日時 2000年7月29日（土） 13:00～17:00
場所 広島国際会議場 地下2階 ヒマワリ
Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century
International Symposium on July 29, 2000
The Hiroshima Peace Institute sponsored an international symposium in Hiroshima on July 29, 2000. The symposium, which was open to the public, featured the analysis of discussions and decisions at the Sixth NPT review conference held in April and May 2000, and examined the prospect of nuclear disarmament in the 21st Century. Specializing in disarmament, foreign policy, international law and national security, experts both governmental and non-governmental were invited as the panelists. Summaries of their presentations are as follows.
|Mitsuru Kurosawa||Professor, Osaka University, Japan|
|Seiichiro Noboru||Ambassador, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Conference on Disarmament, Japan|
|Hiromichi Umebayashi||President, the Peace Depot, Japan|
|Rebecca Johnson||Executive Director, the Acronym Institute, United Kingdom|
|Cathleen S. Fisher||Senior Associate, the Henry L. Stimson Center, United States|
|Date:||July 29, 2000|
|Venue:||Himawari Room, second basement (B2) International Conference Center (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park)|
|Host:||Hiroshima Peace Institute|
|Support:||Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation|
Of the many contentious issues discussed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, three are particularly worthy of note. First, there were conflicts among the five nuclear-weapon states (N-5) over the relationship between national missile defense (NMD) and the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, with Russia, China and France fiercely opposing the United States' attempts to deploy NMD. The N-5, however, agreed in a joint statement issued at the beginning of the second week that it was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty "as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons." This equivocal wording allows room for wide interpretation, with the United States focusing on "strengthening" the treaty and the other nuclear powers on "preserving" it.
Second, the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" was agreed. Initially, the nuclear-weapon states asserted that they were prepared to give an unequivocal undertaking only to achieve the "ultimate goals of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament," but the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) insisted on an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Following a compromise, a treaty on general and complete disarmament was covered by a different paragraph, and the phrase "engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and...take steps leading to nuclear disarmament within five years," which the NAC had demanded, was removed from the final document. We should often remind the nuclear-weapon states of the undertaking and take practical steps immediately, challenging though that will be.
Third, there was little substance to "practical steps" for nuclear disarmament in the future, because of the reluctance of nuclear-weapon states to be innovative, and a regression in the final document from the chairman's working paper. The positive atmosphere for nuclear disarmament was not created due to confrontation among the nuclear-weapon states over the NMD and the ABM. Moreover, China was reluctant to facilitate disarmament, and opposed the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), its moratorium, increased transparency and de-alerting status. Russia also tried to impose a condition of preserving strategic stability on some of the nuclear disarmament steps.
Practical steps for nuclear disarmament can be analyzed on three different levels. The first concerns concerned with multilateral issues. The final document includes multilateral issues, such as the early entry into force of the CTBT, a moratorium on nuclear tests until then, the start of FMCT negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the establishment of a subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament at the CD.
The second level concerns bilateral issues. The final document calls for the early entry into force and full implementation of the START II, as well as the conclusion of the START III at the earliest possible date.
The third concerns the measures among the N-5. The following six steps toward nuclear disarmament were agreed: 1. further efforts for the unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states; 2. increased transparency surrounding nuclear weapons capabilities and agreements on nuclear disarmament; 3. the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; 4. the reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapon systems; 5. a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies; 6. the involvement of all nuclear-weapon states in the process toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Trends in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation over the last couple of years have been far from favorable. In addition, a failure by the conference to produce practical results might cause a further deterioration in international relations, casting a shadow over global peace and stability. However, the conference succeeded in applying the brakes to that negative trend. Still, multilateral negotiations and talks among the N-5 will require a huge effort if commitments made at the conference are to be turned into action.
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) concentrated its efforts on realizing an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals," removing the word "ultimate" from that undertaking. In talks with the Japanese delegation, the ambassador of Mexico, an NAC member, said that, given the nuances of the Spanish-language, "ultimate" could mean "never," adding that he would never agree to a document that contained the word.
France and Russia resisted the NAC argument until the very end, and the dispute remained unsettled even after negotiations between the N-5 and the NAC over the weekend. The Mexican ambassador stunned the conference when he said that he regretted the deadlock between the NAC and the N-5, but believed there was no further room for compromise. It looked as if an agreement would elude the conference.
I urged them not to give up so easily because of a diplomatic disagreement over wording, since our decisions may affect the future of mankind. I insisted that all those involved immediately contact their prime ministers or foreign ministers for guidance on making concessions and reaching a compromise. The issue was resolved on the morning of May 18. The agreement, however, is nothing more than a proclamation of the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons; of greater importance is how to achieve that goal.
As the only country to have been the victim of an atomic bombing, Japan presented a practical eight-point proposal with Australia on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, seven of which are reflected in the final document. Japan also helped create the consensus that led to the adoption of the final document, mediating between different groups and bridging the gap between nuclear-weapon states and the NAC. In addition to our role concerning the "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals," we provided momentum toward consensus on the morning of the final day, when the conference was on the verge of breaking up over the Middle East. Japan pointed out the serious implications of failure, and read out a message from Foreign Minister Yohei Kono urging conciliation among the participants.
It is necessary to consider what the future holds for the campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons. First, since the signatures and ratifications of 14 more nations are necessary to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT, it is imperative that we strengthen our appeal to these nations, and establish an international monitoring system. Second, Japan has taken the initiative over the past years in promoting the FMCT treaty. A few nations are very reluctant to sign up to it, but we must start negotiations as soon as possible. Third, the first committee of the UN General Assembly will be held this autumn. Since the mission to gain a commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals at the NPT Review Conference is complete, we now need to explore a new resolution that would help further nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Fourth, Japan should seize every opportunity to urge both the United States and Russia to accelerate START negotiations, while calling on other nuclear-weapon states to make independent efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Serious consideration should be made of the effects NMD would have on Japan's security.
In the context of the role played by Japan, the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference turned out as I had expected. Conversations with Foreign Ministry officials before the conference gave me a reliable yardstick with which to measure the Japanese government's approach to nuclear disarmament against that of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). During negotiations, I realized that the Japanese government opposed the skepticism of NAC toward the nuclear-weapon states, and that in this respect, it believed that the NAC's approach was inappropriate.
When we pressed the Japanese government to vote in favor of the NAC resolution tabled at the UN General Assembly last year, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official argued that the NAC had failed to get through to the nuclear-weapon states, and had been unable to follow up on the resolution. On the other hand, he said, Japan had been able to establish lines of communication with the nuclear-weapon states and to win concessions from them during such negotiations.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Japanese government made an eight-point proposal that contained what it described as stances that could realistically be supported by the nuclear-weapon states.
However, the final document has gone farther than at least two of the Japanese proposals. Goals that the Japanese government regarded as realistic turned out to be too modest. Contrary to the government's belief that the NAC would fail to influence the nuclear-weapon states, negotiations between the two parties formed the core of the final document - future steps for nuclear disarmament. It is a cause for great joy that the conference came up with a better final document, but a disgrace for Japan that it should have made such proposals in the first place.
While the NAC plans to enlist the support of international public opinion in its diplomatic efforts, Japan doggedly clings to a step-by-step approach limited to individual negotiations primarily with the United States. This explains why the Japanese government's target was so unambitious. Moreover, while the NAC appeals for the elimination of nuclear weapons for the sake of humankind, Japan subordinates this goal to its relations with the United States. Critically, Tokyo is not even aware this is the case. Furthermore, there has been political confusion regarding the relationship between the Japan-U.S. security framework and Japan's nuclear elimination policy, with the result that political debate in Japan on disarmament is being strangled by the security alliance. The Japanese government's policy of seeking gradual decreases in the nuclear-weapon states' stockpiles - with elimination the ultimate goal - while at the same time stressing the importance to Japan's security of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is logically and morally unsound. It is necessary, therefore, to make clear that Japan will no longer depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella by accommodating the elimination of nuclear weapons within the Japan-U.S. security framework as the first step, and the Japan-U.S. security framework should eventually be replaced by a regional non-military cooperative security system.
It is important to note the "...diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies" agreed at the NPT Review Conference. This agreement is a commitment made by not only nuclear-weapon states, but also by all NPT members. Japan, too, should meet its commitments in this area.
The National Defense Program Outline, which stipulates Japan's current defense policies, contains three policies related to nuclear weapons. The first is to "adhere to the three non-nuclear principles." Japan needs to restore confidence in this policy by, for example, removing the suspicion that nuclear weapons are brought into Japan. The second is to "rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrence against the threat of nuclear weapons." It will be significant internationally that Japan clearly confirms, as a first step, that nuclear deterrence applies only to "the threat of nuclear arms," and not to attacks, for example by North Korea, using biological and chemical weapons. Such extension of nuclear deterrence to threats of biological and chemical weapons contradicts moves toward a "...diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies." The third is to "play a positive role in the international effort for nuclear disarmament." Japan can play a positive role if it is able to achieve the two aims given above. I expect Diet members to make much greater efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
The outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was a great success, but the gains should not be exaggerated. The conference gives political underpinning to the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and provides the non-nuclear weapon states and civil society with better tools provided they continue to employ effective strategies and tactics. But, like Article VI for much of the 1970s and 1980s, the words adopted in 2000 will mean nothing without political will and pressure.
The NPT parties gave consensus to the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals," together with several practical steps in fulfillment of the 1995 pledge for systematic and progressive efforts to implement the NPT's Article VI. However, many have pointed out that the absence of a timetable is a weakness. Even attempts to give a target date to entry into force of the CTBT were thwarted. The paragraph on the fissban urged the CD to conclude the treaty within five years, but that was as far as advocates managed. It was clear that attempts to push for a timetable would have been blocked by the weapon states, so the New Agenda Coalition and others did not push it. Despite making little headway on the priority issues of CTBT and fissban, the NPT 2000 plan of action contained some important commitments, such as further reducing the role and operational status of nuclear systems, addressing (with a view to withdrawing and eliminating) tactical nuclear weapons, increasing transparency, applying the principle of irreversibility to nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, and further progress in disposing of fissile materials from dismantled warheads.
Such steps have been the core of civil society demands for many years, and NGOs worked hard with governments to get the nuclear-weapon states to agree to this more concrete programme of action. Many therefore regard the 2000 NPT document as a five-year plan, tool and lever for us to use. We will now be looking for ways to increase public attention and apply political pressure regarding each item in the plan. Two aspects of the final document are particularly noteworthy:
First, the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons provides the strongest-yet political interpretation of the Article VI obligation, and has been accepted publicly by all the NPT weapon states. Second, the practical steps are not linear, but mutually complementary and reinforcing. This represents the multistranded application of unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral measures, which need to be addressed in parallel as part of the overall process of reducing the legitimacy of and reliance on nuclear weapons. Some of these issues require more research, especially on technical and verification aspects. Civil society has the resources to help, even to initiate and lead, such studies.
Of course, many NGOs would like the nuclear powers to get talks underway, leading to a convention on the abolition of nuclear weapons. But there is plenty of material in the adopted plan to keep the N-5 productively occupied for the next five years while the political, technical and international conditions are made ready for the non-nuclear weapon states to demand consideration of a global prohibition and elimination regime.
Politics shaped the 2000 outcome, including the ghost at the wedding - national missile defense (NMD). International and economic relations, and particularly the fate of NMD in light of the U.S. elections, together with changing relations among the major powers, will likely determine how much of the ambitious plan is achieved between now and 2005. Each step in the plan needs a specialized strategy for implementation and a public campaign to create the necessary political will to make it happen. That is the task before us.
The chances of implementing the undertakings made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference will depend on the outcome of three larger debates that frame consideration of U.S. policies.
The first debate concerns the role of nuclear weapons in national policy and in international security, and the relationship between nuclear deterrence and defense. The failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty, for example, reflects the steadfast belief of some that the United States must retain the means of preserving, or even enhancing, its nuclear arsenal against future, unknown threats. And while many factors are driving the U.S. national missile defense (NMD) program, enthusiasts of missile defenses point to the inadequacy of deterrence to counter regional missile threats as justification for NMD.
The problem is that NMD proponents want to deploy a system whose benefits are uncertain at best and whose costs and risks are both sizeable and evident. The next administration, whether Republican or Democrat, is likely to review the current plans for NMD, but the debate in the United States now appears to be about how and when, not whether, to build NMD. A move by the United States to deploy NMD unilaterally, and to withdraw from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, could have profoundly negative consequences for a broad range of arms control and disarmament efforts.
Allied nations and nongovernmental organizations who might wish to avert the deployment of NMD must engage in the broader debate about the role of nuclear weapons and the role of defenses in the future international security environment. Any debate about the role of nuclear weapons in national policy must include discussion of extended deterrence. And this debate must take on the issue of missile defenses. Difficult questions like "Is the technology ripe?" and "Are American threat assessments accurate?" can and should be asked.
The second debate concerns the future of arms control and disarmament in the 21st century. The question is whether the current tools and institutions of arms control and disarmament can be effective in a world of multiple and multiplying nuclear powers. There are many in the United States who express great skepticism about the value of arms control. Where arms control is not valued, however, there can be little concern about the potential damage to the arms control edifice from U.S. missile defense plans.
Arms control and disarmament concepts and institutions need an overhaul. The role of the New Agenda Coalition in the recent review conference is a promising example of the power of creative alignments and approaches.
The third debate concerns the value of multilateral approaches to security and of treaty-based constraints and international law as opposed to unilateral action. The preponderance of American power 10 years after the Cold War has given rise to an arrogant - and ultimately dangerous ? mind-set among many American policy makers and officials. This attitude bespeaks a new unilateralism, a distrust and dislike of multilateral entanglements and international commitments that may bind American power and constrain American actions. It is based on a mistaken, but familiar, belief that nations must rely on "self-help" if they are to survive and protect their peoples and interests.
American policy makers and the U.S. Congress in particular need to be reminded that unilateralism is a false alternative. The most profound threats to U.S. security and to the security of all nations can no longer be countered effectively through "self-help." The spread of disease, environmental degradation, ethnic conflicts that transcend artificially designated national borders require - indeed demand - the cooperation of many. Nowhere is this truer than with regard to efforts to combat the spread of nuclear weapons or to reduce the chances that these weapons will ever be used again.