Comparative Study on Japanese and Chinese Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy and Peacebuilding

Martyna Szoja（PhD Candidate at University of Duisburg-Essen）

Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are often perceived as very different actors within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan is widely seen as a global leader advocating for a world without nuclear weapons, while China is sometimes regarded with suspicion as a disruptor. However, this simplistic view overlooks the significant evolution in China’s non-proliferation policies and narratives. Today, both countries’ official positions on non-proliferation reveal notable similarities, creating a paradox where China could potentially challenge Japan’s leadership role.

While there is extensive scholarship on Japan’s approach to nuclear disarmament, comparative studies analyzing the PRC’s policies remain scarce. My research aims to fill this gap, offering the first in-depth comparative analysis of Japanese and Chinese nuclear non-proliferation strategies. In this short essay, I will try to present my preliminary findings, which will be published in the future in an academic journal.

Introduction

My personal connection to this field began in August 2024, when I joined the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs Youth Leader Fund program during a study trip to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I never imagined returning so quickly then. However, in January 2025, I began my fellowship at the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) as the first female researcher from Europe selected for this program. Conducting my field research from January to March 2025 strengthened my expertise and reinforced my aspiration to contribute to international peace efforts against nuclear weapons.

My comparative analysis is based on National Role Theory1 and Social Identity Theory2, with a focus on political discourse and official narratives rather than solely practical actions.

Similarities and Differences in Japan’s and China’s Non-Proliferation Approaches

Both Japan and China officially oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament, support strengthening global frameworks like the NPT and the IAEA, and show reluctance toward the TPNW.3 However, both countries also prioritize their national security interests. In Japan’s case, this is evident through its reliance on the U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence (END), while China explicitly highlights national interests, for example, in official statements by Foreign Minister Wang Yi.4

The main differences – the interest of my research – lie in how each country frames its position. Japan often highlights nuclear disarmament as a moral obligation stemming from its historical experience as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings. China, by contrast, frames its commitment through the lens of strategic stability and national sovereignty. At the same time, both countries exhibit internal contradictions: Japan advocates for nuclear abolition while depending on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and China supports disarmament while simultaneously modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal.

Engagement with the international system by both countries also differs significantly. Japan’s participation in UN frameworks aims to strengthen the current liberal international order, whereas China promotes alternative governance concepts, often positioning itself as a leader of the Global South. Grassroots activism is another point of divergence. Japan has an active civil society movement, exemplified by groups like Nihon Hidankyo, while in China, activism around disarmament is state-driven, with two groups: Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD), and China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA); playing limited roles.

Narrative Construction

In Japan, the dominant narrative frames the country as a peace leader/maker/promoter and unique victim of nuclear warfare. The best sources for researching these national roles are easily available online e.g. in Diplomatic Bluebooks and editions of Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy. With developed peace tourism, especially in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Peace Promotion Divisions, UNITAR Hiroshima, and strong grassroot activism5 “Japan’s accomplishments are evident both at home and abroad and a source of great pride”.6 Japanese officials emphasize the moral obligation to advocate for disarmament, pointing to achievements such as co-founding the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), submitting annual nuclear disarmament resolutions to the UN since 1994, and supporting denuclearization projects in former Soviet states.7

Unfortunately, there are recent signs of tension. In February 2025, Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi confirmed Japan would not participate as an observer at the 3rd Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, citing national security concerns.8 Additionally, reports that Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba would skip the meeting stirred criticism among hibakusha communities.9

China’s official narrative has evolved significantly, particularly after 2000. 10 11 The PRC highlights its support for the complete prohibition of WMDs and its commitment to peaceful development. As stated by State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) “China is a peace-loving country and an important force in maintaining world peace and stability.”12 In White Papers and speeches by officials like Ambassador Li Song, China portrays itself as a responsible stakeholder in international security. First of all, the PRC’s role can be described as not only a supporter but also an active player and potential leader.13 China’s promotion of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) reflects its ambition to reshape the global security order, while its emphasis on maintaining No First Use (NFU) policy positions it as a “peaceful” nuclear state.14 At the same time, China critiques U.S. military policies and presents itself as a counterbalance to Western dominance – positioning itself also as the “policemen”.15 While Japan is the only country that suffered from atomic bombs, the PRC presents itself as the only country that invented and follows the NFU and the first Nuclear Weapon State to ratify Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreement under NPT in 2002.16 17

Strategic Identities and Future Outlook

Both countries' national roles reflect different strategic identities. Japan projects itself as a “civilian power,” relying on diplomacy, economic influence, and U.S. security guarantees. China presents itself as a “rising great power,” aiming to restore its historical position of influence, particularly in Asia, and to challenge Western-led systems. Social Identity Theory helps explain their alignments: Japan identifies with liberal democracies, while China positions itself as a leader among non-Western, developing states advocating for a multipolar world.

Japan’s stance on non-proliferation remains consistent, though debates over nuclear deterrence and the TPNW show growing tensions. China’s approach has evolved, and when it emphasizes its commitments to non-proliferation it clashes with assertive modernization of its nuclear capabilities.

The question of whether Japan and China can cooperate in nuclear non-proliferation remains open. Although the 1998 Japan-China Joint Declaration on Peace and Development provides a historical foundation, existing active tensions, especially over security issues, continue to complicate meaningful collaboration.18 The Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation welcomed a delegation from the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD) in 2015 and 2018 – but there is no information about any further exchange.19 Nonetheless, scholars such as Prof. Haruka Satake remain cautiously optimistic about the potential for future Japan-China cooperation in this critical area.20 If both countries genuinely commit to nuclear non-proliferation, it would significantly strengthen international security.

Conclusion

Japan and China approach nuclear non-proliferation through different lenses but share interests in global stability. Understanding their narratives, strategies, and evolving roles is essential for advancing global disarmament and peacebuilding efforts. As the international order faces increasing uncertainty, fostering dialogue between these two key Asian and global powers remains crucial for the future of nuclear non-proliferation.

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  1. On National Role Conceptions see: Holsti, Kalevi (1970), “National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14, pp. 233-309; He, Kai (2015), “Contested Regional Orders and Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific” International Politics 52 (2), pp. 208-222; He, Kai (2018), “Role conceptions, order transition and institutional balancing in the Asia-Pacific: A new theoretical framework,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 72(2), pp. 92-109. ↩︎
  2. On Social Identity Theory see: Tajfel, Henri, M. G. Billig and R. P. Bundy, (1971) “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior,” European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 149-178, Tajfel, Henri/Turner, John C. (1979), “An integrative theory of intergroup conflict,” in W. G. Austin and S. Worchel, eds., The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole), Turner, John C. et. al. (1987), Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), Wendt, Alexander (1999), Social theory of international politics, Vol. 67. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ↩︎
  3. See: MOFA Japan(2005), Japan: Path of 60 Years as a Nation Striving for Peace (Tokyo: MOFA); MOFA Japan(2006), Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy," 4th Edition (Tokyo: MOFA). <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/pamph0812.html>. Accessed: 2025-01-28; MOFA Japan(2011), Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy," 5th Edition (Tokyo: MOFA); MOFA Japan(2006) Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Part III (Tokyo: MOFA); MOFA Japan(2024) “Overview of the International Situation and Outlook for Japan’s Diplomacy Message to the World at a Turning Point in History - Human Dignity,” Diplomatic Bluebook 2024(Tokyo: MOFA); MOFA PRC (2010) “United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)” (Beijing: MOFA); MOFA PRC (2022) “The Global Security Initiative. Concept Paper” (Beijing: MOFA); MOFA PRC (2024) “Statement by Mr. Sun Xiaobo, Director General of the Department of Arms Control of MFA of China at the General Debate of 79th UNGA First Committee” (Beijing: MoFA); <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/202410/t20241011_11505414.html>. Accessed: 2025-03-02. ↩︎
  4. MOFA PRC: n.d. ↩︎
  5. Especially but not only founded by hibakusha. ↩︎
  6. MOFA Japan 2011: 6. ↩︎
  7. MOFA Japan 2011: 6, MOFA Japan 2008. ↩︎
  8. MOFA Japan外務省 (2025), “〔February 18〕Regular Press Conference：Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, IWAYA Takeshi,” MOFA Japan Youtube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l8h7Mk0fhDA>. Accessed: 2025-03-02. ↩︎
  9. “Japan lawmakers may attend U.N. nuclear ban meeting, Ishiba to skip,” Kyodo News, 2025-01-25, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2025/01/e2494acd8544-japan-pm-likely-to-skip-nuclear-ban-treaty-meeting-in-new-york.html>. Accessed: 2025-01-26. ↩︎
  10. During the Maoist era, Chinese participation in the global non-proliferation norm was unlikely, as there was no inclination towards non-proliferation discussions and the PRC actively developed its nuclear capabilities. Non-proliferation goals were perceived as tools to maintain strategic disadvantages for the PRC (Foot/Walter 2010: 165). In 1992, the PRC signed the NPT, likely influenced by the revelation of Iraq's nuclear program and the PRC's export of a nuclear reactor to Algeria, as well as France's willingness to join the Treaty (Davis 1995: 591 in: Yuan 2000: n.p.). Despite this signing, PRC's implementation faced skepticism. While generally supportive of preventing horizontal proliferation, the PRC showed reluctance to pressure countries like North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan and continued its nuclear trade with Algeria, Iran, and Pakistan (Foot/Walter 2010: 163-164; see also Burr (edit.) 2004). ↩︎
  11. Medeiros 2007 : 89. ↩︎
  12. SASTIND 2016. ↩︎
  13. MOFA PRC (2010), "China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures”. Website: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. 2010-05-27. <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjlc_665236/fkswt_665240/200802/t20080229_599800.html>. Accessed: 2024-06-06. ↩︎
  14. MOFA PRC (2004) “Statement at the General Debate by H.E. Amb. LI Song, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China and Head of Chinese Delegation to the First Committee of the 77th Session of the UNGA”. 2022-10-11. Website: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjfywj_665252/202210/t20221011_10780842.html>. Accessed: 2024-05-01. ↩︎
  15. SASTIND 2016. ↩︎
  16. Gu, Xinping 古新萍 (2004), “China pursues policy of nuclear non-proliferation”. Website: China Atomic Energy Authority. 2004-09-22 <https://www.caea.gov.cn/english/n6759374/n6759376/c6793216/content.html>. Accessed: 2024-04-22. ↩︎
  17. The other states ratified them in the following dates: France: 30 April 2004; Russia: 16 Oct. 2007; USA: 6 Jan. 2009; and UK: 31 Dec. 2020. ↩︎
  18. MOFA Japan(1998), “Japan-China Joint Declaration On Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development,” MOFA Japan website, 1998-11-26, Available online: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html>. Accessed: 2025-01-19. ↩︎
  19. Peace and International Solidarity Promotion Division (2018), “Visit by Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament delegation,” Peace Culture English Newsletter, No. 81, Available: <https://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/hpcf/heiwabunka/pce081/English/06E.html>. Accessed: 2025-04-26. ↩︎
  20. Satake, Haruka (2025), “Positivity peaks at the Japan–China Summit,” East Asia Forum, 2025-01-28, Available online: <https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/01/29/positivity-peaks-at-the-japan-china-summit/>. ↩︎

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