Narayanan Ganesan（Professor）
Introduction
The Myanmar military staged a coup against the elected civilian government on 1 February 2021. The coup was the culmination of long-standing hostilities between the military and its Commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the civilian government led by the National League for Democracy (NLD) party helmed by Aung San Suu Kyi. Following from the country’s democratic transition that began in 2010, the NLD won an overwhelming victory in the 2015 general elections and a subsequent win with an even larger share of the votes in the November 2020 elections. Conversely, the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) suffered a humiliating defeat making it clear that the general population preferred the civilian led NLD over the military’s USDP. The trajectory of results made it abundantly clear that the military’s attempts to secure electoral victory through the USDP would be frustrated.
Following a tense standoff between the NLD’s leaders, President Win Min and State Counselor ｃ, against General Min Aung Hlaing, many senior party leaders were detained before the newly elected parliament could convene in Naypyitaw. The military justified its coup by alleging widespread electoral fraud in the 2020 elections that were not investigated by the NLD or the Union Election Commission (UEC). International observers had not noted such irregularities during the elections. A clause in the military drafted 2008 Constitution that allowed for a military takeover of government in the event of a threat to national security was invoked to provide legal justification for the military’s seizure of power. A State Administrative Council (SAC) headed by General Min Aung Hlaing was then formed to take over governmental functions together with the imposition of a state of emergency. The 2008 Constitution that allowed for this emergency declaration set a two-year term limit for it. However, the emergency has simply been extended once every six months since the expiry of the original term limit.
Domestic impact of the coup
Notable domestic political developments have included widespread resistance to the coup and the evolution of a Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Members of the CDM have also gone on to form People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) at the urging of the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG that draws on elected representatives from the NLD serves as the shadow government that competes with the SAC for domestic and international political legitimacy. It holds the seat in the United Nations for Myanmar, and it is also recognized by a number of Western countries like the United States, United Kingdom, France and Netherlands. The NUG coordinates the resistance to the SAC through the PDFs that are also supported by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that help to arm and train the PDFs. The Chin National Front (CNF), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Karen National Union (KNU), and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) have been at the forefront of such collaboration. Suffice it to say that both the SAC and its opponents are determined to fight against each other to resolve their differences. The fighting has been protracted and exacted a huge toll with some 6,500 civilians killed, 2.6 million internally displaced, and some 18.6 million more facing food shortages according to recent statistics from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNOCHA).
Regional implications of the coup
The military coup has also had several negative regional consequences. The first of these is that an attempt by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of which Myanmar is a member tried to intervene and restore calm by offering to mediate between the SAC and its opponents, in particular Suu Kyi. In a meeting held in Jakarta in April 2021, members of the organization including Myanmar agreed to a Five Point Consensus Plan (5PC). This plan proposed an end to violence and the exercise of restraint, engagement in dialogue to seek a peaceful solution, the appointment of an ASEAN Special Envoy to facilitate the dialogue process, the provision of humanitarian aid and the visit of the ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar to facilitate dialogue among all parties.
Suffice it to say that the 5PC has not been implemented thus far. Countries that hold that ASEAN Chair on a rotational basis beginning with Brunei in 2021, Cambodia in 2022, Indonesia in 2023, and now Laos in 2024 have all appointed Special Envoys who have been unable to meet with Suu Kyi who remains under detention. The Brunei Special Envoy did not even visit Myanmar while the Cambodian Special Envoy and Prime Minister Hun Sen both attempted to mediate the situation but failed. Indonesia opted for a much lower profile policy of engaging with all stakeholders but despite claims to numerous such meetings by President Joko Widodo and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, there was no visible progress. The Lao Special Envoy is not expected to have much success either.
For failing to adhere to the terms of the 5PC, ASEAN has decided withhold invitations to the SAC for Ministerial level meetings, suggesting a ranking bureaucrat attend such meetings instead. Myanmar, on the other hand, has decided to suspend participation from such meetings to display its unhappiness with the ASEAN decision. Within ASEAN Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore have been much more critical of the coup and Myanmar’s SAC while the mainland states of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam have been much more accommodative. Thailand attempted to serve as mediator among the conflictual parties by appointing its own Special Envoy, Pornpimol Kanchanalak, during the previous government led by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha. It was also widely reported that the country’s Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai met with Suu Kyi in July 2022.
This divide in policy preferences and output between the maritime states and the mainland ones in Southeast Asia is unsurprising. Maritime countries, with the exception of Brunei that has an absolute monarchy, practice some form of democracy compared to the mainland countries where only Thailand can now claim limited democratic governance. There state institutions designed to promote and protect democratic practices have been subverted to support an entrenched elite that includes the monarchy, the military, bureaucracy, and influential business interests with monopolies. Thailand claims a legitimate right to articulate an independent policy as the country most affected by the coup in terms of refugees, illegal migrants and threats to its energy and labour supplies from Myanmar.
The divide in policy output towards ASEAN has frayed the organization’s collective identity albeit the differences are not articulated in public. It threatened regional cohesion on am important matter when the organization decided to forego its traditional and sacrosanct principle of not interfering in the domestic affairs of its member states. Although Myanmar has frustrated the implementation of the 5PC, ASEAN can claim a robust response and international support for its policy, thereby deflecting criticisms against inaction. The policy has also validated its centrality in regional affairs.
Beyond exposing divisions within ASEAN, the Myanmar coup and subsequent developments have had a much more direct spillover effect on its immediate neighbouring countries with which Myanmar shares long borders. Thailand that has a 2,400 kilometres long shared border has hosted an influx of refugees as well as political exiles from the coup. The border town of Mae Sot reportedly hosts some 40,000 refugees with more in the border provinces of Tak and Mae Hong Son. Exiles and members of EAOs are typically to be found in the urban cities of Bangkok and Chiang Mai. These recent arrivals are over and above some 90,000 Myanmar refugees that are currently housed in camps overseen by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Thailand is however not a signatory to refugee conventions and under Thai law those found outside the camps will be deported based on Thai immigration laws. Additionally, some of these camps are close to the border with Myanmar and prone to cross border intrusions.
On October 2023, the Alliance Brotherhood comprising of the Arakan Army (AA representing the Rakhine ethnic group), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA representing the Kokang ethnic group), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA representing the Palaung ethnic group) launched Operation 1027. This military offensive succeeded in capturing large swathes of territory together with military camps and bases along the common border with China. The Alliance and the Kachin Independence Army now control the major overland trade routes into Yunnan province in China. Large numbers of Myanmar military personnel also surrendered during the offensives. Alarmed at the threat to security along its common border China has brokered a ceasefire between the Alliance and Myanmar military. China retains significant influence with the northern EAOs, especially the Wa and Kokang ethnic groups and armies that were previously fighters from the Communist Party of Burma that collapsed in 1989.
Along the Western front where Myanmar shares a long border with India, the Arakan Army’s offensives, and capture of territory in Chin and Rakhine states have led to the influx of refugees into India’s Manipur and Mizoram states. Ethnic minorities along the border like the Kuki and Naga groups are to be found on both sides of the border and those in India are often sympathetic to their kinsfolk. These borders are also porous with regular cross border trade and human traffic. Consequently, and in light of the recent dramatic number of refugees, India has jus announced that it will erect fences along the border with Myanmar. Additionally, members of the Myanmar military have also crossed the border into India after being defeated by the Arakan Army and India has had to airlift them back to the Rakhine state capital Sittwe.
Conclusion
It is now three years since the Myanmar military staged a coup to usurp power from an elected civilian government. The domestic political situation is now akin to a state of civil war and opponents of the military have had remarkable success in their offensives against the army in 2023. By some estimates, the EAOs and PDFs now control two thirds of the country’s territory, However, the large urban cities of Yangon and Mandalay as well as the capital city Naypyitaw where the military elites live remain generally free from violence. Most observers expect the conflict to continue into the medium term and negotiations between the warring parties appear nowhere in sight. The civilian population has borne the brunt of violence in the aftermath of the coup and many of them have fled into neighbouring countries to avoid the violence. It remains to be seen how the situation will finally settle and what form of state and regime emerge. Internationally. the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Hamas have received the limelight even as the Myanmar situation continues to deteriorate.