me now, as a town of exceptional scenic beauty with layers of green hills surrounding and several large rivers flowing right through it. As I also said at the time, however, it did not otherwise look appreciably different from any other medium-sized Japanese city. In other words, there is very little to remind us that it is in fact a city very different from any other—a unique "International Peace Culture City," as it has been officially named—except in the confined downtown area centering on Peace Memorial Park and extending to the Atomic Bomb Dome to the north and to a section of Peace Boulevard behind the Peace Memorial Museum in the south. As I suggested a while ago in an op-ed piece published in the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation's newsletter, most first-time visitors to the city are likely to be "surprised by the great gap between the Hiroshima as they had imagined it and the Hiroshima as they see it now" (*Peace Culture*, December 2003).

Many such visitors probably wish, as I do, that Hiroshima looked more like the city as they had imagined it, a city visibly and unmistakably dedicated to peace and the culture of peace. If I could have my dream come true, I would cover the entire city, rather than just the Peace Park and its immediate vicinity, with graphic, sculptural, musical, and other symbols of peace. For example, the dove is a universal symbol of peace, and so is the folded paper crane, which is widely associated with the well-known young victim of the atomic bomb, the late Sadako Sasaki. I would have graphic or sculptural images of the dove or the paper crane displayed at as many public places as possible throughout the city, including the airports, major railroad stations, bus terminals, ferry docks, public schools, the baseball stadium, etc., and, perhaps, even department stores and high-rise office buildings. Replicas or photographs of Sadako's statue on display at such places would send even more powerful messages of peace and opposition to nuclear weapons to all who see them. I would also have a variety of music of peace, both classic and contemporary, routinely played wherever background music is played in public places.

A dream is a dream, but I would rather leave the city, which has become as much my spiritual home as its research institute, with pleasant dreams rather than with the grief of parting.

Fukui is president at HPI

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On the 60th Anniversary of the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

2005.1.2

By Yuki Tanaka

Mr. Sunao Tsuboi would appear to be an ordinary healthy elderly Japanese man except for the large patch of white skin that medical specialists call "leucoderma," on his forehead. He is a cheerful 79-year-old, but over the past 60 years he has been critically ill four times, each time being told that he would not survive. He first fell ill immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima when he was unconscious for 40 days. He is presently suffering from prostate cancer. Despite his illness he has been and still is an active campaigner against nuclear arms and one of the best-known *hibakusha*, or victims of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In December 2003 he went to Washington D.C., to protest against the permanent display of the "Enola Gay" in the new wing of the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum. He was not against the actual display of the B-29 bomber that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, killing 140,000 people by the end of 1945. Rather he was against the exhibition of this plane without any explanation of the consequences caused as a result of the attack that took so many civilian lives and left tens of thousands of others to suffer throughout their lives.

Mr. Tsuboi does not expect to be alive when Hiroshima City commemorates the 70th anniversary of the atomic attack in 2015. Indeed, it is almost certain that not only Mr. Tsuboi, but also most *hibakusha* will have passed away by then, as approximately 5,000 *hibakusha* have died every year over the past 10 years. Due to the rapidly diminishing number of *hibakusha* the "weathering of the Hiroshima experience" as it is called in Japan has become a serious concern for many citizens of this city in recent years. The number of children from various parts of Japan who visit the Atomic Bomb Museum in Peace Park on school excursions has also decreased sharply in recent years so that "oblivion to the Hiroshima memory" is becoming a nationwide phenomenon.

In one corner of the Hiroshima Peace Park stands the statue of a young girl, Sadako, stretching her arms towards the sky. Sadako's story is well-known throughout the world, as books in many languages have been published about this girl who died of leukemia at the age of 12 in 1955, 10 years after the bombing of Hiroshima. While ill in hospital Sadako attempted to make 1,000 folded paper cranes, working on these until shortly before her death, in the belief that she would survive if she could achieve her goal. As a result of her efforts, the paper crane became a symbol of peace in Japan. Since her death visiting school groups from all over Japan have placed thousands of strings of paper cranes around her statue in memory of her lost youth and the Hiroshima tragedy. Sadly, over the past few years, these paper cranes have been set on fire a number of times, probably by young people "just for fun." To prevent such juvenile crime the city council built a small glass enclosure behind the statue in which to protect the paper cranes. Security cameras were also installed. Yet again, a few days before August 6, Hiroshima Day, in 2003, a university student from Kobe broke the glass and set fire to the cranes. When arrested later he confessed that he did it out of frustration over the grim employment situation facing new university graduates. The incidents suggest that Sadako's sorrowful tale, and the plight of the living as well as dead atomic victims, has become irrelevant to many young people in Japan.

Today, Japan's experience as the only nation to encounter a nuclear holocaust also appears irrelevant to Japan's leading politicians including Prime Minister Koizumi. Until Mr. Koizumi became prime minister four years ago, it was an annual tradition for the prime minister to meet representatives of the *hibakusha* for about half an hour or so immediately after attending the commemoration ceremony in Peace Park on August 6.

It was, of course, merely a token gesture for previous successive prime ministers to make a show of government concern for the health of *hibakusha*. Yet even this important publicity gesture was cancelled when Mr. Koizumi became prime minister, although he still reluctantly attends the ceremony. Some of his colleagues in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including former Party Secretary-General Mr. Shinzo Abe, think that Japan should develop nuclear arms for defense purposes against so-called "rogue nations" such as North Korea. Until a decade or so ago, there were still a few prominent conservative politicians who tenaciously objected to the nuclearization of Japan and to the dispatch of Japan's Self-Defense Forces to overseas war zones. Today, such statesmen no longer exist within the LDP. Article 9 of Japan's post-war Constitution forbidding engagement in any form of armed conflict has so far been widely supported by the Japanese people, partly because of a strong desire not to repeat the nuclear holocaust. Recently, however, powerful voices both within the LDP as well as opposition parties have called for elimination of the pacifist clause of the Constitution.

For many months now some major Japanese anti-nuclear organizations and other grass-roots peace movement groups have been planning their own events scheduled for August 2005 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet these planned events seem to offer few new ideas of how to tackle the problem of "oblivion to the Hiroshima memory" that pervades both the younger generation as well as the politicians. It is almost certain that events to commemorate the 60th anniversary will be the last chance for surviving *hibakusha* to appeal to the world to oppose the idea of genocide by weapons of mass destruction. I am sure that, in August 2005, they will receive much media attention from all over the world. However, the real question that the Japanese people should ask themselves is what they will do after the 60th anniversary in order to keep alive the Hiroshima memory and to utilize it to construct a peaceful world without the living voices of the *hibakusha*.

A Hiroshima A-bomb victim, Ms. Sadako Kurihara, once wrote the following passage in one of her poems:

It was night in the basement of a broken building
Victims of the atomic bomb
Crowded into the candleless darkness
Filling the room to overflowing
The smell of fresh blood, the stench of death
The stuffiness of human sweat, the writhing moans
When, out of the darkness, came a wondrous voice
"Oh! The baby's coming!" it said
.....
And so, a new life was born
In the darkness of that living hell
.....
We shall give forth new life!
We shall bring forth new life!
Even to our death

What is urgently required for Japan's peace movement now is a powerful cry for new life to its own ideas of peace with new perspectives in order to confront the present world of military violence and terrorism.

(This text was broadcast on BBC Radio 4 on January 2, 2005)

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THE NPT REGIME AND THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

By Mitsuo Okamoto

According to a news report by Kyodo News Service dated December 31, 2004, the U.S. will announce at the seventh Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May of this year its decision to abandon its "unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons." This undertaking had been agreed to by the five nuclear powers, i.e., the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France and China, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. If the U.S. actually reneges on this commitment, it will accelerate nuclear development in North Korea and Iran, which could lead to the collapse of the NPT regime.

The NPT was created to prevent by law any increase in nuclear-weapon states in exchange for "general and complete disarmament" by the five nuclear-weapon states. The abandonment of the "unequivocal commitment" by the U.S. means that it intends to prevent nuclear proliferation not by law but by the force of arms. The NPT is a one-sided treaty once derided by a former West German Chancellor as a "temperance movement by alcoholic patients." However, to our sorrow, it is still the only treaty that can legally bind the U.S. and the other nuclear powers.

Essential Features and Problems of the NPT

The nuclear weapons myth is deeply rooted, and the development of nuclear weapons is relatively easy. Therefore, the number of nuclear-weapon states would rise rapidly without regulation. China proved this in 1964. It succeeded in conducting a nuclear experiment on its own, even after the former Soviet Union stopped offering technological assistance. The five declared nuclear-weapon states then hurriedly concluded a treaty to ban development of nuclear weapons, which is how the NPT was created. It was concluded in 1968 and came into effect in March 1970.

The essential features of the NPT are as follows:

- 1) A ban on the transfer of information regarding the manufacture of nuclear weapons (Articles I and II).
- 2) The right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligation to cooperate with inspections on the part of non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty (Articles III and IV).
- 3) The obligation to pursue negotiations "in good faith" toward "general and complete" disarmament on the part of nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty (Article VI).
- 4) Acceptance of the concept of nuclear-weapon free zones (Article VII).
- 5) A nuclear-weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to 1 January 1967 (This, in effect, is the approval of possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon states; the U.S., the Soviet Union, the U.K., France, and China). (Article IX).
- 6) The right to withdraw from the NPT with three months advance notice (Article X).

The biggest problem with the NPT lies in its inequality, but another serious problem is the right to "use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." Unfortunately, the techniques for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and those for its military use are strikingly similar. In fact, both India and Pakistan conducted their initial nuclear experiments in experimental nuclear power reactors. Another problem is the lack of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to check the implementation of obligatory disarmament by nuclear-weapon states, even though the IAEA inspection of non-nuclear-weapon states is sometimes so stringent as to be clear infringements of sovereignty.

The "Logic of Power" or International Law?

Problems with the NPT are discussed at NPT Review Conferences, which are held every five years. The 1995 NPT Review Conference approved an "indefinite extension" of the NPT on the condition that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear experiments, be concluded. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear abolition stipulated in Article VI was confirmed and the terminology changed from "ultimate objective" to "unequivocal undertaking." Thirteen concrete steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the early entry into force of the CTBT, were agreed upon. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC), composed of seven countries,

namely Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden, successfully persuaded the nuclear-weapon states to agree to this admirable commitment.

If the U.S. now scraps this agreement, the NPT itself will no longer be in force. The abrogation of the treaty by the nuclear superpower will lead to anarchy in the international community. At this point, the question is, will we adhere to international law or the "logic of force"? U.S. unilateralism leads us back to anarchy and renders international law meaningless. The rest of the world acting in concert could not defeat the U.S. militarily, but the Vietnam War proved and the Iraq War is proving again that military force has its limits.

The 60th Anniversary of the Atomic Bombings and the Task of NGOs

Robert Guillain, a French journalist, stood in the ruins after the atomic bombing and murmured: "I'm ashamed of the West. I'm ashamed of science. I'm ashamed of mankind." This is the feeling of all decent men and women. Even during a war, the "ultimate terrorism" of an atomic bombing is utterly unforgivable. Asked to select the most significant news story of the 20th century, American journalists answered, "The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." The atomic bombings are an unforgettable, unforgivable incident in human history.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is terrifying, because the actual use of a nuclear weapon becomes increasingly probable with every increase in the number of nuclear-weapon states. It was declared at the NAC conference of foreign ministers in March 2003 that the sole guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination and the assurance that they will never be produced or used again.

Since the publication of the Nuclear Posture Review in January 2002, the U.S. has been advocating a broader role for nuclear weapons and promoting the development of new "small" nuclear weapons. Moreover, the U.S. casually claimed that nuclear weapons play a decisive role in the defense of the U.S. and its allies and friendly nations. During World War II, Japan committed crimes in neighboring countries and the U.S. committed crimes in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, yet neither government admits any sense of guilt.

It will be difficult to motivate the U.S. to change its nuclear policy, but one survey (Lake Sosin Snell & Associates, 1997) revealed that 84% of Americans "would feel safer if they knew for sure that no country, including the U.S., had nuclear weapons," and 87% favor the elimination of all nuclear weapons. This finding is a relief. Citizens in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who stand for abolition of nuclear weapons with such a deep feeling, should link arms with these American citizens and develop a hand-in-hand campaign for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Following the example of the Ottawa Process, which culminated in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, this campaign should include both governments and civil society.

NGOs around the world need to bring an indomitable resolve to the 2005 NPT Review Conference in New York this May. NGOs in Japan have long been preparing for that Conference, holding initial meetings in Hiroshima on March 27, 2004, in Nagasaki on October 24, 2004 and in Tokyo on February 19, 2005. The majority of Japanese people are intent on the abolition of nuclear weapons. Thirty seven prefectures and 2,289 cities, towns, and wards have declared themselves nuclear-weapon-free entities. This means 78% of all autonomous communities and more than 80% of the Japanese people are located within nuclear-weapon-free entities. The NGO "Mayors for Peace," with Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba serving as president, is growing rapidly.

In May, we need to go to the U.N. in large numbers and convey our strong desire to get rid of all nuclear weapons in the world, a feeling shared by the majority of Japanese people, but apparently not by the Japanese government, which continues to follow U.S. nuclear policy. This is the task for any NGO that would like to respond to the wishes of A-bomb survivors and make the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombing a significant milestone for conquering the evil of the nuclear age.

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Anti-war Philosophy Developed behind Bars

—Self Reflection of Japanese War Criminals in a Prison in Muntinlupa— By Hitoshi Nagai

1. The Philippines and War Crimes Trials

On July 22, 1953, Yokohama Port was crowded with happy people welcoming back 108 former Japanese soldiers returning home from the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, the Philippines, where they had been detained as war criminals since the end of World War II. After spending many years behind bars, they had been returned thanks to special pardons and commutation of sentences ordered by President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines. Japan and the Philippines still had no formal diplomatic relations, since the Philippines refused to ratify the San Francisco Peace Treaty, even though the country's representative had signed it.

Thus, it was quite surprising that the Philippine President pardoned Japanese war criminals and permitted return to their home country. In addition to commuting death sentences to life imprisonment, the President issued special pardons and released prisoners, including some who had been serving life terms. Underlying this decision was no doubt President Quirino's expectation that the political effect would benefit him in terms of compensation to be paid by Japan for damage done during its wartime occupation of the Philippines, and by extension, in terms of the Philippine presidential election. Even so, it is amazing that President Quirino, whose wife and children were killed by the Japanese soldiers, pardoned Japanese ex-combatants. In all probability, however, he was also motivated by an earnest desire to establish long-lasting friendly relations between the two countries. Given the anti-Japanese sentiment of the Philippine public, the President demanded that the Japanese government accept the judgments of the Philippine Military Courts on war crimes, which meant that Japan should recognize the war crimes committed by the Japanese soldiers. In addition, the President stated that the released war criminals would be banned from re-entering the Philippines. The Japanese government accepted all these conditions.

In August 1947, when the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo War Crimes Trial) was under way, in which Japanese wartime leaders were tried by the Allies, the Philippine Army, having taken over jurisdiction from the U.S. Army, commenced war crime trials by military commissions established in Manila. There, Filipino judges decided cases concerning some 150 Japanese ex-officers and soldiers, who had been kept in custody long after Japan's surrender. They were charged with murder and various types of ill treatment of Filipinos during the war. The court was overflowing with Filipino observers, who had suffered deeply from Japanese oppression (1942-1945). In this atmosphere, Japanese defendants were in a tight corner. The military commissions sought to place responsibility on individual officers and soldiers for crimes for which the Japanese military as a whole was responsible. The defendants' arguments on grounds of "orders from a superior" were not accepted as relieving the defendants of their responsibilities.

At that time in the Philippines, the entire nation shared a strong anti-Japanese sentiment. The large number of victims of the Japanese forces, including the families of the President and other high government officials, made it extremely difficult for the Philippine authorities to uphold justice and fairness in their decisions in the face of a strong public demand for revenge. In this context, the military commissions, which met during the period August 1947-December 1949, returned guilty verdicts against 90% of the defendants, 79 of whom were sentenced to death.

2. Campaigns for Commutation and Release of War Criminals

Of the 79 defendants sentenced to death, however, only 17 were executed. If we compare the actual execution rate of the condemned criminals in the Philippines with that (approximately 80%) of such criminals in the custody of the U.S., U.K., Australia, and other Allied powers, we may conclude that the Philippine authorities spent more time on reviews and exercised greater caution with respect to the executions.

Fourteen of the 17 executions, including Captain Nakamura's, had particularly great impact on the Japanese public, because these executions took place in January 1951, when the conclusion of the peace treaty was imminent, and most Japanese were just beginning to enjoy peaceful lives. The news of the executions reminded many Japanese that

Japanese war criminals were behind bars in a country far away to Japan's south. At the same time, news of the executions reminded the Japanese public that the Filipino people still felt strong hostility against them. Immediately after the war, Japanese newspapers reported on the war crimes trials in the Philippines, but over time such reports became sporadic. Thus, this news came as a shock to many Japanese people when they were beginning to forget about war criminals in the Philippines.

Surprised and shocked by the news, the Japanese began campaigning for sentence commutation and release of Japanese war criminals. Japanese public opinion and government were concerned primarily about the hardships experienced by imprisoned war criminals and their families. (At that time, the Japanese public tended to sympathize with war criminals, regarding them as "war victims" rather than "perpetrators.") The campaigns were thus by and large one-sided and ethnocentric, lacking concern for the suffering of the Filipino people. Few Japanese engaged in those campaigns paid due attention to the collective violence committed by Japanese military forces and the hardships inflicted on the Filipinos.

In July 1953, both houses of the Japanese National Diet passed a resolution that expressed the nation's gratitude to President Quirino and the Philippine government for pardoning the war criminals. Although the resolution contained expressions of deep gratitude, it did not contain any specific words of apology to the people of the Philippines, who experienced enormous losses and suffering at the hands of the Japanese forces.

3. Self-reflection Behind Bars

Many Japanese war criminals were grateful to their Filipino defense counsels, who, despite harsh criticism heard from other Filipinos, defended the war criminals with exceptional determination to do justice. However, many of those on trial felt that the trials themselves were unfair. Some of the accused even developed the notion that they were serving as scapegoats. The trials were hasty, finding Japanese eyewitnesses to defend the accused was extremely difficult, the judges tended to give priority to testimonies of the Filipino victims, and above all, death sentences followed one after another.

Japanese war criminals imprisoned in Muntinlupa suffered an extremely powerful sense of isolation and alienation from their home country, where postwar reconstruction was progressing day by day. Those on death row felt despair, tormented by fear of death and the strong psychological pressure associated with their impending doom. (The agony of those who survived was intensified greatly following the execution of 14 war criminals in January 1951.) Fortunately, in prison they were treated relatively generously by the Philippines authorities; few suffered violent acts or other forms of private retribution by the prison guards. They also received continual encouragement from the prison chaplain Shunin Kagao, a Buddhist priest dispatched to Muntinlupa by the Japanese government.

Meanwhile, extended imprisonment in a foreign country offered the Japanese war criminals opportunities to take off the "spiritual armor" of the Japanese forces, to reflect upon their deeds and to regain human emotions they had lost during the war. While they were distrustful of the trials and frustrated by their scapegoat role, they were also forced to contemplate the reasons for the strong anti-Japanese sentiment that prevailed across Filipino society. They experienced in person the strong hostility and anger that Filipino men and women felt toward Japanese soldiers when they surrendered. They were accused by the military commissions, and through their daily contacts with a Filipino prison director, prison guards and Filipino convicts in the same wards, they were made keenly aware of their anger toward them.

"As Japan starts down a new road, I truly hope that Japan will fulfill moral responsibilities and atone for what our country has done to its neighbors. That is, atone for all crimes and mistakes the country committed during the war. I truly hope so, because Japan must gain international trust to regain its proper position in international society." This is the statement of a condemned war criminal, who joined a discussion held in the prison in February 1952. This statement reflects

Economic Regionalism in Southeast Asia?

By Narayanan Ganesan

For some time now, Southeast Asia has been attempting to enhance intra-regional trade. While countries in the region collectively grouped in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have tried very hard to make that grouping a reality, there have been a number of nagging problems. The first of the two most ambitious attempts at regional economic cooperation came in 1989 in the form of a collective membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the subsequent attempts to create a free trade area by 2020, with earlier dates for more developed economies. The second attempt restricted to ASEAN's geographic footprint was the launch of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1993 with an initial gestation period of 15 years that was subsequently reduced to 10 and later, 9 years. In other words, AFTA was supposed to have been in place since 2002. The AFTA scheme calls for member countries to reduce tariffs to between 0.5 % and 5 % through a system of Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT).

Both AFTA and APEC have been slow in achieving their goals and may indeed never achieve them. This pessimistic forecast derives from an admixture of old and new factors. The old factors include the common export items in the primary and manufacturing sectors that many ASEAN members export to the same destinations, namely the European Union, Japan, and the United States. This convergence of export products and markets makes ASEAN member countries evolve competitive rather than complementary strategies. Nonetheless, intra-ASEAN trade has significantly grown over the years and now accounts for about 25 % of total regional trade.

Then, there are problems associated with different levels of development and cooperation. In general, the countries that joined ASEAN later in the 1990s, namely Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, are granted a longer time frame within which to fulfill their obligations. In addition, economic nationalism in Indonesia and oligopolistic practices in the Philippines have also impeded regionalism. Finally, pet national projects in individual countries are often declared infant industries requiring protection and exclusion from regional cooperation. Malaysia's automobile industry and Indonesia's aircraft industry are classic cases in point.

These old or previously acknowledged problems have been compounded by a number of new ones like the deterioration of the regional economies after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. One of the clearest lessons learnt in the aftermath of that crisis is that countries invariably become introverted during times of economic difficulties and attend to their domestic economies before they push for trade liberalization and regionalism. After all, the very survival of regimes may be at risk, if the Indonesian situation serves as an example.

Besides, it is only fair to assume that any government whose legitimacy is more directly tied to economic performance than political criteria will have to attend to the domestic situation first. Regionalism involves tradeoffs and benefits to certain individuals and conglomerates that may be unsettling to patrimonial regimes accustomed to having control over the allocation and distribution of resources. Add to these factors widespread skepticism in the developing world over the benefits of free trade and the benign intent of Washington's policies, and the outlook dims.

In fact, in recognition of the seeming impossibility of concluding regional free trade arrangements, many countries have decided to take matters into their own hands and negotiate bilateral free trade arrangements with major trading partners. Singapore, the first country to realize the futility of region-wide free trade areas, has since 2000 gone on to conclude a number of bilateral free trade arrangements. Not to be outdone, Malaysia and Thailand have quickly followed suit. But do multiple bilateral arrangements have the same effect as a full trade area? The answer is quite obvious — absolutely not. In fact, bilateral free trade arrangements are a way of tweaking the deal to satisfy very specific constituencies and issues. "Sensitive" items are simply negotiated away or excluded. Over time, each country gets to do exactly what it wants, making appropriate adjustments for power inequities.

This development of tailor-made economic arrangements clearly goes against the spirit of free trade as originally envisaged — the utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. Yet it is this trend that appears to be taking root in the region. Not only are individual countries involved in negotiating bilateral trade arrangements but entire regions. The most recent example of this larger trend is ASEAN's attempts to collectively negotiate free trade arrangements with China and Japan. Complicating the situation is the push for East Asian economic regionalism. Whereas ex-Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir's push for such a grouping was stoutly resisted by Australia, Japan, and the United States, it appears to be cohering. Beginning with a meeting of finance ministers in 1998 and a currency swap in 2002, an embryonic East Asian economic community does indeed appear to be forming. After all, the ASEAN meeting in Vientiane has agreed to a meeting of the East Asian Community (EAC) in Malaysia in 2005, just the way Mahathir envisioned it. And guess what? The caucus does plan to exclude the Caucasians (read Australia and New Zealand).

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his awareness of the perpetrator role played by his country.

As a result of life-and-death struggles on the battlefield and rigorous self-reflection during subsequent imprisonment, many war criminals developed strong revulsion against war. One of them on death row said, "Of the many forms of misery and human suffering caused by war, I feel saddest about the loss of humanity we experienced." Deploring the fact that a series of battles numbed the normal human feelings of combatants, he continued, "In battle, human beings became less than human. We became beasts. War turned us into beasts." Another on death row wrote in his diary, "I believe that few people in the world abhor and reject war with greater fervor than we war criminals." With Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (which stipulates renunciation of war) in mind, he

also wrote, "The Japanese people should make an all-out effort to ensure absolute peace and renunciation of war, as stipulated in the new constitution. That is the only prescription that points us in the correct direction for the progress of human kind." Still another condemned to death wrote in his diary, "I am painfully aware that human beings must never again initiate war." (The last two prisoners were executed in January 1951, leaving these words behind.) Tormented by the shadow of death, they span their last words to express their remorse and pain, words that sound to me like an echo of the Japanese people's honest feelings in the days immediately after the end of the war.

Nagai is research associate at HPI

The first workshop for the HPI project *Contention and Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Analysis of Domestic-Regional Linkages* was held on November 12-13, 2004 in the HPI conference room.

The project's objective is to examine the problems that interfere with regional security cooperation and to explore solutions to those problems. Many studies have looked at how to build a multilateral institution to deal with security issues in Northeast Asia, but previous studies were not based on extensive analyses of linkage problems between the domestic politics of individual countries and the region as a whole.

The HPI project presumes that identifying the problems deriving from differing regime types and perceptions of security issues should precede the construction of a multilateral institutional mechanism. In searching for the ways and means of regional cooperation, the complex linkages between domestic politics and international issues must be explored. For instance, the Taiwan Strait tension and the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be understood without examining the linkages to the domestic politics of nationalism in China and the Bush's presidency in the U.S.

To discuss the linkages between domestic and regional politics, Japanese and international experts were invited to the first workshop. The workshop comprised four sessions: 1) conceptions of domestic-regional linkages in Northeast Asia; 2) cases of domestic-regional linkages; 3) comparative and transnational effects; and 4) conclusion.

Participants and paper presentations were as follows.

The first session dealt with the conceptual development of regionalism and domestic-regional linkages. Haruki Wada addressed discourses on regionalism, including his own, and pointed out the central importance of peace on the Korean Peninsula to regional community building. Sung Chull Kim explored layers of linkages for the analyses of regional contention and cooperation. He noted that domestic and transnational organizations are significant actors in the furtherance of regional cooperation that interstate relations have not yet achieved.

- Haruki Wada (University of Tokyo)
"Northeast Asia as a Regional Community: Its Relevance to Domestic Politics"
- Sung Chull Kim (HPI)
"Multilayer Politics of Regional Security in Northeast Asia"

In the second session on case studies, country experts discussed the domestic dimension of foreign policies and impacts on regional relations. T. J. Cheng's empirical study of the U.S. case revealed an institutional difference in viewing regional issues between the Presidency and the Congress that was stronger than partisan discrepancy. This illustrates the importance of presidential character and policy orientation in American foreign policy in this region. Leszek Buszynski described how the Russian political culture of favoring strong political leadership, like Putin's, has contributed to greater consideration of the Asia-Pacific region in its foreign policy, reviving traditional relations with China and North Korea to a certain extent. Yoneyuki Sugita warned against a rise of bigoted nationalism, which he identified in a review of Japanese politics since the end of WWII. Lowell Dittmer and Edward Friedman discussed changes in Chinese foreign policy on Taiwan and the U.S. as well as increasing Chinese patriotism, which threatens regional relations. Yong-Pyo Hong analyzed South Korea's democratization and the Sunshine Policy, showing how the latter contributed to the improvement of inter-Korean relations, while weakening ties with the U.S. In her

comparative study, Etel Solingen examined ways of cultivating the internationalization coalition in each country to promote regional cooperation.

- T. J. Cheng (College of William and Mary)
"Washington's Policies toward North Korea and the Taiwan Strait: The Role of U.S. Domestic Politics"
- Leszek Buszynski (International University of Japan)
"Domestic Consolidation and Foreign Policy in Russia"
- Yoneyuki Sugita (Osaka University of Foreign Studies)
"Impact of Postwar Domestic 'Democracy' on Japanese Security Policy for Northeast Asia"
- Lowell Dittmer (University of California, Berkeley)
"Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy"
- Edward Friedman (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
"China's Patriotic Preoccupation with Taiwan: The Fragility of Regional Cooperation"
- Yong-Pyo Hong (Hanyang University)
"Two Koreas in Northeast Asia: Linkages between Domestic, Inter-Korean, and Regional Politics"
- Etel Solingen (University of California, Irvine)
"Domestic Politics and Regional Cooperation in Southeast and Northeast Asia"

The third session focused on non-governmental actors' activities and their transnational effects for regional cooperation. James Tang, Daehoon Lee, and Kazumi Mizumoto discussed the role of NGOs in each country's foreign policy-making and the transnational alliance for peace and cooperation. Mizumoto pointed out that Hiroshima's anti-war and anti-nuclear initiatives should strengthen international ties to increase the efficacy of the peace movement.

- James Tang (University of Hong Kong)
"Impact of Non-Governmental Security Forum on Policy-Making: A Comparative Perspective"
- Daehoon Lee (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy)
"Transnational Cooperation among NGOs in Northeast Asia: Present and Future"
- Kazumi Mizumoto (HPI)
"Peace Alliance in Northeast Asia: Voice from Hiroshima"

The first workshop was successful in the sense that participants not only identified the problem of regional contention originating in domestic situations but also reached an agreement on how to deal with these problems. The solution lies not simply in interstate collaboration but in multilayer transnational cooperation and the formation of international coalitions in each country. The project will convene another workshop to review and discuss revised papers in May 2005 in preparation for publication of an edited volume in the near future.

By Sung Chull Kim, associate professor at HPI



October 29, 2004

Title: “Humane Bombing” and “Precision Bombing” in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis of Aerial Bombing by the RAF in the 1920s and by the U.S. Forces in 2003-2004

Speaker: Dr. Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

Towards the end of World War I, in April 1918, the British government established the Royal Air Force, historically the first independent air force in the world. Combining its Naval Air Service and Army Flying Corps the move sought to strengthen the British airborne and bombing capability at the time when London had come under repeated attacks by German airships and bombers. The main task of the RAF strategic bombing was to bomb military targets as well as densely populated industrial centers in Germany and occupied areas. Yet, the bombing of industrial centers aimed not only to destroy military arsenals but also to break down the morale of German workers. After the war, General Trenchard and other leaders of the British air forces claimed that British bombing had made a great contribution to ending the war by demoralizing German civilians, although their claim did not reflect the fact at all.

Although Britain won World War I, the war efforts had consumed enormous funds and resources, leaving the management of British colonies badly neglected. The British Empire faced a serious crisis immediately after the war, encountering popular revolts and violent political demonstrations in its colonies and mandated territories. Indeed, the British air power was soon utilized to suppress such revolts and demonstrations in the territories. For example, in 1920, an air squadron was sent to Somaliland to suppress a revolt by the local militia. The bombing destroyed not only the fortresses of the militiamen, but also private dwellings nearby.

Yet it was in Iraq that Britain employed its air forces for the purpose of suppressing local revolts most widely and for the longest period. Full-scale bombing activities in Iraq by eight RAF squadrons began in October 1922 and continued until 1932, the year that the British mandatory rule of Iraq officially ceased. Various types of bombs including delayed and incendiary bombs were dropped in attacks on villages where militiamen were believed to be hiding, and in some cases petrol was sprayed over civilian houses in order to intensify the fires ignited by the bombing. Tents and other types of dwellings of Bedouins and even their cattle became targets, resulting in the death and injury of many women and children. Their conduct was literally “indiscriminate bombing,” yet the British forces justified this by claiming that their operations “proved outstandingly effective, extremely economical and undoubtedly humane in the long run” as they could swiftly put down revolts and riots.

Eighty years after the British first began bombing Iraq, Iraqi civilians were again exposed to massive aerial bombardment by the British and U.S. forces, and many were killed. This time the excuse was that weapons of mass destruction would be removed and democracy would be introduced to their nation. Aerial bombing still continues in various parts of Iraq, causing further civilian casualties. Yet, the British and U.S. forces regard civilian victims as “collateral damage” of “precision bombing.”

In my lecture, I first examined the bombing of Iraq by the RAF in the 1920s, utilizing relevant British military documents and aerial photos obtained from the Public Record Office in London. Then I critically analyzed the military justification of indiscriminate bombing by comparing the British conduct in the 1920s with the so-called “precision bombing” of Iraq by the U.S. and British forces in the recent Iraq War.

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

December 10, 2004

Title: Japan and Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Constraints

Speaker: Dr. Narayanan Ganesan, associate professor at HPI

The forum began with an introduction to Southeast Asia, beginning with the region’s major characteristics, then moving on to the major differences between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia. Ganesan emphasized the geographical differences between the two sub-divisions and the ethno-linguistic and religious differences between the peoples inhabiting the countries that fall within them. Following this introduction, the forum examined a number of issues in Japan-Southeast Asia relations. These included existing impediments in the bilateral relationships, the nature of Japanese interests in the region as well as a scaling of perceptions of Japan in individual Southeast Asian countries. Finally, the talk identified areas in which Japan could assist Southeast Asia in developmental terms, especially through post-conflict reconstruction, enhancing human security, and other peace-related activities. Recently, human security with individuals rather than states at the center of consideration has taken center stage in academic literature.

It was argued that Japan can play a far greater role in brokering peace in Aceh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines and Myanmar — a sentiment that was actually conveyed by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi during a visit to Southeast Asia in 2000. In the first two instances, peace agreements have collapsed and military operations are under way. In Myanmar, a ceasefire is in place between ethnic insurgent groups and the military junta, but the standoff between the military government and the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi remains stalemated. Similarly, much developmental work

needs to be undertaken in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia after the cessation of conflict in 1989. There exists a great need for schools and hospitals as well as clean water, sanitation and basic infrastructure. To assist those in poor agricultural areas, irrigation facilities are also needed, while preventive medicine should target diseases like malaria that claim a large number of lives.

The forum was attended by some 20 persons, including citizens and staff from the Institute. The talk was followed by a lively question and answer session that lasted for 30 minutes. Mizumoto from the Institute provided the Japanese translation throughout the entire course of the forum, which ended at 5:10 p.m.

By Narayanan Ganesan, associate professor at HPI



HPI's New President



Motofumi Asai was appointed president of HPI effective April 1, 2005.

Asai specializes in international relations, Japanese politics and foreign policy. Admitted to the Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo in 1960, he passed his Class I foreign service examination and joined the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1963. While at MOFA, he served as Director of the Division of International Agreements in the Bureau of Treaties and the Division of Chinese Affairs in the Bureau of Asian Affairs, Councilor at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, and Minister at the Japanese Embassy in London. From 1988 to 1990, he served as professor in the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the University of Tokyo on loan from MOFA. He voluntarily retired from MOFA in March 1990 to accept professorship in the Faculty of Law at Nihon University (1990-1992), then moving to the Faculty of International Studies at Meiji Gakuin University (1992-2005), where he was Director of the university's International Peace Institute (1993-1995). Asai was born in Aichi Prefecture in 1941.

DIARY

November 1, 2004 - February 28, 2005

◆**Nov. 5** At a meeting of the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima, lecturer Setsuko Kozawa of Waseda University gives lecture on "The Hiroshima Panels and Peace Movement in Hiroshima."

◆**Nov. 6** Hiroko Takahashi serves as commentator for Peace Studies Association of Japan at Keisen University.

◆**Nov. 10** Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture on "Peace Movement in Hiroshima—Its History and Prospect" in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima.

◆**Nov. 12-13** First workshop of the HPI Research Project "Contention and Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Analysis of Domestic-Regional Linkages" is held.

◆**Nov. 14** Christian Scherrer participates in the 14th hearing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq in Osaka and gives presentation on "Genocide by Sanctions in Iraq 1990-2003."

◆**Nov. 17** At a meeting of the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima, professor Mikiyo Kano of Keiwa College gives lecture on "Hiroshima and Feminism."

HPI President Haruhiro Fukui, Scherrer, Narayanan Ganesan, Sung Chull Kim, and Mizumoto meet and exchange information and views with visiting researchers from the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA).

◆**Nov. 23** Mizumoto attends as panelist and gives lecture on "Peace Education Suitable for International Cooperation: A Message from Hiroshima" at the 2nd symposium of the Hiroshima International Peace Forum organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Chugoku International Center and held at Hiroshima International Conference Center.

◆**Nov. 26** Mizumoto attends inaugural meeting of "Peace NGOs Hiroshima" as director at Hiroshima International Center.

Takahashi gives lecture on "Lucky Dragon Incident and Anti-Nuclear Movements" in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima.

◆**Nov. 29-Dec. 3** Fukui visits China as member of the 9th Hiroshima Civic Delegation for Peace and Friendship.

◆**Dec. 1** At a meeting of the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima, former professor Sayoko Yoneda of Yamanashi Women's Junior College gives lecture on "Raicho Hiratsuka as a 'Citizen of the World': The Possibility for 'General and Global Peace'."

◆**Dec. 3** Takahashi gives presentation on "U.S. Control of Nuclear Information after WWII" at mini-symposium titled "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: How to Report, How to Be Reported" for Hiroshima/Nagasaki joint course offered by Meiji Gakuin University.

◆**Dec. 8** Yuki Tanaka gives lecture on "Mizuno Hironori's Philosophy: The Thoughts of a Military Officer Who Became an Anti-war Activist" in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima.

◆**Dec. 10** Ganesan gives lecture on "Japan and Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Constraints" at HPI Research Forum.

◆**Dec. 12** Scherrer interviews Denis J. Halliday, the former U.N. Assistant Secretary-General, Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, about his experience with the sanction regime.

◆**Dec. 13** Fukui and Takahashi attend Exploratory Committee for Renewal Plan of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

◆**Dec. 15** Tanaka gives lecture on "Godzilla and the Bravo Shot: Who Created and Killed the Monster" in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima.

Hitoshi Nagai gives lecture on "American Studies at Rikkyo University during World War II" at Rikkyo University.

◆**Dec. 18** Mizumoto gives lecture on "The Current Situation of Nuclear Weapons in the World" at the training course of the Hiroshima Peace Volunteer Project sponsored by and held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

◆**Dec. 18-Feb. 24** Scherrer conducts 3rd round of field research in Sri Lanka, interrupted by tsunami, on the current state of the ceasefire and the responses of the government, U.N. and international NGOs to the tsunami in minority areas in the Northeast; he interviews all important government officials, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), Muslim leaders, political parties, the Monitoring Mission, religious leaders, peace groups, civil society leaders, U.N. agency staff, academics and experts in North and South.

◆**Jan. 12-15** Fukui participates in session 4 "Peaceful Resolution of North Korean Nuclear Issue" at "International Symposium on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia" organized by Uri Party and held in Seoul.

◆**Jan. 22** Mizumoto gives lecture on "The Current Situation of Nuclear Weapons in the World" in training course for volunteer readers of A-bomb memoirs organized by and held at Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims.

◆**Jan. 26** Kim participates as a discussant in workshop "A Threat Reduction Program for North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction," organized jointly by JIIA and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and held at JIIA in Tokyo.

◆**Jan. 27** Fukui attends and chairs Tokyo meeting of Peace Memorial Facilities Utilization Council convened by Hiroshima City at Tokai University Members-Club.

◆**Jan. 29** Mizumoto attends as a commentator the Peace Club for Junior High and High School Students at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

◆**Jan. 31** Fukui attends and chairs Hiroshima meeting of Peace Memorial Facilities Utilization Council convened by Hiroshima City at Hiroshima City Hall.

◆**Feb. 8-26** Takahashi conducts research on U.S. nuclear test records at National Archives at College Park, Maryland.

◆**Feb. 17** Fukui attends Exploratory Committee for Renewal Plan of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

- Visitors to HPI -

◆**Nov. 17** Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Mansour Abo Alazm, Junwei Ma, visiting research fellows of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Rika Sasaki, research assistant of JIIA.

◆**Nov. 22** Dr. Silvia Lidia González, historian/journalist in Mexico.

◆**Jan. 6** Dr. George Mousourakis, faculty of law, the University of Auckland, New Zealand.

◆**Feb. 25** Philip Cordier, second secretary of Embassy of Canada, Japan. Mirai Maruo, business development associate of the Honorary Consulate of Canada in Hiroshima.

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