テロリズムに対する戦争に代わる非暴力的市民行動 Non-violent Civil Alternatives to War on Terrorism

English Below

2002年7月9日 HPI研究フォーラム 

講師 レギーネ・メール(ボン平和研究情報機関(AFB-PRIUB)所長)


1. テーマ
  「テロリズムに対する戦争に代わる非暴力的市民行動」

2. 日時
  2002年7月9日(火) 14:30~17:00

3. 場所
  広島平和研究所 会議室

4. 講演の概要
 2001年9月11日は、果たして世界を変えたのだろうか。我々は、本当に新しい質のテロリズムに出会ったのであろうか。市民社会や国家の発展において、終結を目的とした手段としての個人的・国家的テロリズムの使用には長い歴史があることを、我々は知っていなかったのだろうか。今回のテロ攻撃は、テロに対する戦いをどう決定するかという我々の考えを改める有益な歓迎ではなかろうか。これらの問いは、すべて一般的・歴史的見解における国と市民社会関係の深い探索へとつながる。一方で独裁的な政権でありながら、他方で彼らの社会そのものである、その間の現状関係を細かく分析することが我々に要求されている。また、我々は、アメリカ合衆国がいわゆる「悪の国家」と呼ぶものへ対して精神的撲滅運動を行うという先祖返り的逆行・後退行動の分析をすべきである。つまり、アメリカ優位の「安全」という定義が我々には何を意味するかを注意深く考える必要がある。非暴力的市民行動は、異文化間の理解、異なる社会における多様性の中での社会発展から学ぶと共に、歴史的背景とその追求に対応したものでなければならない。同じ目線での協同パートナーシップを!

5. レギーネ・メール氏の略歴
 1988年ドイツ、ミュンスター大学で、政治学科博士号を取得後、デュッセルドルフ工科大学政治学講師として勤務。1989年、ボン平和研究情報機関(AFB-PRIUB)副所長。1955年、同機関所長就任。その間、女性平和研究者ネットワーク共同創始者・マネージャー、欧州平和学会共同創立者、ドイツ平和・紛争研究協会副会長、専務理事、国際平和学会副会長などを歴任。

HPI Research Forum on July 9, 2002  

Non-violent Civil Alternatives to War on Terrorism

By Regine Mehl, Director of AFB-PRIUB, Peace Research Information Unit

1. Topic
"Non-violent Civil Alternatives to War on Terrorism"

2. Date and Time
July 9 (Tue.), 2002, 14:30-17:00

3. Venue
HPI Conference Room

4. Abstract of forum
The questions Dr. Mehl raised could not be more relevant: "Did 11 September 2001 introduce a qualitatively new kind of terrorism?" "Didn't we know that state terrorism and the private use of terrorism as a means to an end has a long history?" "Weren't the terrorist attacks used by the U.S. as an occasion to realize its hidden agenda and to teach its allies how to use them for such a purpose?" Meanwhile, aggressive war drumming by the U.S. reveals that the hidden agenda again dominates world politics. Dr. Mehl took a deeper look into the relationship of state and civil society. She called for analysis of the atavistic U.S. regression into a "crusading mentality" against so-called "rogue states." Indeed, there is need for a critical view of what the U.S. terms "security" and "constabulary duties" (Wolfowitz) mean to us and to those who may become its targets.

Almost silenced by the phony war drumming, nonviolent and civil alternatives are all but forgotten. Responses to terrorism need to take into account historical contexts and to be guided by intercultural understanding if they are to contribute to a solution. Dr. Mehl called for a cooperative partnership at eye level. The role of the media is especially important, yet most mass media failed to function as the independent powers they should be in a democratic society. The participants found instead that U.S.-influenced media intensified the war drumming and behaved like tools of the U.S. quest for supremacy.

Fortunately, sub-state actors have not yet employed the most dangerous means: 9/11 took place without the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Yet, actually, some of the most dangerous means already used by sub-state actors have been WMD, as in the case of the Sarin gas attack by the Aum Sect in Japan. There are fears about dirty bombs and nuclear terrorism. These fears are justified, and the U.N. should lead the effort to prevent such threats.

The participants discussed evidence that bin Laden is a creation of the United States. (As analyzed by Ahmed Rashid, author of Taliban and Jihad, and others, Islamist terror was invented 25 years ago and financed by the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.) An answer to the question "What made al-Qaeda turn against its master?" might contribute significantly to an understanding of sub-state terrorism, but the U.S. seems unready to address this question. Participants also felt that, if an attempt were made to eliminate al-Qaeda, many other organizations would simply spring up to replace it. It is necessary to address the root causes of sub-state terrorism - for instance, the Middle East conflict and U.S. blunders regarding the Israel-Palestine question, as well as its attempt to militarize the Middle Eastern region. For many people the "war on terrorism" appears rather to be a war against Islam.

(By Christian P. Scherrer, professor at HPI)

 5. Abstract of the lecture 
(Reprinted below are the abstract and text of the paper prepared by Dr.Mehl, followed by her bio-bibliography.)

Was 11 September 2001 the day that changed the world? Did we really meet a new quality of terrorism? Didn't we all know that state terrorism and private use of terrorism as a means to an end has a long history in the development of civil societies and state entities? Aren't terrorist attacks a useful welcome in order to replace own ideas of how to dominate the fight against them? All these questions lead to a deeper search into the relationship of state and civil society in general and in historical perspective. A critical analysis of the current relationship between autocratic and oligarchic regimes on the one hand and their societies on the other hand is required. It also brings us to an analysis of the atavistic backlash/regression of the US into a "crusading mentality" against so-called "rogue states"; there is a need for a critical look at the very special US-dominated definition of what their term of "security" could mean to us. The nonviolent and civil alternatives on the other hand all cope with historical contexts and their follow-ups as well as with intercultural understanding and learning from the societal developments within the diversity of different societies, i.e. cooperative partnership at the eye le7. Paper of Dr.Mehl
Non-Violent Civil Alternatives to War on Terrorism
Paper to be presented at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, July 9 2002, 14:30-17:00

1. A look at the world - Informational "lopsidedness" in the age of the media

In the abstract which I wrote for your website I pose several questions about the global political situation following the September 11th, 2001.  Because this date on which the inordinately large terrorist attack on the USA took place has since become regarded as some kind of "turning point", I will take the liberty of examining this critically - for most of the things that have been discussed on the international political stage since that day have been dominated by military logic consisting of a combination of concepts about the enemy ("rogue states") and fantasies about armed retaliation. This attitude also dominates media coverage - this is the case across the world and in nearly all states on earth (including the Arab world).

Since all governments in the western and northern hemisphere, and several in the southern hemisphere have thought it politically advantageous to declare their solidarity with the attacked USA, it hardly has been possible to hear discriminating or critical voices. While we as intellectuals in the academic world enjoy the great advantage of a more balanced view owing to our knowledge, education, research, and our ability to think abstractly and for these reasons are able to criticize politics factually and develop alternatives this is not possible for the majority of the human race. Most people depend upon the media for information, which is available in their respective circumstances.

Most of the media, unfortunately, is neither independent nor neutral. On the contrary: The larger and the more globally networked the media is, the more it takes a stance that supports national policy and caters to what governments do, what governments want to hear, and what the military could do should a conflict or a crisis become violent. For this reason, most people are forced to accept what I call "the dearth of information"and must form their opinions on that basis. This means that expertise which is developed on the civil levels of society such as expertise gained in action groups or NGOs is ignored or is not even noticed because no one reports on the work of these organisations, or only occasionally, and then mostly with a negative slant.

What is the consequence of this? Most people in Central Europe, North America, and in many Asian and East Asian countries generally entertain healthy critical views about the USA, but some - despite whole-heartedly copying the American way of life - have elevated anti-American sentiments to a philosophy of life; and yet on the other hand there is enormous worldwide approval for the war which the Americans fought in Afghanistan because a country was liberated from an atavistic and oppressive regime as a consequence of the attacks on the 11th September, 2001. For most of these people and for most politicians who gave public statements on this war - including many politicians from alternative parties of the left - it is simply unimaginable that there could have been other, non-violent means of ending the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

This is where we as scientists and intellectuals have a responsibility within our societies. At this point we must leave our ivory towers and go public. We have to meet people and create forums by means of which civil society can express alternative views - for one thing is quite clear when it comes to these observations and considerations: non-violent solutions to conflicts and crises are highly challenging and often comprise many separate components which include complex suggestions that generally do not take effect from one day to another and which, moreover, require great staying power.

2. Causes of international terrorism

First an important preliminary remark: terrorism is not a new phenomenon. We are therefore not confronted with an essentially new situation because terrorist activities can be traced back to the very beginning of the creation of states. In Europe this applies to the "ancient Greeks" and the Romans - and I am sure that you will recall that there were also terrorist or violent activities at the very beginning of the creation of Asian and East Asian states. Before states developed, i.e. structures that executed the authority of the state by means of some kind of defined monopoly of power, people were organized into clearly defined microstructures with rigid hierarchies. Individuals were "well-known" to their rulers and were within reach and controllable at any time. Within these structures there was virtually no space that afforded an opportunity to organize counter-movements. In addition, people were completely free from environmental and media stimuli, but instead were mentally subject to a single-cause fixation on one or several leaders of such micro-societies: They were divinely ordained and so had to be respected.

There is also nothing new about the fact that the attacks in the USA were not directed against their own regimes in the Islamic world, but against a foreign power and on that power's own territory. Such "borderless" or cross-border terrorism also existed in the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe.

There is nothing new either about the fact that the terrorists involved many innocent people who were subsequently killed in their attacks. The terrorism of the seventies in Central Europe, mainly in Germany and France, was of a similar nature, and the same applies to suicide attackers in many regions of the world, not only in Palestine.

What is new, however, is the dimension of the effects of the terrorist attacks in the USA. On the one hand, we have the extent of the destruction and the incredible number of victims and, on the other, the international reactions at all high political levels. Until recently, terrorists and their activities have mainly been a matter for police forces, and in the case of international terror groups, they were cases for Interpol. For a state or an alliance of states to wage war against terrorism is in fact quite new - and not in accordance with international law. But this is actually of no interest to anyone anymore.

In my opinion, it is necessary to distinguish three main causal groups with respect to terrorism because the alternatives to war must also take these into account:

·        Poverty, oppression, the lack of democratisation
·        Islamic terror cells created with Western help (secret services, mainly the CIA)
·        Support of autocratic and theocratic regimes by the West (especially by the USA)

(1) There is a controversial debate about whether social deprivation and structural oppression are contributory causes or single causes for terrorist phenomena and groups.

Of course they are neither, at least not by themselves. International terrorism is much too multi-layered for this to be the case. If one examines a multinational organisation such as El-Qaida - and there are many types of these in different sectors (e.g. nuclear terrorism) - then it can be seen that neither their function, their cult-like monolithic and theocratic organisation, nor their infrastructure has anything to do with an extremely violent reaction to poverty and oppression, even if they employ these arguments in public in order to secure the support of their base. Terrorist acts such as those committed on the September 11th, 2001 in and against the USA are probably aimed at some something different, a point to which I will return to in due course.[1]

It is different with small terrorist cells. These exercise terror on the micro-level of their causal context in the immediate surroundings of their home. Most suicide attacks, by the way, are neither committed by Palestinian nor Arab terrorists, but by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.

Social deprivation and oppression play a major role in these terrorist activities. Of course, we immediately think of the Intifada of the Palestinians and of the terrorist acts among its radical supporters, but a look at a number of Black African states or at South America teaches us that there is something else:  profound social and mental upheavals created by social modernisation processes, which can be observed in their grossest form in some Latin American and Black African states.

Capitalist modernisation - and who else stated this better than Karl Marx himself - causes insecurity and fear, since the successive processes of modernisation, urbanisation, and education can completely destroy traditional social and family structures, especially if these processes take hold in autocratic political structures.

The inhibited transition from traditional communities to modern society manifests itself as an accumulation of disadvantages and injustices. Only the social and mental erosion of the traditional social environment caused by these processes have persuaded the world to look at Islamic fundamentalism as if it were a phenomenon issuing from the Middle Ages or the Stone Age. This is also the view of the American government. And its allies also regard it in this way in order to confront the "evil emerging from each erosion.

The crucial factor, however, is not that a "successful" war is waged - rather it is far more important whether it is possible to establish new forms of social integration in this vacuum of identity, which are accepted by the majority of people. Both Arab nationalism and Marxist interpretations have attempted this, namely to combine the imperative of social modernisation with enthusiasm for progress while at the same time guaranteeing social equality.[2]

(2) In the context of analysing the causes of international terrorism it is often argued that the losers of globalisation are to blame, where the term 'globalisation' here refers to its negative aspects. A look at the perpetrators of the attacks of the September 11th and at the operatives - to the extent that these are known - of the multinational network organisation, El-Qaida, clearly does not identify them as victims, but as beneficiaries of globalisation. I am probably reiterating a well-known fact when I say that the monies of the former Saudi Binladin Group (construction firm and property speculators) have been invested very profitably in a number of successor organisations in the international financial system. And the perpetrators were definitely not poor, but, quite to the contrary, were members of the middle and upper classes of their societies who not only had university places and scholarships in the West, but also received material support from fundamentalist Islamic networks.[3]

We can see from this that there is not an automatic causal relationship between the impoverishment processes in some parts of the Third World and international terrorism. Political fundamentalist Islam and its most radical terrorist groups are not rooted in poverty.

Just why this kind of terrorism, however, could take root and grow so large in the last 20 years is not explained by this alone. To explain this more fully we must look back to the height of the Cold War when the two block leaders not only waged "representative wars", but also used insurgents to create terror networks against the global adversary by means of undercover operations and activities in NDCs and countries of the so-called Third World. To act politically on the international stage in this way during the East/West conflict was to a certain extent an "accepted custom". The Taliban movement in Afghanistan was in the end a construct of the CIA. The El-Qaida fighters and especially Osama bin Laden as the leading head were on the CIA's payroll for many years. Many of the mountain caves into which the Taliban regime retreated at the beginning of the bombing raids were dug out by the construction companies of the Saudi Binladin Group with the help of American logistical support.[4]

The Pakistani journalist and scientist, Ahmed Rashid, estimates that more than 100,000 radicalised Muslims from nearly all Central Asian states, including Turkey, as well as from various Black African countries belong to the El-Qaida network.[5]

(3) All these activities conducted by the United States must be viewed in the context of its support for autocratic and theocratic regimes. One reason why this has happened is that these regimes were able to support the terror networks on the spot free from any kind of control or publicity and equip them with authentic ideologies, which are extremely important for the creation of an identity within an Islamic fundamentalist or similar kind of autism. Extreme forms of terrorism in which the terrorist throws away his life in an attack cannot be had for nothing - this is something which must be practised even in theocratic cult structures.

3. The aims of terrorism

Muslims tending to fundamentalism have long been observing with suspicion that the USA has been supporting regimes such as in Saudi Arabia that preach water, but drink wine, that is to say: the USA supports autocracies for power-political reasons which, in the eyes of the fundamentalists, have long erred from the true faith.[6]

They have also come to realise that the Americans don't give a damn about the essential demands of the Islamic world if these don't fit into the concepts of the USA's foreign and security policies of the time. The best example for this is the demand of the Arab world since 1947 to further the creation of a Palestinian state at international level in order to pre-empt what is now so shocking to us in the Middle East.

Finally, many believers in fundamentalist doctrines have turned their backs on the tremendously fast modernisation processes in a somewhat gross and helpless manner and instead have fallen back on the radical messages of salvation - and in this way, of course, people can be very easily exploited and used.

Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and other so-called "religious fanatics" misuse and exploit religious agitators and verses from the Koran in order to legitimise their terrorist activities. By pointing out the mistakes of American world order politics and by personifying America as Satan, they provide their supporters with an identifiable figure on which they can take revenge for committed injustice.

Bin Laden's messages are proclamations filled with hate. Instead of preaching about fighting for freedom and justice for the downtrodden and the offended, he preaches hatred and destruction.  This destructive element is void of an earthly vision or of an utopian dream except for the eschatological promise of final salvation in the hereafter. The issue therefore is not political power as was the case with Che Guevara or with Ho-tschi Min. The only thing that remains is the apocalyptic dimension of hatred. There is no manifesto, at least none that can be identified from all the documents that are currently available.[7]

4. The alternatives: Six problems at the core of world politics[8]

If we wish to speak of alternatives to waging war against terrorism we must consider six problems at the core of present-day world politics:

Extremely unbalanced power structures, which result in feelings of powerlessness in disadvantaged regions and states.
Social polarisation and segregation in disadvantaged regions and states resulting from modernisation processes incomprehensible to those involved.

An anachronistic security policy that thinks in terms of 19th and 20th century stereotypes and is entrenched in nationalistic egotism.

Neglected regional conflicts in which the agents on the spot are merely used by Western states to serve their own interests (example: Afghanistan and the states of Central Asia that have enormous oil and gas reserves at their disposal).

Irresponsible elitist groups in so-called developing and newly developing countries (NDCs) who are only concerned about acquiring wealth for themselves and who have neither interest in building up a society nor in protecting human rights or sharing power.

Global powerlessness and cross-cultural divides in perception due to the one-sided stipulation of cultural standards that are valid in the West.

5. Alternatives: Moving towards a domestic policy for the world with "internal world law"

The politics of developed countries must combine and balance three aspects with each other: (1) Visible contributions to solving the conflict in Palestine based on a fair exchange; (2) Creation of a culture of partnership and co-operation with the Islamic world at "eye-level" such as the dismantling of cultural concepts of "the enemy" as well as racist views, together with a political attitude that is consistently guided by the observance of human rights. This must also apply to states that are seen as "friends" - such as Saudi Arabia - which are nonetheless profoundly undemocratic autocracies; (3) In agreement with the respective partners, the interests of all parties involved must be taken into account and economic balance and investment must be ensured in exchange for resources and guaranteed energy supplies - here, too, this must be done "at eye-level".

These suggestions can only be implemented in the long run, but they can build confidence and open doors at first initiatives in this direction if Western and Northern states fundamentally change their attitudes. This is a long-term strategy to combat terrorism.

However, economic and political hobnobbing with local dictatorships and corrupt power elites fosters terrorism and in fact urges on those who are prepared to resort to violence and who anyway do not accept the power monopoly of the state.

Another important point which must be considered in uprooting terrorism is the transition from patriarchal "development aid" to a "co-operation on development" in a relationship between equal partners.  It is not so long ago that the countries of the Western and Northern hemisphere began to realise how well their investments are spent if their own societies are willing to learn from the societies in the south i.e. that there is great wealth to be gained in the exchange of wares and culture - instead of indulging in arrogant prejudices and displaying aggressive dissatisfaction at the allegedly sloppy use of resources provided by the state and the churches.

I know this has remained a dream until now because for this to happen there needs to be something like a revolution in development aid policy. It (development aid policy) must be turned into a global structural policy to achieve the aims listed above. But this takes far more than simply increasing the budget of the relevant ministry from time to time by 0.02% or something of that order. This revolution must gain the insight that reduction to a single cause and military-dominated thinking leads to a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence in situations of conflict and crisis. But since underdevelopment and the disintegration of societies and states endanger peace, a new development policy must aim to strengthen the inner development potentials of these countries through initiatives that create structures. There are three pillars necessary for this: (1) Fighting poverty with immediate effect; (2) Creating economic resources that can compete on the world markets and are environmentally sustainable; (3) Strengthening powerful democratic institutions and feasible judicial systems. The second and third pillars are aimed at a medium to long-term effect and serve to ensure stability.

Such a policy requires many resources, and means that the states in the Northern and Western hemisphere must fundamentally rethink their priorities. The military as the constitutive element of all democracies worldwide without exception (apart from Costa Rica) and the prop for all regimes that are ruled by autocratic, oligarchic, and theocratic power elites consumes enormous amounts of resources and must be reduced to a level which is of direct benefit to the restructuring processes that are required for such a new structural development policy.

In this way, global structure policy would turn into a crisis prevention policy and could also contribute to overcoming other global problems such as those of climate change, migration, AIDS, and, last but not least, global terrorism, at least to the extent that it conveys a message and is not simply driven by raging hatred. This type of terrorism, too, is a product of existing circumstances and this is why a convincing global structure policy could also uproot it.

Let us for a moment imagine a scenario in which industrialized countries and developing countries worked together to find solutions for common problems: in such a case converging views, shared standards and interests, cross-cultural learning and trust on social, economic, and political levels would go hand in hand and generate solutions.

And finally, a global structure policy of this kind would turn into a domestic world policy, which would require internal world law. What do I mean by this? Conventional international law was developed as a contractual system on a governmental level between states. Internal world law would also grant rights to individuals in different societies. The history of nation states teaches us that the law is an essential instrument for civilizing power and is the basis of democracy. The beginnings of this already exist and can be seen in the protection of human rights in many regions (yet not everywhere) e.g. the UN tribunals with respect to Yugoslavia and Rwanda; the mediation mechanisms of the world trade organisation; the agreements on environmental protection and disarmament, and certain social standards for multinationals. But these are only the first steps, which need to be extended to a global legal system. An important component, for example, would be the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).

And further: political and judicial security policies must be brought together i.e. an "International Constitutional Court" is required that ensures the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive in the context of the United Nations. Today's composition of the Security Council seems to be attempting to be a "World Intervention Court", but in fact only follows the logic of the power politics of its members. In future, it could have its decisions reviewed by an independent "International Constitutional Court" to verify whether they are in accordance with international law.

If military interventions are deemed necessary - since, sadly enough it is hardly imaginable that the military will ever be a thing of the past - these should only be permitted if they are embedded in political and judicial security policies.

6. Concluding remarks: Conservative trends and their consequences

In conclusion, I would like to draw your attention to how politics and society in Europe and the USA are increasingly drifting in a certain conservative direction. I am very eager to hear from you later as to how you assess the situation with respect to this issue in Japan and across East Asia.

I would like to refer back to the beginning of my lecture where I referred to a "dearth of information" to which most people are subjected, despite international networking of the media and the Internet because they are informed by media companies which represent one-sided interests of power and do not really want people to develop a discriminating awareness about certain issues.

Allow me to take as an example the information policy of the USA: Most broadcasters in the USA simply reduce political news to personalities i.e. to the nature, character, biography, and the way of life of politicians. Political contexts and the big WHY that constitute the background to conflicts and crises as well as terrorism are generally not touched upon. This has two effects upon average Americans: (1) Subjective personification leads to emotional reactions, both positive and negative, with regard to the assessment of the political figures involved. (2) Because political contexts generally do not play any role whatsoever or only a subordinate role, average Americans cannot evaluate the importance of problems and relate them to a larger context because contexts are not given.

Such an information policy, which has already taken root in Europe because of concentrations of large companies causes widespread fear of all that is new and fans prejudice. This, of course, is deliberate and leads to a mentality that isolates itself from all alternative ideas on how crises and conflicts could be resolved. At the same time, this results in almost atavistic relapses into martial methods of "defence" against everything that could threaten this isolation.

And this makes it even easier for governments - especially for the US government - to propagate this separation or the resulting "isolationism" as a security requirement; this is a security concept that does not arise from political prudence and does not bring about integration, but on the contrary is militarily aggressive and politically exclusive. Right from the start the states of the alliance are excluded from finding common solutions - despite statements to the contrary i.e. on how important the international partners are in the war against terrorism.

For some time now, the trend in Europe has also been going in this direction. Many national governments are either very conservative or very right wing - sometimes even resulting in near racist legislation such as in the case of Denmark. What will happen in France remains to be seen.[9]

I would like now to discuss with you how it is at all possible to work for the alternatives outlined above within such a hostile climate and how one can organise alternative publicity in order to show that civil societies also have other voices apart from the muffled calls for military retaliation and war.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Compare Bruno Schoch: The 11th September as receipt? It is not the USA's catalogue of misdeeds which is the cause of terrorism, but neglected democratisation. HSFK-Standpunkte No. 6/2001, Frankfurt/M. 2001, page 6/7

[2] Ibid. pp. 8/9

[3] Ibid. p. 9

[4] Christian P. Scherrer: What is new? What could have prevented September 11th? Manuscript. Hiroshima Peace Institute, 15th February 2002, e-mail manuscript, page 1

[5] Ibid. p. 2

[6] Cf. Schoch pp. 4/5

[7] Ibid. pp. 3/4

[8] The following explanations partly refer to (with my own additions and enlargements): Hamm, Brigitte/Hippler, Jochen/Messner, Dirk/Weller, Christoph: World Politics at the Watershed. The 11th September 2001 and its consequences. Policy paper 19 of the Foundation for Development and Peace (SEF), Bonn, March 2002, particularly pages 9-15

[9] The only exception at the moment is the victory of the Social Democrats in the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic a few weeks ago. Conservatives now rule all other countries that held elections in the past three years, partly with fascist parties in coalition. In Denmark, a law has been passed that prohibits Danes from marrying a foreigner before the age 24. Between the ages of 18 and 24 one is not seen has possessing the necessary maturity. The law contains further restrictions that refer to marriage with foreigners.

7. Profile of Dr. Regine Mehl

Regine Mehl, born 1957 in Bonn (Germany), studied political science, sociology and international law at the universities of Freiburg and Münster (Germany); MA 1984; PhD 1988; Deputy Director of the Peace Research Information Unit Bonn since April 1989; Director of PRIUB since January 1995.

  • Education

1988 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Political Science
University of Muenster, Germany
Major: Political Science; Minor: Sociology, Public / Constitutional Law 

1984 

Master of Arts (MA), Political Science
University of Muenster, Germany
Major: Political Science; Minor: Sociology, Public / Constitutional Law 

  • Professional positions

January1995 to present: Director, Peace Research Information Unit Bonn (PRIUB) 
April 1989 - December 1994: Deputy Director Peace Research Information Unit Bonn (PRIUB)
April 1992 - September 1992: Lecturer, Political Science Technical College Duesseldorf 

  • Professional responsibilities and service

Beginning January 1999: Elected Member Selection Committee for Scholarships Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Bonn 
March 1989: Program Organizer Seminar for Doctoral Candidates: Détente between the Superpowers: Aspects of the Détente Perspectives within the Two Germanies, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Bonn 
April 1999: Program Organizer Seminar for Grant Candidates: Foreign and Security Policy of the Two Germanies - Focus: The Concept of Common Security and the Chances for Disarmament and Détente Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Bonn
January 1989 - March 1989: Research Assistant Research Project Youth and Conflicts Comenius Institute Muenster
October 1988 - December 1988: Freelance Researcher StudyPeace Studies at British and Irish Universities

University of Lancaster (UK)
November 1987 - December 1987: Intern/Trainee Working Group: Foreign and Security Policy, European and Development Policy
Socialdemocratic Party, Faction of the German Bundestag
May 1981 - December 1984: Assistant Faculty of Law, Chair of Public / Administrative Law University of Muenster

  • Major Offices in academic / professional associations

June 1998- June 2000:  Vice President International Peace Research Association (IPRA) 
June 1996- June 1998: Council Member International Peace Research Association (IPRA) 
February 1990 -February 1994:  Managing Director, Deputy Chair German Association for Peace and Conflict

Research 

April 1990: Co-founder European Peace Research Association (EuPRA) 
February 1990-February 1994: Co-founder, Manager Network of Women Peace Reseachers 

  • Membership in academic / professional associations

International Peace Research Association (IPRA)
European Peace Research Association (EuPRA)
Peace Studies Association (PSA)
Society for Intercultural Education, Training and Research (SIETAR)
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
German Association for Peace and Conflict Research
Joseph-Wirth-Foundation for International Understanding    

  • Selected participation at national and international conferences and symposia

August 2000:  International Peace Research Association, bi-annual conference; convener of the working group on Indigenous Peoples Rights (together with John Synott, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia) 
October 1999:  International Conference on Conflict Management, Charlotte, South Carolina, USA. Paper Presentation: "Emerging Conflicts in Merging Societies".
November 1998: World Congress of the Society for Intercultural Education, Training and Research (SIETAR). Paper presentation, "A New Basis for Intercultural Understanding and Ethno-political Conflict Management in Germany and Europe." Tokyo, Japan.
May 1998: International Conference, Globalization - on Whose Terms? Paper presentation, "We Had the Audacity to Survive: Some Remarks on Australia's Black Heritage and Its Intra-Societal Problems." Institute for Educational Research, the University of Oslo, Norway.
April 1998 : Represented the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) Council at the European Congress of the Society for Intercultural Education, Training and Research (SIETAR). Presentation on intercultural and nonviolent conflict management and the appropriate cooperation between IPRA and SIETAR. Bath, UK.
June 1997: Represented the IPRA Council at the World Congress of the International Association for Conflict Management (IACM). Presentation on close cooperation with IPRA in the field of conflict management. Bonn, Germany. 
Sept./Oct. 1996:  Inaugural Conference of the Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy (CCM). Paper presentation, "Culture, Culture of Peace and the Nonviolent Development of Participating Citizenship - Remarks on the State of the Art in Germany and Europe". Brisbane, Australia.
November 1993: Co-Organizer and Manager, Second International Conference of the European Peace Research Association (EuPRA). Budapest, Hungary.
November 1991: Co-Organizer and Manager, First International Conference of the European Peace Research Association (EuPRA). Florence, Italy. 
March 1991: Thirty-Second Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA). Paper presentation, "Women Peace Researchers in German Peace Research Institutions after the Unification." Vancouver, Canada.

  • Major publications

Mehl, R. (2000), "Challenges for Peace Research in the 21st Century: A Dialogue of Civilizations." In: AFB-INFO 2/2000 (pp 11-14). Bonn 2000 (Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung Bonn / Peace Research Information Unit Bonn). 
Mehl, R. (1999), "We Had the Audacity to Survive" --Some Remarks on Australia's Black Heritage and Its Intra-societal Problems." In: Birgit Brock-Utne / Gunnar Garbo (Eds.) Globalization -- on whose terms? (pp 261-265). Oslo 1999 (University of Oslo, Institute for Educational Research, Report No. 5 1999). 
Mehl, R. (1997), Keyword: OSCE. In: Ulrich Albrecht / Helmut Volger (Eds.) Encyclopaedia of International Politics (pp. 405-410). München / Wien: R. Oldenbourg Verlag.
Mehl, R. and Czempiel, E.O. (1996), "The Development of Peace and Conflict Research in Germany since 1990 - A Comprehensive Survey." In: AFB-INFO (Bonn) 1996 (1), pp. 1-5.
Mehl, R. (1994), "For a Pacifist Alternative: Approaches and Outlines of Non-violent Conflict Resolution." In: Bernhard Moltmann (Ed.) Future Needs Peace - The Future of the Christian Peace Corps (pp. 18-26). Arnoldshain: Arnoldshainer Protokolle 1994 (1). 
Mehl, R. and Koch, J. (1994, Eds.), When Borderlines are Transgressed. Politics of Intervention: Between Conflict Prevention and Crisis Intervention. German Association for Peace and Conflict Research, Vol. XXII. Baden-Baden: NOMOS Verlag, pp. 238.
Mehl, R. and Dominikowski, T. (1994, Eds.), Bound by Humanism: The Pacifist Engagement as a Matter of Topical Interest. Münster: agenda Verlag, pp. 261. 
Mehl, R. (1993), "On the Test: The CSCE between Nonviolent Logic and the Military Logic." In: Hanne-Margret Birckenbach / Uli Jäger / Christian Wellmann (Eds.), Yearbook for Peace 1994 (pp. 61-71). München: Verlag C.H. Beck. Mehl, R. (1993, Ed.), At the End of Marginalization? Selected Contributions of the First Symposium of the Network of Women Peace Researchers: Europe's Integration - Peaceful or Patriarchal? Bonn. Peace Research Information Unit Bonn, Documentation 1993 (1).
Mehl, R. (1992), "The National and International Activities of Peace and Conflict Research 1990/91 in the Course of the Dissolution of the East West Conflict." In: Ulrike C. Wasmuht (Ed.), Does Knowledge Mean Power? The Recent Purpose of Peace Research (pp. 295-317). German Association for Peace and Conflict Research, Vol. XIX. Baden-Baden: NOMOS Verlag. 
Mehl, R. and Koppe, K. (1990), "25 Years International Peace Research Association (IPRA)." In: AFB-INFO (Bonn) 1990 (2), pp. 1-3. 
Mehl, R. (1989), "Peace Studies at British and Irish Universities." In: AFB-INFO (Bonn) 1989 (1), pp. 1-5. 
Mehl, R. (1989), The German Parliamentary Parties and National Security Policy. A Synoptic Study of Concepts, Positions, and Perspectives (Doctoral Thesis). Bochum: Verlag Brockmeyer, pp. 315.