国際シンポジウム2001「どうなる、核廃絶の『明確な約束』? ――核の現状と日本の課題」 Where Does "Unequivocal Undertaking" Stand?: THe Current Situations and Japan's Responsibilities in Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

English Below

日時2001年7月28日(土) 13:30~16:50
場所広島国際会議場 地下2階 ヒマワリ
(広島市中区中島町1番5号 平和記念公園内)



ローレンス・シャインマン(米国 モントレー国際問題研究所教授)
ローランド・ティメルバエフ(ロシア 政策研究センター理事長)
タリク・ラウフ(米国 モントレー国際問題研究所核不拡散プロジェクトディレクター)
ダラ・マッキンバー(アイルランド 外務省軍縮・不拡散局長)
レベッカ・ジョンソン(英国 アクロニム研究所長)
黒沢 満(大阪大学大学院教授)

Where Does "Unequivocal Undertaking" Stand?: The Current Situations and Japan's Responsibilities in Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

International Symposium on July 28, 2001  

The Hiroshima Peace Institute sponsored an international symposium in Hiroshima on Jul. 28, 2001. The symposium, which was open to the public, featured an "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals" pledged by five nuclear-weapon states at the 2000 NPT Review conference. Six panelists including overseas experts were invited to suggest ways in which to realize this important undertaking.


Lawrence ScheinmanDistinguished Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies, United States
Ronald M. TimerbaevChairman of the Board and Senior Advisor, the Center for Policy Studies, Russia 
Tariq RaufDirector, Monterey Institute of International Studies, United States
Darach MacFhionnbhairrDirector of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland
Rebecca JohnsonExecutive Director, the Acronym Institute, United Kingdom
Mitsuru KurosawaProfessor, Osaka University, Japan
Date:July 28, 2001
Venue:Himawari Room, second basement (B2) International Conference Center (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park)
Host:Hiroshima Peace Institute
Support:Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation


   PART I: The Task for the Nuclear Superpowers, the U.S. and Russia, and the Nuclear Problems in the World

                Nuclear Disarmament: Issues and Prospects for the United States
        (Lawrence Scheinman)
               Dealing with Nuclear Issues: Russia's Perspective
        (Roland M. Timerbaev)
               Global Nuclear Problems: The Future of Multilateral Arms Control Processes
          (Tariq Rauf)
               Panel Discussion/Questions and Answers

   PART II: Leading Advocates for Nuclear Disarmament and Japan

               The Role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in the Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament         
        (Darach MacFhionnbhairr)
               The Responsibility and Role of Civil Society in Implementing Nuclear Disarmament
          (Rebecca Johnson)
                Panel Discussion/Questions and Answers

   Concluding Remarks:
                The Current Situation and Japan's Responsibilities in Eliminating Nuclear Weapons
         (Mitsuru Kurosawa)

Summary of the symposium:

Nuclear Disarmament: Issues and Prospects for the United States


At this time the policy of the new U.S. administration is still in the process of being defined. Among other things, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review are still in process. In addition, there is scope for domestic and international political factors to enter into the policy equation. For example, the unexpected shift in control of the U.S. Senate from Republican to Democratic as a result of Senator Jeffords leaving the Republican Party to become an Independent has given rise to skepticism over the Bush administration's disposition to put greater emphasis on unilateral approaches to security policy rather than on multilateral arrangements which it sees as a constraint on pursuing the country's national interest.

The unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament concurred in by the United States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference maintains continuity with past administrations and is consistent with the Bush administration's view favoring reductions in strategic weapons even if on a unilateral as opposed to formal negotiated basis. The question is less whether the elimination of nuclear weapons should be an objective but rather when and how and under what circumstances. Context is extremely important in that if the security system, which is dependent on nuclear deterrence, is to be eliminated, it must be in circumstances in which it is replaced with an alternative structure that satisfies national security and meets the international community's need to be able to counter aggression. In short, if one wants to build down a security system, one must simultaneously build up a credible and reliable alternative system.

A recent study by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) in which a number of persons now serving in the Bush administration participated, emphasized the continued importance of nuclear deterrence and, given the uncertainties about stability or instability in the security environment, the consequent need to maintain a capability to support deterrence objectives. This would, of course, mean the legal and political right to build new weapons, if deemed appropriate by strategic and foreign policy requirements. That study concluded that reductions should be determined and carried out unilaterally and not be the subject of formal negotiations which would deprive the United States of the freedom to adjust the size of its nuclear forces in keeping with changes in the strategic environment.

Unilateral initiatives, while useful means of getting a process going and making progress in the relatively short term, also have a downside; they are not legally binding, they are reversible, and they would not normally involve meaningful verification arrangements. Those three factors, however, are important to long-term predictability and stability. The United States should look to a mix of approaches, using unilateral measures to jump start the process of reducing nuclear weapons and their relevance while engaging in multilateral negotiations to lock in agreements that can be reached.

The situation we face today is similar to that of 1945 when the United States was capable of influencing the entire world. Now, as in the period 1945-1957, the United States should invest its energy in multinational regimes and supporting institutions consistent with national interests  that control weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons and in security arrangements that hold out the promise for stability of the international order.


Dealing with Nuclear Issues: Russia's Perspective


We in Russia are very concerned about the status and future of arms control and nuclear disarmament. Even though we had quite a few success stories at the beginning of the 1990s, there were several negative developments in the closing years of the decade, such as the continuing impasse on the Russian-U.S. strategic dialogue, U.S. plans to go ahead with missile defense, and the failure to enforce the START II treaty and the CTBT.

The world is undergoing a transition from a Cold War system based on two opposing, and excessively armed, superpowers, toward one with a new framework.

Given the pauses in the bilateral Russia-U.S. talks and the multilateral Geneva conference on disarmament, the hiatus in the nuclear arms control negotiation process is bound to continue for some time. What will be done during this pause? I think one should consider the possibility of coordinated unilateral steps to downsize the number of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, which has already been suggested by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Preferably, such steps should be combined with confidence-building measures and other voluntary arrangements to improve transparency.

Putin suggested to French President Jacques Chirac during his recent visit to Russia that the five officially recognized nuclear weapon states, which are also permanent members of the UN Security Council, begin multilateral talks on strategic stability. Russia favors negotiating the reduction, with international verification, of the five's strategic warheads from the present 14,000 to 4,000 - with Russia and U.S. cutting down to 1,500 or less - over the next seven years.

While welcoming this suggestion, I would rather see the inclusion in the negotiating process or consultations, whatever form they take, of not only the official nuclear weapon states but also the other three states that have nuclear explosive devices - India, Pakistan and Israel - as well as other states with advanced nuclear capabilities, such as Japan and Germany. As things stand, I do not believe that any formal and verifiable agreement can be achieved any time soon.

A solution along the lines of coordinated unilateral reductions is more likely, so I am very much in favor of internationalizing the process of nuclear disarmament.

One of the most serious problems we face is the problem of the entry into force of the CTBT. The U.S., China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and some other states have yet to ratify it. Alarming media reports claim that the U.S. is preparing to abandon test moratoriums and resume testing. If these tests do indeed go ahead, they will signal the end of the moratoriums, which are currently adhered to by all states capable of experimenting with or exploding nuclear devices.

Despite these negative developments, I do not wish to appear too pessimistic. There are, for example, signs that Putin and Bush, who established good working relations in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in June and in Genoa, Italy, in July, have agreed to speed up consultations. Let's hope that these consultations bring about results. I have my doubts, but I still hold out hope.


Global Nuclear Problems: The Future of Multilateral Arms Control Processes


The end of the Cold War has given us the opportunity to dramatically reduce nuclear weapons and strengthen multilateral frameworks. The following three points may be of use to citizens who are attempting to persuade their governments to take steps to ensure a secure future for us all.

First, Washington is likely to try to act outside the constraints imposed by multilateral treaties and regimes to promote more than non-proliferation and the abolition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. For the past 50 years, the international community has striven to build and maintain a multilateral framework designed to ensure stability and predictability. But the postwar premise that international treaties enhance security ended with the advent of the new U.S. administration. The Bush administration's arms control policies and programs are unlikely to pursue traditional methods of arms control, but to create conditions that will allow the United States to act unilaterally in its own interests. Regarding the 2000 NPT Review Conference, for example, the U.S. has not said it is unequivocally committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The second point relates to missile defense. The end of deterrence as promoted by mutually assured destruction (MAD) requires nothing less than the abolition of nuclear weapons. But this is not what the Bush administration is trying to do. In fact, nuclear deterrence will be with us as long as nuclear weapons exist. The United States has said that a missile defense system incorporating a robust nuclear offensive capability will create a world that no longer has to rely on MAD to keep the peace. The United States is trying to convince its allies that, by deploying missile defense, it will remove the shadow of MAD. However, missile defense will make the world less safe if China, as many expect, responds by increasing its nuclear arsenal and Russia feels it has no option but to build new multiple warhead systems.

Third, it is the responsibility of U.S. allies to influence Washington as it engages in policy reviews, not to wait until the results of these reviews emerge. They should also remind Washington of its obligation to implement the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to take steps toward nuclear disarmament it agreed to at the NPT Review Conference. I urge U.S. allies to highlight the dangers of moving away from multilaterally negotiated treaties toward unilateralism.

Arms control negotiations, now in their 15th year, have not finished yet. World leaders with ties to the United States should use every opportunity to counter the unilateralist message U.S. officials are taking to their capital cities.


The Role of Non-Nuclear Weapon States in the Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament

The challenge of nuclear disarmament has been an issue between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states ever since the use of the atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When Ireland tabled the resolution at the United Nations in 1958, which launched the process that resulted in the NPT 10 years later, the role of the non-nuclear weapon states in driving the nuclear disarmament agenda was already well established. The NPT partnership enabled the non-nuclear weapon states to address the weapon states on their legal treaty obligations and to demand the prize of early nuclear disarmament.

The end of the Cold War altered the entire context in which nuclear weapons and their elimination could be considered. The moratoria on nuclear testing and the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996 represented a high watermark. However, by the mid-1990s, the pace of nuclear disarmament had faltered. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) was created in response to the unwillingness of the weapon states to proceed with the disarmament that they had always promised once the Cold War had ended.

Preoccupied at the lack of resolve by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear weapons, Ireland, together with its New Agenda partners, joined together to examine how our governments might more effectively address that complacency and reverse the ineffectiveness of the non-nuclear weapon states' advocacy of nuclear disarmament, which had left the nuclear weapon states unchallenged in their restatement of the role of nuclear weapons in their defense postures and policies.

The New Agenda called first and foremost for an unequivocal commitment by the nuclear weapon states to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. With this undertaking as a starting point, and agreement on a realistic programme of action, nuclear disarmament could become a realizable goal. And because this goal would take some time to achieve, certain interim measures could be undertaken to lessen the risk of the use of nuclear weapons in the period leading to their elimination. Such interim measures were already being advocated by some NATO states in the run-up to the strategic concept to be adopted at the Washington Summit in 1999.

During negotiations with the New Agenda at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states finally committed themselves unequivocally to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons as proposed by the New Agenda. The Final Document of the 2000 Review contains a comprehensive programme of action for nuclear disarmament, including the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral elements required to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, it includes steps to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, to minimize the chances of these weapons ever being used and facilitate the process of their elimination, to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons, and to tackle the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.

The unequivocal commitment ends the ambiguity that nuclear weapon states have, over the years, read into Article VI of the NPT. The new political commitment requires them to pursue nuclear disarmament without equivocation. The non-nuclear weapon states must, therefore, insist that this fundamental step is the measure by which all steps involving nuclear weapons will henceforth be judged.

We must continue to press nuclear weapon states so that our recent achievements will not quickly be consigned to history. Civil society, too, will have to be more active than ever to ensure their implementation. This is our last and best chance to reverse and eradicate the scourge of nuclear weapons, to which Hiroshima is a witness and warning to us all.


The Responsibility and Role of Civil Society in Implementing Nuclear Disarmament


At the end of the Cold War, we believed governments would take nuclear disarmament into their own hands and start getting rid of their weapons. We know now that that was not to be the case. Now, more than ever, civil society, has to create the pressure, the conditions, the actions to make our governments recognize that we do not want to live under the threat of nuclear weapons. Nor do we want our countries to rely on nuclear weapons or be dependent as allies of nuclear weapons states.

Civil society can be proud of its achievements in several areas. Years of pressure for the CTBT and the INF Treaty was created by people desperate for change; not only nongovernmental organizations, but doctors, scientists, women, peace movements, city authorities led by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, environmentalists, indigenous peoples and survivors of the atomic bombings.

Missile defence is put forward as a way of protecting the U.S. or others from weapons of mass destruction. If it were genuinely concerned about weapons of mass destruction (WMD), of which missile delivery is probably the least likely form, then a sensible WMD defence policy would encompass the following priorities, which would be far more useful than missile defence:

1) security and controls to deny access to the materials (plutonium etc), i.e. fissile materials ban, no transport, more cooperative threat reduction programmes with Russia, better IAEA monitoring of stockpiles pending elimination etc;

2) control, reduction, and disarmament policies for missiles -- although they can carry conventional payloads and the technology is useful for shooting things into space, it is well understood that they are primarily intended to deliver WMD -- something could be worked out for peaceful satellite launches;

3) public education about the dangers of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, including training emergency services and equipping medical facilities;

4) banning and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. This entails reinforcing and implementing the treaties that ban chemical and biological weapons and the disarmament agreements associated with the NPT, with better monitoring, verification, accountability etc, and, furthermore, to initiate negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention that would ban such weapons for all time.

With regard to the NPT 2000's Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action, civil society should consider five approaches: diplomatic, international, parliamentary, national, and local, but there is no room to describe strategies for each in detail. What can Japan do? Is your government scared of offending the United States, Japan's major ally? How can you make the government even more fearful of offending you, its citizens - the electorate? This calls for a well-coordinated campaign to rouse public opinion and direct the message at elected officials at the local and national levels. How can we work with governments to repel the threat from weapons of mass destruction? We can begin by raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear policies and using our democratic rights to press for changes that will bring us greater security.


Questions & Answers

1) How likely is the Bush administration to deploy a missile defense system in space, and how would Russia react?

Rauf: U.S. government officials said that they want to deploy some of the elements of missile defense in space by the year 2004, maybe in Alaska.

Timerbaev: If the U.S. proceeds with missile defense in space, Russia will have to respond.

2) What is the significance of the ICJ advisory on the illegality of nuclear weapons? Was dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima a war crime?

Johnson: At the time Hiroshima was bombed, no-one understood the terrible effects. Now that knowledge has contributed to the ICJ Opinion. Any future use of nuclear weapons in a situation like the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings would certainly be war crimes.

3) Even if Japan advocates the abolition of nuclear weapons, other countries will not listen to Japan, which is under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. What do Americans think about Japan leaving the alliance?

Scheinman: I think that Japan would be far better able to influence U.S. policy by staying as a member of the alliance than by leaving it. The United States values its close relations with Japan and wants to sustain and strengthen the alliance, not to see it disintegrate.

4) But wouldn't Japan be able to concentrate on eliminating nuclear weapons by leaving the U.S. nuclear umbrella?

MacFhionnbhairr: Being an ally is an advantage in the sense that Japan is treated as an equal partner. In the initial stages, steps toward nuclear disarmament would progress within the framework of the alliance. It is Japan's responsibility to influence an ally who possesses nuclear weapons.

5) Do you think there are enough opportunities for NGO's to influence the outcome of international conferences?

Johnson: The role of NGOs will be limited once a conference has started, so the key time to exert pressure is to work on your parliamentarians and governments well before the conference takes place, so that you influence their policy and positions in advance.