国際シンポジウム2002「原爆投下をめぐる『記憶』と『和解』 ――平和構築における広島の新たな役割を探る」 Competing Memories of Hiroshima: Quest for a New Role of "Hiroahim” for Peace and Reconciliation in the 21st Century

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Competing Memories of Hiroshima: Quest for a New Role of "Hiroshima" for Peace and Reconciliation in the 21st Century

International Symposium on August 3, 2002 

The Hiroshima Peace Institute sponsored an international symposium in Hiroshima on Aug. 3, 2002. The symposium, which was open to the public, was entitled "Competing Memories of Hiroshima - Quest for a New Role of 'Hiroshima' for Peace and Reconciliation in the 21st Century." Five panelists including overseas experts participated. 　

Panelists:

Program:

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Kiichi Fujiwara
Professor in the Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, and Visiting Professor at the Center for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia. He graduated from the University of Tokyo in law. After receiving a Master's degree from the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Law and Politics, he entered the doctoral program in Political Science at Yale University as a Fulbright scholar. He specializes in international politics, comparative politics, and politics in Southeast Asia.

How the War Has Been Remembered: Hiroshima and the Politics of Memories

A war produces not just a single memory, but various memories. Conflicts over these different memories--in other words, conflicts caused by the different ways people remember a war--are one of the major issues in the world today.

Memories of war are rooted in each region's experiences and are given different meanings from place to place. Moreover, these memories are selective. Some memories are remembered and passed on to others; others are not. Most memories of war are memories of one's own suffering. Therefore, a conflict arises when memories of individual sufferings, i.e., different memories of war, encounter each other. This symposium was planned with a view to preventing such encounters from becoming a cause of conflict.

The symposium aimed not only to convey the experiences of Hiroshima to the world, but also to learn how the experience of Hiroshima has been differently perceived in other places in the world. For instance, Chinese and Korean standpoints could present us with alternative views and help us to broaden our perspective when talking about the war.

I would like to take up three points pertinent to the relationship between memory and wars (or conflicts). The first point is that memories of wars are not a problem of the past, but relate to current conflicts. Conflict between Japan and China over historical perceptions shows this fact clearly. The second point is that memories of wars vary from region to region. Individual memories of war (i.e. small memories of war) are linked to ideology (or big memories of war), resulting in lopsided memories. We thus need to pay attention to these regionally varying memories. The third point is that memories of war have great potential for preventing wars in the future. Japanese people need to do more than remember the war solely from the point of view of their own suffering. They must also pay attention to the Japanese aggression abroad and think about what meanings the war had to people who lived in different regions. I believe that this should be the foundation on which we make decisions about the future.

Since the September 11th attacks last year, the use of nuclear weapons has become a real threat. Also, the rhetoric of "just war" is frequently employed. As the threat of war increases, so the tendency to interpret history in one's own favor also increases. Now is the time to consider memories of wars in a broader perspective.

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Martin Sherwin
Professor of History at Tufts University, Visiting Professor of American History at Yale University, and Visiting Professor of International Relations at Wellesley College. He graduated from Dartmouth College and received a Ph.D. from University of California Los Angeles.

Legacies of the First Nuclear War
In 1945, there were only four nuclear weapons in existence, but their number increased to tens of thousands after World War II. The number of nuclear states also increased. The U.S. has insisted on the legitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons in the name of nuclear deterrence. It has also demonstrated to the world that nuclear weapons are a sign of influence and power. The current situation has its historical roots in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But I wonder if those historic incidents were inevitable. By the time of President Roosevelt's death in April 1945, the idea had been germinated that America could win the war and assure an American-controlled peace if it possessed nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons thus became valued as new and potentially all-powerful weapons.

Roosevelt passed on two ideas to Truman. The first was that, after careful consideration, atomic bombs might be used against Japan with appropriate warning given to the Japanese. The second was that a postwar U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons would be useful in dealing with the Soviets. At the same time, Roosevelt was fully aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons as well as their supposed advantages. Roosevelt was a man of experience, confident enough to decide against the use of atomic bombs in the war if presented with convincing arguments. However, under the Truman administration, these two ideas of Roosevelt merged. The use of atomic bombs, which would demonstrate their devastating effects and in theory bring about a sudden conclusion to the war, came to be seen and valued as a necessary step in convincing the Soviets that these new weapons were unmatchable. Therefore, the U.S. needed to validate atomic bombs as real usable weapons by actually dropping them on cities in Japan.

Ironically, the Emperor said in his speech to the Japanese people that the American use of a "cruel new weapon" was one of the reasons for Japan's surrender. This helped to convince the U.S. that the atomic bombs had ended the war, and the use of nuclear weapons in diplomacy was initiated after the war. The U.S. maintained its atomic diplomacy during the Iran crisis, the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State under the Eisenhower administration, promulgated the nuclear-based doctrine of massive retaliation. Though the Kennedy administration shifted this "massive retaliation" strategy to a defensive mode with the concepts of mutually assured destruction and nuclear deterrence, it still left nuclear weapons and their deployment against civilian populations at the center of U.S. national security policy. After the Cold War, it was wrongly believed that the Soviet Union collapsed because of its arms race against the U.S.

For more than 50 years, public debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been distorted. To adequately confront the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we need to consider an alternative future. The assumption that the atomic destruction of the Japanese cities acted as a deterrent to future use of nuclear weapons strikes me as more of a rationalization than a logical deduction. If President Truman had not used the atomic bombs, he would have been asked for the reason after the war, and would have had to stress the inhumanity of these weapons and the wrong of using them. Had the U.S. taken that position, the build-up of nuclear weapons after the war would not have been initiated. The Soviet Union would also not have produced weapons that the U.S. had rejected because of their inhumanity. But it did not happen that way. It is still Hiroshima's mission to cry for "No More Hiroshimas" so that there will be no more Hiroshimas.

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Bu Ping
Deputy Director and Professor at Heilongjiang Social Sciences Academy. He graduated from Harbin Normal University in history. He specializes in international relations in Northeast Asia. He is also a specialist in abandoned poison gas weapons.

Chinese People's Thoughts on the Atomic Bomb Explosion in Hiroshima and the Importance of War Memory for Sino-Japanese Relations

When I first came to Hiroshima, I visited the Peace Memorial Museum. I learned there that most of the victims of the atomic bomb were women and children, non-combatants in the war. Until then, I had felt that Japanese people stressed only their own suffering. But thanks to my visit to the museum, I could understand the feelings of the Japanese sufferers. If I had not come to Japan and had not visited the Peace Memorial Museum, I could not have understood Japanese feelings about their suffering. Likewise, I imagine that many Japanese do not deeply understand the suffering of the Chinese, nor have much idea about Chinese perceptions and feelings as victims of the war.

Until the 1970s, in China, the significance of the atomic bombs was considered to be that they contributed to the early conclusion of the war. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, this gave way to the recognition that the U.S. had dropped the atomic bombs as a political warning to the Soviet Union, and that the atomic bombings were more important for their effects on international politics than for their military impact per se. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a further recognition that the Japanese need to consider the atomic bombings in connection with their responsibility for a war of aggression caused by Japanese militarism, and that other nations need to consider the horrible consequences of atomic bombs.

The foregoing is a summary of theoretical ideas accepted by Chinese scholars. We need to distinguish them from the emotional perceptions of history held by ordinary Chinese people. Most emotional memories of the war held by ordinary Chinese people are of Chinese suffering and Japanese aggression, including the Nanjing Massacre, the Chongqing Air Raids, Unit 731 and comfort women. In Japan, on the other hand, most memories of the war are related to its own people's suffering, for example, in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Tokyo air raids and the Battle of Okinawa.

Mutual understanding and exchanges of historical perceptions have so far been insufficient. As a result, there is a gap between the findings of academic research and the emotional perceptions of the war held by ordinary Chinese. For instance, there has been insufficient explanation of the suffering caused to the Japanese by the atomic bombings, and Chinese people know little about Japanese feelings about the atomic bombs. If, in addition to our own emotional perceptions of the past, we also appreciated the emotional perceptions of ordinary people in the other country, it would be possible for us to understand each other better and to share a common historical understanding. Therefore, it is necessary for China and Japan to exchange memories of the war at the grass-roots level. However, certain historical views to which some conservative Japanese politicians and "liberal" scholars adhere hinder improved mutual understanding.

The Chinese people's image of the war is Nanjing, while that of the Japanese is Hiroshima. Both Chinese and Japanese people need to extend the scope of their humanism; the Chinese need to extend theirs from Nanjing to Hiroshima and understand the cruelty of war as such, while Japanese need to extend theirs from Hiroshima to Nanjing, so that they may realize their responsibility as perpetrators of aggression. It is very important for us to share a historical understanding, especially to investigate and understand facts about the history of aggression, if Japan is to restore its relations with neighboring countries based on mutual trust and to improve its standing in the international community. Hiroshima has an important role to play in building a peaceful 21st century, a century of peace and humanism.

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Sook-Jong Lee
Research Fellow at Sejong Institute in Korea.  After obtaining a Ph.D. in Sociology from Harvard University, she has taught at several universities.  Her research interests include the Japanese political economy, civil society in Korea and Japan, and political and security opinion studies.  She has written extensively on Japanese political economy, including the Japanese industrial and financial systems, employment relations, and major public policies.  Her works have appeared in Sejong Institute's publications and many journals, including Asian Perspective and International Studies Review.  She has also contributed chapters to books published by the Stanford University Press and Hudson Institute.

Korean Memories of "Hiroshima" and Quest for Reconciliation between Korea and Japan

There are irreconcilable memories of the war between Korea and Japan. And Hiroshima has a place in those memories. Memories of a war are the personal recollections of people's own war experiences on the battlefront or at home. At the same time, they are reconstructed as public memories of war and inherited by later generations, members of which did not experience the war at all. Japanese liberals view the war as a period when freedom and democracy were suppressed, while some Japanese nationalists argue that the war was inevitable for defending Japan's national interests. Despite these differences, Japanese all agree that the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were inhumane and want to turn Hiroshima into a global symbol for peace and humanity and a bastion of the anti-nuclear weapons movement.

Korean memories of the Pacific War, on the other hand, naturally relate to memories of the Japanese colonial rule, and Hiroshima has a very marginal place in those memories. The Korean memories of the war transcend political and ideological divisions and are consummated as solid collective memories integrated with the people's national identity. Many Koreans view the atomic bombings as a means to bring about victory for justice. Koreans agree on the horrendous consequences of atomic warfare and oppose any future use of atomic bombs. On the other hand, they are eager to point out that the Japanese government has not yet fairly treated Koreans. Many Koreans criticize Japan for its failure to apologize for its past colonial rule and accuse it of distorting history. They also suspect that Japanese tend to overemphasize the tragedy of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, while trying to cover up their role as perpetrators of crimes.

How can we make Hiroshima a bridge for reconciliation and peace in Asia? It is very difficult to let the memories of war lead to reconciliation. If we want to reconcile ourselves with each other over what has happened in the past and build a new relationship for the future, we had better stop playing the game of victims and accept the fact that we have mutually irreconcilable memories of the war. Should we not then try to overcome our nationalisms (and their hidden political goals) that impede reconciliation between Korea and Japan? In that respect, I would count on the younger generation's cosmopolitan outlook.

I think that Hiroshima can play an important role in this process of reconciliation, since no one can deny the universal value of peace that Hiroshima has constantly upheld since the end of the Pacific War to this day. The two civil societies of Korea and Japan must support the norms of peace symbolized by Hiroshima. Koreans need to pay due attention to what Hiroshima stands for. The tasks for the Japanese are more challenging. When Japan confronts the negative legacies of its own aggression and learns to consider the atrocities committed by itself along with the Hiroshima experience, Hiroshima will become the bastion of peace and humanism. When Koreans and Japanese unite in the common cause of promoting pacifist and humanitarian values, wrangling over the irreconcilable war memories will give way to true friendship and to a common effort to build a better future in Asia.

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Kazumi Mizumoto
Associate Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University. He graduated from the University of Tokyo in law. He received a Master's degree from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He specializes in international politics and international relations, with special emphasis on U.S.-Japanese relations.

The A-Bomb Experience from the Hiroshima Perspective and the Role of Hiroshima in the 21st Century

When I discuss issues related to the atomic bombs and nuclear weapons in university courses, I try to touch on the course the U.S. followed in developing the atomic bombs and dropping one on Hiroshima. I also talk about whether there was any possibility of Japan taking measures to avert the atomic bombing. I teach students about the conduct of the Japanese Imperial Army in China and on the Korean peninsula, and about Chinese and Korean perceptions of the atomic bombings and Japan's defeat in World War II.

This is because Japanese youth would risk making wrong decisions as members of the international society if they should base them only on the viewpoints of "Japan" or "Hiroshima" and because dialogue between Japan and the international community could not even begin if they did not realize that there are a wide variety of perceptions of events around the world, each for its own good reasons.

Prior to our discussion of the diverse interpretations and perceptions, however, we must agree at the outset that the atomic bombings, which indiscriminately killed and wounded a huge number of non-combatants, were unquestionably inhumane acts. But we often come across arguments that ignore this fact and that address other issues that are deliberately linked to the problem of the atomic bombings. These arguments are often connected to political, ideological, or nationalist issues and are found in peace movements at home as well as overseas. We must carefully examine the substantive message of Hiroshima by purging it of the political and nationalist encumbrances.

Hiroshima has related its experience of the atomic bombing over and over again throughout the post-World War II period with a view to informing as many people as possible of the facts about its tragic experience as accurately as possible so as to spare them of the tragedy of indiscriminate mass killing, no matter where or under what circumstances they lived. Each atomic bomb survivor has his/her own different memories, but feelings of hatred, grudge, and hostility have gradually been overcome and replaced by a genuine and pure desire for peace.

The message of Hiroshima, which is supposed to be very simple and clear, sometimes fails to reach the outside world, presumably because the people to whom it is addressed live in circumstances we do not know about or are faced with problems such that we cannot simply say we did not know about. Like most other Japanese, people in Hiroshima must pay serious attention to the colonial policies pursued and the aggression and crimes against humanity committed by Japan and sympathize with those who had gone through the devastating experiences caused by the inhumane Japanese actions.

On the other hand, the theory of punitive justice that Hiroshima should take full responsibility for Japan's wartime wrongs is incorrect. Survivors of the atomic bomb have been discriminated against in their own society and subjected to constant worries about their health.

Hiroshima should continue to play the role of the witness speaking to the world against the inhumanity of nuclear weapons in the 21st century, as it did in the previous century. Also, I hope Hiroshima will have an infinite amount of sympathy for those who have suffered similarly tragic experiences and offer helping hands to them.

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Questions & Answers

Question: Concerns over the use of nuclear weapons are growing because of the new U.S. nuclear doctrine. How should we cope with this situation?

Fujiwara: It is true that there is now a growing possibility that the U.S. will use its nuclear weapons. The U.S. is powerful enough to win a war by itself, and this fact emboldens the U.S. to act contrary to international frameworks and the opinions of allied nations. Also, some people in the U.S. administration are beginning to view nuclear weapons as weapons available in actual wars. Still, we do not have to give up entirely, because nuclear weapons have not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thanks to various factors and circumstances.

Mizumoto: Atomic bomb survivors have devoted their lives to the anti-nuclear movement. But we should not depend on them forever. Everyone has his or her right and responsibility to demand peace. Now that there is a decreasing possibility that Japan's posture as the sole nation committed to non-nuclear power status will lead to the denuclearization of the world, it should turn to international cooperation to deal with the U.S. problem.

Q: Are there any differences between the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? If President Truman had had a stronger will, could the atomic bombings have been avoided? When we think about the atomic bombings and World War II in broad perspective, including the issues of foreign victims of the atomic bombings and Japan's war responsibility, how should we regard the Chinese and Korean victims of the atomic bombings?

Sherwin: The point is that neither atomic bomb was necessary to bring the war to a conclusion in August of 1945. There were members of the Truman administration who believed that, but their views were not accepted. President Truman could have made the decision not to use atomic bombs.

Bu: It is difficult for the aggressors and the aggressed to share perceptions of history. But I believe that our efforts to work on something together in the globalized world, such as holding a symposium, are useful for understanding each other's views.

Lee: Japan has to accept its own wartime criminal responsibility as it dwells on the responsibility of the U.S. towards Hiroshima's victims. Korean victims of the bombing have not been treated properly in Hiroshima. If you take an approach to the Hiroshima problem as if it were a local question, that is, exclusively a question for Hiroshima residents, then that undermines the meaning of the Hiroshima atomic bombing itself. If you want to appeal to the world about the meaning of Hiroshima, you have to make it a more universal human rights issue. I hope that the Japanese will be more honest about a very contradictory situation in which they are perpetrators and victims at the same time.