

China and prospects for preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific

By Nobumasa Akiyama

The quest for preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific began with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. Since then, some commentators have voiced skepticism over the evolution of preventive diplomacy in the region. Granted, the region's political environment differs from that of Europe, where such frameworks have been in place for some time. The Asia-Pacific is characterized by its diversity, comprising, as it does, several types of states, including western democratic countries such as the United States and Australia, communist China, and small, developing states such as Laos. Many countries in the region, particularly those in Asia, are still strongly oriented toward economic development, and regard national sovereignty as being of utmost importance. Under these circumstances, it is only natural that preventive diplomacy, having experienced teething problems, is only now beginning to find its shape. As a result, it is better to withhold judgement on whether or not the region's experiment with preventive diplomacy has succeeded.

Meanwhile, most agree that the ARF's effectiveness as a framework

of preventive diplomacy will depend on whether China, a regional power, can be persuaded to commit itself to regional security. In that sense, the ARF was at least successful in involving China in a multilateral security dialogue. However, it remains to be seen how China will respond to the idea of preventive diplomacy, which may determine its future role in the region. The first Joint Conference of the Japan-China Preventive Diplomacy Research Group provided a much-needed opportunity to sound out China's attitude toward preventive diplomacy. Following is a discussion of China's stance on the issue, illustrated by several matters brought up at the conference "Potential and prospects of preventive diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific," held on February 10 at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.

The fact that most of the Chinese participants acknowledged the importance of preventive diplomacy could be taken as a sign that China is becoming more aware of its role and responsibilities in the region, and is deepening its understanding of regional cooperation. In addition, China chaired the ARF Inter-Sessional Supporting Group (ISG) on Confidence-Building Measures in 1997. However, a more detailed examination of comments made by Chinese representatives at the conference suggest the country is still handling preventive diplomacy with caution.

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President of 2000 NPT Review Conference visits HPI

Ambassador Abdallah Baali, permanent representative of Algeria to the United Nations, who will be presiding over the 2000 NPT Review Conference, is confident progress will be made at the conference, due to be held from April 24 to May 19 in New York. Baali made the comments during a visit to Hiroshima on March 12, when he also discussed nuclear disarmament and related issues with researchers at the Hiroshima Peace Institute.



The conference's prospects have been described as gloomy, due to such issues as continuing international dismay over the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the CTBT, and the delay in ratification of START by the Russian Duma.

Baali acknowledged the conference would be "difficult," and highlighted the need for nuclear weapon states to take a lead. "Unless nuclear weapon states make concessions to non-nuclear states, the conference will make hardly any progress. I hope there will be some success, which would promote the signing and ratification of the CTBT, and Russia's ratification of START."

Baali, who was on his second visit to Japan, but first to Hiroshima, said: "I was very moved by what I saw. We have heard and read about the city, but it is a little bit different when you come and see it with your own eyes." He said he understood the magnitude of the suffering experienced by survivors of the atomic bombing. Regarding the role of Hiroshima and HPI, he said, "I hope you will act with moral authority in (the movement for) nuclear disarmament."

By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI

Cause for optimism on Korean Peninsula stability 2nd symposium on peace in Northeast Asia held in Kyoto

By Kazumi Mizumoto

Experts on Northeast Asian security called for concerted efforts to encourage North Korea to play a responsible role in international society to maintain stability, and to prevent conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles on the Korean Peninsula.

In a three-day symposium held at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto from December 15, 1999, about 40 participants from Japan, South Korea and China, as well as those from the United States, Russia and Europe, exchanged views on issues related to the peninsula, which has been affected by economic difficulties and famine. There is also international concern over suspected nuclear weapons and missile development.

The symposium, titled "Korea and the Search for Peace in Northeast Asia," was co-organized by the university and the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI), and was sponsored by the United Nations trust fund. It was the second symposium of its kind, the first having taken place in December 1998.

The event was attended by researchers, diplomats, journalists and international agency officials from nine countries. They included Robert Scalapino, professor at the University of California, Berkeley, and Yasushi Akashi, former U.N. Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and former president of HPI, who chaired the symposium.

In a keynote speech titled "The Korean Peninsula—Prospects and Policies," Scalapino presented a cautiously optimistic view, saying, "Recent developments relating to the Korean peninsula appear more promising than at any time in recent years." Behind such a view, he explained, were signals from North Korea that it was willing to pursue expanded diplomatic relationships and to promote economic reform, including the dispatching overseas in 1998 of some 100 people to undertake training in the economic, legal and scientific fields. Scalapino was also encouraged by North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's second meeting in October 1999 with Chung Ju-yung, founder of the Hyundai group in South Korea.

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The NPT regime and prospects for the Review Conference

By Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.

The most important threat to international security now and in the foreseeable future is the danger associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is not to suggest that proliferation is a new problem. Indeed, Manhattan Project scientists were concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries even before the United States attacked Hiroshima and Nagasaki with nuclear weapons in August 1945. Despite this initial concern, however, the Cold War focused attention on efforts to control the bilateral U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. With the demise of the superpower rivalry, arms control efforts have shifted back to the proliferation question.

The centerpiece of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which now has 187 state parties. Under the NPT, 182 states have pledged never to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and to submit to international safeguards intended to verify compliance with this commitment. In exchange, these states were promised unfettered access to peaceful nuclear technologies. The five nuclear weapon states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China—also pledged, in NPT Article VI, to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This central bargain, non-proliferation in exchange for nuclear arms reductions and eventual nuclear disarmament, is the foundation upon which the NPT regime rests.

When the NPT was negotiated, nations such as Germany, Italy and Sweden were concerned that a permanent NPT would deny them the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy and lock them into a discriminatory regime. As a result of these concerns, its drafters gave the treaty only a 25-year life span, with the option thereafter of extending the treaty for a fixed period or periods, or indefinitely. The concerns of non-nuclear weapon states that an indefinite NPT would lock the nuclear status quo in place were very much on the minds of some of the NPT state parties at the Review and Extension conference convened to decide the future existence of the treaty in 1995. Several non-nuclear weapon states believed that the nuclear weapon states had shown insufficient progress in fulfilling their Article VI disarmament commitments and feared that a permanent NPT would leave the non-nuclear weapon states with no leverage with which to press the nuclear weapon states to improve their records.

To ameliorate these concerns, when the NPT state parties agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension conference to indefinitely extend the NPT, they also negotiated an associated Statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. In addition to pledging the NPT state parties to work toward a variety of nuclear disarmament objectives, the Statement of Principles and Objectives reaffirmed the commitment of all state parties to Article VI disarmament commitments.

With the first Review Conference, since the treaty was indefinitely extended, set for April 2000, the non-proliferation regime is in serious jeopardy. The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, a general lack of progress in further reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals, ongoing concern over nuclear and missile programs in Iran, Iraq and North Korea, movement toward a possible unilateral U.S. deployment of a national missile defense system, the U.S. Senate rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and other problems demonstrate the troubled condition of the regime. Unless sincere efforts are taken by the state parties, particularly the nuclear weapon states, to revitalize the NPT, the situation is likely to worsen.

Without positive action at the April Review Conference, the NPT regime may begin to unravel as some non-nuclear weapon states begin to reconsider their commitment to the regime. In one scenario, nations such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq or others eventually may test nuclear weapons, which could prompt other prominent states presently committed to non-proliferation to acquire indigenous nuclear deterrents. The NPT regime would be destroyed and, because of the delicate compromise it contains, could never be revived. Proliferation by as few as one or two key states could spark a chain reaction that would lead in the medium term to the

existence of a significant number of new states with nuclear weapons.

Alternatively, it is possible that some states that remain committed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament—some of the more than 110 nations party to Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone agreements for example—may determine that they no longer benefit from their membership of the NPT regime. These states, which are not proliferation risks but frustrated disarmers, may decide to withdraw from the NPT and instead pursue a non-discriminatory convention banning nuclear weapons. While the withdrawal of these states would not directly be proliferative, it would seriously, if not fatally, weaken the NPT regime and thus inhibit efforts to convince would-be proliferators that continued adherence to the non-proliferation norms established by the NPT regime is the appropriate path. The nuclear weapon states would, of course, not subscribe in the foreseeable future to a nuclear weapons convention.

To prevent either outcome, the NPT state parties could consider agreeing to an additional statement of principles and objectives at the 2000 NPT Review Conference as part of an agreement to diffuse widespread disaffection and criticism at the conference. In such an understanding, the non-nuclear weapon states would pledge to refrain from acting in a manner that would question the NPT regime at and after the 2000 Conference, and the nuclear weapon states would agree to pursue specific additional steps prior to the 2005 Review Conference. These could include good faith efforts to bring the CTBT into force, universalize no-first-use policies among the nuclear weapon states or establish legally binding negative security assurances for NPT non-nuclear weapon state parties, maintain the viability of the ABM Treaty, and pursue reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to a level well below proposed START III levels.

Under such an agreement, if sufficient progress, or at least a good faith effort, is perceived to have been made toward fulfilling these commitments, the 2005 Conference would reaffirm the fundamental international commitment to the NPT. Otherwise, support for the NPT regime might begin to erode after the 2005 Conference.

If the NPT regime is reaffirmed at the Review Conference of 2005, the nuclear disarmament process could continue. After 2005, the United States and Russia could agree to a comprehensive transparency regime, a limit of 500 nuclear tactical warheads each, and a subsequent limit of 1,000 total nuclear weapons each. This in turn could lead to the establishment of a five-power nuclear disarmament process with three main objectives:

- A reduction in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to residual levels in the low hundreds.
- A reduction in Chinese, French and British nuclear arsenals to levels below 100.
- The elimination of Indian, Pakistani and Israeli nuclear arsenals, but with their fissile material retained on their territories under international safeguards as a hedge against a breakdown of the agreement. These three states would also agree to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

In addition, as an essential part of this process, all the non-nuclear weapon states would pledge again their non-nuclear status and all the NPT parties would commit themselves to joint action—including force if necessary—against any violator. These levels would be the end point until the world has changed sufficiently to permit contemplation of a prohibition on nuclear weapons.

If the nuclear non-proliferation regime is to be strengthened over the long term, sincere, concerted efforts will need to be undertaken by the international community. A course of action such as this may help to ensure that the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are never again visited upon the world.

Graham is president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWs) in the United States. He was the Special Representative of the U.S. President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT.

Kosovo's interim administration faces myriad challenges

By Yoshifumi Okamura

Almost nine months since its establishment last June under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244—adopted after NATO ended its air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has been performing civilian administrative functions in the war-ravaged province. For the first time in the history of interim government operations, international organizations and agencies are working together under UNMIK; humanitarian assistance is being provided by UNHCR, democratization and institution-building by the OSCE, economic reconstruction by the EU, and civil administration by the United Nations itself.

It is extremely difficult to govern the province's two million people and help them develop democracy given the chaos wrought by the continuous outflow and repatriation of refugees. Houses, buildings and other key components of Kosovo's infrastructure were devastated, and ethnic hostilities between Serbs and Albanians, either real or remembered, remain.

At the beginning of UNMIK's operation, murders and arsons proliferated as Albanians tried to take revenge on their erstwhile Serbian tormentors. Increases were also observed in other crimes, with offenders taking advantage of the general disorder that had descended on the province. The mission's immediate task was simply to restore order. The deployment of civilian police officers, who now exceed 2,300, from around the world, and improvements in their management have brought noticeable improvements. The number of murders, for example, decreased from more than 20 a week last September to just a handful at most at present.

A scarcity of such basic public services as electricity and running water, coupled with the immense task facing a relatively small number of UNMIK staff, have gradually been addressed with the support of national governments, nongovernmental organizations and other international bodies. There has also been an increase in the number of UNMIK personnel, 937 of whom are stationed at the headquarters and in the province's 29 municipalities.

Last autumn, the province was preparing for a particularly severe winter, with temperatures plummeting to minus 20C and heavy snowfall expected. We desperately needed to put a plan into action to protect villagers before winter took hold. Thanks to support from international agencies and NGOs, deaths caused by the cold and another exodus of refugees were evaded.

For its part, Japan has made a substantial contribution, providing 500 prefabricated houses, repairing more than 1,500 damaged homes and procuring firewood and coal for heating.

Although Kosovo still has some way to go before any semblance of normality returns, people appear less wary of one another now that economic activity has returned. Considering the level of confusion seen immediately after the conflict, UNMIK has achieved success, however limited, in bringing a degree of stability to everyday life.

On the other hand, many problems remain to be solved. First, it has been extremely difficult to "ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo," as stipulated in the UNSC resolution. Albanians whose family members were killed and their houses burned by Serb soldiers and security police, find it difficult to accept Serbs as neighbors. Reports continue of acts of violence and intimidation carried out in the name of a Kosovo solely for Albanians against Serbs, Romany communities and other minorities, leading to a Serb exodus from Kosovo and the isolation of Serb communities. With UNMIK investing so much energy in protecting Serbs and guaranteeing them education and medical services, the realization of the ideal of a multiethnic Kosovo seems a long way off.

Second, UNMIK has encountered problems securing financial resources. The total budget for this fiscal year was DM423 million (U.S.\$214 million). Matters are made worse by the fact that, with many people having lost their jobs, it is not possible to collect taxes. Besides

imposing tariffs on imported goods and levying taxes on restaurants, shops and other businesses, financial support comes from individual national governments. Although many countries, including those in the EU, have pledged more financial assistance, the payments are already behind schedule, and public servants, such as doctors and teachers, have gone without salaries and public works projects have been neglected. As a result, the province's administrative structure is on the verge of collapse.

Although there is a need to establish a taxation system and build a stable financial base, it should be remembered that Kosovo was an underdeveloped province long before the recent war, and was able to manage its administration only with subsidies from the federal government. With local resources limited, it is inevitable that Kosovo will, for the foreseeable future, have to rely on the international community for financial support.

The third task facing Kosovo is the swift completion of elections. The UNSC resolution calls for the promotion of substantial autonomy and self-government as one of its most important missions. With the establishment of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure now under way, Kosovo residents will have greater opportunities to take part in the administration of their province. The fact remains, however, that elections are the best means of reflecting the will of local people in local administration, and of encouraging people to shoulder the responsibilities of government. Preparations for local elections to be held in the autumn have proved problematic. Since household registers were lost or destroyed during the recent conflict, we will have to draw up new registers, from which electoral registers can be drawn up. It will also be difficult to determine the voting status of Albanians who have fled tyranny at home and settled in other countries during the past 10 years, and of Serbs who sought refuge outside the province more recently. There are also people who occupy others' homes because their own were destroyed, and registering their addresses is a delicate matter. One should also not forget the sheer magnitude of the task that lies ahead—that of registering an estimated 1.5 million residents in just three to four months.

UNMIK's biggest problem stems from the UNSC resolution's call to promote the establishment of democratic institutions, while maintaining that the province remains a region "within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." If the people of Kosovo—90 percent of whom are Albanians—were asked were given the chance to democratically express their plans for the province, an overwhelming majority would support independence.

International society, however, by opposing secession and independence, has shown a disregard for the apparent will of Kosovo's people. It fears that such a move would invite secession calls from ethnic minorities in other parts of the world. That, however, is scant justification for keeping the secession issue off Kosovo's fledgling democratic decision-making agenda.

The UNSC resolution did not indicate where an ultimate solution to Kosovo's problems lies. That is why political movements, which abide by their own emotive resolutions, are aggravating the confusion. In early February, in the predominantly Serb sector in northern Kosovo, Albanian residents were attacked in another round of ethnic violence, seen by some as an attempt to render fait accompli Serb-enforced incorporation of the sector into the Serbian Republic. In the short-term, UNMIK is struggling to carry out its commitment to oversee the provisional administration of Kosovo, while leaving aside the province's status in the future. In this sense, the situation is different from that of East Timor, where a similar interim administration is helping decide that province's long-term fate.

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Internet access to the FIRST database system

Institutes launch comprehensive IRS database

By Gerd Hagemeyer-Gaverus and Niklas Oxeltoft

The widespread use of the Internet has dramatically changed our attitudes towards information retrieval. We increasingly rely on the Internet as a major information resource in our daily work because it offers us fast access to new and updated information. The Internet information pool, however, has become so immense that collecting relevant information takes a considerable amount of time. One approach to overcome the necessity of jumping from link to link is to package specific high-quality information in one Internet location. The Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST) database system (<http://first.sipri.org/>) represents such an approach. It offers the International Relations and Security (IRS) community a one-point stop where facts and data from different sources can be retrieved from a single link; a simple user-interface allows a country-wise search for a variety of data, connecting users to a series of database systems in different global locations and returning the search results in one result page. The main objective of the project is to provide relevant, high-quality data to experts and the general public. Its ultimate goal is to increase transparency in complicated IRS issues and thereby provide the basis for better analysis and better political decision making.

Background

The project set up to create such a database system emanated from the Geneva 1996 Conference on Institutes and the Security Dialogue that was organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. In a special working group on information needs, the idea was born to coordinate access to facts and data in the area of international relations and security. Several workshops were subsequently organized to discuss all facets


of database cooperation; one feasible idea was to build up a federated and interconnected database system. In close partnership between the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) in Zurich, Switzerland, the ISN funded a project on "Integrating fact databases in International Relations and Security." First, a pilot-project was conducted in 1998 at SIPRI in which surveys of the needs for data in the IRS community were carried out and the technical feasibility of a federated database system was tested. The surveys—one with a group of experts and one with the general public—indicated an overwhelming (over 90%) demand for IRS data and facts. A prototype of a federated database system developed by us proved that it was possible to interconnect databases in different geographical locations to one system using existing Internet technology. In early 1999 we started the present project at SIPRI with the aim of building up a comprehensive federated database system, again with the ISN as a partner and the project funder. In cooperation with a computer consultancy company and the software company Oracle, we developed a new connectivity interface which allows real-time access to databases in different locations and in accordance with our demands for simplicity and security. The technology used is based on the Java programming language for establishing a connection and the Extended HTML (XML) standard for transferring data, two approaches which are today at the forefront of Internet software development.

Status and Features

On 17 January 2000 we launched an official version of the Facts

on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST) database system, which replaced the prototype version containing 12 databases. The new version has a new, complete set of 19 updated databases. Compared to the previous version, more content has been added to these data sets, allowing for the retrieval of much more information. In addition, the new version has a considerably improved design and extended functionality. We have emphasized user-friendliness and transparency. For example, each data set has explanatory information such as a link to a 'sources and methods' text. The FIRST database system is based on Oracle database software and currently contains data and facts which are organized in 19 database tables, including those of "Arms control and disarmament agreements," "Military expenditure" and "Major armed conflicts," as well as of "Transfers and licensed production of major conventional weapons" and "Armed forces personnel, employment in arms production and weapons holdings."

Seventeen of these tables are stored locally in a database at SIPRI, while two are stored in databases at different geographical locations to which we make a real-time connection when we package all the data. Currently, two of the four non-SIPRI databases—the ISN and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) datasets—are



accessed in real-time at their original locations. The data from Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research at University of Heidelberg (HIIC) and Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) are temporarily accessed locally from a database copy on a SIPRI server. The main reason for this temporary solution is that both HIIC and BICC are for the moment unable to implement the connectivity software on their respective servers owing to a lack of resources. Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (INCORE), University of Ulster and United Nations University in Northern Ireland, and Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) in Ottawa are in the process of being connected. More non-SIPRI data will be added in the next few months. The retrieval system is, in the initial stage, based on the concept of country profiles. The service is free of charge, but we require user registration. Upon entering the system, the user is provided with a search interface which allows her or him to choose a country, a year and a set of data tables. As an additional feature we provide the possibility to retrieve the most recent data if data for the chosen year are not available. The result of the retrieval is presented to the user in one HTML page and as a set of HTML tables. A table of contents for all retrieved data is also provided at the beginning of the output.

Problems

The increasing Internet traffic overload is one of the major problems Internet users face today. We all have experience of the Internet slowing down to an unacceptable level. Most affected is intercontinental traffic. In the framework of the FIRST system we confront this problem on two levels: A) the overseas users who want to access the system, which is located in Sweden; and B) the internal connections the system makes to databases located overseas. Overseas users' access problems (A) can in the long run be eliminated by establishing mirror sites of the system. The mirror sites should, however, be strategically located along the main routes in the global Internet topology. Internal connections to overseas databases (B) can effectively be managed by a time-controlled real-time connection/cache file access switch. Caching is a method that is widely used in, for example, today's Browser systems. If an internal real-time connection to a partner database exceeds a predefined time limit, the real-time connection is aborted and a cache file is accessed instead. Any successful connection creates such a cache. The cache file is simply the HTML code for the respective table, which is then kept for 48 hours.

There are also considerable difficulties in finding partners. At present, relatively few databases on IR facts and figures are available on the Internet. Many sites which claim to have a database have only a collection of static HTML pages, often without a search engine connected to it. In many instances the sources of the data are not revealed, calling into question the reliability of the data.

Displaying several sets of the same category of data increases the user's choices when these datasets emanate from a well-known, reliable organization. Data of the same category usually differ in the sources and methods used; by providing the sources and methods for each dataset, we allow the user to choose the most relevant data for the intended use. Decisions on which data should be included in the system are currently based on multilateral consultations with the

Web sites and on-line databases on security issues

International Security Network (ISN) <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/>

A links library and full-text searches of carefully selected web sites of international organizations, government bodies, research institutes.

The US State Department Arms Control Bureau <http://www.acda.gov/>

The web site of the former ACDA provides official documents of the U.S. Government and legislatures. International treaties and related reports could also be obtained.

Canadian Forces College <http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/>

Comprehensive guide to military and defense-related resources, including armed forces of the world, contemporary conflicts, military biography and history.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) <http://www.csis.org/>

Research papers on security analysis and policy are available.

Federation of American Scientists <http://www.fas.org/>

Provides data on weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile defense systems.

Monterey Institute of International Studies <http://www.mii.edu/>

One of the biggest databases, containing information about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems compiled from over 340 source publications. Only available to members who subscribe to the service.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation <http://www.nato.int/>

Official documents and relevant information on NATO.

"Poly-Cy" by Faculty of Political Science, West Virginia University

<http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/PolyCy/>

Provides collection of links relating to international relations, foreign policy and politics.

The Henry L. Stimson Center <http://www.stimson.org/>

Project reports on nuclear and security issues, foreign policy and arms control.

Initiative on Conflict Resolution & Ethnicity (INCORE)

<http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/>

Provides database on conflicts and ethnicity based on researchers and regions.

The URLs listed above are based on respondents to a questionnaire about the need for hard data in the field of international relations and security, conducted by SIPRI.

partners and discussions in the respective institutes. When the system is expanded, a referee group in the form of a scientific council should be established to ensure that the system maintains its high quality.

Next steps

The next phase of the project will concentrate, in addition to further development of the existing system, on the design and theoretical outline of an extended retrieval system that goes beyond the country-profiles approach. This phase requires much research and conceptualization, since the search will permit data and facts retrieval on such general terms as "nuclear policy," thus retrieving both data and facts on nuclear issues for all countries, as well as policy documents. While increasing the amount and type of data in the system, new retrieval methods such as intelligent agents and/or referenced dictionaries need to be applied.

Although we are in the initial stage of the running of the project, the FIRST system has already attracted the attention of many in the IRS community. We would like to invite interested institutes to join our effort by contributing their databases. Please send e-mail to: hagmeyer-gaverus@sipri.se, or oxeltoft@sipri.se.

Hagmeyer-Gaverus is head of the information technology department at SIPRI. Oxeltoft is a research assistant for a project "Integrating Fact Database in the field of International Relations and Security" led by Hagmeyer-Gaverus.

The ARF process for the peace and prosperity of the region comprises three stages—confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. China said the gradual approach toward building confidence among countries in the region should be thoroughly pursued before discussing preventive diplomacy, since the latter may leave open the possibility of interference in a country's domestic affairs.

A Chinese participant said: "It is not true that China takes a negative attitude toward preventive diplomacy. Our position is that we should allow time for preventive diplomacy to evolve. By doing so, we will achieve a stable outcome." The participant added that China emphasized bilateral confidence building, particularly between major powers, rather than multilateral dialogues. "Although the Sino-Japanese relations are generally good, a perception gap concerning history may create mutual distrust," he said. China appears to be wary of Japan taking a leading role in promoting preventive diplomacy in the region. In this context, we may interpret China's chairing of the ISG on CBM as an attempt to take discussions on preventive diplomacy in the direction it desires.

One of the key issues in preventive diplomacy is how to deal with the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs. For example, during the Kosovo crisis, the United Nations was able to predict, but unable to prevent, the outbreak of armed conflict. Instead, a regional, multilateral force in the form of NATO intervened under the banner of humanitarian intervention, signaling a break with the traditional principle of noninterference in domestic affairs. International organizations such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have stepped up their role in assisting the victims of war. Such humanitarian concerns have been gaining currency as legitimate excuses for conflict intervention and conflict prevention, even when national sovereignty and the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs are superseded. China is uncomfortable with this trend, since it, too, faces problems, such as minority groups in Tibet and Uyghur, as well as Taiwan. While another Chinese participant concurred with a Japanese colleague who praised the important role played by NGOs in preventive diplomacy, he said intergovernmental diplomacy and confidence building were more important.

China has given credit to the ARF because it is ASEAN, not the United States or Japan, that plays the leading role in the forum. China is also comfortable with ASEAN's flexibility and the priority it places on economic development, as well as member states' adherence to the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of others. In addition, the ARF has adopted an evolutionary approach toward preventive diplomacy.

Since moves toward preventive

diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region are in their infancy, China's emphasis on confidence building appears realistic, and was supported by conference chairman Yasushi Akashi in his statement. Furthermore, the region's diversity prevents the establishment of a regional security system that would satisfy all parties in the region.

Nevertheless, there is also cause for optimism in China's modest, but positive, attitude toward preventive diplomacy. Japan and China should continue their dialogue on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, and on possible cooperation in the area of conflict prevention, without allowing their respective national interests to gridlock talks. By continuing dialogue, both countries will be encouraged to recognize their heavy responsibility to ensure the evolution of preventive diplomacy and to exercise it themselves. In this sense, the first joint conference of the Japan-China Preventive Diplomacy Research Group was a step in the right direction for preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific.

Akiyama is a research associate at HPI.

These developments, together with the "sunshine policy" of the Kim Dae-jung administration in South Korea, its improved relations with Japan, and consultations on security matters with China, pointed toward a stabilization of the security environment in Northeast Asia, Scalapino said. U.S.-North Korea relations, he added, remained the most important factor. He said the United States had indicated its willingness to respond affirmatively in the Perry Report should North Korea take a "constructive path," adding that Pyongyang had shown an interest in the proposal.

Regarding the development of North Korea, Scalapino cited five possible scenarios: imminent collapse; a gradual growth of elitist friction over economic and related policies; a regime that maintains the status-quo; a strike by the North against the South; and cautious acceptance by the North of an evolutionary process, with the initial emphasis upon economic interaction with its neighbors. He called on the international community to aim toward a realization of the fifth scenario.

Prof. Izumi Hajime of the University of Shizuoka, and two other participants from the United States and Russia, reported on recent developments in North Korea and Northeast Asia in general. Following the reports, participants split up into two groups to discuss how best to encourage North Korea to become involved in the international community while maintaining peace and stability in the region. The discussions were closed, to allow participants to speak as individuals rather than as representatives of their respective organizations.

At a press conference held at the end of the symposium, Akashi released a statement compiled using the results of two days of group discussions. The statement expressed concerns over the possibility of renewed deterioration of the North Korean economy, the possibility of political destabilization brought on by upcoming national assembly elections in South Korea or the U.S. presidential election, and the pursuit by North Korea of weapons of mass destruction. The statement expressed optimism, however, over improvements in consultations between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo, and an easing of the famine in North Korea. Regarding policy coordination efforts, the statement said priority should be placed on:

- a) Preventing war.
- b) Promoting the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.
- c) Maintaining regional stability.
- d) Promoting peaceful change in North Korea through gradual integration with the outside world.

The statement also included the following recommendations made during group discussions:

- a) Support for expansion of consultations to include Russia and the European Union as part of policy coordination efforts among the United States, Japan and South Korea.
- b) Support for expanded South Korean efforts to continue the North-South dialogue.
- c) Avoidance of Korean peninsula-related policy consultations being adversely influenced by the U.S.-China relationship and other major bilateral relationships.
- d) Reaffirmation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
- e) Encouragement of expanded North Korean participation in regional consultations and multilateral lending agencies.
- f) Support for U.N.-led humanitarian and technical assistance activities in North Korea.

Mizumoto is an associate professor at HPI.

By Masafumi Kaneko

Like the Hiroshima Peace Institute, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California is devoted to researching arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues, focusing on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. I am currently a visiting fellow at the CNS' Washington office, where I am researching security policies.

Since I am a second-generation hibakusha (survivor of the atomic bombings) from Hiroshima, I have long been interested in issues related to nuclear weapons. My grandparents' generation lived through the A-bomb attack, and the pain they experienced after the bombing remains a vivid memory. I have been able to appreciate, in a very immediate way, the terror of nuclear weapons through talking to my grandparents, more so than if I had just learned about it by studying reports on the damage caused.

My mother was an unborn baby when the attack took place, and so was not directly involved in the disaster. However, every time a change in the number of leukocytes is detected in her body, she worries that it may have something to do with the aftereffects of the atomic bombing, and becomes depressed that the scars of an event that happened more than 50 years ago have yet to heal. Also, it has yet to be confirmed that radioactivity poses no risk of genetic damage to my generation and those that follow. We should not forget that the inhumanity of nuclear weapons is extraordinary, not just because of the sheer scale of death and destruction, but also in terms of the duration of their aftereffects.

International society has tried to prevent nuclear war through nuclear deterrence, a component of which has been Japan's dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Nuclear powers place high priority on nuclear weapons as the guarantor of their own security. There seems to be little mileage in calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons unless there are improvements, including in the area of nuclear weapons, in the overall security environment.

The clear inhumanity of nuclear weapons, when set against the realities of international security, places hibakusha and the families of people killed by atomic bombs in a dilemma. However, through my training in the United States, I have come to believe that it is indeed possible to make realistic suggestions to devalue, step by step, the role of nuclear weapons, in order to influence policy makers.

In making realistic suggestions, limiting discussions to the issue of nuclear disarmament will not accomplish much. Instead, it is important to fully appreciate the entire global security situation and nuclear weapons' place within it. This is why I decided to study at the Monterey Institute. The institute is highly regarded internationally—the result, I suppose, of the accumulation of the many small steps it has taken over the years. In this article, I will introduce some of the institute's special features.

Dissemination of research achievements

Like other think tanks and private research bodies in the United States, the Monterey Institute attaches importance to the effective dissemination of research achievements. Lists of pertinent congressmen, senators, and government offices, as well as people in the media, researchers and participants in conferences, are kept on the institute's computer system. The institute publishes the results of research projects, conference information and news of updates on its Web site and via facsimile news releases and in copies of its journal, *Nonproliferation Review*. In order to have a real influence on the policy-making process, it is important, besides conducting high-level research, to bring the institute's achievements to the attention of politicians and government officials. While the institute's Web site contains a great deal of information, it is still important to ensure that the site is visited regularly. During last October's discussions in the Senate on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the institute, together with others knowledgeable about the issue, sent messages to the Congress, the Senate and the media. It sometimes takes part in conferences sponsored by NGOs and other political activities.

ChemBio Weapons and WMD Terrorism News

The CNS Washington office distributes news on biological and chemical weapons, and WMD terrorism via e-mail, three times a week. Graduate interns are in charge of collecting relevant news articles from the Internet, summarizing them in a pre-determined format, and sending them to more than 700 subscribers. The service is free of charge.

Nonproliferation database

The nonproliferation database of the Monterey Institute, which is known throughout the world, is available on CD-ROM and the Internet. The head office in California is responsible for creating the database, which features more than 300 sources, many in foreign languages, including trade journals, government documents, newspapers, Web sites, books and conference proceedings.

Emphasis on education

Since the Monterey Institute is an educational institution, the mission of the CNS is "to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis." Together with its graduate programs, the institute's California head office draws up curriculums to train specialists in nonproliferation and arms control. They are also given the opportunity to work as assistants at the center. Compared with other organizations of this type, the institute's programs place greater emphasis on broadening the views of interns and offering them the chance to learn new skills. With some of those who completed programs having obtained jobs with governmental organizations or institutions specializing in arms control, the institute is steadily expanding the nonproliferation community. The institute accepts visiting research fellows from foreign organizations, such as one from Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as part of efforts to reach beyond the domestic community and to create an international community favorable toward nonproliferation.

Influence on policy planning process

Researchers of the Monterey Institute are often invited to express their opinions at meetings of the U.S. Department of State and the Department of Defense, or at Congressional hearings. Activities of this kind have been made possible by the institute's relentless efforts in the areas of information dissemination and human networking mentioned earlier. The creation of networks cannot be accomplished overnight, but tributes should be paid to Dr. Lawrence Scheinman, distinguished professor of the CNS Washington office, and former officials of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, for their help in bringing the institute and policy makers closer together.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons has been radically reduced. However, nuclear proliferation, exemplified by nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the suspected possession of nuclear weapons technology by North Korea, and suspicion that Russia is exporting nuclear weapons technology, as well as the concept of nuclear weapons acting as a deterrent against WMDs, has given rise to fears that the "second nuclear age" is just around the corner. There is a need for policies that go beyond bringing about a decrease in the number of nuclear weapons. If the motivation for such policies can come from a city that has experienced a nuclear attack, the impact, both practical and symbolic, will be all the greater. I strongly hope the Hiroshima Peace Institute remains ahead of the times and fully realizes its potential to contribute toward the creation of a more peaceful world.

Kaneko is a visiting fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is also a fellow of the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management in Chigasaki, Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan.

DIARY

December 1, 1999 ~ February 29, 2000

December 4

Kazumi Mizumoto delivers a report, "Idealism and Realism of Recommendations for Nuclear Disarmament: Discussions on the Tokyo Forum," at a local study meeting of the Peace Studies Association of Japan, at Hiroshima University.

December 9

Nobumasa Akiyama attends a workshop on Central Asia and Kavkaz at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo. He also attends a workshop sponsored by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, held at the Institute of Applied Energy.

December 10

Mizumoto participates in a study-group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) in Tokyo.

December 11

Mizumoto delivers a lecture on the current situation surrounding nuclear weapons as part of a training program for Hiroshima Peace Volunteers, sponsored by Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

December 11-12

Akiyama attends JIIA's 40th anniversary symposium, "In quest of Human Security," cosponsored by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and the United Nations University, held at the university.

December 14

Masamichi Kamiya participates in a workshop on preventive diplomacy sponsored by and held at the Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Tokyo.

December 15-17

Mizumoto, Akiyama and Kamiya attend a symposium, "Korea and the Search for Peace in Northeast Asia," cosponsored by Ritsumeikan University and HPI, and held at the university in Kyoto.

December 18

Akiyama participates in a workshop of the Strategic Studies Fellowship Program sponsored by the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), held at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.

December 19

Mizumoto acts as a commentator at an international symposium, "Denuclearization in Asia and Japan's role—What remains to be done?" sponsored by the International Peace Research Institute Meigaku (PRIME) in Tokyo.

December 21

Mizumoto delivers a report, "Idealism and realism in nuclear disarmament," at the Forum on New Thinking on Security Issues, held at and sponsored by the Tokyo Foundation.

January 7

Mizumoto participates in a study-group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security strategies: The case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by NIRA in Tokyo.

January 13

Akiyama attends a workshop on Central Asia and Kavkaz at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo.

January 19-21

Kamiya attends an international conference, "On the threshold: The United Nations and global governance in the new millennium," sponsored by and held at the United Nations University in Tokyo.

January 26

Kamiya visits the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and discusses small arms and light weapons, as well as the 2000 NPT Review Conference to be held in April. He also participates in meetings of the Center for Preventive Diplomacy, held at the center in Tokyo.

January 28-February 4

Ikuko Togo visits the U.N. headquarters in New York and Harvard University in Boston, Mass., to make an international comparative analysis of peace-keeping and environmental activities.

January 29

Akiyama participates in a seminar organized by the Strategic Studies Fellowship Program, sponsored by RIPS and held at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.

February 2

Mizumoto and Akiyama attend a lecture by Max Van der Stoep, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, at the NIRA in Tokyo.

February 3

Mizumoto and Kamiya attend the 128th workshop of the Institute for Peace Science at the Hiroshima University, titled "The CTBT Ratification Process and U.S. Nuclear Policy."

February 10

Mizumoto, Akiyama and Kamiya attend an inaugural joint conference, "Potential and prospects of preventive diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific," cosponsored by the Center for Preventive Diplomacy, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and HPI, and held at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.

February 15-17

Kamiya participates in the 12th U.N. Regional Disarmament Meeting in the Asia-Pacific Region, in Katmandu, Nepal.

February 17

Mizumoto attends a special colloquium, "Russia between the Parliamentary and the Presidential Elections," sponsored by the Research & Exchange Committee, faculty of international studies, Hiroshima City University, at HPI. Features a lecture by Prof. Evgeny Torchinov of St. Petersburg State University, Russia.

Akiyama attends a workshop on Central Asia and Kavkaz at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

February 19

Akiyama acts as a coordinator at an Asia-Europe Forum symposium.

February 21

Mizumoto attends the 2nd Annual JNC International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, sponsored by the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute in Tokyo. He also participates in a workshop, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Viewpoint of the International Atomic Energy Agency," sponsored by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JNC), in Tokyo.

Kamiya attends meetings of the Center for Preventive Diplomacy in Tokyo.

February 24

Mizumoto, Akiyama and Kamiya attend an international symposium, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: In the Face of a Possible Renewed Nuclear Arms Race," sponsored by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, JIIA, and held at the New Takanawa Prince Hotel.

February 25-26

Akiyama attends a conference, "Securing Peace and Stability in the Asia Pacific: The U.S. Presence," cosponsored by RIPS and the Tokyo American Center.

February 28

Mizumoto attends a forum on new thinking on security issues, "Ballistic Missile Defense" and "Recent Japan-U.S. Security Issues," held at and sponsored by the Tokyo Foundation.

February 28-March 3

Kamiya observes the 1st preparatory committee for the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Aspects, to be held in 2001, held at the U.N. headquarters in New York.

Visitors to HPI

January 24

Ambassador Dr. David D. Malone, president of the International Peace Academy (IPA) in New York

Masafumi Takubo, member of the People's Research Institute on Energy and Environment (PRIEE) in Tokyo

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS is a newsletter published four times a year by the Hiroshima Peace Institute.

Readers are encouraged to submit comments or articles for inclusion in HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS.

Articles should contain a maximum of 1,200 words, and may be edited for length and clarity. Submissions can be sent by fax, mail or, preferably, by e-mail. They should be accompanied by the writer's name, address, telephone number and profession. Unfortunately, submissions cannot be returned.

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